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12 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1971–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Maraghgreen2 sentences2026We found these statements raised a question of whether A.H. engaged in misconduct, which occurs when "a juror who is a professional in everyday life shares expertise to evaluate and draw an expert conclusion about a material issue in the case that is distinct from and additional to" the proof at trial ( People v Maragh , 94 NY2d 569, 574 [2000]; see also People v Cochrane , 195 AD3d 525, 525 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 991 [2021]). 2026We found these statements raised a question of whether A.H. engaged in misconduct, which occurs when "a juror who is a professional in everyday life shares expertise to evaluate and draw an expert conclusion about a material issue in the case that is distinct from and additional to" the proof at trial ( People v Maragh , 94 NY2d 569, 574 [2000]; see also People v Cochrane , 195 AD3d 525, 525 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 991 [2021]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cochranegreen2 sentences2026We found these statements raised a question of whether A.H. engaged in misconduct, which occurs when "a juror who is a professional in everyday life shares expertise to evaluate and draw an expert conclusion about a material issue in the case that is distinct from and additional to" the proof at trial ( People v Maragh , 94 NY2d 569, 574 [2000]; see also People v Cochrane , 195 AD3d 525, 525 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 991 [2021]). 2026We found these statements raised a question of whether A.H. engaged in misconduct, which occurs when "a juror who is a professional in everyday life shares expertise to evaluate and draw an expert conclusion about a material issue in the case that is distinct from and additional to" the proof at trial ( People v Maragh , 94 NY2d 569, 574 [2000]; see also People v Cochrane , 195 AD3d 525, 525 [1st Dept 2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 991 [2021]). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Sherrill v. . O'Briengreen1 sentence2022We have often (though not always) described that burden as proving unconstitutionality “beyond a reasonable doubt” (Matter of Wolpoff v Cuomo, 80 NY2d 70, 78 [1992]; but see Matter of City of Utica, 91 NY2d 964 [1998] [upholding a state statute’s constitutionality without reference to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard]; Matter of Sherrill v O’Brien, 188 NY 185, 198 [1907] [“A legislative apportionment act cannot stand as a valid exercise of discretionary power by the legislature when it is manifest that the constitutional provisions have been disregarded”]; Matter of Whitney, 142 NY 531, | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Whitneygreen1 sentence2022We have often (though not always) described that burden as proving unconstitutionality “beyond a reasonable doubt” (Matter of Wolpoff v Cuomo, 80 NY2d 70, 78 [1992]; but see Matter of City of Utica, 91 NY2d 964 [1998] [upholding a state statute’s constitutionality without reference to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard]; Matter of Sherrill v O’Brien, 188 NY 185, 198 [1907] [“A legislative apportionment act cannot stand as a valid exercise of discretionary power by the legislature when it is manifest that the constitutional provisions have been disregarded”]; Matter of Whitney, 142 NY 531, | 1 | 1 |
Wolpoff v. Cuomogreen1 sentence2022We have often (though not always) described that burden as proving unconstitutionality “beyond a reasonable doubt” (Matter of Wolpoff v Cuomo, 80 NY2d 70, 78 [1992]; but see Matter of City of Utica, 91 NY2d 964 [1998] [upholding a state statute’s constitutionality without reference to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard]; Matter of Sherrill v O’Brien, 188 NY 185, 198 [1907] [“A legislative apportionment act cannot stand as a valid exercise of discretionary power by the legislature when it is manifest that the constitutional provisions have been disregarded”]; Matter of Whitney, 142 NY 531, | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Faygreen1 sentence2012It is the settled law of this state that statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is the one to be applied (Matter of Fay, 291 NY 198, 206-207 [1943]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Leontigreen1 sentence1987It must also be noted that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard which is applicable to a jury’s consideration of voluntariness of a confession is thus the same standard applied to "that selfsame issue” in a hearing on a Huntley motion (People v Leonti, 18 NY2d 384, 389 [1966]). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Addington v. Texasgreen2 sentences1984(Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 525 .) Notwithstanding the court’s recognition that civil commitment “constitutes a significant depriva tion of liberty” (Addington v Texas, 441 US, at p 425 ), the Supreme Court expressly declined to adopt the beyond a reasonable doubt standard which the court characterized as an “unique standard of proof * * * regarded as a critical part of the ‘moral force of the criminal law’ (Supra, at p 428.) So, too, in a civil contempt proceeding in which, indeed, it should be further noted, the State is not a party. 1982But see Addington v Texas ( 441 US 418 ), where the Supreme Court required clear and convincing evidence in civil commitment cases. | 1 | 2 |
