beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Maryland

2019An " Unger instruction" refers to this Court's decision in Unger v. State , 427 Md. 383 , 48 A.3d 242 (2012), in which we held that "telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters [are] 'merely advisory,' " id. at 417 , 48 A.3d 242 , "constitutes [a] structural error" that can only be cured by a specific instruction stating that "the jury ... is bound by the presumption of innocence and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard," State v. Adams-Bey , 449 Md. 690 , 705, 144 A.3d 1200 (2016).

2019An " Unger instruction" refers to this Court's decision in Unger v. State , 427 Md. 383 , 48 A.3d 242 (2012), in which we held that "telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters [are] 'merely advisory,' " id. at 417 , 48 A.3d 242 , "constitutes [a] structural error" that can only be cured by a specific instruction stating that "the jury ... is bound by the presumption of innocence and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard," State v. Adams-Bey , 449 Md. 690 , 705, 144 A.3d 1200 (2016).

2019An " Unger instruction" refers to this Court's decision in Unger v. State , 427 Md. 383 , 48 A.3d 242 (2012), in which we held that "telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters [are] 'merely advisory,' " id. at 417 , 48 A.3d 242 , "constitutes [a] structural error" that can only be cured by a specific instruction stating that "the jury ... is bound by the presumption of innocence and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard," State v. Adams-Bey , 449 Md. 690 , 705, 144 A.3d 1200 (2016).

2019An " Unger instruction" refers to this Court's decision in Unger v. State , 427 Md. 383 , 48 A.3d 242 (2012), in which we held that "telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters [are] 'merely advisory,' " id. at 417 , 48 A.3d 242 , "constitutes [a] structural error" that can only be cured by a specific instruction stating that "the jury ... is bound by the presumption of innocence and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard," State v. Adams-Bey , 449 Md. 690 , 705, 144 A.3d 1200 (2016).

2016See Robertson v. State, 295 Md. 688, 689 , 457 A.2d 826 (1983) (per curiam) (concluding that the defendant “was entitled to an instruction that the court’s comments on the burden of proof were not merely advisory but were binding upon the jury” and that the “[fjailure to give the requested instruction constituted reversible error”); Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91 , 437 A.2d 654 (concluding that the trial judge erred in advising the jury that all of his instructions were advisory because “certain bedrock *706 characteristics” such as the presumption of innocence and standard of proof “are not ‘the l

2016See Robertson v. State, 295 Md. 688, 689 , 457 A.2d 826 (1983) (per curiam) (concluding that the defendant “was entitled to an instruction that the court’s comments on the burden of proof were not merely advisory but were binding upon the jury” and that the “[fjailure to give the requested instruction constituted reversible error”); Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91 , 437 A.2d 654 (concluding that the trial judge erred in advising the jury that all of his instructions were advisory because “certain bedrock *706 characteristics” such as the presumption of innocence and standard of proof “are not ‘the l

2011Like our sister courts, we conclude that the offensive use of collateral estoppel against the defendant deprives the defendant of a jury that will “discharge fully its paramount deliberative and decisional responsibilities.” Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 892 (quoting Ingenito, 432 A.2d at 916 ).

2011Under the circumstances, I rely upon the reasons stated in my previous dissents in the cases of Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), and Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001), and Judge McAuliffe's dissenting and concurring opinion in Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 539 , 499 A.2d 1261, 1288 (1985).

2011Under the circumstances, I rely upon the reasons stated in my previous dissents in the cases of Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), and Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001), and Judge McAuliffe's dissenting and concurring opinion in Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 539 , 499 A.2d 1261, 1288 (1985).

2011As the Court of Appeals noted in Ruffin, 394 Md. at 372 , 906 A.2d 360 , “the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt principles do not change from case to case.

2011As the Court of Appeals noted in Ruffin, 394 Md. at 372 , 906 A.2d 360 , “the presumption of innocence and the reasonable doubt principles do not change from case to case.

2011Like our sister courts, we conclude that the offensive use of collateral estoppel against the defendant deprives the defendant of a jury that will “discharge fully its paramount deliberative and decisional responsibilities.” Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 892 (quoting Ingenito, 432 A.2d at 916 ).

2011Under the circumstances, I rely upon the reasons stated in my previous dissents in the cases of Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), and Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001), and Judge McAuliffe's dissenting and concurring opinion in Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 539 , 499 A.2d 1261, 1288 (1985).

2011Under the circumstances, I rely upon the reasons stated in my previous dissents in the cases of Oken v. State, 378 Md. 179 , 835 A.2d 1105 (2003), and Borchardt v. State, 367 Md. 91 , 786 A.2d 631 (2001), and Judge McAuliffe's dissenting and concurring opinion in Evans v. State, 304 Md. 487, 539 , 499 A.2d 1261, 1288 (1985).

2010Burns, 149 Md.App. at 540 , 817 A.2d 885 .

2010Burns, 149 Md.App. at 540 , 817 A.2d 885 .

