6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1979–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burrage v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Cf. Burrage, 571 U.S. at 218 (uncertainty about meaning of term “substantial” “cannot be squared with the beyond-a-reasonable- doubt standard applicable in criminal trials or with the need to express criminal laws in terms ordinary persons can comprehend”). 2020Who knows”) and therefore would inject “[u]ncertainty” that “cannot be squared with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applicable in criminal trials.” 571 U.S. at 218 . | 2 | 2 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2013See Rivas, 783 A.2d at 133 (“[p]roof of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt[,] ... a component of due process, ... ‘operates to give “concrete substance” to the presumption of innocence, to ensure against unjust convictions, and to reduce the risk of factual error in a criminal proceeding”’ (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979))). 2013See Rivas, 783 A.2d at 133 (“[p]roof of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt[,] ... a component of due process, ... ‘operates to give “concrete substance” to the presumption of innocence, to ensure against unjust convictions, and to reduce the risk of factual error in a criminal proceeding”’ (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979))). | 1 | 1 |
Rivas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013See Rivas, 783 A.2d at 133 (“[p]roof of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt[,] ... a component of due process, ... ‘operates to give “concrete substance” to the presumption of innocence, to ensure against unjust convictions, and to reduce the risk of factual error in a criminal proceeding”’ (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979))). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Hodgesgreen1 sentence1980See In re Hodges, D.C.App., 325 A.2d 605 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Williams
green
2 sentences1996This is because “absolute certainty is unattainable in matters relating to human affairs.” Id. at 131 . 1996This is because "absolute certainty is unattainable in matters relating to human affairs." Id. at 131 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Matter of Nelson
green
1 sentence1980Addington v. Texas, supra , on which she relies, and In re Nelson, supra , deal with the standard of proof in final judicial, not preliminary, commitment proceedings. [11] At the time of appellant's trial, the standard of proof in judicial civil commitment proceedings was the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences1979See D.C.Code 1973, § 21-562; Rouse v. Cameron, supra. We both are bound by and concur in the Supreme Court’s unanimous rejection in Addington , of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 7 The Court stated: We have concluded that the reasonable doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment. [ 99 S.Ct. at 1812-13 .] Since a civil commitment proceeding focuses on the individual’s psychiatric condition as we 1979We both are bound by and concur in the Supreme Court's unanimous rejection in Addington , of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. [7] The Court stated: *1238 We have concluded that the reasonable doubt standard is inappropriate in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment. [ 99 S.Ct. at 1812-13 .] Since a civil commitment proceeding focuses on the individual's psychiatric condition as well as on his past behavior, both the diagnosis | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.