equitable estoppel doctrine in Texas

2023See Rise Above Steel Co., LLC, 656 S.W.3d at 581. 29 We assume without deciding that de Rochemont’s pro se filings successfully pleaded estoppel as an affirmative defense in response to the motion for summary judgment. 22 “[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts; (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations.” Johnson & Higgins of

2019Equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense that “generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.” Ulico, 262 S.W.3d at 778 . “[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts; (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations.” Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco

2021Accordingly, it belongs in this category. 13 recognized that fraudulent concealment—“which is based upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel”—can “estop[] a defendant from relying on the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense to plaintiff’s claim.” Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983).12 When “the defense of the statute of limitations is established by the record as a matter of law, and [plaintiffs] are relying on fraudulent concealment to avoid that defense,” it is “their burden . . . to come forward with proof raising an issue of fact with respect to fraudulent conceal

2016Fraudulent Concealment Fraudulent concealment is based upon the doctrine of equitable estoppel.4 Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1983).

2026Because easements by estoppel are a specific application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel (estoppel in pais), they are “a creature of equity” that “seeks to prevent injustice and to protect innocent parties from fraud.” Id. at 451 ; see PDT Holdings, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 712 S.W.3d 597 , 603 & n.7 (Tex. 2025).

2024Id.; see Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979).

2008“The fraudulent concealment doctrine, unlike the discovery rule, resembles equitable estoppel.” Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 439 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (fraudulent concealment is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel; the doctrine tolls or suspends the running of limitations after it has begun because the defendant has concealed facts necessary for the plaintiff to know that he had a cause of action).

2008"The fraudulent concealment doctrine, unlike the discovery rule, resembles equitable estoppel." Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett , 958 S.W.2d 430, 439 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (fraudulent concealment is based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel; the doctrine tolls or suspends the running of limitations after it has begun because the defendant has concealed facts necessary for the plaintiff to know that he had a cause of action).

2018Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “a litigant who sues based on 3 a contract subjects him or herself to the contract’s terms . . . including the Arbitration Addendum.” Id. at 527 .

2015Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “a defendant-signatory to an arbitration agreement [can] compel arbitration with a plaintiff-signatory.” Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2006) (applying equitable estoppel to compel arbitration against signatory-plaintiff); see also Neatherlin Homes, Inc. v. Love, 2007 WL 700996 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 8, 2007, no pet.) (applying equitable estoppel to compel arbitration where “[signatory to arbitration agreement] brought the sam

2019Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991).

1999Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex.1991).

2019Texas courts have recognized two ways in which a non-signatory can seek a direct benefit from the contract containing the arbitration clause: “(1) bring claims in a lawsuit that seek direct benefits from a contract containing an arbitration clause, or (2) deliberately seek and obtain substantial benefits from the contract itself outside of litigation.” Id. (emphasis added); see Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. 2006) (applying the equitable estoppel standard to an arbitration agreement governed by the TAA); In re Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 132.

2015Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable estoppel, “a defendant-signatory to an arbitration agreement [can] compel arbitration with a plaintiff-signatory.” Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2006) (applying equitable estoppel to compel arbitration against signatory-plaintiff); see also Neatherlin Homes, Inc. v. Love, 2007 WL 700996 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 8, 2007, no pet.) (applying equitable estoppel to compel arbitration where “[signatory to arbitration agreement] brought the sam

2018Allen v. Allen, 280 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2008, pet. denied).

2014Allen v. Allen, 280 S.W.3d 366, 381 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. denied).

2012Johnson & Higgins of Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex.1998); Enchilada’s Northwest, Inc. v. L & S, Rental Properties, 320 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2010, no pet.).

2012Johnson & Higgins of Texas, Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex.1998); Enchilada’s Northwest, Inc. v. L & S Rental Properties, 320 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2010, no pet.).

2026Equity “enjoin[s] the [land]owner . . . from preventing the use” when “the other party has expended moneys which will be lost and valueless if the right to enjoy 1773208, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 13, 2018, pet. denied); Ramsey v. Champion, No. 10-12-00394-CV, 2014 WL 1882758 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 8, 2014, pet. denied); McClung v. Ayers, 352 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2011, no pet.); Martin v. Cockrell, 335 S.W.3d 229, 237 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 2010, no pet.). 19 See Drye, 364 S.W.2d at 209-211 ; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.10 cmt. d (2000) (explaining that

2018See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) (citing Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962)). 7 The doctrine of easement by estoppel is not applied as strictly as the doctrine of implied easement.

2012In re Merrill Lynch Co. FSB, 123 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (citing Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 527-28 (5th Cir. 2000)); see also Lette v. Brooke Corp., No. 13-02-00527-CV, 2004 WL 1797578 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 12, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2006“A party that is not a signatory to an arbitration agreement may enforce the agreement’s provisions if the non-signato ry ‘falls into an exception, recognized under general equitable or contract law, that would allow such enforcement.’” In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., FSB, 123 S.W.3d 549, 554-55 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Mohamed, 89 S.W.3d 830, 836 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, orig. proceeding)).

2018See Scott v. Cannon, 959 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) (citing Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962)). 7 The doctrine of easement by estoppel is not applied as strictly as the doctrine of implied easement.

