18 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2025The beyond a reasonable doubt standard "gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, A-3628-19 22 to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 2022The beyond a reasonable doubt standard "gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Reyesgreen2 sentences2021Those rules ensure that there is no weakening of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, even if the jury is swayed to render a guilty verdict in the absence of sufficient evidence. 22 Our courts are cautioned not to enter a judgment of acquittal, pre- or post-verdict, unless after viewing the direct and circumstantial evidence in its entirety and after giving the State the benefit of all the favorable testimony and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, no “reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” See State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967). 2021Those rules ensure that there is no weakening of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, even if the jury is swayed to render a guilty verdict in the absence of sufficient evidence. 22 Our courts are cautioned not to enter a judgment of acquittal, pre- or post-verdict, unless after viewing the direct and circumstantial evidence in its entirety and after giving the State the benefit of all the favorable testimony and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, no “reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” See State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Munizgreen1 sentence2025Under Rule 3:18-1, when deciding a motion for a judgment of acquittal, the court "is not concerned with the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla) of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the State." State v. Muniz, 150 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Budisgreen1 sentence2022"In the absence of independent witnesses, the case often turns on an assessment of the credibility of the participants, an assessment better left to the trier of fact." State v. Budis, 125 N.J. 519, 528 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cookgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 539 , 847 A.2d 530 (2004). 2006See State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 539 , 847 A.2d 530 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Knightgreen1 sentence2005Finally the Court may give the new rule complete retroactive effect, applying it to all cases, including those in which final judgments have been entered and all other avenues of appeal have been exhausted. [Id. at 249, 678 A.2d 642 (citations omitted).] An application of these principles leads to the threshold conclusion that today we do announce a new rule of law: we have increased the burden of proof for breathalyzer refusal prosecutions from the preponderance of the evidence standard to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.green2 sentences1997“In terms of the nature of the inquiry, this is no different from the consideration of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and where the trial judge asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 214 (1986); see State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 , 236 A.2d 385 (1967). 1997“In terms of the nature of the inquiry, this is no different from the consideration of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and where the trial judge asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 214 (1986); see State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 , 236 A.2d 385 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Paul Adkins, Jr.green1 sentence1996See, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir.1991) (“This circuit has repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because definitions tend to impermissibly lessen the burden of proof.... | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Santosky v. Kramer
green
1 sentence2018The Court addressed the statute when it explained the rationale for not mandating a beyond a reasonable doubt standard: [a]lthough Congress found a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard proper in one type 19 A-3241-16T2 of parental rights termination case, another legislative body might well conclude that a reasonable-doubt standard would erect an unreasonable barrier to state efforts to free permanently neglected children for adoption. [Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 .] The Santosky Court clearly was aware of the higher standard applicable to the termination of parental rights to Indian children wh | 1 | 2018–2018 |
TURRO EX REL. TURRO v. Turro
green
2 sentences2014Responding to an argument that this Court in Weisberg also modified the standard of proof to rebut a presumption of a gift from no reasonable doubt to clear and convincing, the Appellate Division in Turro v. Turro, 38 N.J.Super. 535, 543 , 120 A.2d 52 (App.Div.1956) observed that Weisberg *45 never addressed the standard of proof at all. 2014Responding to an argument that this Court in Weisberg also modified the standard of proof to rebut a presumption of a gift from no reasonable doubt to clear and convincing, the Appellate Division in Turro v. Turro, 38 N.J.Super. 535, 543 , 120 A.2d 52 (App.Div.1956) observed that Weisberg *45 never addressed the standard of proof at all. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2009The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard cannot be dispensed with, or its burden eased, because it serves to “impress[ ] on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.” Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 363-64 , 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 375 . 2009The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard cannot be dispensed with, or its burden eased, because it serves to “impress[ ] on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue.” Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 363-64 , 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 375 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Petrucci
green
2 sentences2004Therefore, we conclude that, as in Johnson and Stanton, defendant was entitled to have this finding made by a jury under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. [ 343 N.J.Super. at 550-51 , 779 A.2d 429 .] On this remand, the question is whether the Supreme Court’s opinion in Stanton now requires a different conclusion. 2004Therefore, we conclude that, as in Johnson and Stanton, defendant was entitled to have this finding made by a jury under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. [ 343 N.J.Super. at 550-51 , 779 A.2d 429 .] On this remand, the question is whether the Supreme Court’s opinion in Stanton now requires a different conclusion. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2002See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c) (requiring for death eligibility finding that defendant committed murder by own-conduct); Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 511 , 651 A. 2d 19 (holding jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed murder by own conduct to proceed to penalty phase). 2002See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c) (requiring for death eligibility finding that defendant committed murder by own-conduct); Brown, supra, 138 N.J. at 511 , 651 A. 2d 19 (holding jury must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that defendant committed murder by own conduct to proceed to penalty phase). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Parolin
green
2 sentences2001State v. Parolin, 339 N.J.Super. 10, 19 , 770 A.2d 1204 (App.Div.2001). 2001State v. Parolin, 339 N.J.Super. 10, 19 , 770 A.2d 1204 (App.Div.2001). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Wright
green
2 sentences1999Although the bill originally required proof of the elements of refusal beyond a reasonable doubt, the Assembly acquiesced to Governor Byrne’s recommendation that “the preponderance of the evidence standard currently utilized in the administrative hearing of this type of case be retained” because “the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is an unusually harsh burden of proof in a non-criminal case.” Wright, supra, 107 N.J. at 503 n. 8, 527 A.2d 379 (quoting Report of the Governor to the Assembly re: Assembly Bill No. 2293 (Jan. 4,1982)). 1999Although the bill originally required proof of the elements of refusal beyond a reasonable doubt, the Assembly acquiesced to Governor Byrne’s recommendation that “the preponderance of the evidence standard currently utilized in the administrative hearing of this type of case be retained” because “the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof is an unusually harsh burden of proof in a non-criminal case.” Wright, supra, 107 N.J. at 503 n. 8, 527 A.2d 379 (quoting Report of the Governor to the Assembly re: Assembly Bill No. 2293 (Jan. 4,1982)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Victor v. Nebraska
green
2 sentences1996In the first part of the opinion dealing with defendant Arthur Sandoval the Supreme Court stated that it was "concerned with Sandoval's argument that the phrase `moral certainty' has lost its historical meaning, and that a modern jury would understand it to allow a conviction on proof that does not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1247 , 127 L.Ed. 2d at 595 . 1996In the first part of the opinion dealing with defendant Arthur Sandoval the Supreme Court stated that it was "concerned with Sandoval's argument that the phrase `moral certainty' has lost its historical meaning, and that a modern jury would understand it to allow a conviction on proof that does not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard." Id. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 1247 , 127 L.Ed. 2d at 595 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Improvement Company v. Munson
green
2 sentences1995The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict — “whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” [Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448 , 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872).] In terms of the nature of the inquiry, this is no different from the consideration of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and where the trial judge 1995The judge’s inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict — “whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” [Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448 , 20 L.Ed. 867 (1872).] In terms of the nature of the inquiry, this is no different from the consideration of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and where the trial judge | 1 | 1995–1995 |
I. v. D.
green
1 sentence1989We reversed and remanded to allow the putative father a new trial and commented in passing that proof of paternity did not require proof under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, but only proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence. ( 60 N.J.Super. at 217 ). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.