23 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Searlegreen2 sentences2022The court held that the presumption failed to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and the defendant had consequently been adjudged guilty without requiring that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime charged.' 1 Id. 1988Defendant further points out that in State v. Searle, 339 So.2d 1194, 1206 (La.1976), [the] presumption that a defendant found in possession of property recently stolen in a burglary is presumed to have committed the burglary does 'not meet the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard, and ... defendant consequently was adjudged guilty without requiring that the State .prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime charged. | 1 | 4 |
Victor v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences2015“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 . 2015“The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course.” Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 . | 1 | 4 |
Cannon v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Antithetically, this Court has long prohibited the lower courts of this State from attempting to define the term “reasonable doubt” through jury instructions, finding that the term is “obscure and it must be assumed that the members of the jury were men of ordinary intelligence and capable of understanding their meaning.” Cannon v. State, 190 So.2d 848, 851 (Miss.1966). | 1 | 1 |
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. v. Garrell S. Mullaneygreen1 sentence1976In State v. Odom, 83 Wash.2d 541 , 520 P.2d 152 (1974), the Court stated: "In Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943, 948 (1st Cir. 1973), the court struck down a presumption that malice is presumed from an intentional killing, noting that while a presumption `might, conceivably, be justified if based upon a fact which, if found beyond a reasonable doubt, also compels the inference beyond a reasonable doubt . . . no one could suggest such in this case.' "The application by the United States Supreme Court of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as an alternative in Leary and Turner, and its subsequ | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arthur R. Blackgreen1 sentence1976See also, United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975); Dinkins v. State, 29 Md.App. 577 , 349 A.2d 676 (1976); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680 , 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); Ashford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165 (1969); McCormick on Evidence, § 344, at p. 816 (2d ed. 1972) ("* * * [T]he Court's frequent reference that [beyond a reasonable doubt] standard in Turner, coupled with its decision in In re Winship recognizing that such a measure of proof is constitutionally required in criminal cases, makes it li | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1994There is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow a conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). 1994There is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instruction to allow a conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). | 3 | 1984–1994 |
Daniel v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
green
2 sentences2016Daniel, 02-2427 at p. 6, 861 So.2d at 725-26 . 2010Daniel , 02-2427 at p. 6, 861 So.2d at 725-26 . | 2 | 2010–2016 |
Bundren v. Affiliated Nursing Homes
neutral
2 sentences1996Bundren v. Affiliated Nursing Homes, Inc., 94-808 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/95) ; 649 So.2d 1177 . 1996Bundren v. Affiliated Nursing Homes, Inc., 94-808 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/95) ; 649 So.2d 1177 . | 2 | 1996–1996 |
Ardoin v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
green
1 sentence2016This standard lies between the preponderance-of-the-evidenee standard and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hollingsworth v. Steven Garr Logging
neutral
1 sentence2016Gilliam, supra; Hollingsworth v. Steven Garr Logging, 47,884 (La.App.2d Cir.2/27/13), 110 So.3d 1219 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Clark
green
1 sentence2008This standard lies between the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard." Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Comeaux v. City of Crowley
green
2 sentences2008Comeaux v. City of Crowley, 01-32 (La.7/3/01), 793 So.2d 1215 . 2008Comeaux v. City of Crowley, 01-32 (La.7/3/01), 793 So.2d 1215 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Mitchell v. AT & T
green
1 sentence1999Renter v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, 28,589 (La.App.2d Cir.8/23/96), 679 So.2d 603 ; Mitchell v. AT & T, 27,290 (La.App.2d Cir.8/28/95), 660 So.2d 204 , writ denied 95-2474 (La.12/15/95), 664 So.2d 456 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Renter v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center
green
1 sentence1999Renter v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, 28,589 (La.App.2d Cir.8/23/96), 679 So.2d 603 ; Mitchell v. AT & T, 27,290 (La.App.2d Cir.8/28/95), 660 So.2d 204 , writ denied 95-2474 (La.12/15/95), 664 So.2d 456 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Mitchell v. AT & T
green
1 sentence1999Renter v. Willis-Knighton Medical Center, 28,589 (La.App.2d Cir.8/23/96), 679 So.2d 603 ; Mitchell v. AT & T, 27,290 (La.App.2d Cir.8/28/95), 660 So.2d 204 , writ denied 95-2474 (La.12/15/95), 664 So.2d 456 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Dowling v. United States
green
2 sentences1997In its brief to this court, the state contends that, under Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990), evidence of other crimes for which a defendant has been acquitted is admissible. 1997In its brief to this court, the state contends that, under Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990), evidence of other crimes for which a defendant has been acquitted is admissible. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Spooner
green
