Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
55 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 28 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Craiggreen2 sentences2026Clear and convincing evidence is “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” People v. Craig, 403 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2010). 2026Clear and convincing evidence is “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” People v. Craig, 403 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2010). ¶ 31 Again, our standard of review here is whether the court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence, because it heard live testimony. | 18 | 18 |
Holland v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014The Court began by laying out the analytical framework for such claims: “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, -7- 2014 IL App (2d) 121203 [citation], the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. [Citati 2014The Court began by laying out the analytical framework for such claims: “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, [citation], the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. [Citation.] Rather, ‘taken as a who | 4 | 4 |
In Re Marriage of Wechselbergergreen2 sentences2026In re Marriage of Wechselberger, 115 Ill. 2021In re Marriage of Wechselberger, 115 Ill. App. 3d 779, 786 (1983). | 2 | 2 |
Schlup v. Delored2 sentences2018Although the description is stated in terms of reasonable doubt, our courts have considered clear and convincing evidence to be “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” People v. Craig, 403 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2010) (citing In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004) and Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995)). ¶ 57 Additionally, a “truly persuasive demonstration of innocence” by “compelling evidence,” (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488-89 ) may be made by presenting evi 2018Although the description is stated in terms of reasonable doubt, our courts have considered clear and convincing evidence to be “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” People v. Craig, 403 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2010) (citing In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004) and Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995)). ¶ 57 Additionally, a “truly persuasive demonstration of innocence” by “compelling evidence,” (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488-89 ) may be made by presenting evi | 2 | 2 |
The United States of America v. Barney Glassgreen2 sentences2014See United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1988) (“ ‘Reasonable doubt’ must speak for itself. 2014See United States v. Glass, 846 F.2d 386, 387 (7th Cir. 1988) (“ ‘Reasonable doubt’ must speak for itself. | 2 | 2 |
The People v. Malmenatogreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 ; Speight, 153 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 48 However, when considering the due process implications of an instruction that defined reasonable doubt to the jury, the United States Supreme Court stated in Victor v. Nebraska: “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable dou 2012See, e.g., Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 ; Speight, 153 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 54 However, when considering the due process implications of an instruction that defined reasonable doubt to the jury, the United States Supreme Court stated in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994): “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyo | 2 | 2 |
In Re DTgreen2 sentences2010In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 , 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1226 (2004); Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 213 , 647 N.E.2d at 276 . 2010In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 , 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1226 (2004); Bazydlo, 164 Ill. 2d at 213 , 647 N.E.2d at 276 . | 2 | 2 |
In Re Detention of Kishgreen2 sentences2010App. 3d at 555-56 , 916 N.E.2d at 602 (there is no logical contradiction in the Act’s use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in the initial commitment proceeding and the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in a conditional-release-revocation proceeding). 2010App. 3d at 555-56 , 916 N.E.2d at 602 (there is no logical contradiction in the Act's use of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in the initial commitment proceeding and the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in a conditional-release-revocation proceeding). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Neil C.green2 sentences2000App. 3d at 671 ; accord Fitzgerald v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 539, 548 , 845 P.2d 465, 474 (App. 1992); In re Neil C., 308 Md. 591, 594-95 , 521 A.2d 329, 331 (1987). 2000App. 3d at 671 ; accord Fitzgerald v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 539, 548 , 845 P.2d 465, 474 (App. 1992); In re Neil C., 308 Md. 591, 594-95 , 521 A.2d 329, 331 (1987). | 2 | 2 |
Fitzgerald v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000App. 3d at 671 ; accord Fitzgerald v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 539, 548 , 845 P.2d 465, 474 (App. 1992); In re Neil C., 308 Md. 591, 594-95 , 521 A.2d 329, 331 (1987). 2000App. 3d at 671 ; accord Fitzgerald v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 539, 548 , 845 P.2d 465, 474 (App. 1992); In re Neil C., 308 Md. 591, 594-95 , 521 A.2d 329, 331 (1987). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Moralesgreen2 sentences2026It is “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Morales, 2024 IL App (2d) 230597, ¶ 15 . 2026Clear and convincing evidence is “that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question” (internal quotation marks omitted) (People v. White, 2024 IL App (1st) 232245, ¶ 19 ), although it is a less demanding standard than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary for a conviction (People v. Morales, 2024 IL App (2d) 230597, ¶ 15 ). | 1 | 5 |
Victor v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences2014The Court began by laying out the analytical framework for such claims: “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, [citation], the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of proof. [Citation.] Rather, ‘taken as a who 2012See, e.g., Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 ; Speight, 153 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 54 However, when considering the due process implications of an instruction that defined reasonable doubt to the jury, the United States Supreme Court stated in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994): “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyo | 1 | 4 |
