16 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re McCarrickgreen2 sentences2018See In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux , 307 Mich. App. 436 , 469, 861 N.W.2d 303 (2014) ("We conditionally reverse and remand for the trial court to determine whether McCarrick's continued custody would result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children."). 2018See In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux , 307 Mich. App. 436 , 469, 861 N.W.2d 303 (2014) ("We conditionally reverse and remand for the trial court to determine whether McCarrick's continued custody would result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children."). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Hamptongreen2 sentences2017Hampton, 407 Mich at 368 (“The resolution of credibility disputes is within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.”). 2017Hampton, 407 Mich at 368 (“The resolution of credibility disputes is within the exclusive province of the trier of fact.”). | 2 | 2 |
In re Englandgreen2 sentences2022See In re England, 314 Mich App 245, 253 ; 887 NW2d 10 (2016) (applying the clear-and-convincing standard under ICWA when analyzing the statutory grounds for termination). 2022See In re England, 314 Mich App 245, 253 ; 887 NW2d 10 (2016) (applying the clear-and-convincing standard under ICWA when analyzing the statutory grounds for termination). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Szalmagreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., People v Brantley, 296 Mich App 546 ; 823 NW2d 290 (2012), quoting People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708 , 712 n 5; 3 “The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g.” MCL 750.520h. -5- 790 NW2d 662 (2010) (“ ‘[T]he complainant’s testimony can, by itself, be sufficient to support a conviction’ of criminal sexual conduct.”). 2014See, e.g., People v Brantley, 296 Mich App 546 ; 823 NW2d 290 (2012), quoting People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708 , 712 n 5; 3 “The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g.” MCL 750.520h. -5- 790 NW2d 662 (2010) (“ ‘[T]he complainant’s testimony can, by itself, be sufficient to support a conviction’ of criminal sexual conduct.”). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Brantleygreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., People v Brantley, 296 Mich App 546 ; 823 NW2d 290 (2012), quoting People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708 , 712 n 5; 3 “The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g.” MCL 750.520h. -5- 790 NW2d 662 (2010) (“ ‘[T]he complainant’s testimony can, by itself, be sufficient to support a conviction’ of criminal sexual conduct.”). 2014See, e.g., People v Brantley, 296 Mich App 546 ; 823 NW2d 290 (2012), quoting People v Szalma, 487 Mich 708 , 712 n 5; 3 “The testimony of a victim need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g.” MCL 750.520h. -5- 790 NW2d 662 (2010) (“ ‘[T]he complainant’s testimony can, by itself, be sufficient to support a conviction’ of criminal sexual conduct.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Iwan Mandyczgreen1 sentence2012Doing so would threaten due process protections by undercutting the presumption of innocence and shifting onto defendants the burden of disproving the actus reus of the crime.62 In civil proceedings to set child support, trial courts employ a preponderance-of- the-evidence standard to make factual findings regarding a parent’s ability to pay.63 These ability-to-pay determinations include findings of imputed income based on an individual’s potential earning capacity.64 Ability-to-pay determinations are thus inherently linked to the actus reus of a subsequent criminal nonsupport charge. 61 See, | 1 | 1 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2012This beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement . . . applies in state as well as federal proceedings.”) (citations omitted); In re Winship, 397 US 358, 363-364 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970) (“[A] society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”). 66 See Waknin v Chamberlain, 467 Mich 329, 335-336 ; 653 NW2d 176 (2002) (“[D]efendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—a standard of proof granting him protection greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard i 2012This beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement . . . applies in state as well as federal proceedings.”) (citations omitted); In re Winship, 397 US 358, 363-364 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970) (“[A] society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”). 66 See Waknin v Chamberlain, 467 Mich 329, 335-336 ; 653 NW2d 176 (2002) (“[D]efendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—a standard of proof granting him protection greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard i | 1 | 1 |
