equitable estoppel doctrine in California

2025Equitable Estoppel To show the applicability of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, it was incumbent on Rowe to establish: “ ‘(1) [T]he party to be estopped [the City] must be apprised of the facts; (2) [the City] must intend that [its] conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party [Rowe] must be 2 We deny Rowe’s request for judicial notice of the City’s brief on the motion to dismiss in bankruptcy court, as it appears irrelevant to the matters addressed. 14 ignorant of the true state of facts; a

2022The court specifically stated that the defendants had not shown any detrimental reliance on plaintiff’s written notice under PAGA, which was sent to the LWDA, Employer and Parent Company.1 “Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must [reasonably]

2023(City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 493 .) Given our conclusion that CDCR properly interpreted its regulations and Section 32(a)(1) to preclude Harless from early parole consideration under Proposition 57, we find no basis to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel here.

2022Burlesque Has Not Established that the City Is Estopped from Invalidating Its Permit Burlesque argues that the City should be estopped from revoking 10 Burlesque’s permit under the LAMC because the City had renewed Burlesque’s permit without any issue for 12 years. “ ‘Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other

2025Equitable Estoppel The term “equitable estoppel” has long been used to describe an exception to “ ‘the general rule that a non[-]signatory to an agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate and cannot invoke an agreement to arbitrate, without being a party to the arbitration agreement.’ ” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222 , 1236–1237 (JSM Tuscany); Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership 8 (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713 (Metalclad) [“Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting rights ‘he otherwise would have had against another

2024(Cf. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency (5th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 524, 530 [plaintiff’s commencement of action against nonsignatories after voluntary dismissal of action against signatory that moved to compel arbitration was “a quite obvious, if not blatant, attempt to bypass the agreement’s arbitration clause”].) “No person can be permitted to adopt that part of an entire transaction which is beneficial to him/her, and then reject its burdens.” (Halperin v. Raville (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 765, 772 .) “To allow respondent[s] to assert rights and benefits under the contract and then later repudiat

2025Equitable Estoppel The term “equitable estoppel” has long been used to describe an exception to “ ‘the general rule that a non[-]signatory to an agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate and cannot invoke an agreement to arbitrate, without being a party to the arbitration agreement.’ ” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222 , 1236–1237 (JSM Tuscany); Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership 8 (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713 (Metalclad) [“Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting rights ‘he otherwise would have had against another

2024(Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 50, 59 .) But under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, a “party who has not signed a contract containing an arbitration clause may nonetheless be compelled to arbitrate when he seeks enforcement of other provisions of the same contract that benefit him.” (Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713 (Metalclad).) Equitable estoppel applies when the nonsignatory’s claims are “dependent upon, or inextricably intertwined with,” the terms of the agreement containing an ar

1975Under well settled California law four *841 elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury (Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 431 P.2d 245 ]; Simank Realty, Inc. v. DeMarco (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 6

1975Under well settled California law four *841 elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury (Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 431 P.2d 245 ]; Simank Realty, Inc. v. DeMarco (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 6

2025Although the trial court did not address the merits of BMW’s equitable estoppel argument, if the court’s ruling was “correct upon any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment will be sustained regardless of the considerations that moved the lower court to its conclusion.” (Belair v. Riverside County Flood Control Dist. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 550, 568 .) Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “in limited circumstances, if a plaintiff sues a third party to assert a claim that is ‘ “intimately founded in and intertwined with” ’ a contractual provision, that third party may move to compel a

2025Equitable Estoppel The term “equitable estoppel” has long been used to describe an exception to “ ‘the general rule that a non[-]signatory to an agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate and cannot invoke an agreement to arbitrate, without being a party to the arbitration agreement.’ ” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222 , 1236–1237 (JSM Tuscany); Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership 8 (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713 (Metalclad) [“Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting rights ‘he otherwise would have had against another

2024And, finally, I explain why, in my view, those claims fall within the scope of the equitable estoppel doctrine and permit appellants to enforce the arbitration provision of the sale contract against respondents. 3 A An exception to the general rule that “only a party to an arbitration agreement is bound by or may enforce the agreement” (Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 613 , fn. omitted) is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which allows a nonsignatory to a contract to enforce its arbitration clause against a signatory who asserts contract-related claims against the nonsignatory

