double jeopardy clause in Alabama

2026However, the Court's disposition -- as well as its determination, pursuant to Sisson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1988), that a double- jeopardy analysis under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), is inapplicable to multiple convictions under § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, see Ex parte Rice, 766 So. 2d at 150 -51 -- is still controlling in this case. 16 CR-2025-0003 concern a double-jeopardy violation.

2026However, the Court's disposition -- as well as its determination, pursuant to Sisson v. State, 528 So. 2d 1159 (Ala. 1988), that a double- jeopardy analysis under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), is inapplicable to multiple convictions under § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, see Ex parte Rice, 766 So. 2d at 150 -51 -- is still controlling in this case. 16 CR-2025-0003 concern a double-jeopardy violation.

2005The Court of Criminal Appeals held that "this double jeopardy claim goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court to render judgment," and that, therefore, "Rolling's double jeopardy/jurisdictional issue [was] not precluded by operation of the limitations period." 673 So.2d at 816 .

2005The Court of Criminal Appeals held that “this double jeopardy claim goes to the jurisdiction of the trial court to render judgment,” and that, therefore, “Rolling’s double jeopardy/jurisdictional issue [was] not precluded by operation of the limitations period.” 673 So.2d at 816 .

1991See also Brown v. Ohio , 432 U.S. 161 , 166-67 n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 2226 n. 6, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) (The double jeopardy clause bars a second prosecution which "requires the relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first [prosecution].").

1991See also Brown v. Ohio , 432 U.S. 161 , 166-67 n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 2226 n. 6, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) (The double jeopardy clause bars a second prosecution which "requires the relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first [prosecution].").

2024See Ex parte Benefield, 932 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 2005). 7 CR-2024-0333 "…. " '(a) … An offense is an included if: " '(1) It is established by proof of the same or fewer than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged. " '…. " '(4) It differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property or public interests, or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.' "§ 13A-1-9, Ala. Code 1975. " 'In Blockburger v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States enumerated the "sa

2018See Ex parte Benefield , 932 So.2d 92 (Ala. 2005).

2003The Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Ziglar , 669 So.2d 133 (Ala. 1995), recognized that mandamus is the appropriate vehicle to seek redress of a circuit court's ruling on an allegation of a double-jeopardy violation.

2001As we stated in Ex parte K.H., 700 So.2d 1201, 1202 (Ala.Crim.App.1997): “The Alabama Supreme Court addressed this issue in Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So.2d 133 (Ala.1995), where the Court, departing from the long-established practice of not reviewing double jeopardy issues by way of mandamus, stated: “ ‘We are satisfied that a criminal defendant with a double jeopardy defense should not be foreclosed from pretrial correction of a trial judge’s erroneous denial of a plea of former jeopardy.

2005"The doctrine of collateral estoppel also `emanates from both the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.' S.W. v. State , 703 So.2d 427 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997); see Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436 (1970); United States v. Sanchez , 992 F.2d 1143 , 1154 (11th Cir. 1993), on reconsideration, 3 F.3d 366 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1110 , 114 S.Ct. 1051 , 127 L.Ed.2d 373 (1994).

1997The doctrine of collateral estoppel also "emanates from both the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." S.W. v. State , 703 So.2d 427 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997); see Ashe v. Swenson , 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970); United States v. Sanchez , 992 F.2d 1143 , 1154 (11th Cir. 1993), on reconsideration, 3 F.3d 366 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1110 , 114 S.Ct. 1051 , 127 L.Ed.2d 373 (1994).

1994See also Hess, supra (holding that since the proceedings under the statute were remedial and designed “to protect the government from financial loss” — rather than to “vindicate public justice” — they were civil in nature) 317 U.S. at 548-49 , 63 S.Ct. at 386-87 .

1994See also Hess, supra (holding that since the proceedings under the statute were remedial and designed “to protect the government from financial loss” — rather than to “vindicate public justice” — they were civil in nature) 317 U.S. at 548-49 , 63 S.Ct. at 386-87 .