Waknin v. Chamberlaingreen2 sentences2012This beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement . . . applies in state as well as federal proceedings.”) (citations omitted); In re Winship, 397 US 358, 363-364 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970) (“[A] society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”). 66 See Waknin v Chamberlain, 467 Mich 329, 335-336 ; 653 NW2d 176 (2002) (“[D]efendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—a standard of proof granting him protection greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard i 2012This beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirement . . . applies in state as well as federal proceedings.”) (citations omitted); In re Winship, 397 US 358, 363-364 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970) (“[A] society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable doubt about his guilt.”). 66 See Waknin v Chamberlain, 467 Mich 329, 335-336 ; 653 NW2d 176 (2002) (“[D]efendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt—a standard of proof granting him protection greater than the preponderance of the evidence standard i | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robinsongreen1 sentence1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fredericksgreen2 sentences1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to 1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to | 1 | 1 |
People v. Finksgreen1 sentence1978The Court stated: "In the present case we adopt the statement of the Oklahoma supreme court—we cannot believe that the jury found against an innocent man to save the taxpayers from supporting the child, because when we read the entire instruction to the jury we come to but 1 conclusion, namely: That the trial court emphatically instructed the jury that they must not find the defendant to be the father of the child unless they were satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the father.” People v Finks, supra, at 312. 4 See, e.g., People v McFadden, 347 Mich 357 ; 79 NW2d 869 (1956 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Yamat
green
2 sentences2017Id. “[P]robable cause . . . requires a quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt on each element of the crime charged.” People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49, 52 ; 714 NW2d 335 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 2017Id. “[P]robable cause . . . requires a quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt on each element of the crime charged.” People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49, 52 ; 714 NW2d 335 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Perkins
green
2 sentences2017Id. “[P]robable cause . . . requires a quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt on each element of the crime charged.” People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49, 52 ; 714 NW2d 335 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 2017Id. “[P]robable cause . . . requires a quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt on each element of the crime charged.” People v Yamat, 475 Mich 49, 52 ; 714 NW2d 335 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Yost
green
2 sentences2021People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126 ; 659 NW2d 604 (2003). 2021People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 126 ; 659 NW2d 604 (2003). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2019A decision rendered on the basis of an erroneous definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not a true “verdict” within the meaning of the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. [Citations omitted.] -6- “The stringency of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard bespeaks the weight and gravity of the private interest affected, society’s interest in avoiding erroneous convictions, and a judgment that those interests together require that society impose almost the entire risk of error upon itself.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 755 ; 102 S Ct 1388 ; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982) (cleaned up). 2019A decision rendered on the basis of an erroneous definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not a true “verdict” within the meaning of the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial. [Citations omitted.] -6- “The stringency of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard bespeaks the weight and gravity of the private interest affected, society’s interest in avoiding erroneous convictions, and a judgment that those interests together require that society impose almost the entire risk of error upon itself.” Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 755 ; 102 S Ct 1388 ; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982) (cleaned up). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2019The United States Supreme Court has explained that because the application of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard requires a fact-finder to “reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that our society attached to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself.” Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 315 ; 99 S Ct 2781 ; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979) (citation omitted). 2019The United States Supreme Court has explained that because the application of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard requires a fact-finder to “reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused, the standard symbolizes the significance that our society attached to the criminal sanction and thus to liberty itself.” Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 315 ; 99 S Ct 2781 ; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Holland Home v. City of Grand Rapids
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 394-395 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Oakwood Hospital Corp. v. State Tax Commission
neutral
