equitable estoppel doctrine in Maryland

2026App. 64, 92 (2012), “courts have permitted a non-signatory agent to enforce an arbitration agreement executed by his principal” when the claims asserted against the agent “relate to the agent’s actions on behalf of the principal.” In enforcing an arbitration agreement signed by its principal, an agent is “subject to the same equitable estoppel framework left to other non[-]signatories.” Id. at 91 (alteration in original) (quoting Westmoreland v. Sadoux, 299 F.3d 462, 467 (5th Cir. 2002)).

2012The doctrine of equitable estoppel 5 permits non-signatories to enforce an arbitration *83 provision, first, when a signatory “must rely on the terms of the written agreement [containing the arbitration clause] in asserting [its] claims,” Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir.1993), and “seeks to claim the benefit of” such an agreement “while simultaneously attempting to avoid the terms of an arbitration provision contained therein,” Long, supra, 248 F.3d at 320 (citation and quotation omitted); or, second, “when the signatory to the contract containing

2022In this context, the substantial evidence test “has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion[.]’” Id. at 569 (quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512 (1978)).

2022In this context, the substantial evidence test “has been defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion[.]’” Id. at 569 (quoting Bulluck v. Pelham Wood Apts., 283 Md. 505, 512 (1978)).

2015The doctrine of equitable estoppel “lies at the foundation of the law of waiver because estoppel arises as a result of the voluntary conduct of one party, whereby he is precluded from asserting a right as against another person who has, in good faith, relied upon such conduct and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.” Id. at 356 , 933 A.2d 426 (quoting Arnold Bernstein Shipping Co. v. Tidewater Commercial Co., 84 F.Supp. 948, 952 (D.Md. 1949)). “[CJonsistent with the equitable estoppel principles, the court has discretion to reject a party’s retraction of a waiver if by it

2009The doctrine of equitable estoppel “ ‘lies at the foundation of the law of waiver because estoppel arises as a result of the voluntary conduct of one party, whereby he is precluded from asserting a right as against another person who has, in good faith, relied upon such conduct and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse.’ ” Id. at 356, 933 A.2d 426 (quoting Arnold Bernstein Shipping Co. v. Tidewater Commercial Co., 84 F.Supp. 948, 952 (D.Md.1949)).

2010Corp. v. Montgomery County, 308 Md. 239, 251-53 , 518 A.2d 123, 129-130 (1986) (holding that, where a contractor relied on Montgomery County’s prior reasonable and debatable interpretation of the statutory phrase “nonhabitable structures” and constructed its building based on that interpretation and with a valid permit, it would be inequitable for the County Board of Appeals to apply a changed interpretation to require removal of the building’s fourth floor); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. East Prince Frederick Corp., 80 Md.App. 78, 88 , 559 A.2d 822, 827 (1989) (noting that, in order to demonstrate

2010Corp. v. Montgomery County, 308 Md. 239, 251-53 , 518 A.2d 123, 129-130 (1986) (holding that, where a contractor relied on Montgomery County’s prior reasonable and debatable interpretation of the statutory phrase “nonhabitable structures” and constructed its building based on that interpretation and with a valid permit, it would be inequitable for the County Board of Appeals to apply a changed interpretation to require removal of the building’s fourth floor); Bd. of County Comm’rs v. East Prince Frederick Corp., 80 Md.App. 78, 88 , 559 A.2d 822, 827 (1989) (noting that, in order to demonstrate

2019See Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 319 (1966) (“It is essential for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel that the party claiming the benefit . . . changed his position for the worse, having believed and relied on the representations of the party sought to be estopped.”); Lusby v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 263 Md. 492, 506 (1971) (Lusby was not entitled to invoke doctrine of equitable estoppel where there was no evidence that she had “changed her position for the worse because of her reliance on the representation.”); Old Republic Ins.

1986The majority also recognizes that it is essential for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in Maryland "that the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel must have been misled to his injury and changed his position for the worse, having believed and relied on the representations of the party sought to be estopped," citing Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277 Md. 471, 487 , 356 A.2d 221 (1976) and Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 319 , 216 A.2d 521 (1966).

