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16 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ring v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2021See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not requ 2020See, e.g., Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (rejecting fundamental-error claim because the sufficiency and weighing determinations “are not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof”) (citing Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872 , 886 (Fla. 2019)); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (“Under - 17 - Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible. | 3 | 3 |
McKinney v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2021See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not requ 2020See, e.g., Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (rejecting fundamental-error claim because the sufficiency and weighing determinations “are not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof”) (citing Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872 , 886 (Fla. 2019)); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (“Under - 17 - Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible. | 3 | 3 |
Reed v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not requ 2020See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not requ | 2 | 2 |
Hurst v. Floridagreen2 sentences2021See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not requ 2020See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not requ | 2 | 2 |
Hurst v. Floridagreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (rejecting fundamental-error claim because the sufficiency and weighing determinations “are not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof”) (citing Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872 , 886 (Fla. 2019)); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707 (2020) (“Under - 17 - Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible. 2019And when we amended Florida Standard Criminal Jury Instruction 7.11—Final Instructions in Penalty Proceedings— Capital Cases—last year in order to conform with the requirements of Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and Hurst v. State, we fully considered the arguments made that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof should apply to the jury’s determinations of sufficiency of the aggravation and weighing of the aggravation and mitigation but ultimately declined to include a standard of proof for these determinations. | 1 | 2 |
People in Interest of CAJgreen1 sentence2026C.A.J., 709 P.2d 604, 606 (Colo. App. 1985)). 4 In sum, the trial court correctly applied the clear and convincing standard to the findings required under Florida law and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to the finding required by 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (f). | 1 | 1 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen1 sentence2025See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”). | 1 | 1 |
Fla. Soc. of Ophthalmology v. Fla. Optometricgreen1 sentence2024While Defendant acknowledges that this heightened standard of proof is contained only in the first prong of Article I, Section 14 pertaining to persons charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment, he asserts that “it makes no sense that the State should be permitted any easier means of securing his detention for a first- degree felony than it would for a capital, life or punishable by life felony.” We interpret Article I, Section 14 according to its text, not according to what Defendant thinks “makes sense.” See Israel v. Desantis, 269 So. 3d 491, 495 (Fla. 201 | 1 | 1 |
Scott J. Israel, Sheriff v. Ron DeSantis, Governorgreen1 sentence2024While Defendant acknowledges that this heightened standard of proof is contained only in the first prong of Article I, Section 14 pertaining to persons charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment, he asserts that “it makes no sense that the State should be permitted any easier means of securing his detention for a first- degree felony than it would for a capital, life or punishable by life felony.” We interpret Article I, Section 14 according to its text, not according to what Defendant thinks “makes sense.” See Israel v. Desantis, 269 So. 3d 491, 495 (Fla. 201 | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Van Eeghen v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2022Van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1956) (noting that “proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great is actually a greater degree of proof than that which is required to establish guilt merely to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt” (citing Russell v. State, 71 So. 27, 28 (Fla. 1916)))—in many cases, it is highly unlikely that the State will have time before a first appearance to marshal its evidence, prepare exhibits for admission into evidence, and secure the attendance of witnesses needed to meet that burden. | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. Stategreen1 sentence2022Van Eeghen v. Williams, 87 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1956) (noting that “proof that guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is great is actually a greater degree of proof than that which is required to establish guilt merely to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt” (citing Russell v. State, 71 So. 27, 28 (Fla. 1916)))—in many cases, it is highly unlikely that the State will have time before a first appearance to marshal its evidence, prepare exhibits for admission into evidence, and secure the attendance of witnesses needed to meet that burden. | 1 | 1 |
Khianthalat v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Anderson v. State, 291 So. 3d 531 , 533 (Fla. 2020) (citing Khianthalat v. State, 974 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 2008)). - 15 - those factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) We explained that “these determinations are not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Id. at 886. | 1 | 1 |
In Re: Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in Capital Casesgreen1 sentence2019See In re Standard Criminal Jury Instructions in Capital Cases, 244 So. 3d 172, 191-92 (Fla. 2018); Fla. Std. | 1 | 1 |