2011See Smith v. State, 895 So.2d 381, 382-385 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (relying on Craig, this Court found that two convictions for first-degree robbery violated principles of double jeopardy where the appellant took money from the business cash drawer and from office manager’s purse); McPherson v. State, 933 So.2d 1114 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (finding Craig to be factually similar, this Court found the appellant’s convictions for two counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling during one course of conduct was a double-jeopardy violation).” Abrams v. State, 978 So.2d at 797-99 .

2006See Smith v. State , 895 So.2d 381 , 382-385 (Ala.Crim.App. 2004) (relying on Craig , this Court found that two convictions for first-degree *Page 799 robbery violated principles of double jeopardy where the appellant took money from the business cash drawer and from office manager's purse); McPherson v. State , 933 So.2d 1114 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005) (finding Craig to be factually similar, this Court found the appellant's convictions for two counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied dwelling during one course of conduct was a double-jeopardy violation).

2009Compare Peterson v. State, 842 So.2d 734, 736 (Ala. Crim.App.2001) (when, in response to appellate court’s remand order instructing trial court to “make specific findings of fact regarding the appellant’s double jeopardy claim,” the trial court issued a conclu-sory statement indicating that the double-jeopardy claim was without merit, the appellate court could neither determine the factual basis for the trial court’s ruling nor decide the issue presented on appeal, and, accordingly, the appellate court issued a second remand order to the trial court).

2009Compare Peterson v. State, 842 So.2d 734, 736 (Ala. Crim.App.2001) (when, in response to appellate court's remand order instructing trial court to "make specific findings of fact regarding the appellant's double jeopardy claim," the trial court issued a conclusory statement indicating that the double-jeopardy claim was without merit, the appellate court could neither determine the factual basis for the trial court's ruling nor decide the issue presented on appeal, and, accordingly, the appellate court issued a second remand order to the trial court).

2008In addition, “[o]ur case law has consistently upheld the validity of this statutory scheme, as against a double jeopardy challenge, where the variance is of such a material character that the second indictment constitutes a separate and different offense.” Ex parte Allred, 393 So.2d 1030, 1032 (Ala.1980).

2008I note that because James McClendon was never in jeopardy for purposes of a double-jeopardy analysis, see, e.g., Ex parte Tribble, 783 So.2d 69 (Ala.2000) (jeopardy attaches in a jury trial only after the jury is empaneled and sworn), neither Ex parte Allred, 393 So.2d 1030 (Ala.1980), nor Ex parte Airhart, 477 So.2d 979 (Ala.1985), is applicable here.

2018"Second, if the offenses did arise from the same act or transaction, then it must be determined whether each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, i.e., whether the two offenses are the 'same' for double-jeopardy purposes. '[A]pplication of the test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense,' Iannelli v. United States , 420 U.S. 770 , 785 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284 , 43 L.Ed. 2d 616 (1975), and is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that a legislature 'ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes.' *30

2018"Second, if the offenses did arise from the same act or transaction, then it must be determined whether each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, i.e., whether the two offenses are the 'same' for double-jeopardy purposes. '[A]pplication of the test focuses on the statutory elements of the offense,' Iannelli v. United States , 420 U.S. 770 , 785 n. 17, 95 S.Ct. 1284 , 43 L.Ed. 2d 616 (1975), and is a rule of statutory construction based on the assumption that a legislature 'ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes.' *30

2000See North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711 (1969). . . . ". . . "`In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, this Court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the "same-elements" test, the double jeopardy bar applies.

1994North Carolina v. Pearce , 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).

2018Thus, whether a defendant's conduct constitutes the same act or transaction 'does not determine whether there is a double jeopardy violation; rather it determines if there could be a violation.' State v. Schoonover , 281 Kan. 453 , 467, 133 P.3d 48 , 62 (2006).

2018Thus, whether a defendant's conduct constitutes the same act or transaction 'does not determine whether there is a double jeopardy violation; rather it determines if there could be a violation.' State v. Schoonover , 281 Kan. 453 , 467, 133 P.3d 48 , 62 (2006).

2014See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-169 [ 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 ] (1977); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (multiple punishment); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 [ 31 S.Ct. 421 , 55 L.Ed. 489 ] (1911) (successive prosecutions).

