23 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United Air Lines, Inc. v. City & County of Denvergreen2 sentences2021In recent years, two Colorado appellate cases have addressed this discrepancy. ¶ 73 First, in United Air Lines, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 973 P.2d 647, 655 (Colo. App. 1998) (Briggs, J., specially concurring), aff’d on other grounds, 992 P.2d 41 (Colo. 2000), my former colleague Steve Briggs presented a thorough, erudite analysis expressing his concerns about using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for determining the constitutionality of a statute. 2018See United Air Lines, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denver , 973 P.2d 647 , 655-59 (Colo. App. 1998) (Briggs, J., specially concurring) (questioning the wisdom of maintaining the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for constitutional challenges). | 3 | 4 |
United States v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2026Id. at ¶¶ 67-68, 583 P.3d at 1277; cf. United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir. 1994) (“When read in 53 the context of the charge as a whole, the instruction’s ‘real possibility’ formulation explains that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not require ‘proof that overcomes every possible doubt.’ In other words, the modifier ‘real’ merely indicates that the jury is not to acquit a defendant if it can conceive of any possibility that the defendant is not guilty.” (emphasis added)). 2025“And the phrase ‘real possibility’ correctly directs the jury not to acquit the defendant simply because it can conceive of some fanciful possibility that the defendant is not guilty.” Schlehuber, ¶ 31; see also Victor, 511 U.S. at 17 (approving of an instruction providing that a reasonable doubt is “not a mere possible doubt”); Williams, 20 F.3d at 131 (“[An] instruction’s ‘real possibility’ formulation explain[ed] that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not require ‘proof that overcomes every possible doubt.’”). ¶ 21 We are not persuaded otherwise by Finney’s reliance on a Hawaii ca | 2 | 2 |
Ernest Joseph Tibbels, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent/Cross-Petitionergreen2 sentences2025See Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1 , 501 P.3d 792 . ¶ 43 In Tibbels, the court provided the jury with an improper analogy to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that encouraged the jury to analogize the standard to a nonlegal, crack- in-the-foundation illustration. 2025See Tibbels v. People, 2022 CO 1 , 501 P.3d 792 . ¶ 43 In Tibbels, the court provided the jury with an improper analogy to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard that encouraged the jury to analogize the standard to a nonlegal, crack- in-the-foundation illustration. | 2 | 2 |
City of Greenwood Village v. for the Proposed City of Centennialgreen2 sentences2007See City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.2000) (refusing to reformulate the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used to determine the constitutionality of a statute); Colo. Criminal Justice Reform Coal. v. Ortiz, 121 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo.App.2005) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to determine whether a house bill is unconstitutional). 2007See City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centenmial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.2000) (refusing to reformulate the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used to determine the constitutionality of a statute); Colo. Criminal Justice Reform Coal. v. Ortiz, 121 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo.App.2005) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to determine whether a house bill is unconstitutional). | 2 | 2 |
Colorado Criminal Justice Reform Coalition v. Ortizgreen2 sentences2007See City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.2000) (refusing to reformulate the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used to determine the constitutionality of a statute); Colo. Criminal Justice Reform Coal. v. Ortiz, 121 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo.App.2005) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to determine whether a house bill is unconstitutional). 2007See City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centenmial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.2000) (refusing to reformulate the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used to determine the constitutionality of a statute); Colo. Criminal Justice Reform Coal. v. Ortiz, 121 P.3d 288, 291 (Colo.App.2005) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to determine whether a house bill is unconstitutional). | 2 | 2 |
Schriro v. Summerlingreen2 sentences2006See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351 n. 1, 124 S.Ct. 2519 . 2006See Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351 n. 1, 124 S.Ct. 2519 . | 2 | 2 |
Poudre Valley Rural Electric Ass'n v. City of Lovelandgreen2 sentences2001See Poudre Valley Rural Electric Ass'n v. City of Loveland, 807 P.2d 547, 557 (Colo.1991)(judgment entered by the trial court will not be reversed for alleged errors unless those errors are shown to prejudice the substantial rights of the complaining party). 2001See Poudre Valley Rural Electric Ass'n v. City of Loveland, 807 P.2d 547, 557 (Colo.1991)(judgment entered by the trial court will not be reversed for alleged errors unless those errors are shown to prejudice the substantial rights of the complaining party). | 2 | 2 |
