beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Georgia

2008Furthermore, "[t]he investigating officers' county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of D.D., supra, 287 Ga.App. at 515 (2)(b), 651 S.E.2d 817 .

2007In King v. State, 271 Ga.App. 384, 387 (1), 609 S.E.2d 725 (2005), we explained that by reversing our holding in Thompson, the Supreme Court implicitly ruled "the investigating officers' county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard." [3] See also In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga.App. 512, 514-515 (2)(b), 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007) (holding that evidence of responding officers' county of employment "cannot serve as the exclusive proof that the crimes occurred in that county").

2021See Hill, 277 Ga. at 260 (II) (B) (“Now that the Georgia exemption from death sentences for mentally retarded persons is paralleled by a new federal exemption, we must determine whether, under the authority of federal constitutional law, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard continues to be an acceptable standard of proof to apply to mental retardation claims.” (emphasis omitted)). 13 We note here Young’s extensive argument regarding statistics concerning claims of intellectual disability in Georgia; however, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit in holding that statistics like Young’s are neith

2021See Hill, 277 Ga. at 260 (II) (B) (“Now that the Georgia exemption from death sentences for mentally retarded persons is paralleled by a new federal exemption, we must determine whether, under the authority of federal constitutional law, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard continues to be an acceptable standard of proof to apply to mental retardation claims.” (emphasis omitted)). 13 We note here Young’s extensive argument regarding statistics concerning claims of intellectual disability in Georgia; however, we agree with the Eleventh Circuit in holding that statistics like Young’s are neith

1996“When an enumeration of error is based, as in this case, upon the overruling of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal grounded at trial on insufficiency of the evidence, the proper test for an appellate court to apply is ‘the beyond a reasonable doubt test’ as expressed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560).” Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 567 (1) ( 405 SE2d 716 ).

1996“When an enumeration of error is based, as in this case, upon the overruling of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal grounded at trial on insufficiency of the evidence, the proper test for an appellate court to apply is ‘the beyond a reasonable doubt test’ as expressed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560).” Williams v. State, 199 Ga. App. 566, 567 (1) ( 405 SE2d 716 ).

2013But see King v. State, 271 Ga. App. 384, 387 (1) ( 609 SE2d 725 ) (2005) (“the investigating officers’ county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard”).

2013But see King v. State, 271 Ga. App. 384, 387 (1) ( 609 SE2d 725 ) (2005) (“the investigating officers’ county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard”).

2011We then took guidance from Leland v. Oregon, which approved the application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to claims of insanity at the time of defendants' crimes, because claims of mental retardation and claims of insanity "both relieve a guilty person of at least some of the statutory penalty to which he [or she] would otherwise be subject." Hill, 277 Ga. at 261 (II)(B), 587 S.E.2d 613 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952)).

2011We then took guidance from Leland v. Oregon, which approved the application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to claims of insanity at the time of defendants' crimes, because claims of mental retardation and claims of insanity "both relieve a guilty person of at least some of the statutory penalty to which he [or she] would otherwise be subject." Hill, 277 Ga. at 261 (II)(B), 587 S.E.2d 613 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 , 72 S.Ct. 1002 , 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952)).

2021See id. at 372 (1) (discussing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 ( 72 SCt 1002 , 96 LE 1302) (1952), and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U. S. 348 ( 116 SCt 1373 , 134 LE2d 498) (1996)).

2021See id. at 372 (1) (discussing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 ( 72 SCt 1002 , 96 LE 1302) (1952), and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U. S. 348 ( 116 SCt 1373 , 134 LE2d 498) (1996)).

2021See Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (4). 41 Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 260-263 (II) (B) ( 587 SE2d 613 ) (2003)).

2021See Hill, 269 Ga. at 303-304 (4). 41 Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 260-263 (II) (B) ( 587 SE2d 613 ) (2003)).

2021See Humphrey, 662 F3d at 1365-1366 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (noting that the State 30 Indeed, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard employed in criminal proceedings has been described in the legal community as a societal preference for acquitting guilty people rather than risking incarceration of the innocent.

2021See Humphrey, 662 F3d at 1365-1366 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (noting that the State does not “have unfettered discretion to establish procedures that 30 Indeed, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard employed in criminal proceedings has been described in the legal community as a societal preference for acquitting guilty people rather than risking incarceration of the innocent.

2021Willis, 304 Ga. at 693 (3) (c) (citation omitted). 44.

2021Willis, 304 Ga. at 693 (3) (c) (citation omitted). 44.

2021See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 372 ( 90 SCt 1068 , 25 LE2d 368) (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”). 142 does not “have unfettered discretion to establish procedures that through their natural operation will deprive the vast majority of [intellectually disabled] offenders of their Eighth Amendment right not to be executed”).

2021See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 372 ( 90 SCt 1068 , 25 LE2d 368) (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”). 142 does not “have unfettered discretion to establish procedures that through their natural operation will deprive the vast majority of [intellectually disabled] offenders of their Eighth Amendment right not to be executed”).