2008See Scott v. Cannon , 959 S.W.2d 712, 720 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied) (citing Storms v. Tuck , 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Drye , 364 S.W.2d at 209 )); see also 25 Am.

2015Arroyo v. State, 117 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim.

2015Arroyo v. State, 117 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

2010See, e.g. , Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc ., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex. 1998) ("[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts; (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations."); Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson , 944 S.W.2d 631, 636 (Tex. 1997) ("Promissory estoppel generally is a defensive doctrine in that

2010See, e.g., Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex. 1998) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts; (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations.”); Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 636 (Tex. 1997) (“Promissory estoppel generally is a defensive doctrine in that it

2024Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Machala, 56 S.W.3d at 756 .

2019Storms v. Tuck, 579 S.W.2d 447, 451 (Tex. 1979); Machala, 56 S.W.3d at 756 .

2019Equitable estoppel is an affirmative defense that “generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.” Ulico, 262 S.W.3d at 778 . “[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts; (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations.” Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco

2010Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex.2008) (“Estoppel, on the other hand, generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.”); see also Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex.1998) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowle

2022Id. “[W]hether a claim seeks a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause turns on the substance of the claim, not artful 7 pleading.” Weekley Homes, 180 S.W.3d at 131–32.

2018See id.

2014Co. v. Jared Res., Ltd., 422 S.W.3d 68, 82 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, no pet.) ("The application of the equitable estoppel doctrine to arbitration clauses in Texas is limited to the direct benefit prong.”) (citing In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d at 194-95 ).

2009However, the Texas Supreme Court has observed, “Estoppel is one of five or six instances in which the federal circuit courts require arbitration with nonsignato-ries.” In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 191 (Tex.2007); see also Grigson, 210 F.3d at 526 (holding that “in certain limited instances, pursuant to an equitable estoppel doctrine, a non-signatory-to-an-arbitration-agreement-defendant can nevertheless compel arbitration against a signatory-plaintiff.”).

2023See City of White Settlement v. Super Wash, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 770, 774 (Tex. 2006).

2022See City of White Settlement, 198 S.W.3d at 772–74; Roberts, 543 S.W.2d at 76–80; City of Hutchins, 450 S.W.2d at 830 , 833–36; Deutsch, 91 S.W.2d at 308–13; Groba v. City of Taylor, No. 03-19-00365-CV, 2021 WL 359203 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 3, 2021, pet. denied) (concluding that the Equitable Estoppel Cases address whether and under what exceptional circumstances a city may be estopped from enforcing municipal ordinances, not whether a city’s actions may confer jurisdiction on the trial court) (mem. op.); North Texas Municipal Water Dist. v. Jinright, No. 05-18-00152-CV, 2018 WL 618763

2015See 928 S.W.2d at 296 (citing Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc., 10 F.3d at 757-58 ; J.J.

1999See id. at 296 (citing Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc., 10 F.3d at 757-58 ; J.J.

2015See Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007) (standard of review for grant or denial of sanctions).

2015See Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007) (standard of review for grant or denial of sanctions).

2010See Mustang Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Driver Pipeline Co., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981)). 3 Specifically, the jury was instructed that Landmark’s failure to comply would be excused if each to the following circumstances had occurred: 1.

2010See Mustang Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Driver Pipeline Co., Inc., 134 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981)). 3 Specifically, the jury was instructed that Landmark’s failure to comply would be excused if each to the following circumstances had occurred: 1.

2010Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n , 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex. 2008) (“Estoppel, on the other hand, generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.”); see also Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc. , 962 S.W.2d 507 , 515–16 (Tex. 1998) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining k

2010Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778 (Tex.2008) (“Estoppel, on the other hand, generally prevents one party from misleading another to the other’s detriment or to the misleading party’s own benefit.”); see also Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16 (Tex.1998) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel requires: (1) a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) with the intention that it should be acted on; (4) to a party without knowledge or means of obtaining knowle

2009See Bailey, 287 S.W.3d at 913 (following Kane and reversing summary judgment against trustee that was based on judicial estoppel).

2009See Bailey , 287 S.W.3d at 913 (following Kane and reversing summary judgment against trustee that was based on judicial estoppel).

2008However, in determining whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel even applies in a case such as this, "the child's best interests are of paramount concern." In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.).

2008However, in determining whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel even applies in a case such as this, “the child’s best interests are of paramount concern.” In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.).

2024Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 439 (Tex. 2017); id. (“When a forum-selection clause encompasses all disputes arising out of the agreement, instead of claims, its scope is necessarily broader than claims based solely on rights originating exclusively from the contract.”) (internal quotations omitted).

2024Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 439 (Tex. 2017); id. (“When a forum-selection clause encompasses all disputes arising out of the agreement, instead of claims, its scope is necessarily broader than claims based solely on rights originating exclusively from the contract.”) (internal quotations omitted).

1987The equitable estoppel rule stated in Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412 , 252 S.W.2d 929 (1952), requires a finding of false representation or concealment of material facts where the bar of limitations is sought to be tolled.

1987The equitable estoppel rule stated in Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412 , 252 S.W.2d 929 (1952), requires a finding of false representation or concealment of material facts where the bar of limitations is sought to be tolled.