beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Connecticut

2008Notwithstanding the state's civil labels and good intentions . . . this level of certainty [is] necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a variety of government-initiated proceedings that threaten the individual involved with a significant deprivation of liberty or stigma." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Santosky v. Kramer, supra, 455 U.S. at 754-56 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 .

2000The stringency of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard bespeaks the weight and gravity of the private interest affected, society's interest in avoiding erroneous convictions, and a judgment that those interests together require that society impos[e] almost the entire risk of error upon itself." (Citation omitted in part; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 755 (1982).

2020Our Supreme Court has described the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as a subjective state of near certitude . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gray-Brown, 188 Conn. App. 446 , 464–66, 204 A.3d 1161 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 922 , 205 A.3d 568 (2019).

2020Our Supreme Court has described the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as a subjective state of near certitude . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gray-Brown, 188 Conn. App. 446 , 464–66, 204 A.3d 1161 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 922 , 205 A.3d 568 (2019).

2020Our Supreme Court has described the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as a subjective state of near certitude . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gray-Brown, 188 Conn. App. 446 , 464–66, 204 A.3d 1161 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 922 , 205 A.3d 568 (2019).

2020Our Supreme Court has described the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as a subjective state of near certitude . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gray-Brown, 188 Conn. App. 446 , 464–66, 204 A.3d 1161 , cert. denied, 331 Conn. 922 , 205 A.3d 568 (2019).

2010For the reasons set forth in this opinion, neither the defendant nor Justice Schaller has raised any doubt concerning the constitutionality of the born alive rule, let alone a doubt so great as to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. [76] We note that the state had conceded that Miranda's assault convictions "were premised on two separate acts of omission, which led to two, rather than six, discrete injuries." State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 96 n. 1, 794 A.2d 506 .

2010For the reasons set forth in this opinion, neither the defendant nor Justice Schaller has raised any doubt concerning the constitutionality of the born alive rule, let alone a doubt so great as to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. [76] We note that the state had conceded that Miranda's assault convictions "were premised on two separate acts of omission, which led to two, rather than six, discrete injuries." State v. Miranda, supra, 260 Conn. at 96 n. 1, 794 A.2d 506 .

2007Although both this court and the Appellate Court have approved similar language; see State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 370 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002); State v. Nunes, 58 Conn. App. 296, 309 , 752 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 944 , 762 A.2d 906 (2000); the Appellate Court concluded that the instructions in the present case were constitutionally infirm because they failed also to include other explanatory phrases.

2007Although both this court and the Appellate Court have approved similar language; see State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 370 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002); State v. Nunes, 58 Conn. App. 296, 309 , 752 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 944 , 762 A.2d 906 (2000); the Appellate Court concluded that the instructions in the present case were constitutionally infirm because they failed also to include other explanatory phrases.

2007Although both this court and the Appellate Court have approved similar language; see State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 370 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002); State v. Nunes, 58 Conn. App. 296, 309 , 752 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 944 , 762 A.2d 906 (2000); the Appellate Court concluded that the instructions in the present case were constitutionally infirm because they failed also to include other explanatory phrases.

2007Although both this court and the Appellate Court have approved similar language; see State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 370 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002); State v. Nunes, 58 Conn. App. 296, 309 , 752 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 944 , 762 A.2d 906 (2000); the Appellate Court concluded that the instructions in the present case were constitutionally infirm because they failed also to include other explanatory phrases.

2007Although both this court and the Appellate Court have approved similar language; see State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 370 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002); State v. Nunes, 58 Conn. App. 296, 309 , 752 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 944 , 762 A.2d 906 (2000); the Appellate Court concluded that the instructions in the present case were constitutionally infirm because they failed also to include other explanatory phrases.

2007Although both this court and the Appellate Court have approved similar language; see State v. Ferguson, 260 Conn. 339, 370 , 796 A.2d 1118 (2002); State v. Nunes, 58 Conn. App. 296, 309 , 752 A.2d 93 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 944 , 762 A.2d 906 (2000); the Appellate Court concluded that the instructions in the present case were constitutionally infirm because they failed also to include other explanatory phrases.

2001Specifically, he claims that this instruction, which is known as a “two-inference” instruction; id., 208 ; had the effect of directing the jury to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard rather than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.

