beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Washington

2021In Fuller, we explained that the State did not improperly quantify the level of certainty necessary to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 169 Wn.

2017In Fuller, we held the jigsaw puzzle analogy was not improper because “the State neither equated its burden of proof to making an everyday choice nor quantified the level of certainty necessary to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.” 169 Wn.

2010Should, however, the continued viability of Standlee be directly presented to this court during my tenure on it, I believe that I would be inclined to advance the position admirably stated by former Justice Robert Utter in his dissent in Standlee , to wit: Where the sole reason advocated for petitioner’s violation of his parole is the commission of criminal acts upon which he has been adjudged not guilty by application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the superior court of this state, to subsequently remove petitioner’s freedom by the application of a lesser standard seems to me to

2010Should, however, the continued viability of Standlee be directly presented to this court during my tenure on it, I believe that I would be inclined to advance the position admirably stated by former Justice Robert Utter in his dissent in Standlee , to wit: Where the sole reason advocated for petitioner’s violation of his parole is the commission of criminal acts upon which he has been adjudged not guilty by application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the superior court of this state, to subsequently remove petitioner’s freedom by the application of a lesser standard seems to me to

2007We disagree. *1200 A. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ¶ 20 Hegney claims that the juvenile court's decision to decline juvenile jurisdiction violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because it effectively raised the maximum sentence he was exposed to based on findings made by the trial court using the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than findings made by a jury using the beyond a reasonable doubt s

2007Ed. 2d 435 (2000), because it effectively raised the maximum sentence he was exposed to based on findings made by the trial court using the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than findings made by a jury using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 5 ¶21 In Apprendi , the Supreme Court held that, with the exception of a defendant’s prior convictions, “any [disputed] fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 .

2021Jury instruction errors that have been held to be manifest constitutional errors involve errors “‘directing a verdict, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, failing to define the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, failing to require a unanimous verdict, and omitting an element of the crime charged.’” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 268 , 458 P.3d 750 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 100-01 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009)).

2021Jury instruction errors that have been held to be manifest constitutional errors involve errors “‘directing a verdict, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, failing to define the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, failing to require a unanimous verdict, and omitting an element of the crime charged.’” Id. at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 100-01 ).

2011See, e.g., Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (describing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review in challenges to the constitutionality of statutes as a “demanding standard of review”); Island County v. State, 135 Wn.2d 141, 147 , 955 P.2d 377 (1998) (applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to a challenge of the constitutionality of a statute and stating that “we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution”); Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wn.2d 815, 819 , 664

2011See, e.g., Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (describing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review in challenges to the constitutionality of statutes as a "demanding standard of review"); Island Cnty. v. State, 135 Wash.2d 141 , 147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998) (applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to a challenge of the constitutionality of a statute and stating that "we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution"); Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wash.2d 815, 819

2011See, e.g., Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (describing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review in challenges to the constitutionality of statutes as a “demanding standard of review”); Island County v. State, 135 Wn.2d 141, 147 , 955 P.2d 377 (1998) (applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to a challenge of the constitutionality of a statute and stating that “we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution”); Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wn.2d 815, 819 , 664

2011See, e.g., Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (describing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review in challenges to the constitutionality of statutes as a "demanding standard of review"); Island Cnty. v. State, 135 Wash.2d 141 , 147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998) (applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to a challenge of the constitutionality of a statute and stating that "we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution"); Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wash.2d 815, 819

2009At the high end is the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applied in criminal cases, in which the accused's and society's interests in avoiding wrongful convictions is so great that the standard of proof is "`designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.'" Nguyen, 144 Wash.2d at 524 , 29 P.3d 689 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ).

2009At the high end is the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applied in criminal cases, in which the accused’s and society’s interests in avoiding wrongful convictions is so great that the standard of proof is “ ‘designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.’ ” Nguyen, 144 Wn.2d at 524 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 ).

2023Id.; In re Det. of Ross, 102 Wn.

2003Ross, 102 Wn.

2007We disagree. *1200 A. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ¶ 20 Hegney claims that the juvenile court's decision to decline juvenile jurisdiction violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because it effectively raised the maximum sentence he was exposed to based on findings made by the trial court using the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than findings made by a jury using the beyond a reasonable doubt s

2007We disagree. *1200 A. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL ¶ 20 Hegney claims that the juvenile court's decision to decline juvenile jurisdiction violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because it effectively raised the maximum sentence he was exposed to based on findings made by the trial court using the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than findings made by a jury using the beyond a reasonable doubt s

2015Dists.’ All. for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 170 Wn.2d 599, 605 , 244 P.3d 1 (2010). 11 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard when used in this context describes not an evidentiary burden, but rather a requirement that the challenger convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution.

2015Dist. 's Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 170 Wn.2d 599, 605 , 244 P.3d 1 (2010). 11 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard when used in this context describes, not an evidentiary burden, but rather a requirement that the challenger convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution.

2015Dists.’ All. for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 170 Wn.2d 599, 605 , 244 P.3d 1 (2010). 11 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard when used in this context describes not an evidentiary burden, but rather a requirement that the challenger convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution.

2015Dist. 's Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 170 Wn.2d 599, 605 , 244 P.3d 1 (2010). 11 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard when used in this context describes, not an evidentiary burden, but rather a requirement that the challenger convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution.

2021We need not consider this argument because the trial court, which weighed the evidence, actually made its finding beyond a reasonable doubt, and “whether we are dealing with the preponderance of the evidence, the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, or the beyond a reasonable doubt test, the appropriate standard of appellate review is the substantial evidence test.” San Juan County v. Ayer, 24 Wn.

