20 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People in Interest of SRgreen2 sentences2009See People in the Interest of S.R., 323 N.W.2d 885, 887 (S.D. 1982) ("we assume that the same burden required to prove serious emotional or physical harm under § 1912(f), beyond a reasonable doubt, would also be required to prove active efforts by the party seeking termination"); Department of Soc. 1990In re S.R., 323 N.W.2d 885, 887 (S.D. 1982). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Pohgreen2 sentences2019See Poh , 116 Wis. 2d at 525 -26 . ¶36 Mahajni acknowledges that he cannot obtain an evidentiary hearing without making a showing alleging facts that entitle him to a new trial, based on the standards we have described. 2019See Poh, 116 Wis. 2d at 525-26 . ¶36 Mahajni acknowledges that he cannot obtain an evidentiary hearing without making a showing alleging facts that entitle him to a new trial, based on the standards we have described. | 2 | 2 |
Victor v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences1997Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has also unanimously, albeit dictum, agreed that: "The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course." Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994). 1997Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has also unanimously, albeit dictum, agreed that: "The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course." Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994). [11] Zanelli compares his vagueness argument to the analysis relating to statutes challenged on grounds of vagueness. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Pettitgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). 2025See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47 , 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Winnebago County v. C.S.green2 sentences2024Winnebago Cnty. v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, ¶65 , 391 Wis. 2d 35 , 940 N.W.2d 875 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Edward C. 2024Winnebago Cnty. v. C.S., 2020 WI 33, ¶65 , 391 Wis. 2d 35 , 940 N.W.2d 875 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Edward C. | 1 | 1 |
Ascaris Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation Fundgreen1 sentence2020We could even conclude a party has shown clearly and convincingly that a law is unconstitutional, and still we would sustain it." Mayo, 383 Wis. 2d 1, ¶84 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2020See State v. Anderson, 2005 WI 54, ¶64 , 280 Wis. 2d 104 , 695 N.W.2d 731 (citation omitted). 2020See State v. Anderson, 2005 WI 54, ¶64 , 280 Wis. 2d 104 , 695 N.W.2d 731 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Postgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 328-29 , 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (observing that the court "has previously construed deficient statutes to include constitutionally required procedures," and construing a prior version of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 to include the right to a jury trial even though ch. 980 did not provide for it). 2014See State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 328-29 , 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (observing that the court "has previously construed deficient statutes to include constitutionally required procedures," and construing a prior version of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 to include the right to a jury trial even though ch. 980 did not provide for it). | 1 | 1 |
Addington v. Texasgreen2 sentences2014Id. at 427-28, 431 . ¶ 21. 2014Talley points out, correctly, that one of the Addington Court's reasons for rejecting the beyond a reasonable doubt standard was the Court's concern that the "uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis" raised "a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous." Addington, 441 U.S. at 429, 432 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re GSgreen1 sentence2009See Welfare of M.S.S. at 418; In re G.S., 59 P.3d 1063, 1071 (Mont. 2002), 20 However, while it is plain from 25 U.S.C. § 1902 that a purpose of Congress was to protect Indian families by establishing minimum federal standards, it does not follow that Congress must have meant to do so by mandating the highest burden of proof in § 1912(d). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Roegreen1 sentence2009In re Roe, 764 N.W.2d 789, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). 22 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977: Hearing on S.1214 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong. 29-30 (Aug. 4, 1977). 23 In a section-by-section analysis of the Act, the House Report explains: Subsection (d) provides that a party seeking foster care placement or termination of parental rights involving an Indian child must satisfy the court that active efforts have been made to provide assistance designed to prevent the breakup of Indian families. | 1 | 1 |
Buhler v. Racine Countygreen2 sentences2008In Wisconsin, "an ordinance will be held constitutional unless the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt[,] and the ordinance is entitled to every presumption in favor of its validity." Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 646 , 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959); see also 1 Young, supra, § 3.22 (discussing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Wisconsin). 13 "Consequently, although a court may dif fer with the wisdom, or lack thereof, or the desirability of the zoning, the court, because of the fundamental nature of its power, cannot substitute its judgment for tha 2008In Wisconsin, "an ordinance will be held constitutional unless the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt[,] and the ordinance is entitled to every presumption in favor of its validity." Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis.2d 637, 646 , 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959); see also 1 Young, supra, § 3.22 (discussing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Wisconsin). [13] "Consequently, although a court may differ with the wisdom, or lack thereof, or the desirability of the zoning, the court, because of the fundamental nature of its power, cannot substitute its judgment for tha | 1 | 1 |
