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66 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1960–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ballgreen2 sentences1999We first analyze the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the New Hampshire Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 , 471 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1983), and use federal law only as a guide to our analysis. 1999We first analyze the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the New Hampshire Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 , 471 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1983), and use federal law only as a guide to our analysis. | 6 | 7 |
State v. Baileygreen2 sentences1993Where the same conduct violates two statutory provisions, “the touchstone of whether the double jeopardy clause is violated ... is the legislature’s articulated intent. ...” State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 814 , 508 A.2d 1066, 1069 (1986). 1993Where the same conduct violates two statutory provisions, “the touchstone of whether the double jeopardy clause is violated ... is the legislature’s articulated intent. ...” State v. Bailey, 127 N.H. 811, 814 , 508 A.2d 1066, 1069 (1986). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Fitzgeraldgreen2 sentences1995The double jeopardy clause of the New Hampshire Constitution protects against “multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Fitzgerald, 137 N.H. 23, 25 , 622 A.2d 1245, 1246 (1993). 1995The double jeopardy clause of the New Hampshire Constitution protects against “multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Fitzgerald, 137 N.H. 23, 25 , 622 A.2d 1245, 1246 (1993). | 3 | 4 |
State v. Gosselingreen2 sentences1986We therefore affirm as the benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” See State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 117-18 , 370 A.2d 264, 267 (1977) (under State “same-evidence” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when proof of different elements necessary for conviction under each); State v. Smith, 98 N.H. 149, 150 , 95 A.2d 789, 791 (1953) (under State “same-in-law-and-fact” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when each requires p 1986We therefore affirm as the benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” See State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 117-18 , 370 A.2d 264, 267 (1977) (under State “same-evidence” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when proof of different elements necessary for conviction under each); State v. Smith, 98 N.H. 149, 150 , 95 A.2d 789, 791 (1953) (under State “same-in-law-and-fact” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when each requires p | 3 | 4 |
Albernaz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1986Thus, the touchstone of whether the double jeopardy clause is violated in this context is the legislature’s articulated intent, see Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981); and the so-called rule of lenity, which forbids interpretation of a federal criminal statute so as to increase the statutory penalty where Congress’ intent is unclear, is applicable only where statutory ambiguity has been found. 1983The United States Supreme Court recently declared that where cumulative, separate sentences are imposed in a single trial, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution “does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678 (1983); see Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1980). | 3 | 3 |
Heald v. Perringreen2 sentences2014Id. at 472-73 . ‘We therefore affirm[ed] as the benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” Id. at 473 . 2014Id. at 472-73 . ‘We therefore affirm[ed] as the benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” Id. at 473 . | 2 | 5 |
State of New Hampshire v. William Ramseygreen2 sentences2025“In the context of multiple sentences stemming from a single act, there should be no difference between a double jeopardy analysis and a common law merger analysis.” State v. Ramsey, 166 N.H. 45, 50 (2014) (brackets and quotation omitted). “[D]ouble jeopardy and merger are identical in this context and the operative consideration in both is whether the two . . . offenses are the same or different.” Id. (brackets and quotation omitted). 2025“In the context of multiple sentences stemming from a single act, there should be no difference between a double jeopardy analysis and a common law merger analysis.” State v. Ramsey, 166 N.H. 45, 50 (2014) (brackets and quotation omitted). “[D]ouble jeopardy and merger are identical in this context and the operative consideration in both is whether the two . . . offenses are the same or different.” Id. (brackets and quotation omitted). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Guenzelgreen2 sentences2007Part I, Article 16 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that “no subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal, for the same crime or offense.” “The double jeopardy clause of the New Hampshire Constitution protects against successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Guenzel, 140 N.H. 685, 687 (1996). 2007Part I, Article 16 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides that "[n]o subject shall be liable to be tried, after an acquittal, for the same crime or offense." "The double jeopardy clause of the New Hampshire Constitution protects against successive prosecutions for the same offense after acquittal or after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Guenzel, 140 N.H. 685, 687 , 671 A.2d 545 (1996). | 2 | 3 |