2021We need not consider this argument because the trial court, which weighed the evidence, actually made its finding beyond a reasonable doubt, and “whether we are dealing with the preponderance of the evidence, the clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, or the beyond a reasonable doubt test, the appropriate standard of appellate review is the substantial evidence test.” San Juan County v. Ayer, 24 Wn.

2021Jury instruction errors that have been held to be manifest constitutional errors involve errors “‘directing a verdict, shifting the burden of proof to the defendant, failing to define the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, failing to require a unanimous verdict, and omitting an element of the crime charged.’” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256, 268 , 458 P.3d 750 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 100-01 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009)).

2017State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 100-01 , 217 P.3d 756 (2009) (jury instructions that fail to define the beyond a reasonable doubt standard constitutes manifest constitutional error); RAP 2.5(a)(3). 12 49184-2-II In deciding harmless error, we are aware that a split exists among the divisions of this court as to whether a harmless error analysis can be utilized when a trial court gives an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction Division I held that a failure to use WPIC 4.01 constituted reversible error and declined to apply a harmless error analysis.

2021Curtiss, 161 Wn.

2012Curtiss, 161 Wn.

2017App. 209, 213 , 921 P.2d 1076 (1996), review denied, 131 Wn.2d 1018 (1997), for the proposition that courts have “repeatedly held that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue that in order to acquit a defendant, the jury must find that the State’s witnesses are either lying or mistaken.” Br. of Appellant at 27. 20 No. 48732-2-II In Johnson, the court held that a prosecutor’s explanation of the beyond-a-reasonable- doubt standard was flagrant, ill-intentioned, and incurable when the prosecutor analogized the standard to putting together a jigsaw puzzle and being sure of what the picture will

2016Fuller analogizes to State v. Fleming. 83 Wn.

2012You’re entitled, certainly, to make any comments here in court that you want me to listen to and consider in imposing a sentence.” RP at 305-06. ¶17 Second, Ammons held that “the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not required and affirm [ed] the SRA’s adoption of a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Ammons, 105 Wn.2d at 185 .

2002State v. Wheeler, 145 Wn.2d 116, 121 , 34 P.3d 799 (2001); see State v. Lopez, 147 Wn.2d 515, 522 , 55 P.3d 609 (2002) (the State must prove a defendant’s criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence to sentence him as a persistent offender); State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 185 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 (1986) (the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is not required to prove a prior conviction).

2011See, e.g., Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (describing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review in challenges to the constitutionality of statutes as a “demanding standard of review”); Island County v. State, 135 Wn.2d 141, 147 , 955 P.2d 377 (1998) (applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to a challenge of the constitutionality of a statute and stating that “we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution”); Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wn.2d 815, 819 , 664

2011See, e.g., Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000) (describing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of review in challenges to the constitutionality of statutes as a "demanding standard of review"); Island Cnty. v. State, 135 Wash.2d 141 , 147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998) (applying a beyond a reasonable doubt standard to a challenge of the constitutionality of a statute and stating that "we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution"); Grant v. Spellman, 99 Wash.2d 815, 819

2011State v. Deal, 128 Wash.2d 693, 698 , 911 P.2d 996 (1996).

2011State v. Deal, 128 Wash.2d 693, 698 , 911 P.2d 996 (1996).

2009At the high end is the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applied in criminal cases, in which the accused's and society's interests in avoiding wrongful convictions is so great that the standard of proof is "`designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.'" Nguyen, 144 Wash.2d at 524 , 29 P.3d 689 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 ).

2009At the high end is the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applied in criminal cases, in which the accused’s and society’s interests in avoiding wrongful convictions is so great that the standard of proof is “ ‘designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment.’ ” Nguyen, 144 Wn.2d at 524 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 ).

2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).

2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds, ( State v. Baldwin, 150 Wash.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003)). [10] RCW 13.40.230(2). [11] RCW 13.40.150(3) provides the court shall: (h) Consider whether or not any of the following mitigating factors exist: (i) The respondent's conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury or the respondent did not contemplate that his or her conduct would cause or threaten serious bodily injury; (ii) The respondent acted under strong and immediate provocation; (iii) The respondent was suffering from a mental

2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).

2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).

2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wn.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds by State v. Baldwin, 150 Wn.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003).

2006State v. Rhodes, 92 Wash.2d 755, 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 (1979), overruled on other grounds, ( State v. Baldwin, 150 Wash.2d 448 , 78 P.3d 1005 (2003)). [10] RCW 13.40.230(2). [11] RCW 13.40.150(3) provides the court shall: (h) Consider whether or not any of the following mitigating factors exist: (i) The respondent's conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury or the respondent did not contemplate that his or her conduct would cause or threaten serious bodily injury; (ii) The respondent acted under strong and immediate provocation; (iii) The respondent was suffering from a mental

2005Jones, 463 U.S. at 367 ; see State v. Platt, 143 Wn.2d 242, 252 , 19 P.3d 412 (2001) (those subject to commitment as insanity acquittees have been found to have committed, under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, an act that would have resulted in a criminal conviction but for their insanity).

2005Jones, 463 U.S. at 367 , 103 S.Ct. 3043 ; see State v. Platt, 143 Wash.2d 242, 252 , 19 P.3d 412 (2001) (those subject to commitment as insanity acquittees have been found to have committed, under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, an act that would resulted in a criminal conviction but for their insanity).

2004State v. Farr-Lenzini, 93 Wash.App. 453 , 469 n. 7, 970 P.2d 313 (1999).

2004State v. Farr-Lenzini, 93 Wn.