2008There, in answer to a contention that the proffered factual basis for a guilty plea must satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the Court held that the guilty plea waived “ ‘the right to insist that the prosecution’s proof at trial establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. at 598 , 755 A.2d at 1100 .

2008There, in answer to a contention that the proffered factual basis for a guilty plea must satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the Court held that the guilty plea waived “ ‘the right to insist that the prosecution’s proof at trial establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id. at 598 , 755 A.2d at 1100 .

2007The Court reasoned that the rights recognized in Gault and later, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that due process demands that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof be required in delinquency proceedings, “were determined to stem from fundamental fairness[.]” Thomas, 372 Md. at 70 , 811 A.2d 310 .

2007The Court reasoned that the rights recognized in Gault and later, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that due process demands that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof be required in delinquency proceedings, “were determined to stem from fundamental fairness[.]” Thomas, 372 Md. at 70 , 811 A.2d 310 .

2007The Court reasoned that the rights recognized in Gault and later, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that due process demands that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof be required in delinquency proceedings, “were determined to stem from fundamental fairness[.]” Thomas, 372 Md. at 70 , 811 A.2d 310 .

2007The Court reasoned that the rights recognized in Gault and later, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), which held that due process demands that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof be required in delinquency proceedings, “were determined to stem from fundamental fairness[.]” Thomas, 372 Md. at 70 , 811 A.2d 310 .

2004Recently, in White v. State, 363 Md. 150 , 767 A.2d 855 (2001), we considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for cocaine possession in light of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof.

2004Recently, in White v. State, 363 Md. 150 , 767 A.2d 855 (2001), we considered the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction for cocaine possession in light of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof.

2004The Court discussed the analogous scenario of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where “the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and ... the trial judge asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 252 , 106 S.Ct. at 2512 , 91 L.Ed 2d at 214.

2004The Court discussed the analogous scenario of a motion for acquittal in a criminal case, where “the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applies and ... the trial judge asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 252 , 106 S.Ct. at 2512 , 91 L.Ed 2d at 214.

2003It is this factfinding process that brings § 413 within the strictures of Apprendi and the Due Process Clause, even though it is still an open question whether statutes like the one upheld in Walton will survive Supreme Court review after Apprendi. 367 Md. at 161-62, 786 A.2d at 673. [30] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [31] Footnote 20 of the Department's letter notes that "The Florida pattern jury instructions confirm the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for aggravating circumstances but do not specifically deal with the standard applicable to mitigati

2003It is this factfinding process that brings § 413 within the strictures of Apprendi and the Due Process Clause, even though it is still an open question whether statutes like the one upheld in Walton will survive Supreme Court review after Apprendi. 367 Md. at 161-62, 786 A.2d at 673. [30] Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). [31] Footnote 20 of the Department's letter notes that "The Florida pattern jury instructions confirm the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for aggravating circumstances but do not specifically deal with the standard applicable to mitigati

2003Roberts, 361 Md. at 368 , 761 A.2d at 897 .

2003Roberts, 361 Md. at 368 , 761 A.2d at 897 .

2001As the Utah Supreme Court explained: "The reasonable doubt standard..., which is only used when the most basic interests of the individual are at stake, ... conveys to the decision maker a sense of the solemnity of the task and the necessity for a high degree of certitude, given the nature of the value to be weighed, in imposing the death sentence." Wood, 648 P.2d at 84 .

2001As the Utah Supreme Court explained: “The reasonable doubt standard ..., which is only used when the most basic interests of the individual are at stake, ... conveys to the decision maker a sense of the solemnity of the task and the necessity for a high degree of certitude, given the nature of the value to be weighed, in imposing the death sentence.” Wood, 648 P.2d at 84 .

2001In that way, "the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as applied to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors serves to assure the degree of reliability necessary to support a verdict of death in a sentencing proceeding." Id. (emphasis added).

2001In that way, “the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as applied to the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors serves to assure the degree of reliability necessary to support a verdict of death in a sentencing proceeding.” Id. (emphasis added).

1999For instance, as noted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Baldwin, 305 A.2d at 559 , proper jurisdiction, whether territorial or subject matter, is of vital import to the criminal court trying the defendant.

1989See, e.g., Schneider v. Housewright, 668 F.2d 366 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.1980); United States v. Manuszak, 532 F.2d 311 (3d Cir.1976); and United States v. D’Amato, 429 F.2d 1284 (3d Cir.1970).

1989See, e.g., Schneider v. Housewright, 668 F.2d 366 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.1980); United States v. Manuszak, 532 F.2d 311 (3d Cir.1976); and United States v. D’Amato, 429 F.2d 1284 (3d Cir.1970).

1989See, e.g., Schneider v. Housewright, 668 F.2d 366 (8th Cir.1981); United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.1980); United States v. Manuszak, 532 F.2d 311 (3d Cir.1976); and United States v. D’Amato, 429 F.2d 1284 (3d Cir.1970).