2014See, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168-169 [ 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 ] (1977); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (multiple punishment); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 [ 31 S.Ct. 421 , 55 L.Ed. 489 ] (1911) (successive prosecutions).

1981United States v Dinitz , 424 U.S. 600 , 96 S. Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Bobo , 586 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brooks , 599 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1979) In United States v. Bobo , supra, the U.S. Fifth Circuit in referring to the former jeopardy rule stated: "By contrast, where the defendant moves for a mistrial or consents to its declaration, ordinarily the double jeopardy clause does not bar his retrial United States v. Scott , 437 U.S. 82 , 93 , 98 S.Ct 2187 , 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); Lee v. United States , 432 U.S. 23 , 32 , 97 S.Ct. 2141 , 2147 , 5

1981United States v Dinitz , 424 U.S. 600 , 96 S. Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); United States v. Bobo , 586 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Brooks , 599 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1979) In United States v. Bobo , supra, the U.S. Fifth Circuit in referring to the former jeopardy rule stated: "By contrast, where the defendant moves for a mistrial or consents to its declaration, ordinarily the double jeopardy clause does not bar his retrial United States v. Scott , 437 U.S. 82 , 93 , 98 S.Ct 2187 , 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978); Lee v. United States , 432 U.S. 23 , 32 , 97 S.Ct. 2141 , 2147 , 5

1984The Court stated: Where the trial is terminated over the objection of the defendant, the classical test for lifting the double jeopardy bar to a second trial is the "manifest necessity" standard first enunciated in Justice Story's opinion for the Court in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 [ 6 L.Ed. 165 ] (1824).

1984The Court stated: Where the trial is terminated over the objection of the defendant, the classical test for lifting the double jeopardy bar to a second trial is the "manifest necessity" standard first enunciated in Justice Story's opinion for the Court in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579, 580 [ 6 L.Ed. 165 ] (1824).

2024See Ex parte Taylor, 720 So. 2d 1054, 1056 (Ala. Crim.

2003See Ex parte Adams, 669 So.2d 128 , 129 (Ala. 1995) (prosecutor asked witness whether the defendant had made a statement that contained a "pejorative racial term" and jury trial was necessary to determine whether the prosecutor's actions were intentional); Ex parte Taylor, 720 So.2d 1054 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998) (Taylor waived right to jury trial on the issue whether the prosecutor intended to provoke a mistrial after the prosecutor failed to disclose two audiotapes of the conversations with the defendant); Billups v. City of Birmingham, 367 So.2d 518 (Ala.Crim.App. 1978) ("'When the plea on its f

2012Furthermore, this Court has held: “Coral v. State, 628 So.2d 954, 958 (Ala.Crim.App.1992), aff'd, 628 So.2d 1004 (Ala.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012 , 114 S.Ct. 1387 , 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994), illustrates the application of the lesser included offense analysis to a double jeopardy claim: “ ‘The appellant contends that he was twice put in jeopardy for the same offense because he was convicted of the lesser included offense of murder under Count I, which alleged the capital offense of murder-robbery, and he was also convicted of the capital offense of murder-burglary under Count II.

1995Coral v. State , 628 So.2d 954 , 958 (Ala.Cr.App. 1992), aff'd , 628 So.2d 1004 (Ala. 1993), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1387 , 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994), illustrates the application of the lesser included offense analysis to a double jeopardy claim: "The appellant contends that he was twice put in jeopardy for the same offense because he was convicted of the lesser included offense of murder under Count I, which alleged the capital offense of murder-robbery, and he was also convicted of the capital offense of murder-burglary under Count II.

2008Under the Blockbwrger test, the appellant could properly be indicted and convicted for two separate and distinct capital offenses “notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.” The indictment was not multiplicitous and the separate counts, as alleged in the indictment, did not facially violate the Double Jeopardy clause.’ “Borden, 711 So.2d at 501-02 n. 2 (citations omitted).

2007Under the Blockburger test, the appellant could properly be indicted and convicted for two separate and distinct capital offenses `notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the crimes.' The indictment was not multiplicitous and the separate counts, as alleged in the indictment, did not facially violate the Double Jeopardy clause." Borden , 711 So.2d at 501-02 n. 2 (citations omitted).