beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard (Nevada) · Go Syfert
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beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Nevada

26 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2022 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (18)

CaseFollowedCited
Nunnery v. Stategreen
nev · 2011 · cited in 13 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2014–2022
2 sentences

2019We previously rejected the second argument that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard does not apply to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749 , 772, 263 P.3d 235 , 250-51 (2011).

2019We previously rejected the second argument that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard does not apply to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749 , 772, 263 P.3d 235 , 250-51 (2011).

1213
Kansas v. Kansasgreen
scotus · 2016 · cited in 4 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2016–2022
2 sentences

2018Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 775-76 , 263 P.3d 235, 253 (2011); accord Kansas v. Carr, U .S. , 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016) (concluding that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).

2017Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. 749, 775-76 , 263 P.3d 235, 253 (2011); accord Kansas v. Carr, U.S. , 136 S. Ct. 633, 642 (2016) (concluding that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard).

44
Mark Leonard v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2017 · cited in 3 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018Accord People v. Jones, 398 P.3d 529, 554 (Cal. 2017); Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 169 (Ind. 2017); Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 39 (Miss. 2017).

2018Accord People v. Jones, 398 P.3d 529, 554 (Cal. 2017); Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 169 (Ind. 2017); Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 39 (Miss. 2017).

33
Timothy Nelson Evans v. State of Mississippigreen
miss · 2017 · cited in 3 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018Accord People v. Jones, 398 P.3d 529, 554 (Cal. 2017); Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 169 (Ind. 2017); Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 39 (Miss. 2017).

2018Accord People v. Jones, 398 P.3d 529, 554 (Cal. 2017); Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 169 (Ind. 2017); Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 39 (Miss. 2017).

33
People v. Jonesgreen
cal · 2017 · cited in 3 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018Accord People v. Jones, 398 P.3d 529, 554 (Cal. 2017); Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 169 (Ind. 2017); Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 39 (Miss. 2017).

2018Accord People v. Jones, 398 P.3d 529, 554 (Cal. 2017); Leonard v. State, 73 N.E.3d 155, 169 (Ind. 2017); Evans v. State, 226 So. 3d 1, 39 (Miss. 2017).

33
McConnell v. Stategreen
nev · 2009 · cited in 2 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2016–2022
2 sentences

2016But even if postconviction counsel could have demonstrated that appellate counsel's performance was deficient, our decisions in McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 254 , 212 P.3d 307, 314-15 (2009), which concluded that nothing in the relevant statutory language imposed a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev., Adv.

2016But even if postconviction counsel could have demonstrated that appellate counsel's performance was deficient, our decisions in McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 254 , 212 P.3d 307, 314-15 (2009), which concluded that nothing in the relevant statutory language imposed a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard on the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev., Adv.

22
DuFrane v. Sheriff, Washoe Countygreen
nev · 1972 · cited in 2 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021Thus, "[Ole preliminary hearing is not a trial and the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence is SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 1947A 411461D not a matter before the court." Las Vegas Twp., 112 Nev. at 806 , 919 P.2d at 402 ; see also DuFrane v. Sheriff, 88 Nev. 52, 54 , 495 P.2d 611, 613 (1972) (recognizing the lower standard of proof needed to establish probable cause at a preliminary hearing versus the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that must be met at trial).

2021Thus, "[Ole preliminary hearing is not a trial and the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence is SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 1947A 411461D not a matter before the court." Las Vegas Twp., 112 Nev. at 806 , 919 P.2d at 402 ; see also DuFrane v. Sheriff, 88 Nev. 52, 54 , 495 P.2d 611, 613 (1972) (recognizing the lower standard of proof needed to establish probable cause at a preliminary hearing versus the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that must be met at trial).