Tide v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Tide v. State, 804 So.2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“to prove indirect criminal contempt, ‘there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual intended to disobey the court.’ ”) (citing Levine v. State, 650 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Levine v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Tide v. State, 804 So.2d 412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“to prove indirect criminal contempt, ‘there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual intended to disobey the court.’ ”) (citing Levine v. State, 650 So.2d 666, 668 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)). | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2013See Harris II, 133 S.Ct. at 1055 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Wattsgreen2 sentences1997See United States v. Watts, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 633 , 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997), which permits the sentencing judge to take into account evidence of charges for which the defendant was acquitted in determining the appropriate sentence because the burden of proof for sentencing issues is not the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 1997See United States v. Watts, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 633 , 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997), which permits the sentencing judge to take into account evidence of charges for which the defendant was acquitted in determining the appropriate sentence because the burden of proof for sentencing issues is not the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.green1 sentence1986Id. at 214. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gary Czajkowski v. State of Florida
red
2 sentences2021See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not requ 2020See Reed v. State, 837 So. 2d 366, 370 (Fla. 2002) (“If the error was not harmful, it would not meet our requirement for being fundamental.”). - 22 - “not subject to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.” Newberry v. State, 288 So. 3d 1040 , 1047 (Fla. 2019) (citing Rogers, 285 So. 3d at 886); see also McKinney v. Arizona, 140 S. Ct. 702, 707-08 (2020) (explaining that “[u]nder Ring [v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),] and Hurst [v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92 (2016)], a jury must find the aggravating circumstance that makes the defendant death eligible” but that “Ring and Hurst did not requ | 3 | 2020–2021 |
Albritton v. State
green
1 sentence1986We find, however, notwithstanding the trial court's above statement, that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of appellate review for departure sentences mandated by Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1985), has been met. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Murray
green
1 sentence1985Moreover, as Murray points out, "prosecutorial misconduct or indifference to judicial admonitions is the proper subject of bar disciplinary action." 443 So.2d at 956 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Helland v. Evans
green
2 sentences1970The court declared the state's burden to be a "prima facie" showing of voluntariness and defined prima facie to mean "the quality and quantum of evidence from which an inference of voluntariness can reasonably be drawn." [15] 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2497 p. 325 (3d ed. 1940). [16] Id. at § 2498 p. 329. [17] Powell v. Race, 1942, 151 Fla. 536 , 10 So.2d 142 (burden of proof on party asserting a resulting trust is to remove "every reasonable doubt as to its existence by clear, strong, and unequivocal evidence." This is certainly a hybrid of Wigmore's "clear and convincing," but we do not think i 1970The court declared the state's burden to be a "prima facie" showing of voluntariness and defined prima facie to mean "the quality and quantum of evidence from which an inference of voluntariness can reasonably be drawn." [15] 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2497 p. 325 (3d ed. 1940). [16] Id. at § 2498 p. 329. [17] Powell v. Race, 1942, 151 Fla. 536 , 10 So.2d 142 (burden of proof on party asserting a resulting trust is to remove "every reasonable doubt as to its existence by clear, strong, and unequivocal evidence." This is certainly a hybrid of Wigmore's "clear and convincing," but we do not think i | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Florida East Coast Railway Co. v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1970Co. v. Thompson, 1927, 93 Fla. 30 , 111 So. 525 (impeachment of a release of liability for personal injuries must be "clearly, convincingly and substantially established by a preponderance of the evidence." This seems to be another hybrid, but we cannot ascertain whether the "clear and convincing" language raises the quantum required to something more than a preponderance. 1970Co. v. Thompson, 1927, 93 Fla. 30 , 111 So. 525 (impeachment of a release of liability for personal injuries must be "clearly, convincingly and substantially established by a preponderance of the evidence." This seems to be another hybrid, but we cannot ascertain whether the "clear and convincing" language raises the quantum required to something more than a preponderance. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Powell v. Race, Et Ux.
neutral
2 sentences1970The court declared the state's burden to be a "prima facie" showing of voluntariness and defined prima facie to mean "the quality and quantum of evidence from which an inference of voluntariness can reasonably be drawn." [15] 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2497 p. 325 (3d ed. 1940). [16] Id. at § 2498 p. 329. [17] Powell v. Race, 1942, 151 Fla. 536 , 10 So.2d 142 (burden of proof on party asserting a resulting trust is to remove "every reasonable doubt as to its existence by clear, strong, and unequivocal evidence." This is certainly a hybrid of Wigmore's "clear and convincing," but we do not think i 1970The court declared the state's burden to be a "prima facie" showing of voluntariness and defined prima facie to mean "the quality and quantum of evidence from which an inference of voluntariness can reasonably be drawn." [15] 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2497 p. 325 (3d ed. 1940). [16] Id. at § 2498 p. 329. [17] Powell v. Race, 1942, 151 Fla. 536 , 10 So.2d 142 (burden of proof on party asserting a resulting trust is to remove "every reasonable doubt as to its existence by clear, strong, and unequivocal evidence." This is certainly a hybrid of Wigmore's "clear and convincing," but we do not think i | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.