People v. Morgangreen2 sentences2026The State need not comply with the evidentiary rules applicable at trial and “may present evidence at the hearing by way of proffer based upon reliable information.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2), (5) (West 2024). ¶ 25 Section 110-6.1(j) of the Code provides a defendant the right to appeal from an order denying pretrial release (id. § 110-6.1(j)), and where, as here, the parties submitted evidence at the pretrial detention hearing by proffer and no live witnesses testified, we review de novo whether the State overcame the presumption of pretrial release (People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶¶ 21, 51 2026Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54 . ¶ 32 1. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Evansgreen2 sentences2019He then reiterated that the jurors could have questions, “as long as those questions don’t amount to a reasonable doubt.” This argument was an improper attempt to define and dilute the State’s burden of proof (see People v. Evans, 2016 IL App (3d) 140120, ¶ 59 (prosecutor’s rebuttal remarks improperly conflated the beyond-a-reasonable- doubt standard with a question of whether the defendant’s actions were reasonable, lessening the State’s burden of proof)), and nothing close to it is permitted on retrial. 2018He then reiterated that the jurors could have questions, "as long as those questions don't amount to a reasonable doubt." This argument was an improper attempt to define and dilute the State's burden of proof (see People v. Evans , 2016 IL App (3d) 140120 , ¶ 59, 406 Ill.Dec. 175 , 60 N.E.3d 77 (prosecutor's rebuttal remarks improperly conflated the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard with a question of whether the defendant's actions were reasonable, lessening the State's burden of proof) ), and nothing close to it is permitted on retrial. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Minniweathergreen2 sentences2011Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); People v. Minniweather, 301 Ill.App.3d 574, 577 , 234 Ill.Dec. 812 , 703 N.E.2d 912 (1998). 2011Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); People v. Minniweather, 301 Ill.App.3d 574, 577 , 234 Ill.Dec. 812 , 703 N.E.2d 912 (1998). | 1 | 2 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2011Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); People v. Minniweather, 301 Ill.App.3d 574, 577 , 234 Ill.Dec. 812 , 703 N.E.2d 912 (1998). 2011Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); People v. Minniweather, 301 Ill.App.3d 574, 577 , 234 Ill.Dec. 812 , 703 N.E.2d 912 (1998). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jacksongreen1 sentence2026People v. Holman, 2025 IL App (2d) 240513, ¶ 56 ; see People v. Jackson, 149 Ill. 2d 540, 549 (1992) (“We need not decide now if - 17 - any specific traditional standard of proof applies at sentencing. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McDonaldred | 1 | 1 |
| People of Illinois v. Rhodesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Clinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Galangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Nelsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gerstein v. Pughgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. McBridegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pelored | 1 | 1 |
| In Re EHgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Greengreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bazydlo v. Volant
green
2 sentences2018Although the description is stated in terms of reasonable doubt, our courts have considered clear and convincing evidence to be “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” People v. Craig, 403 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2010) (citing In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004) and Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995)). ¶ 57 Additionally, a “truly persuasive demonstration of innocence” by “compelling evidence,” (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488-89 ) may be made by presenting evi 2018Although the description is stated in terms of reasonable doubt, our courts have considered clear and convincing evidence to be “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” People v. Craig, 403 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2010) (citing In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004) and Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995)). ¶ 57 Additionally, a “truly persuasive demonstration of innocence” by “compelling evidence,” (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488-89 ) may be made by presenting evi | 4 | 2010–2018 |
People v. Trottier
green
2 sentences2024People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317 , ¶ 13. 2024People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13 . | 3 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Speight
green
2 sentences2012See, e.g., Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 ; Speight, 153 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 48 However, when considering the due process implications of an instruction that defined reasonable doubt to the jury, the United States Supreme Court stated in Victor v. Nebraska: “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyond a reasonable dou 2012See, e.g., Malmenato, 14 Ill. 2d at 61 ; Speight, 153 Ill. 2d at 374-75 . ¶ 54 However, when considering the due process implications of an instruction that defined reasonable doubt to the jury, the United States Supreme Court stated in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994): “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. [Citation.] Indeed, so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be proved beyo | 3 | 1995–2012 |
People v. White
green
