beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Virginia

2023The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard “provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence.” Id. at 363 .

2003Analysis The burden of proof upon the state in a criminal case was given constitutional status in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) wherein the Court stated “that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Later, with an analysis of the history of the use of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the Court acknowledged that the standard “defies easy explication,” but held the following: The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due

2013Here, however, Osman's successful insanity defense established the basis for an exception to the requirement of proving malice as an element of murder: Osman's insanity negated consideration of whether he possessed malice at the time he killed his mother. 2 (1992) (voluntary manslaughter, a common law crime in Virginia requires that "'the killing must have been done in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation'" (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 105-06 , 341 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1986))). 2 I agree with Justice Powell's assessment in her concurrence that the majority's constr

2013Here, however, Osman's successful insanity defense established the basis for an exception to the requirement of proving malice as an element of murder: Osman's insanity negated consideration of whether he possessed malice at the time he killed his mother. 2 (1992) (voluntary manslaughter, a common law crime in Virginia requires that "'the killing must have been done in the heat of passion and upon reasonable provocation'" (quoting Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 105-06 , 341 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1986))). 2 I agree with Justice Powell's assessment in her concurrence that the majority's constr

2012I would conclude that “it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.” Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005-06 , 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991) (en banc). - 11 - Therefore, any error of the trial court in employing a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard was harmless on the facts of this case. - 12 -

2012I would conclude that “it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and substantial justice has been reached.” Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005-06 , 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991) (en banc). - 11 - Therefore, any error of the trial court in employing a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard was harmless on the facts of this case. - 12 -

2006See generally id.

2002See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278 (citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 ) (noting that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard is followed by virtually all common law jurisdictions).

1996See e.g., State v. Seymour, 502 N.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 515 N.W.2d 874 (Wis. 1994) (prejudice occurs when the jury's verdict is stated in the disjunctive because the verdict does not satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable- doubt standard).

1996See e.g., State v. Seymour, 502 N.W.2d 591, 594-95 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 515 N.W.2d 874 (Wis. 1994) (prejudice occurs when the jury's verdict is stated in the disjunctive because the verdict does not satisfy the beyond-a-reasonable- doubt standard).