Victor v. Nebraskagreen2 sentences2025“And the phrase ‘real possibility’ correctly directs the jury not to acquit the defendant simply because it can conceive of some fanciful possibility that the defendant is not guilty.” Schlehuber, ¶ 31; see also Victor, 511 U.S. at 17 (approving of an instruction providing that a reasonable doubt is “not a mere possible doubt”); Williams, 20 F.3d at 131 (“[An] instruction’s ‘real possibility’ formulation explain[ed] that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard does not require ‘proof that overcomes every possible doubt.’”). ¶ 21 We are not persuaded otherwise by Finney’s reliance on a Hawaii ca 2019Victor , 511 U.S. at 8 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ("The Webster charge is representative of the time when 'American courts began applying [the beyond a reasonable doubt standard] in its modern form in criminal cases.' ") (quoting Apodaca v. Oregon , 406 U.S. 404 , 412 n.6, 92 S.Ct. 1628 , 32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972) ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Perezgreen1 sentence2025See State v. Perez, 976 P.2d 427 , 442- 43 (Haw. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robbgreen1 sentence2025See People v. Robb, 215 P.3d 1253, 1263 (Colo. App. 2009) (“[A] reasonable doubt instruction need not be phrased in terms of proof of ‘utmost certainty.’”) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
v. Knobbegreen1 sentence2024Compare People v. Knobee , 2020 COA 7, ¶ 34 (concluding that a court’s analogy lowered prosecution’s burden of proof) ( cert . granted June 29, 2020) ( cert. vacated and case dismissed due to respondent’s death Sept. 9, 2021) , with People v. Tibbels , 2019 COA 175, ¶ 35 (concluding that a court’s analogy did not lower prosecution’s burden of proof), rev ’ d , 2022 CO 1 , ¶ 53 , and People v. Avila , 2019 COA 145, ¶ 46 (same) , overruled by Tibbels , 2022 CO 1, ¶ 53 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Strockgreen1 sentence2024See People v. Sanders, 2022 COA 47 , ¶¶ 54-55, aff’d on other grounds, 2024 CO 33 ; see also People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Colo. App. 2010) (a prosecutor may use rhetorical devices and oratorical embellishment in closing argument). ¶ 76 But even assuming the prosecutor’s analogy misstated the law, the trial court didn’t plainly err by not striking it. | 1 | 1 |
v. Tibbelsgreen1 sentence2024Compare People v. Knobee , 2020 COA 7, ¶ 34 (concluding that a court’s analogy lowered prosecution’s burden of proof) ( cert . granted June 29, 2020) ( cert. vacated and case dismissed due to respondent’s death Sept. 9, 2021) , with People v. Tibbels , 2019 COA 175, ¶ 35 (concluding that a court’s analogy did not lower prosecution’s burden of proof), rev ’ d , 2022 CO 1 , ¶ 53 , and People v. Avila , 2019 COA 145, ¶ 46 (same) , overruled by Tibbels , 2022 CO 1, ¶ 53 . | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Bolesgreen | 1 | 1 |
Adkins v. Children's Hospital of Columbiared1 sentence2021See also Adkins v. Child.’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923) (statute must be proved unconstitutional “beyond rational doubt”). ¶ 70 Four years after Adkins was decided, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Czgreen1 sentence2021Compare C.Z., 262 P.3d at 905 (applying the clear and 23 convincing evidence standard), with People in Interest of R.L., 961 P.2d 606, 609 (Colo. App. 1998) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard). | 1 | 1 |
People in Interest of RLgreen1 sentence2021Compare C.Z., 262 P.3d at 905 (applying the clear and 23 convincing evidence standard), with People in Interest of R.L., 961 P.2d 606, 609 (Colo. App. 1998) (applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Grossgreen1 sentence2021Let me explain why. ¶ 81 As the majority opinion observes, subsection (1)(h) provides that a person commits second degree assault if he or she spits on a police officer with the intent “to infect, injure, or harm.” Plemmons asserts that this statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied to her because the meaning of “harm” is subject to different interpretations. ¶ 82 After reiterating that we must address Plemmons’s vagueness challenge under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the majority recites the familiar black letter rule that the essential inquiry in a void for vag | 1 | 1 |
Whimbush v. Peoplegreen1 sentence2021Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Colo. 1994).1 ¶ 10 “The essential inquiry in addressing a void for vagueness challenge is whether the statute ‘forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must 1 For the first time in her reply brief, Plemmons urges us “not [to] apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard because it is out of step with our supreme court’s latest thinking and because the standard is badly misguided.” We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. | 1 | 1 |
Island County v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Island County v. State, 955 P.2d 377, 391 (Wash. 1998) (Sanders, J., concurring) (“For, quite literally, the maxim requires us to hold either a statute is proved unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, or we must . . . hold [that the statute] is constitutional even if it really isn’t.”). | 1 | 1 |
Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiamgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. ___ , ___, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1963 (2020); see also Laura J. | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Virginiared | 1 | 1 |
| Dempsey v. Peoplegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Zaner v. City of Brightongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barber v. Rittergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kirkmeyer v. Department of Local Affairsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Huber v. COLORADO MINING ASS'Ngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bingo Catering & Supplies, Inc. v. Duncangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bickel v. City of Bouldergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Vasquezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| MESA COUNTY BD. OF COUNTY COM'RS v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Murray v. Giarratanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Penry v. Lynaughred | 1 | 1 |
| Sawyer v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lockett v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Tennesongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Huntgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Biegenwaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ford v. Stricklandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDougall v. North Carolinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
v. Avilared1 sentence2024Compare People v. Knobee , 2020 COA 7, ¶ 34 (concluding that a court’s analogy lowered prosecution’s burden of proof) ( cert . granted June 29, 2020) ( cert. vacated and case dismissed due to respondent’s death Sept. 9, 2021) , with People v. Tibbels , 2019 COA 175, ¶ 35 (concluding that a court’s analogy did not lower prosecution’s burden of proof), rev ’ d , 2022 CO 1 , ¶ 53 , and People v. Avila , 2019 COA 145, ¶ 46 (same) , overruled by Tibbels , 2022 CO 1, ¶ 53 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United Airlines v. CITY & CTY. OF DENVER
green
2 sentences2021In recent years, two Colorado appellate cases have addressed this discrepancy. ¶ 73 First, in United Air Lines, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 973 P.2d 647, 655 (Colo. App. 1998) (Briggs, J., specially concurring), aff’d on other grounds, 992 P.2d 41 (Colo. 2000), my former colleague Steve Briggs presented a thorough, erudite analysis expressing his concerns about using the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for determining the constitutionality of a statute. 2016Whether the Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard is Fundamentally Flawed ¶ 22 The Foundation also invites us to abandon the beyond a reasonable doubt standard altogether because it is “archaic and undefined.” The Foundation relies on secondary authority and decisions in some other jurisdictions. ¶ 23 To be sure, squaring the “heavy burden” to deem a statute unconstitutional, People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1022 (Colo. 2004) (citation omitted), with the de novo review applicable to reviewing the constitutionality of statutes could seem anomalous, see United Air Lines, Inc. v. City & Cty. of Denv | 2 | 2016–2021 |
People v. Schlehuber
green
1 sentence2025The jury must, of course, acquit if it believes that there is a “real possibility” that the defendant is actually innocent of the charged crime because the prosecution has not met its burden to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt.2 But if the latter definition applies, and “real possibility” embeds the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the rephrasing only invites more confusion surrounding the legal standard. 2 In People v. Schlehuber, 2025 COA 50 , the division concluded that the “real possibility” phrase does not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People in re L.C
green
2 sentences2021The void for vagueness doctrine also ensures that a statute is sufficiently specific so that police officers “can avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Supra ¶ 10 (quoting People in Interest of L.C., 2017 COA 82, ¶ 8 , ___ P.3d ___, ___). ¶ 84 This latter purpose might not meet constitutional muster here if the supreme court were to abandon the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. This is so for two reasons: (1) the meaning of “harm” in the phrase “infect, injure, or harm” is unclear, as evidenced by the interpretation given to the term by the trial court and the majority’s resort t 2021The void for vagueness doctrine also ensures that a statute is sufficiently specific so that police officers “can avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application.” Supra ¶ 10 (quoting People in Interest of L.C., 2017 COA 82, ¶ 8 , ___ P.3d ___, ___). ¶ 84 This latter purpose might not meet constitutional muster here if the supreme court were to abandon the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. This is so for two reasons: (1) the meaning of “harm” in the phrase “infect, injure, or harm” is unclear, as evidenced by the interpretation given to the term by the trial court and the majority’s resort t | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Blodgett v. Holden
green
1 sentence2021In Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142 (1927), the Supreme Court simply held a statute invalid because it was arbitrary and violated the plaintiff’s right to due process. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tabor Found., Non-Profit Corp. v. Reg'l Transp. Dist.