22
Johnson v. Statered
nev · 2002 · cited in 2 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2011–2016
2 sentences

2016Jury instructions Hover argues that: (1) the instruction concerning weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not conform to the beyond- a-reasonable-doubt standard of Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 802 , 59 P.3d 450, 460 (2002); the "moral culpability" language in the instruction defining mitigating circumstances was not broad enough to define mitigating circumstances; and the instructions failed to define "felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another." Hover did not object to the instructions below and we conclude that the district court did not plainl

2016Jury instructions Hover argues that: (1) the instruction concerning weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not conform to the beyond- a-reasonable-doubt standard of Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787, 802 , 59 P.3d 450, 460 (2002); the "moral culpability" language in the instruction defining mitigating circumstances was not broad enough to define mitigating circumstances; and the instructions failed to define "felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another." Hover did not object to the instructions below and we conclude that the district court did not plainl

12
Gaxiola v. Stategreen
nev · 2005 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 648-50 , 119 P.3d 1225, 1232-33 (2005).5 We further conclude that the instruction neither invited the jury to violate its obligation to consider other evidence nor involved the district court commenting on the facts of the case as the plain language of the instruction was devoid of case facts and reiterated the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard the jury was obligated to follow.

2019Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 648-50 , 119 P.3d 1225, 1232-33 (2005).5 We further conclude that the instruction neither invited the jury to violate its obligation to consider other evidence nor involved the district court commenting on the facts of the case as the plain language of the instruction was devoid of case facts and reiterated the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard the jury was obligated to follow.

11
Hymon v. Stategreen
nev · 2005 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019See NRS 3.230 (prohibiting statements regarding factual matters by district judges); Hymon, 121 Nev. at 211 , 111 P.3d at 1100 (presuming the jury follows its instructions).

2019See NRS 3.230 (prohibiting statements regarding factual matters by district judges); Hymon, 121 Nev. at 211 , 111 P.3d at 1100 (presuming the jury follows its instructions).

11
State v. Gomesgreen
nev · 1996 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
2 sentences

2018State v. Gomes, 112 Nev. 1473, 1481 , 930 P.2d 701, 706 (1996).

2018State v. Gomes, 112 Nev. 1473, 1481 , 930 P.2d 701, 706 (1996).

11
Browning v. Stategreen
nev · 2008 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016See Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 526 , 188 P.3d 60, 67 (2008) ("The focus of a capital penalty hearing is not the defendant's guilt, but rather his character, record, and the circumstances of the offense.").

2016See Browning v. State, 124 Nev. 517, 526 , 188 P.3d 60, 67 (2008) ("The focus of a capital penalty hearing is not the defendant's guilt, but rather his character, record, and the circumstances of the offense.").

11
Valdez v. Stategreen
nev · 2008 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See Valdez, 129 Nev. at 1190 , 196 P.3d at 477 (reviewing unobjected-to error for plain error affecting substantial rights).

11
Leonard v. Stategreen
nev · 1998 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Instructions Blake contends that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim that trial and appellate counsel should have challenged several jury instructions, including (1) reasonable doubt, (2) weighing of SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 16 (0) 1047A aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and (3) "equal and exact justice." Post-conviction counsel's omission of these trial- and appellate- counsel claims was not objectively unreasonable because the instructions were correct statements of law, see NRS 175.211(1); Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. „ 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011) (concludin

2014Instructions Blake contends that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for not raising a claim that trial and appellate counsel should have challenged several jury instructions, including (1) reasonable doubt, (2) weighing of SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 16 (0) 1047A aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and (3) "equal and exact justice." Post-conviction counsel's omission of these trial- and appellate- counsel claims was not objectively unreasonable because the instructions were correct statements of law, see NRS 175.211(1); Nunnery v. State, 127 Nev. „ 263 P.3d 235, 250-51 (2011) (concludin

11
DePasquale v. Stategreen
nev · 1990 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011See, e.g., DePasquale v. State, 106 Nev. 843, 852 , 803 P.2d 218, 223 (1990).

2011See, e.g., DePasquale v. State, 106 Nev. 843, 852 , 803 P.2d 218, 223 (1990).

11
Jimenez v. Stategreen
nev · 1996 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
2 sentences

2011Cf. Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 624-25 , 918 P.2d 687, 695-96 (1996) (applying similar analysis to claim that trial court erred in failing to instruct jury that mitigating circumstances did not have to be found unanimously).