1 sentence1988NOTES [1] 505 So.2d 230 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987) [2] 507 So.2d 221 (La. 1987) [3] The defendant argues that because a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard should apply. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State ex rel. Del Genio v. Orleans Parish, Criminal District Court
neutral
1 sentence1988NOTES [1] 505 So.2d 230 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987) [2] 507 So.2d 221 (La. 1987) [3] The defendant argues that because a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard should apply. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Nelson
neutral
2 sentences1988As noted in Nelson, supra, 487 So.2d at 698 , “(i)ntent, being subjective in nature, need not be proven as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. 1988As noted in Nelson, supra, 487 So.2d at 698 , “(i)ntent, being subjective in nature, need not be proven as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen
green
2 sentences1983County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 , 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). 1983County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 , 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224 , 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
1 sentence1982For example, the Jackson court noted at footnote 10 that "[t]he power of the factfinder to err upon the side of mercy, however, has never been thought to include a power to enter an unreasonable verdict of guilty." 99 S.Ct. at 2788 n. 10, citing United Brotherhood, etc. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America v. United States
green
2 sentences1982For example, the Jackson court noted at footnote 10 that "[t]he power of the factfinder to err upon the side of mercy, however, has never been thought to include a power to enter an unreasonable verdict of guilty." 99 S.Ct. at 2788 n. 10, citing United Brotherhood, etc. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973 . 1982For example, the Jackson court noted at footnote 10 that "[t]he power of the factfinder to err upon the side of mercy, however, has never been thought to include a power to enter an unreasonable verdict of guilty." 99 S.Ct. at 2788 n. 10, citing United Brotherhood, etc. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 408 , 67 S.Ct. 775, 782 , 91 L.Ed. 973 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
State v. Odom
green
2 sentences1976In State v. Odom, 83 Wash.2d 541 , 520 P.2d 152 (1974), the Court stated: "In Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943, 948 (1st Cir. 1973), the court struck down a presumption that malice is presumed from an intentional killing, noting that while a presumption `might, conceivably, be justified if based upon a fact which, if found beyond a reasonable doubt, also compels the inference beyond a reasonable doubt . . . no one could suggest such in this case.' "The application by the United States Supreme Court of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as an alternative in Leary and Turner, and its subsequ 1976In State v. Odom, 83 Wash.2d 541 , 520 P.2d 152 (1974), the Court stated: "In Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d 943, 948 (1st Cir. 1973), the court struck down a presumption that malice is presumed from an intentional killing, noting that while a presumption `might, conceivably, be justified if based upon a fact which, if found beyond a reasonable doubt, also compels the inference beyond a reasonable doubt . . . no one could suggest such in this case.' "The application by the United States Supreme Court of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as an alternative in Leary and Turner, and its subsequ | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Dinkins v. State
green
2 sentences1976See also, United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975); Dinkins v. State, 29 Md.App. 577 , 349 A.2d 676 (1976); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680 , 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); Ashford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165 (1969); McCormick on Evidence, § 344, at p. 816 (2d ed. 1972) ("* * * [T]he Court's frequent reference that [beyond a reasonable doubt] standard in Turner, coupled with its decision in In re Winship recognizing that such a measure of proof is constitutionally required in criminal cases, makes it li 1976See also, United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975); Dinkins v. State, 29 Md.App. 577 , 349 A.2d 676 (1976); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680 , 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); Ashford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165 (1969); McCormick on Evidence, § 344, at p. 816 (2d ed. 1972) ("* * * [T]he Court's frequent reference that [beyond a reasonable doubt] standard in Turner, coupled with its decision in In re Winship recognizing that such a measure of proof is constitutionally required in criminal cases, makes it li | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences1976See also, United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975); Dinkins v. State, 29 Md.App. 577 , 349 A.2d 676 (1976); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680 , 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); Ashford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165 (1969); McCormick on Evidence, § 344, at p. 816 (2d ed. 1972) ("* * * [T]he Court's frequent reference that [beyond a reasonable doubt] standard in Turner, coupled with its decision in In re Winship recognizing that such a measure of proof is constitutionally required in criminal cases, makes it li 1976See also, United States v. Black, 512 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1975); Dinkins v. State, 29 Md.App. 577 , 349 A.2d 676 (1976); State v. Williams, 288 N.C. 680 , 220 S.E.2d 558 (1975); Ashford and Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165 (1969); McCormick on Evidence, § 344, at p. 816 (2d ed. 1972) ("* * * [T]he Court's frequent reference that [beyond a reasonable doubt] standard in Turner, coupled with its decision in In re Winship recognizing that such a measure of proof is constitutionally required in criminal cases, makes it li | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.