2001Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 319 , 216 A.2d 521 (1966) (quoting 3 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence § 804, at 189 (5th ed.) and citing Bayshore Indus. v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167, 175 , 192 A.2d 487 (1963); Webb v. Johnson, 195 Md. 587, 595 , 74 A.2d 7 (1950); Crane Co. v. Onley, 194 Md. 43, 50 , 69 A.2d 903 (1949) (citations omitted)); Holzman v. Fiola Blum, Inc., 125 Md.App. 602, 631 , 726 A.2d 818 (1999) (quoting Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 534 , 510 A.2d 546 (1986) (citations omitted)).

2001Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 319 , 216 A.2d 521 (1966) (quoting 3 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence § 804, at 189 (5th ed.) and citing Bayshore Indus. v. Ziats, 232 Md. 167, 175 , 192 A.2d 487 (1963); Webb v. Johnson, 195 Md. 587, 595 , 74 A.2d 7 (1950); Crane Co. v. Onley, 194 Md. 43, 50 , 69 A.2d 903 (1949) (citations omitted)); Holzman v. Fiola Blum, Inc., 125 Md.App. 602, 631 , 726 A.2d 818 (1999) (quoting Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 534 , 510 A.2d 546 (1986) (citations omitted)).

2017Therefore, it argues, the grant of any extensions in this case was contrary to the “plain language” of the statute, and any Board practice or course of conduct “inconsistent with the statutory scheme” is entitled to “no weight.” As to the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the Association contends that the Board, “as a government agency,” cannot be “estopped from applying the express direction it has been given by the Legislature merely because an employee of the agency accepted [a renewal] payment for an *370 expired license.” In support, it cites Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 1

2017Therefore, it argues, the grant of any extensions in this case was contrary to the “plain language” of the statute, and any Board practice or course of conduct “inconsistent with the statutory scheme” is entitled to “no weight.” As to the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the Association contends that the Board, “as a government agency,” cannot be “estopped from applying the express direction it has been given by the Legislature merely because an employee of the agency accepted [a renewal] payment for an *370 expired license.” In support, it cites Marzullo v. Kahl, 366 Md. 1

2004In support of their argument, Irwin and Wood cite Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (USA), Inc., 283 Md. 296 , 389 A.2d 887 (1978), which addressed the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as follows: Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his pa

2004In support of their argument, Irwin and Wood cite Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (USA), Inc., 283 Md. 296 , 389 A.2d 887 (1978), which addressed the doctrine of equitable estoppel, as follows: Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his pa

1975The chancellor, in answering in the negative as to whether the appellee was estopped, pointed out that the doctrine of equitable estoppel “ ‘will not be applied unless it is shown that the person sought to be estopped has been guilty of sone wrongful or unconscientious conduct upon which another relied and was misled to his injury.’” Alvey v. Alvey, 220 Md. 571, 576 , 155 A. 2d 491, 493 (1959).

1975The chancellor, in answering in the negative as to whether the appellee was estopped, pointed out that the doctrine of equitable estoppel “ ‘will not be applied unless it is shown that the person sought to be estopped has been guilty of sone wrongful or unconscientious conduct upon which another relied and was misled to his injury.’” Alvey v. Alvey, 220 Md. 571, 576 , 155 A. 2d 491, 493 (1959).

1974See City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow, 264 Md. 481, 495 , 287 A. 2d 242 (1972), and Kent County v. Abel, 246 Md. 395, 399, 403 , 228 A. 2d 247 (1967), and authorities cited in each.

1974See City of Hagerstown v. Long Meadow, 264 Md. 481, 495 , 287 A. 2d 242 (1972), and Kent County v. Abel, 246 Md. 395, 399, 403 , 228 A. 2d 247 (1967), and authorities cited in each.

2026App. 64, 92 (2012), “courts have permitted a non-signatory agent to enforce an arbitration agreement executed by his principal” when the claims asserted against the agent “relate to the agent’s actions on behalf of the principal.” In enforcing an arbitration agreement signed by its principal, an agent is “subject to the same equitable estoppel framework left to other non[-]signatories.” Id. at 91 (alteration in original) (quoting Westmoreland v. Sadoux, 299 F.3d 462, 467 (5th Cir. 2002)).