2 sentences2026Id. §§ 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3), 110-10(b). ¶ 22 “Clear and convincing evidence” has been described as “that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question” (internal quotation marks omitted) (People v. White, 2024 IL App (1st) 232245, ¶ 19 ), although it is a less demanding standard than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary for a conviction (People v. Morales, 2024 IL App (2d) 230597, ¶ 15 ). 2026Clear and convincing evidence is “that quantum of proof that leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder about the truth of the proposition in question” (internal quotation marks omitted) (People v. White, 2024 IL App (1st) 232245, ¶ 19 ), although it is a less demanding standard than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary for a conviction (People v. Morales, 2024 IL App (2d) 230597, ¶ 15 ). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018Although the description is stated in terms of reasonable doubt, our courts have considered clear and convincing evidence to be “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” People v. Craig, 403 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2010) (citing In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004) and Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995)). ¶ 57 Additionally, a “truly persuasive demonstration of innocence” by “compelling evidence,” (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488-89 ) may be made by presenting evi 2018Although the description is stated in terms of reasonable doubt, our courts have considered clear and convincing evidence to be “more than a preponderance of the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” People v. Craig, 403 Ill. App. 3d 762, 768 (2010) (citing In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 362 (2004) and Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995)). ¶ 57 Additionally, a “truly persuasive demonstration of innocence” by “compelling evidence,” (Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 488-89 ) may be made by presenting evi | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Turman
green
2 sentences2014Turman and Franklin ¶ 30 In 2011, the First District Appellate Court issued Turman, 2011 IL App (1st) 091019, ¶ 19 , in which it held that the trial court committed reversible error when it answered a jury’s request for a definition of “reasonable doubt” by saying that “ ‘reasonable doubt is not defined under Illinois law. 2014Turman and Franklin ¶ 30 In 2011, the First District Appellate Court issued Turman, 2011 IL App (1st) 091019, ¶ 19 , in which it held that the trial court committed reversible error when it answered a jury’s request for a definition of “reasonable doubt” by saying that “ ‘reasonable doubt is not defined under Illinois law. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Sams
green
2 sentences2014App. 3d 120, 130 (2007). ¶ 80 Here, as in People v. Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 16 , since "the State presented no physical evidence connecting [respondent] to the [bike]", and no evidence that the respondent knowingly intended to permanently deprive the owner of her specific bicycle, we should find that the State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent is guilty. ¶ 81 Finally, the respondent raises the issue of due process, i.e., that the hearsay statements 31 No. 1-10-3835 went unchallenged by cross–examination which is a constitutional question and 2014App. 3d 120, 130 (2007). ¶ 80 Here, as in People v. Sams, 2013 IL App (1st) 121431, ¶ 16 , since “the State presented no physical evidence connecting [respondent] to the [bike],” and no evidence that the respondent knowingly intended to permanently deprive the owner of her specific bicycle, we should find - 17 - that the State has not met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent is guilty. ¶ 81 Finally, the respondent raises the issue of due process, i.e., that the hearsay statements went unchallenged by cross-examination, which is a constitutional question and would hav | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Trainor
green
2 sentences2010Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 335 , 752 N.E.2d at 1065 . 2010Trainor, 196 Ill. 2d at 335 , 752 N.E.2d at 1065 . | 2 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Buonavolanto
green
2 sentences2000"Because this issue had been decided unfavorably to the State under a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, the State is barred from proceeding against defendant under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard." Buonavolanto , 238 Ill. 2000“Because this issue had been decided unfavorably to the State under a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, the State is barred from proceeding against defendant under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” Buonavolanto, 238 Ill. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
People v. Holman
green
1 sentence2026People v. Holman, 2025 IL App (2d) 240513, ¶ 56 ; see People v. Jackson, 149 Ill. 2d 540, 549 (1992) (“We need not decide now if - 17 - any specific traditional standard of proof applies at sentencing. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v.Salamon
green
1 sentence2025See, e.g., People v. Wright, 2016 IL App (5th) 120310, ¶ 33 ; Fort, 2014 IL App (1st) 120037, ¶ 19 ; Newton, 369 F.3d at 679 . ¶ 44 In harmless error review, courts may “(1) focus on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction, (2) examine the other evidence in the case to see if overwhelming evidence supports the conviction, and (3) determine whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence.” People v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 121 . ¶ 45 To convict Rainey of the AHC charge, the State had to prove he (1) eit | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Reed
green
1 sentence2025People v. Reed, 2023 IL App (1st) 231834, ¶ 25 ; see Morales, 2024 IL App (2d) 230597, ¶ 15 (stating that the clear-and-convincing standard is less than the beyond-a-reasonable- doubt standard). ¶ 39 In short, the circuit court here did not err in finding that the State established by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or the presumption great that Mr. Hughes committed the qualifying offense of murder. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Sewn Newton
green
1 sentence2025See, e.g., People v. Wright, 2016 IL App (5th) 120310, ¶ 33 ; Fort, 2014 IL App (1st) 120037, ¶ 19 ; Newton, 369 F.3d at 679 . ¶ 44 In harmless error review, courts may “(1) focus on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction, (2) examine the other evidence in the case to see if overwhelming evidence supports the conviction, and (3) determine whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence.” People v. Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 121 . ¶ 45 To convict Rainey of the AHC charge, the State had to prove he (1) eit | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Clemons green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Barker green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Weston green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Payne green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Stull green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Hester green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Collins green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Eddington green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Felix Stroud Hammontree v. C. Paul Phelps, Director, Louisiana Department of Corrections, Respondent green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Gibson neutral | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.