Missouri v. Huntergreen2 sentences1993See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). 1983The United States Supreme Court recently declared that where cumulative, separate sentences are imposed in a single trial, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution “does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678 (1983); see Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1980). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Strattongreen2 sentences2017See State v. Cobb, 143 N.H. 638, 647 (1999) (explaining that under the United States Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause “determination of the proper unit of prosecution is a function of the legislature’s intent” (quotation and brackets omitted)); State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 455 (1989) (noting that “our review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent”). 2007Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 69 (1978); State v. Stratton, 132 N.H. 451, 455 (1989). “[0]nce [the legislature] has defined a statutory offense by its prescription of the allowable unit of prosecution, that prescription determines the scope of protection afforded ....” Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 69-70 (quotations and citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Sanabria v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017Cf. State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 361 (1984) (finding “no reviewable State constitutional claim presented” where “the defendant in his appeal relating to [a certain] issue wholly failed to raise anything but a federal constitutional claim and propositions in State case law relying entirely on federal law”). “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 182 N.H. 451 , 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive pow 2017Cf. State v. Rodney Portigue, 125 N.H. 352, 361 (1984) (finding “no reviewable State constitutional claim presented” where “the defendant in his appeal relating to [a certain] issue wholly failed to raise anything but a federal constitutional claim and propositions in State case law relying entirely on federal law”). “[O]ur review of the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under the United States Constitution requires us to consider the legislature’s articulated intent.” State v. Stratton, 182 N.H. 451 , 455 (1989); see Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 499 (noting that “[b]ecause the substantive pow | 2 | 2 |
State v. Paquingreen2 sentences2008See Paquin, 140 N.H. at 528 ; cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard). “[A] mistrial is of such gravity and implicates such a fundamental constitutional right that we will defer to a trial court’s finding of manifest necessity only where the record affirmatively supports it.” Gould, 144 N.H. at 418 . 1999See State v. Paquin, 140 N.H. 525, 527 , 668 A.2d 47, 49 (1995). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hutchinsongreen2 sentences2006He argues that under a double jeopardy analysis, “The same evidence that the State offered to prove that Blomquist attempted to murder George also established that he committed first degree assault against George... by purposely... causing bodily injury by means of a deadly weapon.” See State v. Hutchinson, 137 N.H. 591, 596 (1993) (double jeopardy bars prosecution for first-degree assault and attempted murder where each indictment alleged the same conduct). 1997See Lucius, 140 N.H. at 64 , 663 A.2d at 608 ; State v. Hutchinson, 137 N.H. 591, 596 , 631 A.2d 523, 526 (1993); State v. Houtenbrink, 130 N.H. 385, 386-87 , 539 A.2d 714, 715 (1988); Heald, 123 N.H. at 470 , 464 A.2d at 276 ; see also State v. Hennessey, 142 N.H. 149, 162 , 697 A.2d 930, 938-39 (1997) (rejecting double jeopardy assertion where defendant was convicted once pursuant to RSA 632-A:2, I(l) (1996) and sentenced once under RSA 651:6, I(f), II(a) (1996)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. MacLeodgreen2 sentences1999The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects a criminal defendant from multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. MacLeod, 141 N.H. 427, 429 , 685 A.2d 473, 475 (1996) (quotation omitted). 1999The Double Jeopardy Clause “protects a criminal defendant from multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. MacLeod, 141 N.H. 427, 429 , 685 A.2d 473, 475 (1996) (quotation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Houtenbrinkgreen2 sentences1997See Lucius, 140 N.H. at 64 , 663 A.2d at 608 ; State v. Hutchinson, 137 N.H. 591, 596 , 631 A.2d 523, 526 (1993); State v. Houtenbrink, 130 N.H. 385, 386-87 , 539 A.2d 714, 715 (1988); Heald, 123 N.H. at 470 , 464 A.2d at 276 ; see also State v. Hennessey, 142 N.H. 149, 162 , 697 A.2d 930, 938-39 (1997) (rejecting double jeopardy assertion where defendant was convicted once pursuant to RSA 632-A:2, I(l) (1996) and sentenced once under RSA 651:6, I(f), II(a) (1996)). 1997See Lucius, 140 N.H. at 64 , 663 A.2d at 608 ; State v. Hutchinson, 137 N.H. 591, 596 , 631 A.2d 523, 526 (1993); State v. Houtenbrink, 130 N.H. 385, 386-87 , 539 A.2d 714, 715 (1988); Heald, 123 N.H. at 470 , 464 A.2d at 276 ; see also State v. Hennessey, 142 N.H. 149, 162 , 697 A.2d 930, 938-39 (1997) (rejecting double jeopardy assertion where defendant was convicted once pursuant to RSA 632-A:2, I(l) (1996) and sentenced once under RSA 651:6, I(f), II(a) (1996)). | 2 | 2 |
North Carolina v. Pearcered2 sentences1996Fitzgerald, 137 N.H. at 25 , 622 A.2d at 1246 ; see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). 1983State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 118 , 370 A.2d 264, 267 (1977); see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Pugliesegreen2 sentences1995See Pugliese, 120 N.H. at 729-30 , 422 A.2d at 1321 . 1995See Pugliese, 120 N.H. at 729-30 , 422 A.2d at 1321 . | 2 | 2 |
