22 Vermont opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gregagreen2 sentences2020“Under the Blockburger test, the double jeopardy clause does not prevent multiple punishment if ‘each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ” State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 382 , 721 A.2d 445, 459 (1998) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 ). 2020“Under the Blockburger test, the double jeopardy clause does not prevent multiple punishment if ‘each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ” State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 382 , 721 A.2d 445, 459 (1998) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 ). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Nashgreen2 sentences1990See also State v. Nash, 144 Vt. 427, 435 , 479 A.2d 757, 761 (1984) (double jeopardy claim, based on failure of State to specify which alternative theory of sexual assault it was using, was premature). 1990See also State v. Nash, 144 Vt. 427, 435 , 479 A.2d 757, 761 (1984) (double jeopardy claim, based on failure of State to specify which alternative theory of sexual assault it was using, was premature). | 2 | 2 |
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020“Under the Blockburger test, the double jeopardy clause does not prevent multiple punishment if ‘each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ” State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 382 , 721 A.2d 445, 459 (1998) (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 ). 1998Under the Blockburger test, the double jeopardy clause does not prevent multiple punishment if “each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Id. at 304 . *383 The State in the instant case charged defendant with aggravated murder pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 2311(a)(8), alleging as the aggravating factor that the murder was committed while defendant was perpetrating a sexual assault. 2 To obtain a conviction, the State was required to prove each of the elements of both crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Wileygreen2 sentences2024State v. Wiley, 2007 VT 13, ¶ 8 , 181 Vt. 300 . 2024State v. Wiley, 2007 VT 13, ¶ 8 , 181 Vt. 300 . | 1 | 2 |
Ohio v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1991Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 , 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2542 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984). 1991Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 502 , 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2542 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Onix Fonseca-Cintrongreen2 sentences2020In State v. Fonseca-Cintron, we rejected a double-jeopardy challenge to convictions on one count of domestic assault for recklessly causing bodily injury and two counts of aggravated domestic assault—one for attempting to cause serious bodily injury and one for threatening to use a deadly weapon.3 2019 VT 80, ¶¶ 6, 22-23 . 2020For example, in State v. Ritter, the defendant was convicted, based on a single act of domestic abuse, of violating two separate subsections of the aggravated-domestic-assault statute—one for committing domestic assault that caused bodily 3 In analyzing the case, we treated the defendant’s conduct as one continuous act rather than separate acts. 2019 VT 80, ¶¶ 19-20 . 4 “An offense is lesser to a greater offense only if it has no elements that are not necessary to conviction for the greater offense.” State v. Russo, 2004 VT 103, ¶ 17 , 177 Vt. 394 , 864 A.2d 655 . 12 injury while violating spe | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rittergreen2 sentences2020Ritter, 167 Vt. at 633-34 , 714 A.2d at 626 (noting that because “[a] person with a prior conviction for domestic assault may very well be subject to an order of protection preventing future abuse,” it was “likely that in a substantial number of cases a person committing a subsequent domestic assault would fall under both sections” of the aggravated-domestic-assault statute). 2020Ritter, 167 Vt. at 633-34 , 714 A.2d at 626 (noting that because “[a] person with a prior conviction for domestic assault may very well be subject to an order of protection preventing future abuse,” it was “likely that in a substantial number of cases a person committing a subsequent domestic assault would fall under both sections” of the aggravated-domestic-assault statute). | 1 | 1 |
Hill v. Conwaygreen2 sentences2019Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 12 (“The central inquiry when addressing a double jeopardy claim is one of legislative intent, not constitutional prohibition, and this Court’s task becomes predominantly one of statutory construction.” (quotation omitted)); Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93 , 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983) (“Underlying all other rules of [statutory] construction is the fundamental rule that we must ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, for it is that intent which constitutes Count One required proof of an “attempt,” which requires proof of an intent to commit 2 the cr 2019Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 12 (“The central inquiry when addressing a double jeopardy claim is one of legislative intent, not constitutional prohibition, and this Court’s task becomes predominantly one of statutory construction.” (quotation omitted)); Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93 , 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983) (“Underlying all other rules of [statutory] construction is the fundamental rule that we must ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, for it is that intent which constitutes Count One required proof of an “attempt,” which requires proof of an intent to commit 2 the cr | 1 | 1 |
