19 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2023Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 363, ¶ 46 (2012). ¶18 The City also cites Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565, 577, ¶ 36 (1998), to contend that “the state may not be estopped due to the casual acts, advice, or instructions issued by nonsupervisory employees.” Valencia involved an equitable estoppel claim against the state from acting, not a negligent misrepresentation claim for money damages. 2023Stevenson cannot claim to “not have been put on notice to make further inquiries,” see id. (cleaned up), because his conversation with the Division ended with him being “confused,” expecting more contact by the Division. ¶50 Finally, the Commission declined to apply estoppel because “the imposition of estoppel would cause a serious injustice for EquiAlt investors and the public interest in protecting such investors.” “[E]stoppel may apply against the state only when the public interest will not be unduly damaged.” Valencia, 191 Ariz. at 578 , ¶ 40 (citing Freightways, 129 Ariz. at 248 ). ¶51 W | 5 | 7 |
City of Chicago v. Roppologreen2 sentences2008Because the county was unaware in *651 1983 of the trae location of the fence in relation to the property line of the Lowes’ predeeessor-in-interest and the alleged right-of-way, and in view of the “deceptive and flawed” application on which the 1983 permit was based, we find no error in the rejection of the Lowes’ equitable estoppel defense below. 7 See City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill.App.3d 602 , 69 Ill.Dec. 435 , 447 N.E.2d 870, 879-80 (1983) (prior issuance of permit did not estop city from suing property owner when application contained misleading information and “permit was issued by 2008Because the county was unaware in *651 1983 of the trae location of the fence in relation to the property line of the Lowes’ predeeessor-in-interest and the alleged right-of-way, and in view of the “deceptive and flawed” application on which the 1983 permit was based, we find no error in the rejection of the Lowes’ equitable estoppel defense below. 7 See City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 113 Ill.App.3d 602 , 69 Ill.Dec. 435 , 447 N.E.2d 870, 879-80 (1983) (prior issuance of permit did not estop city from suing property owner when application contained misleading information and “permit was issued by | 2 | 2 |
Coleman v. City of Mesagreen1 sentence2023Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 363, ¶ 46 (2012). ¶18 The City also cites Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565, 577, ¶ 36 (1998), to contend that “the state may not be estopped due to the casual acts, advice, or instructions issued by nonsupervisory employees.” Valencia involved an equitable estoppel claim against the state from acting, not a negligent misrepresentation claim for money damages. | 1 | 1 |
Arizona Joint Venture v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2014Ariz. Joint Venture v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 205 Ariz. 50, 53, ¶ 16 , 66 P.3d 771, 774 (App. 2002) (citing Valencia Energy Co., 191 Ariz. at 576–77, ¶¶ 35– 38, 959 P.2d at 1267–68). 2014Ariz. Joint Venture v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 205 Ariz. 50, 53, ¶ 16 , 66 P.3d 771, 774 (App. 2002) (citing Valencia Energy Co., 191 Ariz. at 576–77, ¶¶ 35– 38, 959 P.2d at 1267–68). | 1 | 1 |
City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.green2 sentences2014See Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dept, of Rev., 191 Ariz. 565, 576, ¶ 31 , 959 P.2d 1256, 1267 (1998) (estoppel may lie against the government). ¶40 “The three elements of equitable estoppel are traditionally stated as: (1) the party to be estopped commits acts inconsistent with a position it later adopts; (2) reliance by the other party; and (3) injury to the latter resulting from the former’s repudiation of its prior conduct.” Id. “[I]f the traditional elements of estoppel are present, it will apply against the government ‘when the public interest will not be unduly damaged and when its appl 2014See Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dept, of Rev., 191 Ariz. 565, 576, ¶ 31 , 959 P.2d 1256, 1267 (1998) (estoppel may lie against the government). ¶40 “The three elements of equitable estoppel are traditionally stated as: (1) the party to be estopped commits acts inconsistent with a position it later adopts; (2) reliance by the other party; and (3) injury to the latter resulting from the former’s repudiation of its prior conduct.” Id. “[I]f the traditional elements of estoppel are present, it will apply against the government ‘when the public interest will not be unduly damaged and when its appl | 1 | 1 |
Gorman v. Pima Countygreen2 sentences2014The three elements of equitable estoppel are: “(1) the party to be estopped commits acts inconsistent with a position it later adopts; (2) reliance by the other party; and (3) injury to the latter resulting from the former’s repudiation of its prior conduct.” Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565, 576-77, ¶ 35 , 959 P.2d 1256, 1267-68 (1998); see Gorman, 230 Ariz. at 510-11, ¶ 21 , 287 P.3d at 804-05 (noting the three elements of an equitable estoppel defense). 2014The three elements of equitable estoppel are: “(1) the party to be estopped commits acts inconsistent with a position it later adopts; (2) reliance by the other party; and (3) injury to the latter resulting from the former’s repudiation of its prior conduct.” Valencia Energy Co. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565, 576-77, ¶ 35 , 959 P.2d 1256, 1267-68 (1998); see Gorman, 230 Ariz. at 510-11, ¶ 21 , 287 P.3d at 804-05 (noting the three elements of an equitable estoppel defense). | 1 | 1 |