Thorp v. Town of Lebanongreen2 sentences2008For an example of a reference to conditional-use zoning, see Village Creek Property Owners' Association, Inc., v. The Town of Edenton, 135 N.C.App. 482 , 520 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1999). [13] Wisconsin is one of a minority of states that asserts a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to successfully challenge the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance. 1 Young, supra, § 3.22; see also § 3.20-3.21 (discussing the "fairly debatable issue" and "clear and convincing evidence" standards, which are applied in the majority of states). [14] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provi 2008For an example of a reference to conditional-use zoning, see Village Creek Property Owners' Association, Inc., v. The Town of Edenton, 135 N.C.App. 482 , 520 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1999). [13] Wisconsin is one of a minority of states that asserts a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to successfully challenge the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance. 1 Young, supra, § 3.22; see also § 3.20-3.21 (discussing the "fairly debatable issue" and "clear and convincing evidence" standards, which are applied in the majority of states). [14] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provi | 1 | 1 |
Village Creek Property Owners' Ass'n v. Town of Edentongreen2 sentences2008For an example of a reference to conditional-use zoning, see Village Creek Property Owners' Association, Inc., v. The Town of Edenton, 135 N.C.App. 482 , 520 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1999). [13] Wisconsin is one of a minority of states that asserts a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to successfully challenge the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance. 1 Young, supra, § 3.22; see also § 3.20-3.21 (discussing the "fairly debatable issue" and "clear and convincing evidence" standards, which are applied in the majority of states). [14] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provi 2008For an example of a reference to conditional-use zoning, see Village Creek Property Owners' Association, Inc., v. The Town of Edenton, 135 N.C.App. 482 , 520 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1999). [13] Wisconsin is one of a minority of states that asserts a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to successfully challenge the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance. 1 Young, supra, § 3.22; see also § 3.20-3.21 (discussing the "fairly debatable issue" and "clear and convincing evidence" standards, which are applied in the majority of states). [14] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provi | 1 | 1 |
Norbert C. Pearson, Also Known as Spike v. City of Grand Blanc, J. Larry Tomlinsongreen1 sentence2008Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1223 (6th Cir.1992) (stating that "the zoning power is not infinite and unchallengeable; it `must be exercised within constitutional limits'"). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Casesgreen2 sentences2005The Introductory Note to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, In re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 163 (Okla. 2005), explains its reasons for adopting the single beyond a reasonable doubt standard as follows: the prevailing practice in Oklahoma trial courts has been to use the reasonable doubt standard for both the state law requirements for termination of parental rights and the requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f); a single standard is less confusing for the jury than a dual standard; and the higher standard gives greatest effect to 2005The Introductory Note to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, In re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 163 (Okla. 2005), explains its reasons for adopting the single beyond a reasonable doubt standard as follows: the prevailing practice in Oklahoma trial courts has been to use the reasonable doubt standard for both the state law requirements for termination of parental rights and the requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f); a single standard is less confusing for the jury than a dual standard; and the higher standard gives greatest effect to | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See Stewart v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 185, 193 , 265 N.W.2d 489, 493 (1978) (overruled on other grounds). 1998See Stewart v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 185, 193 , 265 N.W.2d 489, 493 (1978) (overruled on other grounds). | 1 | 1 |
| Schad v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Poellinger
green
1 sentence2023Although Ross emphasizes the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in her arguments, that “is not the test on appeal.” See Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d at 503 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. Mohammad Usman Khan
green
2 sentences2019Second, he argues that the reasonable hypothesis verbiage shifts 30 No. 2017AP1206-CR the burden to the defense by focusing on the defendant's ability to produce alternatives to the government's case. ¶47 In support of his position, Trammell cites United States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). 2019Second, he argues that the reasonable hypothesis verbiage shifts the burden to the defense by focusing on the defendant's ability to produce alternatives to the government's case. ¶47 In support of his position, Trammell cites United States v. Khan , 821 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Sullivan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2018Winship , supra . 508 U.S. at 277 -78 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 . ¶127 The United States Supreme Court concluded in Sullivan that an erroneous beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal because "a misdescription of the burden of proof ... vitiates all the jury's findings." Id. at 281 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 . 2018Winship , supra . 508 U.S. at 277 -78 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 . ¶127 The United States Supreme Court concluded in Sullivan that an erroneous beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal because "a misdescription of the burden of proof ... vitiates all the jury's findings." Id. at 281 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Bonds
green