2024And, finally, I explain why, in my view, those claims fall within the scope of the equitable estoppel doctrine and permit appellants to enforce the arbitration provision of the sale contract against respondents. 3 A An exception to the general rule that “only a party to an arbitration agreement is bound by or may enforce the agreement” (Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 613 , fn. omitted) is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which allows a nonsignatory to a contract to enforce its arbitration clause against a signatory who asserts contract-related claims against the nonsignatory

2022Code, § 623.) 7 “ ‘ “ ‘it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from loss.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) “[F]our elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and

2020(See Lantzy v. Centex Homes (2003) 31 Cal.4th 363 , 383–384 (Lantzy).) “ ‘ “Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he [or she] must intend that his [or her] conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he [or she] must rely 1 Neither the three-year statutory period, nor the restrictive statutory provisions for equita

2025Equitable estoppel Generally, under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “[i]f a trial court finds statements or conduct by a defendant which lulls the plaintiff into a false sense of security resulting in inaction, and there is reasonable reliance, estoppel must be available to prevent defendant from profiting from his deception.” (Tejada v. Blas (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1335, 1341 .) The doctrine applies to motions to dismiss brought under section 583.310.

2018(See Perez v. Smith (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1595 , 1597, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 .) Before the respondent court, Robinson Helicopter argued that petitioners were barred from seeking dismissal under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (§ 583.140 ["Nothing in this chapter abrogates or otherwise affects the principles of waiver and estoppel"]; Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 , 437-439, 96 Cal.Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 [doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to motions to dismiss for failure to effectuate service within three years].) Under this doctrine, "If a trial court

2014Appeals Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 24, 37 (Honeywell).) In addition, “[t]he defendant’s statement or conduct must amount to a misrepresentation bearing on the necessity of bringing a timely suit; the defendant’s mere denial of legal liability does not set up an estoppel. [Citations.]” (Lantzy v. Centex Homes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 384, fn. 18 .) Finally, the doctrine of equitable estoppel only applies if “the plaintiff proceeds diligently once the truth is discovered [citation].” (Ibid.) The facts alleged in the fifth amended complaint and its attachments indicate that plaintiff was not “ignorant

2014Appeals Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 24, 37 (Honeywell).) In addition, “[t]he defendant’s statement or conduct must amount to a misrepresentation bearing on the necessity of bringing a timely suit; the defendant’s mere denial of legal liability does not set up an estoppel. [Citations.]” (Lantzy v. Centex Homes, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 384, fn. 18 .) Finally, the doctrine of equitable estoppel only applies if “the plaintiff proceeds diligently once the truth is discovered [citation].” (Ibid.) The facts alleged in the fifth amended complaint and its attachments indicate that plaintiff was not “ignorant

2024Moreover, the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that Gold Star, as the party relying on the representation, “must be ignorant of the true state of facts.” (Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720, 725 .) Equitable estoppel does not apply here because substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Gold Star had actual and constructive knowledge of the identity of CIT as the construction lender.

2016The equitable estoppel doctrine “provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if he [or she] intentionally led another to believe a particular circumstance to be true and to rely upon such belief to his [or her] detriment.” (Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720, 725 .) The elements of equitable estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) the party to be estopped must intend that his or her conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the

2024And, finally, I explain why, in my view, those claims fall within the scope of the equitable estoppel doctrine and permit appellants to enforce the arbitration provision of the sale contract against respondents. 3 A An exception to the general rule that “only a party to an arbitration agreement is bound by or may enforce the agreement” (Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 613 , fn. omitted) is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which allows a nonsignatory to a contract to enforce its arbitration clause against a signatory who asserts contract-related claims against the nonsignatory

2024And, finally, I explain why, in my view, those claims fall within the scope of the equitable estoppel doctrine and permit appellants to enforce the arbitration provision of the sale contract against respondents. 3 A An exception to the general rule that “only a party to an arbitration agreement is bound by or may enforce the agreement” (Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 613 , fn. omitted) is the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which allows a nonsignatory to a contract to enforce its arbitration clause against a signatory who asserts contract-related claims against the nonsignatory

2018Although it took the City multiple years to issue a compliance order, "the mere failure to enforce the law, without more, will not estop the government from subsequently enforcing it." ( Feduniak , supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 591 ; see also Golden Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 249 , 262, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 ( Golden Gate ) ["[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel will not be applied to allow a *490 landowner to circumvent land use restrictions ... when the public entity simply fails to take early action to warn the landowner" of land

2018Although it took the City multiple years to issue a compliance order, "the mere failure to enforce the law, without more, will not estop the government from subsequently enforcing it." ( Feduniak , supra , 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1369 , 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 591 ; see also Golden Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 249 , 262, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 ( Golden Gate ) ["[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel will not be applied to allow a *490 landowner to circumvent land use restrictions ... when the public entity simply fails to take early action to warn the landowner" of land

1999In Lentz , the court held that a recipient of welfare benefits may assert the equitable estoppel defense in the context of an administrative hearing of the Department of Social Services (DSS). ( Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 .) The court further held that the statutory scheme contemplates the application of the equitable estoppel defense. ( Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 .) The holding in Lentz does not stand for the all-encompassing conclusion that equitable principles apply to all administrative proceedings.