2 sentences2002Oakwood Hosp Corp v State Tax Comm, 385 Mich 704, 708 ; 190 NW2d 105 (1971). 2002Oakwood Hosp Corp v State Tax Comm, 385 Mich 704, 708 ; 190 NW2d 105 (1971). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Retirement Homes of the Detroit Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, Inc v. Sylvan Township
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Norwood
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to 1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Roberson
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to 1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to | 1 | 1994–1994 |
People v. Winans
green
2 sentences1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to 1994See, e.g., Robinson, supra; People v Roberson, 55 Mich App 413 ; 222 NW2d 761 (1974) (distinguishing between constitutional and nonconstitutional error); People v Winans, 187 Mich App 294 ; 466 NW2d 731 (1991) (not indicating any difference in tests and simply applying the two-part Robinson test); People v Fredericks, 125 Mich App 114, 118 ; 335 NW2d 919 (1983) ("Error is not harmless if, in the absence of the error, it is reasonably possible that some juror would have voted to acquit”); People v Norwood, 70 Mich App 53 ; 245 NW2d 170 (1976) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to | 1 | 1994–1994 |
McDaniel v. Jackson
green
2 sentences1978The Court stated: "In the present case we adopt the statement of the Oklahoma supreme court—we cannot believe that the jury found against an innocent man to save the taxpayers from supporting the child, because when we read the entire instruction to the jury we come to but 1 conclusion, namely: That the trial court emphatically instructed the jury that they must not find the defendant to be the father of the child unless they were satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the father.” People v Finks, supra, at 312. 4 See, e.g., People v McFadden, 347 Mich 357 ; 79 NW2d 869 (1956 1978The Court stated: "In the present case we adopt the statement of the Oklahoma supreme court—we cannot believe that the jury found against an innocent man to save the taxpayers from supporting the child, because when we read the entire instruction to the jury we come to but 1 conclusion, namely: That the trial court emphatically instructed the jury that they must not find the defendant to be the father of the child unless they were satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the father.” People v Finks, supra, at 312. 4 See, e.g., People v McFadden, 347 Mich 357 ; 79 NW2d 869 (1956 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. McFadden
green
2 sentences1978The Court stated: "In the present case we adopt the statement of the Oklahoma supreme court—we cannot believe that the jury found against an innocent man to save the taxpayers from supporting the child, because when we read the entire instruction to the jury we come to but 1 conclusion, namely: That the trial court emphatically instructed the jury that they must not find the defendant to be the father of the child unless they were satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the father.” People v Finks, supra, at 312. 4 See, e.g., People v McFadden, 347 Mich 357 ; 79 NW2d 869 (1956 1978The Court stated: "In the present case we adopt the statement of the Oklahoma supreme court—we cannot believe that the jury found against an innocent man to save the taxpayers from supporting the child, because when we read the entire instruction to the jury we come to but 1 conclusion, namely: That the trial court emphatically instructed the jury that they must not find the defendant to be the father of the child unless they were satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the father.” People v Finks, supra, at 312. 4 See, e.g., People v McFadden, 347 Mich 357 ; 79 NW2d 869 (1956 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
People v. Stoeckl
green
2 sentences1978The Court stated: "In the present case we adopt the statement of the Oklahoma supreme court—we cannot believe that the jury found against an innocent man to save the taxpayers from supporting the child, because when we read the entire instruction to the jury we come to but 1 conclusion, namely: That the trial court emphatically instructed the jury that they must not find the defendant to be the father of the child unless they were satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the father.” People v Finks, supra, at 312. 4 See, e.g., People v McFadden, 347 Mich 357 ; 79 NW2d 869 (1956 1978The Court stated: "In the present case we adopt the statement of the Oklahoma supreme court—we cannot believe that the jury found against an innocent man to save the taxpayers from supporting the child, because when we read the entire instruction to the jury we come to but 1 conclusion, namely: That the trial court emphatically instructed the jury that they must not find the defendant to be the father of the child unless they were satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence that he was the father.” People v Finks, supra, at 312. 4 See, e.g., People v McFadden, 347 Mich 357 ; 79 NW2d 869 (1956 | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Harrington v. California
red
2 sentences1971(Emphasis supplied.) 3 *6 In Harrington v. California (1969), 395 US 250 ( 89 S Ct 1726 , 23 L Ed 2d 284 ), the Court expressly “reaffirmed” Chapman in stating its conclusion that a Bruton error was harmless. 1971(Emphasis supplied.) 3 *6 In Harrington v. California (1969), 395 US 250 ( 89 S Ct 1726 , 23 L Ed 2d 284 ), the Court expressly “reaffirmed” Chapman in stating its conclusion that a Bruton error was harmless. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.