beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Texas

2015The alleged victim and the expert medical testimony is inconsistent, the prosecutor deliberately engaged in conduct to inflame and prejudice the jury and the contrary evidence outueighed the evidence supporting the Petitioner's conviction, see: Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004) "Contrary evidence in a criminal case does not have to outueigh evidence of guilt, but has to be only enough to provide reasonable doubt; if contrary evidence does outueigh evidence supporting the verdict, then the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has not been met by the State." Therefore, the Petit

2014Weighing all the evidence under this balancing scale, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met, so the guilty verdict should not stand.” Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477 , (Tex.Crim.App.2004).

2006In a factual sufficiency review, we consider all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting "the verdict is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or if evidence contrary to the verdict is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met." Threadgill v. State , 146 S.W.3d 654, 664 (Tex. Crim.

2006In a factual sufficiency review in a criminal case, we consider all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether evidence supporting “the verdict is too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or if evidence contrary to the verdict is strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met.” Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 664 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); see also Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).

2010Id.

2010Id.

2006See Escamilla , 143 S.W.3d at 817 .

2006See Escamilla , 143 S.W.3d at 817 .

2005In Bluitt v. State, the court held that the trial court need not give a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction concerning extraneous offenses when those offenses resulted in either a final conviction, probation, or deferred adjudication. 137 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).

2005In Bluitt v. State , the court of criminal appeals held that the trial court need not give a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction concerning extraneous offenses when those offenses resulted in either a final conviction, probation, or deferred adjudication. 137 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Fuller v. State, 363 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex. Crim.

2023The State agrees an improper definition of reasonable doubt may violate due process.14 13 Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 (internal citations omitted), states: The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course. . . .

2015A. Definition of Beyond A Reasonable Doubt “The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994).

2022In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means a ‘measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235 (quoting Tex. Fam.

2021In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d at 671 . “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means a ‘measure of degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting TEX.

2006Id.

2006A. Standard of Review In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict if "proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence *588 in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof." Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2008Stated another way, evidence supporting guilt can `outweigh' the contrary proof and still be factually insufficient under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard." Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 485 ; see Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 416 ("The problem is exacerbated by what our Zuniga opinion says next....").

2008Stated another way, evidence supporting guilt can ‘outweigh’ the contrary proof and still be factually insufficient under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.” Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 485 ; see Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 416 (“The problem is exacerbated by what our Zuniga opinion says next....”).

2005In Huizar v. State, the court of criminal appeals held that Article 37.07, section 3(a) requires a trial court to sua sponte give a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction when evidence of extraneous offenses or bad acts is admitted at punishment. 12 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2005In Huizar v. State , the court of criminal appeals held that Article 37.07, section 3(a) requires a trial court to sua sponte give a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt instruction when evidence of extraneous offenses or bad acts is admitted at punishment. 12 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex. Crim.

2006Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 484 B 85; see Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim.

2006A. Standard of Review In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict if "proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence *588 in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof." Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2022In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means a ‘measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 235 (quoting Tex. Fam.

2021In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); In re L.J.N., 329 S.W.3d at 671 . “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means a ‘measure of degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.’” In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (quoting TEX.

2007Id.

2005Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

2024State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979); In re A.B.B., 482 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) A single ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V) is sufficient to uphold termination of a parent’s rights.

1987The difference is material, for a clear and convincing standard is an intermediate one falling between the preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings, and is defined as “that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” See State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.1979).

2006A. Standard of Review In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict if "proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof." Vodochodsky v. State , 158 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex. Crim.

2006A. Standard of Review In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict if "proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence *588 in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof." Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)); Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 593-94 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2005King v. State, 125 S.W.3d 517, 519-20 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (Cochran, J., concurring in refusal of appellant’s petition for discretionary review) (noting that court of criminal appeals has not expressly addressed issue of whether article 37.07, section 3(a) requires beyond-a-reasonable-doubt punishment instruction for extraneous offenses admitted as same transaction contextual evidence at guilt/innocence and re-offered at punishment).

2005King v. State, 125 S.W.3d 517, 519-20 (Tex. Crim.

2005Id.; see Norrid v. State, 925 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1996, no pet.).

2005Id.; see Norrid v. State , 925 S.W.2d 342, 349 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no pet.).

2003See id. [11] See Velasquez, 329 F.3d at 421 ; Groceman, 2002 WL 1398559 , at *3-4. [12] Our research has revealed two cases holding that a statutorily required blood draw violates the Fourth Amendment.

2003See id. .

2006An appellate court "must give due deference to the fact finder's determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence and will reverse the fact finder's determination only to arrest the occurrence of a manifest injustice." Swearingen v. State , 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim.

2006An appellate court "must give due deference to the fact finder's determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence. . . ." Swearingen , 101 S.W.3d at 97 .

2019See, e.g., Easley, 424 S.W.3d at 542 (applying rule 44.2(b) and concluding no harm when counsel was denied his preferred method of discussing criminal burdens of proof but was not precluded from discussing and explaining the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard); Lnuk-X v. State, No. 05-15-00908-CR, 2016 WL 3017565 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 18, 2016, no pet.) (assessing harm where State objected to appellant’s counsel’s question during voir dire).

2015After concluding that Petitioner’s trial counsel “was not entirely precluded from discussing and explaining the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard,” the court of appeals, relying upon dicta contained in this Court’s opinion in Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535 , 541–42 (Tex. Crim.

2006See Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 477, 481 ; see also Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (describing evidence in “fair equipoise” as precluding reversal for factual insufficiency).

2005See Zuniga, 144 S.W.3d at 477, 481 ; see also Goodman v. State , 66 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. Crim.

2026See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim.

2011App. 2009)] to mean that while the factfinder’s prerogative to choose among plausible and rational readings of the evidence is beyond our review, there must still be some evidence to prove the essential elements of the offense and a verdict must be supported by a reasonable inference.3 In Brooks v. State,4 we jettisoned the unworkable “factual sufficiency” review because the single, rigorous due-process standard in Jackson v. Virginia5 suffices to protect a defendant from conviction without sufficient proof of every element of the offense to satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.6 I d

2024State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979); In re A.B.B., 482 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. dism’d w.o.j.).

2024State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979); In re A.B.B., 482 S.W.3d 135, 139 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) A single ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V) is sufficient to uphold termination of a parent’s rights.

2022Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2787 , 61 L.

2016DISCUSSION Legal Sufficiency In his first issue on appeal, Penaloza contends that the evidence was legally “insufficient to prove that [he] hit or pushed [Vasquez] or that he did so with a culpable mental state 5 because [Vasquez]’s intoxication rendered her perceptions so unreliable that her memory of events was not sufficient to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” Under a legal-sufficiency standard of review, appellate courts view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the