51 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1994–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brandon v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2016Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Crim. 2015Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). | 30 | 30 |
Rentenbach Engineering Co., Construction Division v. General Realty Ltd.green2 sentences2016While it is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. at 766, 102 S. Ct. at 1401; Rentenbach Eng'g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), it does -2- not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 2014While it is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, -15- 455 U.S. [745,] 766, 102 S.Ct. [1388,] 1401[(1982)]; Rentenbach Eng’g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App.1985), it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 30 | 30 |
State v. Grovesgreen2 sentences2016Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Crim. 2014Brandon v. Wright, 838 S.W.2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ct. App.1992); State v. Groves, 735 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tenn. Crim. | 29 | 29 |
Victor v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences2013“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). 2010Reasonable doubt instruction “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). “[S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof.” Id. (citations omitted). | 5 | 10 |
Santosky v. Kramergreen2 sentences2008It is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Rentenbach Eng’g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), yet it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 2007It is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); Rentenbach Eng’g Co. v. General Realty Ltd., 707 S.W.2d 524, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985), yet it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 2 | 12 |
Dennis J. Hughes v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennesseegreen2 sentences2013Hughes v. Bd. of Prof’l Resp., 259 S.W.3d 631, 642 (Tenn. 2008). 2011Id. | 1 | 2 |
O'DANIEL v. Messiergreen2 sentences2010This court has defined the clear and convincing evidence standard as being “more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard” but not -7- requiring “such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 2008In O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995), our Court of Appeals defined the clear and convincing standard as follows: While it is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, it does not require such certainty as the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 2 |
Jackson v. Virginiared1 sentence2016In considering this issue, we apply the rule that where sufficiency of the convicting evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn. R. | 1 | 1 |
State of Missouri v. State of Iowagreen2 sentences2011“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 51 U.S. 1, 5 (1994). 2011Furthermore, “so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . [t]he Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof.” Id. (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Winfieldgreen1 sentence2010See State -23- v. Winfield, 23 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tenn. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Walton v. Younggreen1 sentence1997See In re Estate of Walton, 950 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tenn. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re MLD
green
1 sentence2009Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.