State v. Neisnergreen1 sentence2019Neisner, 2010 VT 112, ¶ 12 (“The central inquiry when addressing a double jeopardy claim is one of legislative intent, not constitutional prohibition, and this Court’s task becomes predominantly one of statutory construction.” (quotation omitted)); Hill v. Conway, 143 Vt. 91, 93 , 463 A.2d 232, 233 (1983) (“Underlying all other rules of [statutory] construction is the fundamental rule that we must ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature, for it is that intent which constitutes Count One required proof of an “attempt,” which requires proof of an intent to commit 2 the cr | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jonathan Pennygreen2 sentences2016United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, 10 abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. 2016United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez- Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Branhamgreen2 sentences2016United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, 10 abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. 2016United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez- Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. | 1 | 1 |
Brian J. Corey v. District Court of Vermont, Unit 1, Rutland Circuitgreen2 sentences2016That burden is a heavy one.” Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505 ; accord Corey v. Dist. of Vt., Unit #1, Rutland Circuit, 917 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting state must show mistrial is “demanded by a high degree of necessity” (quotation omitted)). 2016Ct. of Vt., Unit # 1, Rutland Circuit, 917 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting State must show mistrial is “demanded by a high degree of necessity” (quotation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Ramon Hernandez-Guardado,defendant-Appellant. United States of America v. Dario Jimenez-Friasgreen2 sentences2016United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, 10 abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. 2016United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez- Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lewisgreen2 sentences2016United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, 10 abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez-Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. 2016United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2007) (discussing impact of Olano, abrogating Bascaro, and holding that double-jeopardy claim not asserted before trial court is forfeited not waived and defendant is entitled to plain-error review); accord United States v. Hernandez- Guardado, 228 F.3d 1017, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 842 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995). ¶ 25. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Brocegreen1 sentence2008Id. at 570, 575 . | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Zerbstgreen1 sentence2008Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (“intentional relinquishment or abandonment” required to waive personal right of defendant). ¶ 18. | 1 | 1 |
George E. Taylor, Jr. v. John P. Whitley, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiarygreen2 sentences2008Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 330 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 (“intentional relinquishment or abandonment” required to waive personal right of defendant). ¶ 18. 2008Taylor, 933 F.2d at 330 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Stanwoodgreen1 sentence2008See United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. Supp. 791, 796 (D. | 1 | 1 |
Ball v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2007Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985); State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 389 , 721 A.2d 445, 462-63 (1998). ¶ 11. | 1 | 1 |
Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranchgreen1 sentence1995It noted that the drug tax is "exceptional,” and “[t]aken as a whole, [the] drug tax is *607 a concoction of anomalies, too far-re-' moved in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis.” Id. at 783, 114 S. Ct. at 1948 (tax levied on goods that taxpayer never lawfully possessed has unmistakable punitive character). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Almedagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pricegreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 440538green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Stephen Becker A/k/a/ \Steven Fox\" A/k/a/ \"Dr. Fox\". Appeal of Stephen Becker"green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Velandergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bourngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Vitalegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Russo
green