green
2 sentences2021Similarly, in affirming the division’s decision, the supreme court did not address the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of assessing constitutionality. ¶ 75 More recently, in TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District, 2016 COA 102 , 417 P.3d 850 , aff’d, 2018 CO 29 , 416 P.3d 101 , a division of this court rejected the TABOR Foundation’s challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, concluding that it was obligated to follow supreme court precedent employing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 2021Similarly, in affirming the division’s decision, the supreme court did not address the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of assessing constitutionality. ¶ 75 More recently, in TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District, 2016 COA 102 , 417 P.3d 850 , aff’d, 2018 CO 29 , 416 P.3d 101 , a division of this court rejected the TABOR Foundation’s challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, concluding that it was obligated to follow supreme court precedent employing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District
green
2 sentences2021Similarly, in affirming the division’s decision, the supreme court did not address the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of assessing constitutionality. ¶ 75 More recently, in TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District, 2016 COA 102 , 417 P.3d 850 , aff’d, 2018 CO 29 , 416 P.3d 101 , a division of this court rejected the TABOR Foundation’s challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, concluding that it was obligated to follow supreme court precedent employing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 2021Similarly, in affirming the division’s decision, the supreme court did not address the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of assessing constitutionality. ¶ 75 More recently, in TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District, 2016 COA 102 , 417 P.3d 850 , aff’d, 2018 CO 29 , 416 P.3d 101 , a division of this court rejected the TABOR Foundation’s challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, concluding that it was obligated to follow supreme court precedent employing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Peo v. Plemmons
green
1 sentence2021SUMMARY February 4, 2021 2021COA10 No. 18CA0481, Peo v Plemmons — Crimes — Assault in the Second Degree; Constitutional Law — Due Process — Vagueness In this proceeding, a division of the court of appeals considers whether section 18-3-203(1)(h), C.R.S. 2020, under which a person commits second degree assault if he or she spits on a peace officer with “intent to infect, injure, or harm,” is unconstitutionally vague because of a lack of a statutory definition of “harm.” Relying on the precedent of People v. Graves, 2016 CO 15 , and the cases which proceeded it, this division assesses the statut | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Graves
green
1 sentence2021SUMMARY February 4, 2021 2021COA10 No. 18CA0481, Peo v Plemmons — Crimes — Assault in the Second Degree; Constitutional Law — Due Process — Vagueness In this proceeding, a division of the court of appeals considers whether section 18-3-203(1)(h), C.R.S. 2020, under which a person commits second degree assault if he or she spits on a peace officer with “intent to infect, injure, or harm,” is unconstitutionally vague because of a lack of a statutory definition of “harm.” Relying on the precedent of People v. Graves, 2016 CO 15 , and the cases which proceeded it, this division assesses the statut | 1 | 2021–2021 |
TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District
green
2 sentences2021Similarly, in affirming the division’s decision, the supreme court did not address the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of assessing constitutionality. ¶ 75 More recently, in TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District, 2016 COA 102 , 417 P.3d 850 , aff’d, 2018 CO 29 , 416 P.3d 101 , a division of this court rejected the TABOR Foundation’s challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, concluding that it was obligated to follow supreme court precedent employing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 2021Similarly, in affirming the division’s decision, the supreme court did not address the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of assessing constitutionality. ¶ 75 More recently, in TABOR Foundation v. Regional Transportation District, 2016 COA 102 , 417 P.3d 850 , aff’d, 2018 CO 29 , 416 P.3d 101 , a division of this court rejected the TABOR Foundation’s challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute, concluding that it was obligated to follow supreme court precedent employing the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Apodaca v. Oregon red | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Jones v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Malan v. Lewis green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil and Gas Ass'n green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Beck v. Alabama green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Clemons v. Mississippi green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Woodson v. North Carolina green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Johnson v. Mississippi green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Sumner v. Shuman green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Zant v. Stephens green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Proffitt v. Florida green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Wood v. Utah green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Gaziano v. United States green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Gelvin v. North Dakota green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Bullington v. Missouri green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.