In re the Arbitration between City of Utica & Zumpanogreen1 sentence2022We have often (though not always) described that burden as proving unconstitutionality “beyond a reasonable doubt” (Matter of Wolpoff v Cuomo, 80 NY2d 70, 78 [1992]; but see Matter of City of Utica, 91 NY2d 964 [1998] [upholding a state statute’s constitutionality without reference to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard]; Matter of Sherrill v O’Brien, 188 NY 185, 198 [1907] [“A legislative apportionment act cannot stand as a valid exercise of discretionary power by the legislature when it is manifest that the constitutional provisions have been disregarded”]; Matter of Whitney, 142 NY 531, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences1984(Matter of Winship, 397 US 358 .) The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the fact finder of the degree of certitude required for a decision. 1982The handbook for proceedings in the New York Family Court of the State of New York, prepared under the direction of the Office of Projects Development of the Appellate Division, First Department, notes that “Preponderance standard may be unconstitutional given the nature of the proceeding” citing Matter of Winship ( 397 US 358 ), where the Supreme Court required the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in juvenile delinquency cases although the preponderance standard was upheld in Matter of Fred S. (supra). | 4 | 1971–1984 |
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen
green
1 sentence2014To be sure, as the majority states, the People need not prove that defendant intended to use the weapon unlawfully against a particular person (majority op at 725); but the People must do more than simply rely on a permissive presumption to meet their burden (see Allen, 442 US at 167 ; United States v Curcio, 712 F2d 1532, 1541 [2d Cir 1983] [“(a)s long as it is clear that the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt, it need meet only a more likely than not rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard”] [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In re Michael B.
green
1 sentence1998The court properly determined that it was in the best interests of the children to terminate respondent’s parental rights and free the children for adoption rather than to suspend judgment for one year (see, Family Ct Act § 631; Matter of Michael B., 80 NY2d 299, 310-311 ; Matter of Sonny H. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Speiser v. Randall
green
1 sentence1984(Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513, 525 .) Notwithstanding the court’s recognition that civil commitment “constitutes a significant depriva tion of liberty” (Addington v Texas, 441 US, at p 425 ), the Supreme Court expressly declined to adopt the beyond a reasonable doubt standard which the court characterized as an “unique standard of proof * * * regarded as a critical part of the ‘moral force of the criminal law’ (Supra, at p 428.) So, too, in a civil contempt proceeding in which, indeed, it should be further noted, the State is not a party. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. McGee
green
1 sentence1984(People v McGee, 49 NY2d 48, 59 .) To be sure, due process mandates the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for adjudication of guilt in a criminal action. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
In re Fred S.
green
1 sentence1982R. ( 87 Misc 2d 900 ) for an excellent analysis and appraisal by Judge Gartenstein; and Matter of Fred S. ( 66 Misc 2d 683 ), dealing with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
In re Pablo C.
green
1 sentence1982Also see Matter of Pablo C. ( 108 Misc 2d 842 ), where Judge Thorpe sets out the history and significance of the rule as it applies to custody and visitation, matters which are also involved in these proceedings. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
In re J. R.
green
1 sentence1982R. ( 87 Misc 2d 900 ) for an excellent analysis and appraisal by Judge Gartenstein; and Matter of Fred S. ( 66 Misc 2d 683 ), dealing with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Commissioner of Public Welfare v. Ryan
green
1 sentence1979(Commissioner of Public Welfare of City of N. Y. v Ryan, 238 App Div 607, 607-608 .) Richardson appears to adopt the position that "clear and convincing evidence” is the same as proof "beyond a reasonable doubt”. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.