2 sentences2020For example, in State v. Ritter, the defendant was convicted, based on a single act of domestic abuse, of violating two separate subsections of the aggravated-domestic-assault statute—one for committing domestic assault that caused bodily 3 In analyzing the case, we treated the defendant’s conduct as one continuous act rather than separate acts. 2019 VT 80, ¶¶ 19-20 . 4 “An offense is lesser to a greater offense only if it has no elements that are not necessary to conviction for the greater offense.” State v. Russo, 2004 VT 103, ¶ 17 , 177 Vt. 394 , 864 A.2d 655 . 12 injury while violating spe 2020For example, in State v. Ritter, the defendant was convicted, based on a single act of domestic abuse, of violating two separate subsections of the aggravated-domestic-assault statute—one for committing domestic assault that caused bodily 3 In analyzing the case, we treated the defendant’s conduct as one continuous act rather than separate acts. 2019 VT 80, ¶¶ 19-20 . 4 “An offense is lesser to a greater offense only if it has no elements that are not necessary to conviction for the greater offense.” State v. Russo, 2004 VT 103, ¶ 17 , 177 Vt. 394 , 864 A.2d 655 . 12 injury while violating spe | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Breed
green
1 sentence2020“Given our conclusion that there is a double-jeopardy violation,” we must decide “which conviction to vacate and whether to remand the matter for resentencing.” Breed, 2015 VT 43, ¶ 43 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Synnott
green
2 sentences2019State v. Synnott, 2005 VT 19, ¶ 22 , 178 Vt. 66 , 872 A.2d 874 . 2019State v. Synnott, 2005 VT 19, ¶ 22 , 178 Vt. 66 , 872 A.2d 874 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Arizona v. Washington
green
2 sentences2016That burden is a heavy one.” Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505 ; accord Corey v. Dist. of Vt., Unit #1, Rutland Circuit, 917 F.2d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting state must show mistrial is “demanded by a high degree of necessity” (quotation omitted)). 2016When the State requests a mistrial over a defendant’s objection, “the prosecutor must shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he [or she] is to avoid the double jeopardy bar. [That] burden is a heavy one.” Arizona, 434 U.S. at 505 ; accord Corey v. Dist. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Albernaz v. United States
green
2 sentences2015The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized this method of analysis in Albernaz , where it considered the “separate evils” presented by the crimes of importation and distribution of marijuana and concluded that because Congress sought to regulate two “diverse societal harms” that it intended the resulting sentence to be cumulative when violated in a single offense. [1] 450 U.S. at 343 . 2015The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized this method of analysis in Albernaz , where it considered the “separate evils” presented by the crimes of importation and distribution of marijuana and concluded that because Congress sought to regulate two “diverse societal harms” that it intended the resulting sentence to be cumulative when violated in a single offense. 1 450 U.S. at 343 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Garza
green
2 sentences2015Next, the dissent cites State v. Garza, 2014 SD 67 , 854 N.W.2d 833 , which held, also inconsistent with our own case law as stated in Grega , that “the Legislature intended to authorize cumulative punishment for violations of felony murder and the underlying felony of arson.” Id. ¶ 19. 2015Next, the dissent cites State v. Garza, 2014 SD 67 , 854 N.W.2d 833 , which held, also inconsistent with our own case law as stated in Grega , that “the Legislature intended to authorize cumulative punishment for violations of felony murder and the underlying felony of arson.” Id. ¶ 19. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Prior
green
1 sentence2012Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Hazelton
green
2 sentences2009Thus, defendant’s convictions on both counts were in error; to avoid a double jeopardy violation, as our decision in Hazelton I clearly stated, upon his retrial, “defendant c[an] be convicted and sentenced for only one of the two counts.” 2006 VT 121 , ¶ 24 (emphasis added). 2009Thus, defendant’s convictions on both counts were in error; to avoid a double jeopardy violation, as our decision in Hazelton I clearly stated, upon his retrial, “defendant c[an] be convicted and sentenced for only one of the two counts.” 2006 VT 121 , ¶ 24 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Dixon
green
1 sentence2007Id. at 696 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Strong
green
2 sentences1995In contrast to the unmistakably punitive drug tax in Kurth, we reaffirm our conclusion in Strong that “the nonpunitive purpose of the license suspension is. . . clear and compelling.” Strong, 158 Vt. at 62 , 605 A.2d at 514 . 1995In contrast to the unmistakably punitive drug tax in Kurth, we reaffirm our conclusion in Strong that “the nonpunitive purpose of the license suspension is. . . clear and compelling.” Strong, 158 Vt. at 62 , 605 A.2d at 514 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| United States v. Halper red | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Boyer green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| United States v. Perez green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.