2011Cf. Jimenez v. State, 112 Nev. 610, 624-25 , 918 P.2d 687, 695-96 (1996) (applying similar analysis to claim that trial court erred in failing to instruct jury that mitigating circumstances did not have to be found unanimously).

11
Robert Alton Harris v. R. Pulley, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentinred
ca9 · 1982 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985
1 sentence

1985U.S. ......, 105 S.Ct. 1372 (1985) we stated: “Since our procedure for weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances provides the sentencer with adequate information and guidance and the accused with sufficient guarantees that the penalty of death will not be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, the challenged statute passes constitutional muster.” Lastly, as the Ninth Circuit Court stated in Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 465 U.S. 37 (1984): “The United States Supreme Court has never stated that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is requi

11
Gagnon v. Scarpellired
scotus · 1973 · cited in 1 Nevada opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the applicable standard of proof in probation revocation hearings, its opinion in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789 -90 n. 12, 93 S.Ct. at 1763 n. 12, indicates that the Court believes that probation could be revoked on less than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

1980Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the applicable standard of proof in probation revocation hearings, its opinion in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 789 -90 n. 12, 93 S.Ct. at 1763 n. 12, indicates that the Court believes that probation could be revoked on less than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Sawyer v. Whitley green
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

2018Id.

2018Id.

32018–2018
Apprendi v. New Jersey green
scotus · 2000
2 sentences

2015Weighing equation Burnside argues that the jurors were improperly instructed on the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances because that determination is a finding of fact that is necessary to make death an available sentence and therefore that weighing is subject to the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

2015Weighing equation Burnside argues that the jurors were improperly instructed on the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances because that determination is a finding of fact that is necessary to make death an available sentence and therefore that weighing is subject to the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

32014–2015
Ring v. Arizona green
scotus · 2002
2 sentences

2015Weighing equation Burnside argues that the jurors were improperly instructed on the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances because that determination is a finding of fact that is necessary to make death an available sentence and therefore that weighing is subject to the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

2015Weighing equation Burnside argues that the jurors were improperly instructed on the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances because that determination is a finding of fact that is necessary to make death an available sentence and therefore that weighing is subject to the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).

32014–2015
State of Nevada v. Justice Court green
nev · 1996
2 sentences

2021Thus, "[Ole preliminary hearing is not a trial and the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence is SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 1947A 411461D not a matter before the court." Las Vegas Twp., 112 Nev. at 806 , 919 P.2d at 402 ; see also DuFrane v. Sheriff, 88 Nev. 52, 54 , 495 P.2d 611, 613 (1972) (recognizing the lower standard of proof needed to establish probable cause at a preliminary hearing versus the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that must be met at trial).

2021Thus, "[Ole preliminary hearing is not a trial and the issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence is SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 10 1947A 411461D not a matter before the court." Las Vegas Twp., 112 Nev. at 806 , 919 P.2d at 402 ; see also DuFrane v. Sheriff, 88 Nev. 52, 54 , 495 P.2d 611, 613 (1972) (recognizing the lower standard of proof needed to establish probable cause at a preliminary hearing versus the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that must be met at trial).

22021–2021
Hurst v. Florida green
scotus · 2016
1 sentence

2021Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016), provides good cause to excuse his procedural default as to the first claim in his petition—that the district court should have instructed the jury that the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances was subject to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof.

12021–2021
Jeremias v. Nevada green
scotus · 2018
2 sentences

2019We recently rejected the first argument, Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. ----, ----, 412 P.3d 43 , 53, cert, denied, --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 415 , 202 L.Ed.2d 320 (2018), and in doing so, we reaffirmed our prior decisions that a defendant is death-eligible in Nevada once the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of first-degree murder and at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 365-66, 351 P.3d 725 , 732 (2015).