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006To determine whether two violations are the “same offense,” the Court adopted the double jeopardy test announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Cobb, 532 U.S. at 173 (quotation omitted). 1993Therefore, we will analyze the defendant’s double jeopardy claim under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Kevin Lynchgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Lynch, 169 N.H. 689, 706 (2017) (explaining that in the “so-called ‘double-description’ cases, . . . the issue is whether two statutes describe two separate offenses or are merely different descriptions of the same offense” (quotation omitted)). 2017Accordingly, we confine our review to analysis of the unit of prosecution intended by the legislature, cf. id. at 708 , and consider the defendant’s double jeopardy challenge to be solely a federal constitutional claim. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jenningsgreen2 sentences2018In declining our invitation to propose a formulation of the double jeopardy test to be applied under our State Constitution, the defendant observes that our "unit of prosecution" jurisprudence "is probably not susceptible of ready harmonization." He contends, however, that, although we have "allowed small differences to constitute separate patterns," we have required "that there be some material differences in the acts to justify separate pattern allegations." He cites State v. Richard , 147 N.H. 340 , 786 A.2d 876 (2001), and State v. Jennings , 155 N.H. 768 , 929 A.2d 982 (2007), to support 2018In declining our invitation to propose a formulation of the double jeopardy test to be applied under our State Constitution, the defendant observes that our "unit of prosecution" jurisprudence "is probably not susceptible of ready harmonization." He contends, however, that, although we have "allowed small differences to constitute separate patterns," we have required "that there be some material differences in the acts to justify separate pattern allegations." He cites State v. Richard , 147 N.H. 340 , 786 A.2d 876 (2001), and State v. Jennings , 155 N.H. 768 , 929 A.2d 982 (2007), to support | 1 | 2 |
State of New Hampshire v. Jamie Lockegreen2 sentences2018Although we have consistently articulated this test, we have not consistently applied it and have previously invited parties "to suggest a formulation of the double jeopardy test to be applied under our State Constitution." State v. Locke , 166 N.H. 344 , 353, 96 A.3d 962 (2014). 2017Because we have applied this test inconsistently and because we have expressed doubt that our double jeopardy law can be reconciled, we invited “parties in future cases to ask us to reconsider our double jeopardy jurisprudence consistent with the principles of stare decisis and to suggest a formulation of the double jeopardy test to be applied under our State Constitution.” Id. at 353 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Elbertgreen2 sentences1986We therefore affirm as the benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” See State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 117-18 , 370 A.2d 264, 267 (1977) (under State “same-evidence” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when proof of different elements necessary for conviction under each); State v. Smith, 98 N.H. 149, 150 , 95 A.2d 789, 791 (1953) (under State “same-in-law-and-fact” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when each requires p 1986We therefore affirm as the benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” See State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 117-18 , 370 A.2d 264, 267 (1977) (under State “same-evidence” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when proof of different elements necessary for conviction under each); State v. Smith, 98 N.H. 149, 150 , 95 A.2d 789, 791 (1953) (under State “same-in-law-and-fact” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when each requires p | 1 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1986We therefore affirm as the benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” See State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 117-18 , 370 A.2d 264, 267 (1977) (under State “same-evidence” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when proof of different elements necessary for conviction under each); State v. Smith, 98 N.H. 149, 150 , 95 A.2d 789, 791 (1953) (under State “same-in-law-and-fact” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when each requires p 1986We therefore affirm as the benchmark of the double jeopardy test in this State an inquiry focusing on whether proof of the elements of the crimes as charged will in actuality require a difference in evidence.” See State v. Gosselin, 117 N.H. 115, 117-18 , 370 A.2d 264, 267 (1977) (under State “same-evidence” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when proof of different elements necessary for conviction under each); State v. Smith, 98 N.H. 149, 150 , 95 A.2d 789, 791 (1953) (under State “same-in-law-and-fact” test for double jeopardy, two offenses not the same when each requires p | 1 | 2 |