Lesniewski v. W.B. Furze Corp.green2 sentences2003Furze Corp., 308 N.J.Super. 270 , 705 A.2d 1243, 1251 (App.Div.1998) (“In determining whether to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we consider whether ‘there was a course of conduct that, in its cumulative impact, was tantamount to a representation made by one party with the expectation that the other persons would rely on this conduct.’ ”) (citation omitted). ¶ 19 Finally, although ADOR assessed delinquent tax in 1993 on four of Luther’s state school-district-funded construction contracts, it noted in the assessment that no tax was owed on Luther’s BIA-funded construction contract. 2003Furze Corp., 308 N.J.Super. 270 , 705 A.2d 1243, 1251 (App.Div.1998) (“In determining whether to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, we consider whether ‘there was a course of conduct that, in its cumulative impact, was tantamount to a representation made by one party with the expectation that the other persons would rely on this conduct.’ ”) (citation omitted). ¶ 19 Finally, although ADOR assessed delinquent tax in 1993 on four of Luther’s state school-district-funded construction contracts, it noted in the assessment that no tax was owed on Luther’s BIA-funded construction contract. | 1 | 1 |
Heltzel v. Mecham Pontiacgreen2 sentences1994Heltzel v. Mecham Pontiac, 152 Ariz. 58, 60 , 730 P.2d 235, 237 (1987). 1994Heltzel v. Mecham Pontiac, 152 Ariz. 58, 60 , 730 P.2d 235, 237 (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Graham v. Asburygreen2 sentences1993Graham v. As bury, 112 Ariz. 184, 186 , 540 P.2d 656, 658 (1975). 1993Graham v. As bury, 112 Ariz. 184, 186 , 540 P.2d 656, 658 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Thomas Et Uxgreen2 sentences1978See Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark. 270, 276 , 225 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1949), citing Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461 , 198 N.E. 758 (1935). 1978See Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark. 270, 276 , 225 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1949), citing Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461 , 198 N.E. 758 (1935). | 1 | 1 |
Combs v. Edmistongreen2 sentences1978See Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark. 270, 276 , 225 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1949), citing Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461 , 198 N.E. 758 (1935). 1978See Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark. 270, 276 , 225 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1949), citing Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461 , 198 N.E. 758 (1935). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Van Horn v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1987We recognized that as the one-year filing requirement must be considered an affirmative defense, “the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent an employer from raising the bar of the one-year limitation where he had, by his own conduct, caused the employee to forebear filing a claim____” We also stated, “We believe that the statute as amended complies with the constitutional mandate to the legislature to provide a ‘just and humane compensation law’____” Id. 1982In Van Horn, supra, the Arizona Supreme Court adopted the view that [T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied to prevent an employer from raising the bar of the one-year limitation where he had, by his own conduct, caused the employee to forebear filing a claim.... 111 Ariz. at 239 , 527 P.2d at 284 . | 3 | 1982–1987 |
Freightways, Inc. v. Arizona Corp. Commission
green
2 sentences2023Stevenson cannot claim to “not have been put on notice to make further inquiries,” see id. (cleaned up), because his conversation with the Division ended with him being “confused,” expecting more contact by the Division. ¶50 Finally, the Commission declined to apply estoppel because “the imposition of estoppel would cause a serious injustice for EquiAlt investors and the public interest in protecting such investors.” “[E]stoppel may apply against the state only when the public interest will not be unduly damaged.” Valencia, 191 Ariz. at 578 , ¶ 40 (citing Freightways, 129 Ariz. at 248 ). ¶51 W 2023Stevenson cannot claim to “not have been put on notice to make further inquiries,” see id. (cleaned up), because his conversation with the Division ended with him being “confused,” expecting more contact by the Division. ¶50 Finally, the Commission declined to apply estoppel because “the imposition of estoppel would cause a serious injustice for EquiAlt investors and the public interest in protecting such investors.” “[E]stoppel may apply against the state only when the public interest will not be unduly damaged.” Valencia, 191 Ariz. at 578 , ¶ 40 (citing Freightways, 129 Ariz. at 248 ). ¶51 W | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kimberly McLaughlin v. Suzan McLaughlin