2019We recently rejected the first argument, Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. ----, ----, 412 P.3d 43 , 53, cert, denied, --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 415 , 202 L.Ed.2d 320 (2018), and in doing so, we reaffirmed our prior decisions that a defendant is death-eligible in Nevada once the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of first-degree murder and at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 365-66, 351 P.3d 725 , 732 (2015).

12019–2019
Dettloff v. State green
nev · 2004
2 sentences

2019Dettloff v. State, 120 Nev. 588 , 596 & n.18, 97 P.3d 586 , 591 & n.18 (2004).

2019Dettloff v. State, 120 Nev. 588 , 596 & n.18, 97 P.3d 586 , 591 & n.18 (2004).

12019–2019
Jeremias v. State green
nev · 2018
1 sentence

2019We recently rejected the first argument, Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. ----, ----, 412 P.3d 43 , 53, cert, denied, --- U.S. ----, 139 S. Ct. 415 , 202 L.Ed.2d 320 (2018), and in doing so, we reaffirmed our prior decisions that a defendant is death-eligible in Nevada once the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of first-degree murder and at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, Lisle v. State, 131 Nev. 356 , 365-66, 351 P.3d 725 , 732 (2015).

12019–2019
Bollinger v. State green
nev · 1995
2 sentences

2014State, 111 Nev. 1110 , 1115 & n.2, 901 P.2d 671 , 674 & n.2 (1995) (holding that language in reasonable doubt instruction is not unconstitutional where the jury received additional instruction on the State's burden of proof and the presumption of innocence), and therefore the omitted trial- and appellate-counsel claims would have had no merit.

2014State, 111 Nev. 1110 , 1115 & n.2, 901 P.2d 671 , 674 & n.2 (1995) (holding that language in reasonable doubt instruction is not unconstitutional where the jury received additional instruction on the State's burden of proof and the presumption of innocence), and therefore the omitted trial- and appellate-counsel claims would have had no merit.

12014–2014
Pulley v. Harris green
scotus · 1984
1 sentence

1985U.S. ......, 105 S.Ct. 1372 (1985) we stated: “Since our procedure for weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances provides the sentencer with adequate information and guidance and the accused with sufficient guarantees that the penalty of death will not be imposed arbitrarily and capriciously, the challenged statute passes constitutional muster.” Lastly, as the Ninth Circuit Court stated in Harris v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 465 U.S. 37 (1984): “The United States Supreme Court has never stated that a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is requi

11985–1985

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.810 (12) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 177.055 (10) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.030 (10) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.033 (9) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.726 (9) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.554 (7) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.800 (7) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.552 (6) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.602 (6) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.035 (4) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 48.045 (4) NV § Nev. Rev. Stat. § 34.820 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 563 (1980–2026) CA 468 (1956–2026) OH 86 (1992–2026) WA 72 (1974–2026) IL 55 (1979–2026) TN 52 (1994–2021) PA 45 (1976–2026) GA 40 (1982–2023) CO 27 (1990–2026) FL 27 (1970–2026) MS 26 (1983–2023) NV 26 (1980–2022) LA 23 (1976–2022) NC 22 (1977–2025) NM 21 (2001–2025) WI 20 (1990–2025) MD 19 (1978–2022) NJ 18 (1989–2025) MI 17 (1971–2024) KS 17 (1993–2026) MN 16 (1978–2024) AL 13 (1994–2012) NY 12 (1971–2026) AZ 12 (1984–2026) CT 11 (1991–2020) OR 11 (1977–2025) MO 11 (1983–2021) UT 11 (1983–2025) IA 10 (1981–2025) VT 9 (1992–2026) OK 8 (1995–2024) NH 7 (1981–2015) AK 7 (1980–2021) MA 7 (1978–2023) SD 7 (1981–2022) VA 7 (1996–2023) DC 7 (1979–2026) RI 6 (1970–2026) IN 6 (1988–2017) WY 5 (2012–2025) KY 4 (2001–2026) NE 4 (1996–2022) MT 4 (1996–2018) HI 4 (1981–2007) VI 3 (2011–2013) AR 2 (2004–2008) ME 2 (1983–2018)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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