beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Mississippi

26 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

Case	Followed	Cited
Netterville v. Mississippi State Bargreen miss · 1981 · cited in 3 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1991–1995 2 sentences 1995Attorney Q v. Mississippi State Bar, 587 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 1991) (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981)). 1995While bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, "the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard does not apply; rather, we require an intermediate level of certainty regarding the facts at issue, to-wit; a clear and convincing evidence standard." Id., 587 So.2d at 232 . (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); and Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981).	3	3
Jackson v. Virginiared scotus · 1979 · cited in 4 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1983–2023 2 sentences 2023As Nevels points out in its majority opinion, this standard “‘plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure,’ because it operates to give ‘concrete substance’ to the presumption of innocence to ensure against unjust convictions, and to reduce the risk of factual error in a criminal proceeding.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)). 27 ¶57. 2007Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985)).	2	4
Shields v. Stategreen miss · 1997 · cited in 3 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1999–2012 2 sentences 2012However, this Court noted that “the possession of stolen articles, standing alone, may be sufficient to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard given sufficiently probative circumstances of possession.” Id. (quoting Shields v. State, 702 So.2d 380, 381 (Miss.1997)). 2008In this case, the primary circumstantial evidence was Jones's possession of the stolen items. "[T]he possession of stolen articles, standing alone, may be sufficient to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard given sufficiently probative circumstances of possession." Shields v. State , 702 So.2d 380 , 381 (Miss. 1997).	2	3
Edwards v. Stategreen miss · 1985 · cited in 3 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2006–2008 2 sentences 2008Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985)). 2007Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985)).	2	3
Mississippi State Bar v. Odomgreen miss · 1990 · cited in 3 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1991–1995 2 sentences 1995Attorney Q v. Mississippi State Bar, 587 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 1991) (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981)). 1995While bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, "the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard does not apply; rather, we require an intermediate level of certainty regarding the facts at issue, to-wit; a clear and convincing evidence standard." Id., 587 So.2d at 232 . (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); and Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981).	2	3
Levi v. Mississippi State Bargreen miss · 1983 · cited in 3 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1991–1995 2 sentences 1995Attorney Q v. Mississippi State Bar, 587 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 1991) (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981)). 1995While bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, "the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard does not apply; rather, we require an intermediate level of certainty regarding the facts at issue, to-wit; a clear and convincing evidence standard." Id., 587 So.2d at 232 . (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); and Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981).	2	3
Mississippi State Bar v. Nicholsgreen miss · 1990 · cited in 3 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1991–1995 2 sentences 1995Attorney Q v. Mississippi State Bar, 587 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 1991) (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981)). 1995While bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, "the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard does not apply; rather, we require an intermediate level of certainty regarding the facts at issue, to-wit; a clear and convincing evidence standard." Id., 587 So.2d at 232 . (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); and Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981).	2	3
Sands v. Stategreen miss · 2011 · cited in 2 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 2 sentences 2016Id. at 377-78 (¶ 16) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶9. 2016Id. at 377-78 (¶16) (internal quotations and citations omitted). ¶7.	2	2
Bush v. Statered miss · 2005 · cited in 2 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2008–2016 2 sentences 2016Id.; Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (¶ 16) (Miss.2005). ¶ 11. 2008Id. (citing Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985)).	1	2
ATTORNEY Q v. Mississippi State Bargreen miss · 1991 · cited in 2 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 2 sentences 1995Attorney Q v. Mississippi State Bar, 587 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss. 1991) (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981)). 1995While bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, "the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard does not apply; rather, we require an intermediate level of certainty regarding the facts at issue, to-wit; a clear and convincing evidence standard." Id., 587 So.2d at 232 . (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); and Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981).	1	2
In Re WINSHIPgreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023As Nevels points out in its majority opinion, this standard “‘plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure,’ because it operates to give ‘concrete substance’ to the presumption of innocence to ensure against unjust convictions, and to reduce the risk of factual error in a criminal proceeding.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)). 27 ¶57.	1	1
Stringfellow v. Statered miss · 1992 · cited in 1 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 2 sentences 2018See Stringfellow, 595 So. 2d at 1332 (recognizing that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction is “practically speaking, no less stringent than a circumstantial[-evidence] instruction”). 23 ¶51. 2018See Stringfellow , 595 So.2d at 1332 (recognizing that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction is "practically speaking, no less stringent than a circumstantial[-evidence] instruction").	1	1
Timothy Nelson Evans v. State of Mississippigreen miss · 2017 · cited in 1 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 1 sentence 2018Evans , 226 So.3d at 38 (¶ 103) (relying on Brown v. State , 890 So.2d 901 , 921 (Miss. 2004) (holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement does not apply to the determination that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the totality of the mitigating circumstances) ). ¶ 243.	1	1
Cannon v. Stategreen miss · 1966 · cited in 1 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015Antithetically, this Court has long prohibited the lower courts of this State from attempting to define the term “reasonable doubt” through jury instructions, finding that the term is “obscure and it must be assumed that the members of the jury were men of ordinary intelligence and capable of understanding their meaning.” Cannon v. State, 190 So. 2d 848, 851 (Miss. 1966).	1	1
Rushing v. Stategreen miss · 1984 · cited in 1 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 1 sentence 2012Furthermore, “possession of recently stolen property is a circumstance which may be considered by the jury and from which, in the absence of a reasonable explanation, the jury may infer guilt.” Id. at 151 (¶ 12) (quoting Rushing v. State, 461 So.2d 710, 712 (1984)). ¶ 22.	1	1
McCoy v. McCoygreen miss · 1992 · cited in 1 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 2003–2003 2 sentences 2003Under McCoy v. McCoy, 611 So.2d 957, 961 (Miss.1992), the court stated that the proper burden of proof in mutual mistake involving a reformation of a deed is the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 2003This case also states that “a chancehor’s findings of fact are unassailable on appeal unless those findings are manifestly wrong.” Id. at 960 .	1	1
Turner v. Turnergreen miss · 1961 · cited in 1 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 2 sentences 1992Webb, supra ; Perrien, supra ; Dahlem, supra ; Turner v. Turner, 241 Miss. 444, 454 , 130 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1961); American Alliance Ins. 1992Webb, supra ; Perrien, supra ; Dahlem, supra ; Turner v. Turner, 241 Miss. 444, 454 , 130 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1961); American Alliance Ins.	1	1
Tokman v. Stategreen miss · 1983 · cited in 1 Mississippi opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983 1 sentence 1983See Tokman v. State, 435 So.2d 664 (Miss. 1983), Docket No. 53,676, Instruction No. 12, R. pp. 616-618; and Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1983), Docket No. 53,914, Instruction Nos. 2 and 3, R. pp. 862-865.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