2021See id. at 321 (IV) (“Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the [United States] Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 405 (II) ( 106 SCt 2595 , 91 LE2d 335) (1986)). (b) While Georgia was the first state to ban the execution of intellectually disabled persons, it has from the initial adoption of that ban imposed a burden to prove intellectual disa

2021See id. at 321 (IV) (“Construing and applying the Eighth Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the [United States] Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.” (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U. S. 399, 405 (II) ( 106 SCt 2595 , 91 LE2d 335) (1986)). (b) While Georgia was the first state to ban the execution of intellectually disabled persons, it has from the initial adoption of that ban imposed a burden to prove intellectual disa

2021See id. at 372 (1) (discussing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 ( 72 SCt 1002 , 96 LE 1302) (1952), and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U. S. 348 ( 116 SCt 1373 , 134 LE2d 498) (1996)).

2021See id. at 372 (1) (discussing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U. S. 790 ( 72 SCt 1002 , 96 LE 1302) (1952), and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U. S. 348 ( 116 SCt 1373 , 134 LE2d 498) (1996)).

2013As [this Court has] previously stated, the investigating officers’ county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 6 (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Mock, 306 Ga. App. at 97 (1) (a).

2011The only other evidence concerning venue was that, based on a referral from an unspecified DFCS, a detective with the Cherokee County Sheriffs Department investigated the case. 1 But as we have stated on numerous occasions, “the investigating officers’ county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” Thus, because the only evidence of venue is the officers’ county of employment, the record before us does not authorize a finding that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the [aggravated child molesta

1991When an enumeration of error is based, as in this case, upon the overruling of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal grounded at trial on insufficiency of the evidence, the proper test for an appellate court to apply is “the beyond a reasonable doubt test” as expressed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560); Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525, 527 (1) ( 314 SE2d 436 ).

1991When an enumeration of error is based, as in this case, upon the overruling of a motion for directed verdict of acquittal grounded at trial on insufficiency of the evidence, the proper test for an appellate court to apply is “the beyond a reasonable doubt test” as expressed in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560); Humphrey v. State, 252 Ga. 525, 527 (1) ( 314 SE2d 436 ).

2021In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 669 (2) ( 324 SE2d 443 ) (1985).

2021In re Crane, 253 Ga. 667, 669 (2) ( 324 SE2d 443 ) (1985).

1998See Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 790 (36), 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994) (holding that "[t]here is no constitutional impediment to th[e] statutory requirement that the defendant meet a beyond a reasonable doubt standard as to the issue of mental retardation." (Emphasis supplied.)).

1998See Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 790 (36), 450 S.E.2d 680 (1994) (holding that "[t]here is no constitutional impediment to th[e] statutory requirement that the defendant meet a beyond a reasonable doubt standard as to the issue of mental retardation." (Emphasis supplied.)).

2013Indeed, it is well established that proving a crime happened on a particular street is not sufficient to establish venue,17 nor is “proving that a crime took place within a city without also proving that the city is entirely within a county . . . .”18 Additionally, the investigating officers’ county of employment “does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.”19 And finally, contrary to the State’s assertions, this Court cannot rely upon material not presented to the jury to find that venue was proper;20 “[n]or are we, as a 17

2013Indeed, it is well established that proving a crime happened on a particular street is not sufficient to establish venue,17 nor is “proving that a crime took place within a city without also proving that the city is entirely within a county . . . .”18 Additionally, the investigating officers’ county of employment “does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.”19 And finally, contrary to the State’s assertions, this Court cannot rely upon material not presented to the jury to find that venue was proper;20 “[n]or are we, as a 17

2007See Jones, 272 Ga. at 903-904 (3), 537 S.E.2d 80 .

2007See Jones, 272 Ga. at 903-904 (3).

2008Furthermore, "[t]he investigating officers' county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) In the Interest of D.D., supra, 287 Ga.App. at 515 (2)(b), 651 S.E.2d 817 .

2007In King v. State, 271 Ga.App. 384, 387 (1), 609 S.E.2d 725 (2005), we explained that by reversing our holding in Thompson, the Supreme Court implicitly ruled "the investigating officers' county of employment does not, in and of itself, constitute sufficient proof of venue to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard." [3] See also In the Interest of D.D., 287 Ga.App. 512, 514-515 (2)(b), 651 S.E.2d 817 (2007) (holding that evidence of responding officers' county of employment "cannot serve as the exclusive proof that the crimes occurred in that county").

2023See Young, 312 Ga. at 87-100 (25) (plurality opinion).

2023See Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741, 745 (3) (707 SE2d 80) (2011) (“[T]he presence of the written instructions in the jury room would have served to enlighten, rather than confuse, the 9 The trial court gave no indication during its verbal instructions that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applied to the jury’s consideration of the existence of mitigating circumstances and instead properly limited the application of that standard to the State’s burden of proving the absence of mitigation. 18 jury.”).