1999We should join the Second Circuit and “reaffirm the proposition that the presumption of innocence and the beyond-a-reasonable doubt standard apply to all criminal defendants without regard to their actual guilt or innocence.” United States v. Doyle, supra, 538 .

1996If a “permissive presumption,” namely, a finding of a blood alcohol content greater than 0.10 percent, “leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference. . . . [I]n that situation [the] risk [is] that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational factfinder to make an erroneous fa

1996If a “permissive presumption,” namely, a finding of a blood alcohol content greater than 0.10 percent, “leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference. . . . [I]n that situation [the] risk [is] that an explanation of the permissible inference to a jury, or its use by a jury, has caused the presumptively rational factfinder to make an erroneous fa

1992This same argument was presented to this court in State v. Rivera, 24 Conn. App. 670, 675 , 591 A.2d 440 , cert. denied, 219 Conn. 914 , 593 A.2d 139 (1991), and to our Supreme Court in State v. Ortiz, supra, 666 .

1992This same argument was presented to this court in State v. Rivera, 24 Conn. App. 670, 675 , 591 A.2d 440 , cert. denied, 219 Conn. 914 , 593 A.2d 139 (1991), and to our Supreme Court in State v. Ortiz, supra, 666 .

1992This same argument was presented to this court in State v. Rivera, 24 Conn. App. 670, 675 , 591 A.2d 440 , cert. denied, 219 Conn. 914 , 593 A.2d 139 (1991), and to our Supreme Court in State v. Ortiz, supra, 666 .

1992This same argument was presented to this court in State v. Rivera, 24 Conn. App. 670, 675 , 591 A.2d 440 , cert. denied, 219 Conn. 914 , 593 A.2d 139 (1991), and to our Supreme Court in State v. Ortiz, supra, 666 .

1991The defendant correctly asserts that not all evidentiary facts from which an inference can be drawn need to be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but only those that are essential to proof of an element of the crime. 4 State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507 , 590 A.2d 901 (1991); State v. McDonough, 205 Conn. 352, 355 , 533 A.2d 857 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 , 108 S. Ct. 1079 , 99 L.

1991The defendant correctly asserts that not all evidentiary facts from which an inference can be drawn need to be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but only those that are essential to proof of an element of the crime. 4 State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507 , 590 A.2d 901 (1991); State v. McDonough, 205 Conn. 352, 355 , 533 A.2d 857 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 , 108 S. Ct. 1079 , 99 L.

1991The defendant correctly asserts that not all evidentiary facts from which an inference can be drawn need to be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but only those that are essential to proof of an element of the crime. 4 State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507 , 590 A.2d 901 (1991); State v. McDonough, 205 Conn. 352, 355 , 533 A.2d 857 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 , 108 S. Ct. 1079 , 99 L.

1991The defendant correctly asserts that not all evidentiary facts from which an inference can be drawn need to be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but only those that are essential to proof of an element of the crime. 4 State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507 , 590 A.2d 901 (1991); State v. McDonough, 205 Conn. 352, 355 , 533 A.2d 857 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 , 108 S. Ct. 1079 , 99 L.

1991The defendant correctly asserts that not all evidentiary facts from which an inference can be drawn need to be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but only those that are essential to proof of an element of the crime. 4 State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507 , 590 A.2d 901 (1991); State v. McDonough, 205 Conn. 352, 355 , 533 A.2d 857 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 , 108 S. Ct. 1079 , 99 L.

1991The defendant correctly asserts that not all evidentiary facts from which an inference can be drawn need to be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but only those that are essential to proof of an element of the crime. 4 State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507 , 590 A.2d 901 (1991); State v. McDonough, 205 Conn. 352, 355 , 533 A.2d 857 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 , 108 S. Ct. 1079 , 99 L.

1991The defendant correctly asserts that not all evidentiary facts from which an inference can be drawn need to be proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but only those that are essential to proof of an element of the crime. 4 State v. Castonguay, 218 Conn. 486, 507 , 590 A.2d 901 (1991); State v. McDonough, 205 Conn. 352, 355 , 533 A.2d 857 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 906 , 108 S. Ct. 1079 , 99 L.