1999In Lentz , the court held that a recipient of welfare benefits may assert the equitable estoppel defense in the context of an administrative hearing of the Department of Social Services (DSS). ( Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 .) The court further held that the statutory scheme contemplates the application of the equitable estoppel defense. ( Id., at p. 407, 261 Cal.Rptr. 310 , 777 P.2d 83 .) The holding in Lentz does not stand for the all-encompassing conclusion that equitable principles apply to all administrative proceedings.

2026Code, § 623.) “ ‘ “Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be [sic] acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” ’ ” (Bonanno, at p. 22, quoting Feduniak, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359 .) The probate court based its order on the second element— exp

2026Code, § 623.) “ ‘ “Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be [sic] acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” ’ ” (Bonanno, at p. 22, quoting Feduniak, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 1359 .) The probate court based its order on the second element— exp

2024Code, § 623.) “‘Generally speaking, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is a rule of fundamental fairness whereby a party is precluded from benefiting from his inconsistent conduct which has induced reliance to the detriment of another.’” 5 (Adoption of S.S. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 607 , 631, quoting In re Marriage of Valle (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 840 .) “As our Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, a finding of estoppel requires some act or representation by the party to be estopped, on which the party seeking estoppel has relied to its detriment: ‘[t]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is fo

2021Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1270 ; Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539 , 555 [“the linchpin of the estoppel doctrine is fairness”].) “The object of equitable estoppel is to ‘prevent a person from asserting a right which has come into existence by contract, statute or other rule of law where, because of his conduct, silence or omission, it would be unconscionable to allow him to do so.’ ” (Skulnick v. Roberts Express, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 884, 891 ; see also In re Marriage of Valle (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 840 [“Generally speaking, the doctrine of equitable estoppel

2023(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352 ; Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539 , 549.) In limited circumstances, a nonsignatory to an agreement containing an arbitration provision may compel arbitration of “a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353.) As relevant here, a nonsignatory’s ability to compel arbitration can be grounded on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or on the nature of the relationship between a party to the arbitration agreement and the nonsignatory, including relationships that reflect

2022(Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696, 714 [“[W]here the equitable estoppel doctrine applies, the nonsignatory has a right to enforce the arbitration agreement” and “is not a ‘third party’ within the meaning of section 1281.2 [, subdivision (c)].”].) However, in this case, numerous third parties are not signatories to the arbitration agreement defendants seek to enforce—including SCOT (the real party in interest in the derivative action), as well as at least seven other named defendants in the derivative action.

2024Equitable Estoppel “‘The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on notions of equity and fair dealing and provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if that person has intentionally led others to believe a particular circumstance to be true and to rely upon such belief to their detriment . . . . “‘Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estopp

2020EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL “The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on notions of equity and fair dealing and provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if that person has intentionally led others to believe a particular circumstance to be true and to rely upon such belief to their detriment.” (City of Oakland v. Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 210, 239 (City of Oakland).) “Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (

2024(Byrne v. Laura (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1054, 1068, 1072 .) Unlike the doctrine of part performance, the equitable estoppel doctrine does not require the party’s change of 13 position to specifically refer to the agreement to be enforced.

2021Under Probate Code section 21700, subdivision (a)(4), a contract to “make a will or devise or other instrument” need not be in writing if it can be established by “[c]lear and convincing evidence of an agreement between the decedent and the claimant or a promise by the decedent to the claimant that is enforceable in equity.” 10 serious change of position in reliance on the contract or where unjust enrichment would result if a party who has received the benefits of the other’s performance were allowed to invoke the statute.’ ” (Redke, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 101 , quoting Day v. Greene (1963) 59

2023(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1352 ; Jarboe v. Hanlees Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539 , 549.) In limited circumstances, a nonsignatory to an agreement containing an arbitration provision may compel arbitration of “a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353.) As relevant here, a nonsignatory’s ability to compel arbitration can be grounded on the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or on the nature of the relationship between a party to the arbitration agreement and the nonsignatory, including relationships that reflect

2013(Jones, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 16 .) The essential purpose of the equitable estoppel doctrine is to " 'prevent a party from using the terms or obligations of an agreement as the basis for his claims against a nonsignatory, while at the same time refusing to arbitrate with the nonsignatory under another clause of that same agreement.' [Citation.]" (J.S.M.

