beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Vermont

2026The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof “plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure” because “[i]t is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.” Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 .

2016First, we consider defendant’s argument that in endeavoring to define the phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” for the jury as meaning convinced “with great certainty” the trial court diminished the State’s burden of proof under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), which observes that the “government cannot adjudge [a defendant] guilty of a criminal offense without con *199 vincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.” This language in Winship was part of the explanation of why due process requires a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof in juvenile delinquency cases

2026This Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have not required or encouraged trial courts to define “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., State v. McMahon, 158 Vt. 640, 641 , 603 A.2d 1128, 1129 (1992) (holding there was no error when reasonable doubt was not defined); Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.”).

2026As such, “[r]eduction of the government’s burden of proof . . . is impermissibly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.” United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 629 (5th Cir. 1977) (quotation omitted); see also Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding case where “the trial judge reduced the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden . . . [b]ecause such a requirement is plainly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.”). 8 ¶ 21.

2026As such, “[r]eduction of the government’s burden of proof . . . is impermissibly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.” United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 629 (5th Cir. 1977) (quotation omitted); see also Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100, 104 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing and remanding case where “the trial judge reduced the level of proof necessary for the Government to carry its burden . . . [b]ecause such a requirement is plainly inconsistent with the constitutionally rooted presumption of innocence.”). 8 ¶ 21.

2026This Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have not required or encouraged trial courts to define “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., State v. McMahon, 158 Vt. 640, 641 , 603 A.2d 1128, 1129 (1992) (holding there was no error when reasonable doubt was not defined); Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.”).

2026This Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have not required or encouraged trial courts to define “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See, e.g., State v. McMahon, 158 Vt. 640, 641 , 603 A.2d 1128, 1129 (1992) (holding there was no error when reasonable doubt was not defined); Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.”).

2026Indeed, this Court has warned that “[d]efining ‘reasonable doubt’ is a hazardous undertaking because it seems the more said about it to the jury, the less protection that concept provides the accused.” State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 302 , 561 A.2d 392, 396 (1989).

2026Indeed, this Court has warned that “[d]efining ‘reasonable doubt’ is a hazardous undertaking because it seems the more said about it to the jury, the less protection that concept provides the accused.” State v. Francis, 151 Vt. 296, 302 , 561 A.2d 392, 396 (1989).

2021The Legislature has made this explicit. 28 V.S.A. § 302(a)(4) (providing that “court shall not revoke probation without a proceeding conducted in open court” where the State must prove “establishment of the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence”); see also State v. Millard, 149 Vt. 384 , 385–86, 543 A.2d 700, 701 (1988) (“A court may revoke probation only after the State has established an alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.”). ¶ 33.

2021The Legislature has made this explicit. 28 V.S.A. § 302(a)(4) (providing that “court shall not revoke probation without a proceeding conducted in open court” where the State must prove “establishment of the alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence”); see also State v. Millard, 149 Vt. 384 , 385–86, 543 A.2d 700, 701 (1988) (“A court may revoke probation only after the State has established an alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence.”). ¶ 33.

2007The eases on which the State relies show that the ICWA “does not require that a state court specifically cite the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof’ set forth in § 1912(f), In re M.R.G., 97 P.3d 1085, 1087 (Mont. 2004), but also suggest that the court’s findings should “demonstrate an understanding, on the part of the [trial court], that the State satisfied its burden of proof.” In re M.D.M, 59 P.3d 1142, 1146 (Mont. 2002).

2007The eases on which the State relies show that the ICWA “does not require that a state court specifically cite the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof’ set forth in § 1912(f), In re M.R.G., 97 P.3d 1085, 1087 (Mont. 2004), but also suggest that the court’s findings should “demonstrate an understanding, on the part of the [trial court], that the State satisfied its burden of proof.” In re M.D.M, 59 P.3d 1142, 1146 (Mont. 2002).

2002Plante was decided before State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 555 , 674 A.2d 1258, 1265 (1996), in which we held that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applied to both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors alleged to be harmless, and did not use the harmless beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

2002Plante was decided before State v. Carter, 164 Vt. 545, 555 , 674 A.2d 1258, 1265 (1996), in which we held that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applied to both constitutional and nonconstitutional errors alleged to be harmless, and did not use the harmless beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.