Case	Cited	Years
Victor v. Nebraska green scotus · 1994 2 sentences 2015“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 . 2005Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) (citations omitted). ¶ 34.	2	2005–2015
Austin v. United States green scotus · 1993 2 sentences 1997Judge Russell argues that because this Court has previously held that bar disciplinary proceedings are “quasi-criminal” and thus subject to a “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof, that this Court obviously considers judicial disciplinary proceedings to be “quasi-criminal.” Judge Russell relies upon Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 113 S.Ct. 2801 , 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), wherein the Supreme Court held that civil sanctions which are intended to punish are criminal in nature and therefore warrant criminal protections. 1997Judge Russell argues that because this Court has previously held that bar disciplinary proceedings are “quasi-criminal” and thus subject to a “clear and convincing evidence” standard of proof, that this Court obviously considers judicial disciplinary proceedings to be “quasi-criminal.” Judge Russell relies upon Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 113 S.Ct. 2801 , 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), wherein the Supreme Court held that civil sanctions which are intended to punish are criminal in nature and therefore warrant criminal protections.	2	1997–1997
New York Life Ins. v. Ware neutral miss · 1934 2 sentences 2021New York Life Insurance Company v. Ware, 171 Miss. 341 , 157 So. 359, 894 .”) 25 language “to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence” is on the same level as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.8 Thus, the circumstantial evidence instruction neither heightens nor lessens the burden of proof. 2021New York Life Insurance Company v. Ware, 171 Miss. 341 , 157 So. 359, 894 .”) 25 language “to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence” is on the same level as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.8 Thus, the circumstantial evidence instruction neither heightens nor lessens the burden of proof.	1	2021–2021
Brown v. State green miss · 2004 1 sentence 2018Evans , 226 So.3d at 38 (¶ 103) (relying on Brown v. State , 890 So.2d 901 , 921 (Miss. 2004) (holding that the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement does not apply to the determination that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the totality of the mitigating circumstances) ). ¶ 243.	1	2018–2018
Jones v. State green missctapp · 2008 1 sentence 2012However, this Court noted that “the possession of stolen articles, standing alone, may be sufficient to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard given sufficiently probative circumstances of possession.” Id. (quoting Shields v. State, 702 So.2d 380, 381 (Miss.1997)).	1	2012–2012
McLemore v. State green miss · 1960 2 sentences 2008The defense of entrapment comprises "the act of inducing or leading a person to commit a crime not originally contemplated by him, for the purpose of trapping him in its commission and prosecuting him for the offense." McLemore, 241 Miss. at 675 , 125 So.2d at 91 . 2008The defense of entrapment comprises "the act of inducing or leading a person to commit a crime not originally contemplated by him, for the purpose of trapping him in its commission and prosecuting him for the offense." McLemore, 241 Miss. at 675 , 125 So.2d at 91 .	1	2008–2008
ATTORNEY WL v. Mississippi Bar green miss · 1993 1 sentence 1995While bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, "the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard does not apply; rather, we require an intermediate level of certainty regarding the facts at issue, to-wit; a clear and convincing evidence standard." Id., 587 So.2d at 232 . (citing Mississippi State Bar v. Odom, 566 So.2d 712, 714 (Miss. 1990); Mississippi State Bar v. Nichols, 562 So.2d 1285, 1287 (Miss. 1990); Levi v. Mississippi State Bar, 436 So.2d 781, 783 (Miss. 1983); and Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397 So.2d 878, 884 (Miss. 1981).	1	1995–1995
Perrien v. Mapp green miss · 1979 1 sentence 1992Webb, supra ; Perrien, supra ; Dahlem, supra ; Turner v. Turner, 241 Miss. 444, 454 , 130 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1961); American Alliance Ins.	1	1992–1992
Sunnybrook Children's Home, Inc. v. Dahlem green miss · 1972 1 sentence 1992Webb, supra ; Perrien, supra ; Dahlem, supra ; Turner v. Turner, 241 Miss. 444, 454 , 130 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1961); American Alliance Ins.	1	1992–1992
Webb v. Brown green miss · 1981 1 sentence 1992Webb, supra ; Perrien, supra ; Dahlem, supra ; Turner v. Turner, 241 Miss. 444, 454 , 130 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss. 1961); American Alliance Ins.	1	1992–1992
Leatherwood v. State green miss · 1983 1 sentence 1983See Tokman v. State, 435 So.2d 664 (Miss. 1983), Docket No. 53,676, Instruction No. 12, R. pp. 616-618; and Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1983), Docket No. 53,914, Instruction Nos. 2 and 3, R. pp. 862-865.	1	1983–1983