State of New Hampshire v. Barion Perrygreen1 sentence2019State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983); State v. Perry, 166 N.H. 297, 301 (2014). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carl Henry Howellgreen1 sentence2018Howell , 719 F.2d at 1262 (stating that "the constitutional considerations underlying the double jeopardy clause are wholly different from the premises of the Speedy Trial Act" (quotation omitted) ). **539 Finally, the defendant points out that following jury selection, a defendant can "wait weeks for the commencement of trial," as "actions of the court or the State can interrupt the progress toward adjudication." Although we hold today that the commencement of jury selection constitutes the point when a defendant is "brought to trial" for purposes of the IAD, incident to this holding is our u | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Portiguegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cobbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ohio v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of New Hampshire v. Charles Glenn, Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Howellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of New Hampshire v. John A. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dixongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hannongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lambertgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Pachecogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Texas v. Cobbgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ludwig v. Massachusettsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gould
green
2 sentences2008See Paquin, 140 N.H. at 528 ; cf. State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295, 296 (2001) (explaining unsustainable exercise of discretion standard). “[A] mistrial is of such gravity and implicates such a fundamental constitutional right that we will defer to a trial court’s finding of manifest necessity only where the record affirmatively supports it.” Gould, 144 N.H. at 418 . 2002Gould, 144 N.H. at 416 . | 2 | 2002–2008 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences1992Addressing a double jeopardy claim, we held that a defendant is presumed to know that a violation of probation may lead to “further incarceration, not to exceed the [statutory maximum],” and that by imposing additional terms of incarceration upon revocation of probation the court is considered to have taken “the next step in the original sentencing process.” White, 131 N.H. at 558 , 556 A.2d at 310 . 1992Addressing a double jeopardy claim, we held that a defendant is presumed to know that a violation of probation may lead to “further incarceration, not to exceed the [statutory maximum],” and that by imposing additional terms of incarceration upon revocation of probation the court is considered to have taken “the next step in the original sentencing process.” White, 131 N.H. at 558 , 556 A.2d at 310 . | 2 | 1990–1992 |
State v. Sprague
green
2 sentences2018After all, the burden of showing compliance with the IAD is on the State, Brown , 157 N.H. at 558 , 953 A.2d 1174 , and any improper delay in trial proceedings would contravene the IAD's purpose of securing a speedy trial for prisoners, see Sprague , 146 N.H. at 335 -36 , 771 A.2d 583 . 2018After all, the burden of showing compliance with the IAD is on the State, Brown , 157 N.H. at 558 , 953 A.2d 1174 , and any improper delay in trial proceedings would contravene the IAD's purpose of securing a speedy trial for prisoners, see Sprague , 146 N.H. at 335 -36 , 771 A.2d 583 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Richard
green
2 sentences2018In declining our invitation to propose a formulation of the double jeopardy test to be applied under our State Constitution, the defendant observes that our "unit of prosecution" jurisprudence "is probably not susceptible of ready harmonization." He contends, however, that, although we have "allowed small differences to constitute separate patterns," we have required "that there be some material differences in the acts to justify separate pattern allegations." He cites State v. Richard , 147 N.H. 340 , 786 A.2d 876 (2001), and State v. Jennings , 155 N.H. 768 , 929 A.2d 982 (2007), to support 2018In declining our invitation to propose a formulation of the double jeopardy test to be applied under our State Constitution, the defendant observes that our "unit of prosecution" jurisprudence "is probably not susceptible of ready harmonization." He contends, however, that, although we have "allowed small differences to constitute separate patterns," we have required "that there be some material differences in the acts to justify separate pattern allegations." He cites State v. Richard , 147 N.H. 340 , 786 A.2d 876 (2001), and State v. Jennings , 155 N.H. 768 , 929 A.2d 982 (2007), to support | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2018After all, the burden of showing compliance with the IAD is on the State, Brown , 157 N.H. at 558 , 953 A.2d 1174 , and any improper delay in trial proceedings would contravene the IAD's purpose of securing a speedy trial for prisoners, see Sprague , 146 N.H. at 335 -36 , 771 A.2d 583 . 2018After all, the burden of showing compliance with the IAD is on the State, Brown , 157 N.H. at 558 , 953 A.2d 1174 , and any improper delay in trial proceedings would contravene the IAD's purpose of securing a speedy trial for prisoners, see Sprague , 146 N.H. at 335 -36 , 771 A.2d 583 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Solomon green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Richardson v. United States green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Laurent green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| State v. Paris green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| State v. Cassady green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| United States v. Dixon green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Bell v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| State v. Dukette green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Hudson green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.