green
2 sentences2017Arizona Revised Statutes Section 26-814(C) provides that any presumption established under A.R.S. § 25-814(A) may “be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.” Because Oakley and other similarly-situated spouses are never biologically related to the children involved in the dissolution proceedings, even if the statute is read gender-neutrally, the other spouse will always defeat the presumption by proving that the former spouse is not biologically the child’s parent. ¶20 The McLaughlin court avoided this problem by invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel, holding that the child’s biologi 2017Arizona Revised Statutes Section 26-814(C) provides that any presumption established under A.R.S. § 25-814(A) may “be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.” Because Oakley and other similarly-situated spouses are never biologically related to the children involved in the dissolution proceedings, even if the statute is read gender-neutrally, the other spouse will always defeat the presumption by proving that the former spouse is not biologically the child’s parent. ¶20 The McLaughlin court avoided this problem by invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel, holding that the child’s biologi | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kleinsmith v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1982Respondents contend that estoppel cannot be applied where the claimant cannot satisfy the three-part test of Kleinsmith v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ariz.App. 77 , 546 P.2d 346 , approved and adopted, 113 Ariz. 189 , 549 P.2d 161 (1976), and its progeny dealing with the power of the Commission to waive an untimely filing. 1982Respondents contend that estoppel cannot be applied where the claimant cannot satisfy the three-part test of Kleinsmith v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ariz.App. 77 , 546 P.2d 346 , approved and adopted, 113 Ariz. 189 , 549 P.2d 161 (1976), and its progeny dealing with the power of the Commission to waive an untimely filing. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Kleinsmith v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1982Respondents contend that estoppel cannot be applied where the claimant cannot satisfy the three-part test of Kleinsmith v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ariz.App. 77 , 546 P.2d 346 , approved and adopted, 113 Ariz. 189 , 549 P.2d 161 (1976), and its progeny dealing with the power of the Commission to waive an untimely filing. 1982Respondents contend that estoppel cannot be applied where the claimant cannot satisfy the three-part test of Kleinsmith v. Industrial Commission, 26 Ariz.App. 77 , 546 P.2d 346 , approved and adopted, 113 Ariz. 189 , 549 P.2d 161 (1976), and its progeny dealing with the power of the Commission to waive an untimely filing. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Levo v. General-Shea-Morrison
green
1 sentence1982We find that the doctrine of equitable estoppel should be applied under the facts in this cause. 280 P.2d at 1089-90 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Wyness v. Crowley
green
2 sentences1978See Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark. 270, 276 , 225 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1949), citing Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461 , 198 N.E. 758 (1935). 1978See Combs v. Edmiston, 216 Ark. 270, 276 , 225 S.W.2d 26, 29 (1949), citing Lee v. Thomas, 297 Ky. 858 , 181 S.W.2d 457 (1944); Wyness v. Crowley, 292 Mass. 461 , 198 N.E. 758 (1935). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Staley v. Estate of Harber
green
2 sentences1973The evidence points to an oral contract between the parties to divide their community property, similarly to that approved by our Supreme Court In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 87 , 449 P.2d 7 (1969), and not to the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 1973The evidence points to an oral contract between the parties to divide their community property, similarly to that approved by our Supreme Court In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 87 , 449 P.2d 7 (1969), and not to the doctrine of equitable estoppel. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Lillywhite v. Coleman
neutral
2 sentences1972USF&G contends the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply in this case as Baird’s has failed to establish the elements necessary to raise this defense as enumerated in Lillywhite v. Coleman, 46 Ariz. 523 , 52 P.2d 1157 (1935). 1972USF&G contends the doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply in this case as Baird’s has failed to establish the elements necessary to raise this defense as enumerated in Lillywhite v. Coleman, 46 Ariz. 523 , 52 P.2d 1157 (1935). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Atkins v. Disintegrating Co.
green
1 sentence1900“For its application there must be some intended deception in the. conduct or declarations of the party to be estopped, or such gross negligence as to amount to constructive fraud.” Henshaw v. Bissell, 85 U. S. 271 , 21 L. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.