Statutes the citing opinions construe

MS § Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19 (9) MS § Miss. Code Ann. § 97-17-23 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 563 (1980–2026) CA 435 (1956–2026) OH 72 (1992–2026) WA 70 (1974–2026) TN 51 (1994–2016) IL 50 (1979–2026) PA 46 (1976–2026) GA 40 (1982–2023) MS 26 (1983–2023) NV 26 (1980–2022) LA 23 (1976–2022) CO 23 (1990–2026) NM 21 (2001–2025) WI 20 (1990–2025) MD 19 (1978–2022) NC 19 (1977–2025) NJ 18 (1989–2025) KS 17 (1993–2026) MI 16 (1971–2022) FL 16 (1970–2026) MN 15 (1978–2024) AL 13 (1994–2012) UT 12 (1983–2025) NY 12 (1971–2026) CT 11 (1991–2020) OR 11 (1977–2025) MO 11 (1983–2021) AZ 10 (1984–2026) OK 9 (1995–2024) VT 9 (1992–2026) IA 8 (1981–2017) VA 7 (1996–2023) NH 7 (1981–2015) SD 7 (1981–2022) AK 7 (1980–2021) IN 6 (1988–2017) DC 6 (1979–2020) MA 5 (1978–2007) WY 5 (2012–2025) NE 5 (1996–2023) RI 5 (1970–2011) MT 4 (1996–2018) HI 4 (1981–2007) KY 4 (2001–2026) VI 3 (2011–2013) AR 2 (2004–2008) ME 2 (1983–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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