2021The questions in the original petition for writ of certiorari were: (1) Did the Court of Special Appeals and MSCBA misconstrue the COMAR definition of a “Procurement Contract” and thereby erroneously conclude that Faddis lacked standing to pursue its separate claims against the Maryland State Highway Administration (“SHA”)? (2) Did the Court of Special Appeals and MSCBA improperly conclude that “untimely notice” was a jurisdictional bar to Brawner’s and Faddis’[s] claims rather than an affirmative defense, subject to the doctrine of equitable estoppel? (3) Did the Court of Special Appeals and

2019See Savonis v. Burke, 241 Md. 316, 319 (1966) (“It is essential for the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel that the party claiming the benefit . . . changed his position for the worse, having believed and relied on the representations of the party sought to be estopped.”); Lusby v. First Nat’l Bank of Md., 263 Md. 492, 506 (1971) (Lusby was not entitled to invoke doctrine of equitable estoppel where there was no evidence that she had “changed her position for the worse because of her reliance on the representation.”); Old Republic Ins.

2019Co. v. Gordon, 228 Md.

2016See, e.g., Thompson v. Witherspoon, 197 Md.App. 69, 81 , 12 A.3d 685 (2011) (“Under the [Federal Arbitration Act], courts look to substantive provisions of state law regarding threshold issues of the validity, revocability, or enforceability of contracts, but to federal law to resolve issues as to whether a non-signatory to a contract can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision in a contract signed by other parties.”) (citation omitted); Case Handyman and Remodeling Servs., LLC v. Schuele, 183 Md.App. 44, 57 , 959 A.2d 833 (2008) (“To resolve the issue whether a non-signatory can enf

2016See, e.g., Thompson v. Witherspoon, 197 Md.App. 69, 81 , 12 A.3d 685 (2011) (“Under the [Federal Arbitration Act], courts look to substantive provisions of state law regarding threshold issues of the validity, revocability, or enforceability of contracts, but to federal law to resolve issues as to whether a non-signatory to a contract can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision in a contract signed by other parties.”) (citation omitted); Case Handyman and Remodeling Servs., LLC v. Schuele, 183 Md.App. 44, 57 , 959 A.2d 833 (2008) (“To resolve the issue whether a non-signatory can enf

2016See, e.g., Thompson v. Witherspoon, 197 Md.App. 69, 81 , 12 A.3d 685 (2011) (“Under the [Federal Arbitration Act], courts look to substantive provisions of state law regarding threshold issues of the validity, revocability, or enforceability of contracts, but to federal law to resolve issues as to whether a non-signatory to a contract can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision in a contract signed by other parties.”) (citation omitted); Case Handyman and Remodeling Servs., LLC v. Schuele, 183 Md.App. 44, 57 , 959 A.2d 833 (2008) (“To resolve the issue whether a non-signatory can enf

2016See, e.g., Thompson v. Witherspoon, 197 Md.App. 69, 81 , 12 A.3d 685 (2011) (“Under the [Federal Arbitration Act], courts look to substantive provisions of state law regarding threshold issues of the validity, revocability, or enforceability of contracts, but to federal law to resolve issues as to whether a non-signatory to a contract can enforce, or be bound by, an arbitration provision in a contract signed by other parties.”) (citation omitted); Case Handyman and Remodeling Servs., LLC v. Schuele, 183 Md.App. 44, 57 , 959 A.2d 833 (2008) (“To resolve the issue whether a non-signatory can enf

2012The doctrine of equitable estoppel 5 permits non-signatories to enforce an arbitration *83 provision, first, when a signatory “must rely on the terms of the written agreement [containing the arbitration clause] in asserting [its] claims,” Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir.1993), and “seeks to claim the benefit of” such an agreement “while simultaneously attempting to avoid the terms of an arbitration provision contained therein,” Long, supra, 248 F.3d at 320 (citation and quotation omitted); or, second, “when the signatory to the contract containing

2012As noted above, the first instance in which non-signatories may enforce an arbitration clause is when a signatory “must rely on the terms of the written agreement [containing the arbitration clause] in asserting [its] claims,” Sunkist, supra, 10 F.3d at 757 , and “seeks to claim the benefit of’ such an agreement “while simultaneously attempting to avoid the terms of an arbitration provision contained therein.” Long, supra, 248 F.3d at 320 (citation and quotation omitted).

2012Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir.1995).