2023See Howard v. State, 288 Ga. 741, 745 (3) (707 SE2d 80) (2011) (“[T]he presence of the written instructions in the jury room would have served to enlighten, rather than confuse, the 9 The trial court gave no indication during its verbal instructions that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applied to the jury’s consideration of the existence of mitigating circumstances and instead properly limited the application of that standard to the State’s burden of proving the absence of mitigation. 18 jury.”).

2023Having already concluded above, in the context of Edenfield’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, that the new evidence adduced by Edenfield in the habeas court regarding his alleged intellectual disability would not in reasonable probability have led to a verdict of guilty but intellectually disabled under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, see Holsey, 281 Ga. at 813 (II), we now also conclude that that same evidence is plainly insufficient to directly satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to this freestanding claim of intellectual disability under the misca

2023Having already concluded above, in the context of Edenfield’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, that the new evidence adduced by Edenfield in the habeas court regarding his alleged 103 intellectual disability would not in reasonable probability have led to a verdict of guilty but intellectually disabled under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, see id. at 813 (II), we now also conclude that that same evidence is plainly insufficient to directly satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to this freestanding claim of intellectual disability under the miscarriage o

2023Having already concluded above, in the context of Edenfield’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, that the new evidence adduced by Edenfield in the habeas court regarding his alleged intellectual disability would not in reasonable probability have led to a verdict of guilty but intellectually disabled under a beyond a reasonable doubt standard, see Holsey, 281 Ga. at 813 (II), we now also conclude that that same evidence is plainly insufficient to directly satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to this freestanding claim of intellectual disability under the misca

2021See Mathis v. Corrugated Gear & Sprocket, 263 Ga. 419, 421 (5) ( 435 SE2d 209 ) (1993) (where record does not indicate whether trial court applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, we must vacate the judgment of contempt and remand the case to the trial court for application of that standard); In re A. S., 293 Ga. App. 710, 712-173 (2) ( 667 SE2d 701 ) (2008) (because adjudication under erroneous 4 standard of proof raised a question of whether juvenile, who had been adjudicated delinquent, was deprived of a fair trial, the case was remanded for application of the correct standard even t

2021See Mathis, 263 Ga. 419, 421 (5) (where the record does not indicate whether the trial court applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to criminal contempt cases, we must vacate the judgment of contempt and remand the case to the trial court for application of that standard); Life For God’s Stray Animals, Inc. v. New North Rockdale County Homeowners Assn., 256 Ga. 338, 338-339 (2) ( 349 SE2d 184 ) (1986) (same).

2021See Mathis, 263 Ga. 419, 421 (5) (where the record does not indicate whether the trial court applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard applicable to criminal contempt cases, we must vacate the judgment of contempt and remand the case to the trial court for application of that standard); Life For God’s Stray Animals, Inc. v. New North Rockdale County Homeowners Assn., 256 Ga. 338, 338-339 (2) ( 349 SE2d 184 ) (1986) (same).

2021See Mathis v. Corrugated Gear & Sprocket, 263 Ga. 419, 421 (5) ( 435 SE2d 209 ) (1993) (where record does not indicate whether trial court applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, we must vacate the judgment of contempt and remand the case to the trial court for application of that standard); In re A. S., 293 Ga. App. 710, 712-173 (2) ( 667 SE2d 701 ) (2008) (because adjudication under erroneous 4 standard of proof raised a question of whether juvenile, who had been adjudicated delinquent, was deprived of a fair trial, the case was remanded for application of the correct standard even t

2021See Mathis v. Corrugated Gear & Sprocket, 263 Ga. 419, 421 (5) ( 435 SE2d 209 ) (1993) (where record does not indicate whether trial court applied the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, we must vacate the judgment of contempt and remand the case to the trial court for application of that standard); In re A. S., 293 Ga. App. 710, 712-173 (2) ( 667 SE2d 701 ) (2008) (because adjudication under erroneous 4 standard of proof raised a question of whether juvenile, who had been adjudicated delinquent, was deprived of a fair trial, the case was remanded for application of the correct standard even t

2020Likewise, in White, our Court recently explained that although Veal requires a “specific determination” that a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of his crimes is “irreparably corrupt,” Veal, 298 Ga. at 702 (emphasis in original), “[w]e did not specifically hold in Veal . . . that this determination amounted to a factual finding.” White, 307 Ga. at 607 n.7.9 See also Veal, 298 Ga. at 699 (OCGA § 9 In White, the defendant — who was a juvenile at the time he committed the murder and other crimes for which he was convicted — argued (among other things) that under the Eighth Amendment, the t

2020Likewise, in White, our Court recently explained that although Veal requires a “specific determination” that a defendant who was a juvenile at the time of his crimes is “irreparably corrupt,” Veal, 298 Ga. at 702 (emphasis in original), “[w]e did not specifically hold in Veal . . . that this determination amounted to a factual finding.” White, 307 Ga. at 607 n.7.9 See also Veal, 298 Ga. at 699 (OCGA § 9 In White, the defendant — who was a juvenile at the time he committed the murder and other crimes for which he was convicted — argued (among other things) that under the Eighth Amendment, the t