2 sentences2018Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether the burden of proof meets the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, although it is not required as the preponderance-of-the evidence standard applies. 19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van Riper , 2003 WI App 237 , 267 Wis. 2d 759 , 672 N.W.2d 156 , and State v. Bonds , 2006 WI 83 , 292 Wis. 2d 344 , 717 N.W.2d 133 . 2018Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether the burden of proof meets the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, although it is not required as the preponderance-of-the evidence standard applies. 19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van Riper , 2003 WI App 237 , 267 Wis. 2d 759 , 672 N.W.2d 156 , and State v. Bonds , 2006 WI 83 , 292 Wis. 2d 344 , 717 N.W.2d 133 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Van Riper
green
2 sentences2018Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether the burden of proof meets the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, although it is not required as the preponderance-of-the evidence standard applies. 19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van Riper , 2003 WI App 237 , 267 Wis. 2d 759 , 672 N.W.2d 156 , and State v. Bonds , 2006 WI 83 , 292 Wis. 2d 344 , 717 N.W.2d 133 . 2018Given the Wisconsin Statutes regarding PAC cases, courts may nonetheless decide to make a record of whether the burden of proof meets the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, although it is not required as the preponderance-of-the evidence standard applies. 19 Our conclusion is not in conflict with State v. Van Riper , 2003 WI App 237 , 267 Wis. 2d 759 , 672 N.W.2d 156 , and State v. Bonds , 2006 WI 83 , 292 Wis. 2d 344 , 717 N.W.2d 133 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
1 sentence2018Winship, supra. 508 U.S. at 277-78 . ¶127 The United States Supreme Court concluded in Sullivan that an erroneous beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal because "a misdescription of the burden of proof . . . vitiates all the jury's findings." Id. at 281 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kansas v. Hendricks
green
1 sentence2014Talley appears to argue that Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), supports his argument that due process requires the beyond a reasonable doubt standard at Wis. Stat. ch. 980 discharge trials. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis
green
2 sentences2008In Wisconsin, "an ordinance will be held constitutional unless the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt[,] and the ordinance is entitled to every presumption in favor of its validity." Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis. 2d 637, 646 , 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959); see also 1 Young, supra, § 3.22 (discussing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Wisconsin). 13 "Consequently, although a court may dif fer with the wisdom, or lack thereof, or the desirability of the zoning, the court, because of the fundamental nature of its power, cannot substitute its judgment for tha 2008In Wisconsin, "an ordinance will be held constitutional unless the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt[,] and the ordinance is entitled to every presumption in favor of its validity." Highway 100 Auto Wreckers, Inc. v. City of West Allis, 6 Wis.2d 637, 646 , 96 N.W.2d 85 (1959); see also 1 Young, supra, § 3.22 (discussing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in Wisconsin). [13] "Consequently, although a court may differ with the wisdom, or lack thereof, or the desirability of the zoning, the court, because of the fundamental nature of its power, cannot substitute its judgment for tha | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In Re Michael G.
green
1 sentence2005The Introductory Note to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, In re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 163 (Okla. 2005), explains its reasons for adopting the single beyond a reasonable doubt standard as follows: the prevailing practice in Oklahoma trial courts has been to use the reasonable doubt standard for both the state law requirements for termination of parental rights and the requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f); a single standard is less confusing for the jury than a dual standard; and the higher standard gives greatest effect to | 1 | 2005–2005 |
In Re Annette P.
green
1 sentence2005The Introductory Note to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, In re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 163 (Okla. 2005), explains its reasons for adopting the single beyond a reasonable doubt standard as follows: the prevailing practice in Oklahoma trial courts has been to use the reasonable doubt standard for both the state law requirements for termination of parental rights and the requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f); a single standard is less confusing for the jury than a dual standard; and the higher standard gives greatest effect to | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Matter of Baby Boy Doe
green
1 sentence2005The Introductory Note to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, In re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 163 (Okla. 2005), explains its reasons for adopting the single beyond a reasonable doubt standard as follows: the prevailing practice in Oklahoma trial courts has been to use the reasonable doubt standard for both the state law requirements for termination of parental rights and the requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f); a single standard is less confusing for the jury than a dual standard; and the higher standard gives greatest effect to | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People Ex Rel. Dg
green
1 sentence2005The Introductory Note to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, In re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 163 (Okla. 2005), explains its reasons for adopting the single beyond a reasonable doubt standard as follows: the prevailing practice in Oklahoma trial courts has been to use the reasonable doubt standard for both the state law requirements for termination of parental rights and the requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f); a single standard is less confusing for the jury than a dual standard; and the higher standard gives greatest effect to | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Nye
green
1 sentence1997The instruction read "if that intentional touching can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification ..." Nye, 100 Wis. 2d at 400 . ¶ 56. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| United States v. Franklin Delano Gipson green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.