beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Utah

2025For example, it applied the preponderance standard from section 306 instead of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard identified in Pierce. ¶49 But it did not recognize that Pierce’s procedure allowing for statute of limitations questions to be sent to the jury, id., conflicted with section 306’s directive that the issue must be decided by “the judge,” UTAH CODE § 76-1-306.

2025Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶22 Jakeman first asserts that the conviction for child abuse was against the clear weight of the evidence, arguing that the “evidence before the trial court was insufficient to rise to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to find Jakeman guilty of intentionally and knowingly inflicting upon [AJ] a physical injury.” More specifically, Jakeman contends that he “took the stand . . . to provide direct evidence” of his mental state by showing that “he lacked intent to harm [AJ] in that moment” and was instead “only [seeking] to disengage.” Given that Jakeman testified

2023Hararah asserts that we “should hold that unpreserved, palpably erroneous, uninvited state [c]onstitutional violations caused by district courts that have abandoned their neutral role should be subjected to the heightened beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.” “For certain federal constitutional errors[,] we evaluate prejudice for whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Duran, 2011 UT App 254, ¶ 13 , 262 P.3d 468 (cleaned up).

2023Hararah asserts that we “should hold that unpreserved, palpably erroneous, uninvited state [c]onstitutional violations caused by district courts that have abandoned their neutral role should be subjected to the heightened beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.” “For certain federal constitutional errors[,] we evaluate prejudice for whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Duran, 2011 UT App 254, ¶ 13 , 262 P.3d 468 (cleaned up).

2020See Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, ¶ 12 , 167 P.3d 1058 ; In re L.N., 2004 UT App 120 , ¶ 8 n.2, 91 P.3d 836 . ¶22 On appeal, V.M. contends that the juvenile court committed an error of law in (A) relying on the paper transcript of Child’s testimony from his criminal trial to determine the credibility of Child’s story and (B) relying on the transcript of Forensic Interviewer’s trial testimony to determine that Forensic Interviewer was credible.

2020See Egbert v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, ¶ 12 , 167 P.3d 1058 ; In re L.N., 2004 UT App 120 , ¶ 8 n.2, 91 P.3d 836 . ¶22 On appeal, V.M. contends that the juvenile court committed an error of law in (A) relying on the paper transcript of Child’s testimony from his criminal trial to determine the credibility of Child’s story and (B) relying on the transcript of Forensic Interviewer’s trial testimony to determine that Forensic Interviewer was credible.

2004“This beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement ... applies in state as well as federal proceedings.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , *846 2080-81, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (citation omitted).

2004“This beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement ... applies in state as well as federal proceedings.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , *846 2080-81, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (citation omitted).

1995Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987).

1995Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987).

1993Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148 .

1993Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1148 .

1987In Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982), it was argued that the Court should change the standard in paternity cases to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

1987In Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982), it was argued that the Court should change the standard in paternity cases to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.

1985Appellant also urges that State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345 , 359 P.2d 12 (1961), and State v. Jones, supra , establish that removal procedures are "quasi-criminal" in nature, and therefore, the number of jurors required to remove an officer should be the same as in a criminal proceeding.

1985Appellant also urges that State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345 , 359 P.2d 12 (1961), and State v. Jones, supra , establish that removal procedures are "quasi-criminal" in nature, and therefore, the number of jurors required to remove an officer should be the same as in a criminal proceeding.

1983The Court in Ivan V quoted the following language from Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 , 91 S.Ct. 1148 , 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971): Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect.

1983The Court in Ivan V quoted the following language from Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 , 91 S.Ct. 1148 , 28 L.Ed.2d 388 (1971): Where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule has been given complete retroactive effect.

1983They cite Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 , 92 S.Ct. 1951 , 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), where the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof from In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), was applied retroactively to a case on direct appeal.

1983They cite Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 , 92 S.Ct. 1951 , 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), where the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof from In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), was applied retroactively to a case on direct appeal.

1983They cite Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 , 92 S.Ct. 1951 , 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), where the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof from In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), was applied retroactively to a case on direct appeal.

1983They cite Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 , 92 S.Ct. 1951 , 32 L.Ed.2d 659 (1972), where the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof from In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), was applied retroactively to a case on direct appeal.