equitable estoppel doctrine in Massachusetts

2007The judge ruled that “[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is a defense to a claim that is equitable in nature, and is not available as a defense to a legal claim such as an action on a promissory note,” citing Srebnick v. Lo-Law Transit Mgmt., Inc., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 49 (1990) (“Loches is available ... as a defense to a claim that is equitable in nature . . . [and] is not generally available as a defense to a legal claim”). 7 The authorities cited by the parties are not helpful. 8 “In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court looks for two things: (1) A total absence of genuine d

2000See Srebnick v. Lo-Law Transit Mgmt., Inc., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 45 (1990). 31.

1993See generally Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 , 183-184 & n.7 (1957), (doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to correction by Commissioner of mistake of law); Annot., 21 A.L.R.4th 573 , 620 (1983).” Equitable considerations, not prescribed by statute, are not major players in tax matters (and, indeed, often do not even enter the game).

1985See generally Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 , 183-184 & n.7 (1957), (doctrine of equitable estoppel is not a bar to correction by Commissioner of mistake of law); Annot., 21 A.L.R.4th 573 , 620 (1983).

2024See Turnpike Motors, Inc. v. Newbury Group, Inc., 413 Mass. 119, 123 (1992); Boylston Dev.

2017See Machado, 471 Mass. at 211-212 , quoting from Lenox MacLaren Surgical Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 449 Fed.

2017The Supreme Judicial Court recently adopted the doctrine of equitable estoppel in Machado v. System4 LLC, 471 Mass. 204 (2015).

2017The court explained, "Equitable estoppel typically allows a nonsignatory to compel arbitration in either of two circumstances: (1) when a signatory 'must rely on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory' or (2) when a signatory 'raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract.'" 8 Id. at 211 , quoting from Grigson, supra. The second circumstance emphatically applies in this case.

2016Those jurisdictions that allow a credit when a payor has “satisfied” the original child support obligation by an alternative method in essence create an exception to the “general rule” that “a support obligor must make his or her payments in the manner required by the support order or judgment.” T.M. v. L.H., 50 Mass. App. Ct. at 860 , citing Thacker v. Thacker, 710 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

2012Because the Court disposes of the case on the basis that the record of the town meeting unambiguously evinced the intent that the lease for the north turbine relate to Lot 9, the Court will not address the issue whether the plaintiffs’ delay in challenging the siting independently bars relief by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, see In re Donovan’s Case, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 566, 568-69 (2003), or, as argued by the Town, the closely related doctrine of laches, see Colony of Wellfleet, Inc. v. Harris, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 522, 531 (2008).

2012Because the Court disposes of the case on the basis that the record of the town meeting unambiguously evinced the intent that the lease for the north turbine relate to Lot 9, the Court will not address the issue whether the plaintiffs’ delay in challenging the siting independently bars relief by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, see In re Donovan’s Case, 58 Mass.App.Ct. 566, 568-69 (2003), or, as argued by the Town, the closely related doctrine of laches, see Colony of Wellfleet, Inc. v. Harris, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 522, 531 (2008).

2011Equitable estoppel provides that “where a party against whom enforcement of an oral contract is sought has made a material misrepresentation, that parly may be estopped from raising the statute of frauds defense.” Frederick v. ConAgra, Inc., 713 F.Sup. 41, 45 (D.Mass. 1989), citing Greenstein v. Flatley, 19 Mass.App.Ct. 351, 356 (1984).

2010Contrast Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 88-89, 90-91 (2002) (Federal regulation implementing Family and Medical Leave Act [FMLA], and requiring employers who fail to provide notice that employer-provided leave counts against FMLA entitlement to grant employees twelve additional weeks of FMLA leave, regardless of prejudice to employee, held invalid because it altered FMLA's remedial structure by removing requirement that employee prove impairment of rights and prejudice).

2003The effective application of that doctrine “requires: (1) ‘[a] representation or conduct amounting to a representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to whom the representation is made[;] (2) [a]n act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation is made[;] (3) [and detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or omission.’ Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 2 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 728 (1974)[, S.C., 368 Mass. 811 (1975)].” Boylston Dev.

1993See Commissioner of Revenue v. Wells Yachts South, Inc., 406 Mass. 661, 664-665 (1990).

1978Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co., 267 Mass. 52, 68-69 (1929).

1900See Fowle v. Torrey, 135 Mass. 87 ; Baker v. Stone, 136 Mass. 405 ; Woodward v. Spurr, 141 Mass. 283 ; Clark v. Patterson, 158 Mass. 388 .