2014Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 483-484 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ].) “Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” (Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 431 P.2d 245 ].) Th

2014Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 483-484 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 ].) “Generally speaking, four elements must be present in order to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.” (Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 661 , 431 P.2d 245 ].) Th

2025Equitable Estoppel The term “equitable estoppel” has long been used to describe an exception to “ ‘the general rule that a non[-]signatory to an agreement cannot be compelled to arbitrate and cannot invoke an agreement to arbitrate, without being a party to the arbitration agreement.’ ” (JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222 , 1236–1237 (JSM Tuscany); Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership 8 (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713 (Metalclad) [“Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting rights ‘he otherwise would have had against another

2024(DMS Services, LLC v. Superior Court (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1346 , 1352–1353 (DMS Services); JSM Tuscany, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1236 .) However, both California and federal courts have recognized certain exceptions which permit a nonsignatory to an agreement with an arbitration clause “to compel arbitration of, or be compelled to arbitrate, a dispute arising within the scope of that agreement.” (DMS Services, at p. 1353; see also Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705 , 1713–1714.) These exceptions include wh

2018(See Perez v. Smith (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1595 , 1597, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 .) Before the respondent court, Robinson Helicopter argued that petitioners were barred from seeking dismissal under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (§ 583.140 ["Nothing in this chapter abrogates or otherwise affects the principles of waiver and estoppel"]; Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 , 437-439, 96 Cal.Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 [doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to motions to dismiss for failure to effectuate service within three years].) Under this doctrine, "If a trial court

2018(See Perez v. Smith (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1595 , 1597, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 186 .) Before the respondent court, Robinson Helicopter argued that petitioners were barred from seeking dismissal under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. (§ 583.140 ["Nothing in this chapter abrogates or otherwise affects the principles of waiver and estoppel"]; Tresway Aero, Inc. v. Superior Court (1971) 5 Cal.3d 431 , 437-439, 96 Cal.Rptr. 571 , 487 P.2d 1211 [doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable to motions to dismiss for failure to effectuate service within three years].) Under this doctrine, "If a trial court

2024Finally, defendant’s citation to case law setting out the doctrine of equitable estoppel (e.g., Schafer v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250 ) fares no better.

2023Finally, we note the doctrine of equitable estoppel “‘“ordinarily will not apply against a governmental body except in unusual instances when necessary to avoid grave injustice and when the result will not defeat a strong public policy.”’” (Schafer, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 ; see First Street Plaza Partners v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 650, 669 [discussing 41 legal precedent and noting that “[n]o case has ever held that a city may be bound to a contract by estoppel”].) The city has a strong interest in abiding by the terms of its Personnel Procedures Manual in order to

2022(Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570, 584 .) Normally, the elements of equitable estoppel present questions of fact for the court (not a jury) to determine. ( Santos, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1076, 1080–1081 [summary judgment reversed; triable issues of fact as to existence of equitable estoppel]; Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251 .) However, the existence of equitable estoppel may be decided as a matter of law “when the undisputed evidence is susceptible of only one reasonable inference.” (Santos, at p. 1076.) Here, the superior court determined Employer

2021(Id. at p. 305; see J.M, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 656 [quoting Driscoll’s version of the elements].) “The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be applied against the government where justice and right require it.” ( Driscoll, supra, at p. 305 ; see 30 Cal.Jur.3d, supra, Estoppel and Waiver, § 5, pp. 826–829 [availability against governmental entities].) In comparison, Simmons v. Ghaderi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 570 described the five- element version of the doctrine: “A valid claim for equitable estoppel requires: (a) a representation or concealment of material facts; (b) made with knowledge, actual or v

2022Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1463 .) Instead, the doctrine of equitable estoppel acts defensively only. (13 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Equity, § 212, p. 562.) Second, as a separate and independent ground for concluding the equitable estoppel claim lacks merit, MACC did not present sufficient evidence to substantiate its claim.

2014Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1462 .) The doctrine of equitable estoppel does not apply here.