double jeopardy clause in New Jersey

2022The third protection given by the double-jeopardy clause is that it prohibits "multiple punishments for the same offense." Miles, 229 N.J. at 92 A-1030-19 21 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717 ).

2019The double jeopardy clause "protects against (1) 'a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,' (2) 'a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,' and (3) 'multiple punishments for the same A-3439-16T4 21 offense.'" Miles, 229 N.J. at 92 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).

1983If the state found it necessary to rely on the defendant’s failure to slow down in proving involuntary manslaughter, the double jeopardy claim would be “substantial.” 447 U.S. at 420 , 100 S.Ct. at 2267 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 238 .

1983If the state found it necessary to rely on the defendant’s failure to slow down in proving involuntary manslaughter, the double jeopardy claim would be “substantial.” 447 U.S. at 420 , 100 S.Ct. at 2267 , 65 L.Ed.2d at 238 .

2025"For the most part, it has been employed when the scope of a particular constitutional protection has not been extended to protect a defendant." 3 Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. at 705 . 3 "The doctrine of double jeopardy, which protects defendants from a second prosecution for the same offense after certain terminations of an initial trial, is A-1310-23 16 The fundamental fairness doctrine does not preclude a retrial where "the elements of harassment and oppression which [are] the historic object of the constitutional and common law double jeopardy principles are not . . . present." State v. Tsoi, 217 N

2025Thus, courts evaluating a double jeopardy claim must ask "whether the second prosecution is for the same offense involved in the first." Id. at 93 (quoting State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989)).

1977Yet Bartkus may have been undermined by the application of the double jeopardy clause to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056 , 23 L.

1977Yet Bartkus may have been undermined by the application of the double jeopardy clause to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U. S. 784, 89 S. Ct. 2056 , 23 L.

2020The Court said that the "touchstone of the double jeopardy analysis lies in the expectation of finality that a defendant vests in his sentence." Id. at 619 .

2019These provisions provide "protection to a defendant," including insulation from the "imposi[tion] ... [of] 'multiple punishments for the same offense.' " State v. Schubert , 212 N.J. 295 , 304-05, 53 A.3d 1210 (2012) (quoting Jones v. Thomas , 491 U.S. 376 , 381, 109 S.Ct. 2522 , 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989) ). "[T]he touchstone of the double jeopardy analysis lies in the expectation of finality that a defendant vests in his sentence." State v. Sanders , 107 N.J. 609 , 619, 527 A.2d 442 (1987).

2024Common to all three protections is the concept of "same offense." Accordingly, a prime concern when reviewing a double-jeopardy claim is "whether the second prosecution is for the same offense involved in the first." State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989) (quoting [State v. De Luca, 108 N.J. 98, 102 (1987)]). [Miles, 229 N.J. at 92-93 .] Here, the Borough's second complaint against defendant is not for the same offense involved in the first complaint.

2017Common to all three protections is the concept of “same offense.” Accordingly, a prime concern when reviewing a double-jeopardy claim is “whether the second prosecution is for the same offense involved in the first.” State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989) (quoting State v. De Luca, 108 N.J. 98, 102 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 , 108 S. Ct. 331 , 98 L.

1989To avoid the double-jeopardy bar government “must shoulder the ‘heavy burden’ of demonstrating that there was ‘manifest necessity’ for a mistrial declared over a defendant’s objection * * Id. at 222 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 , 98 S.Ct. 824, 830 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 728 (1978)).

1989To avoid the double-jeopardy bar government “must shoulder the ‘heavy burden’ of demonstrating that there was ‘manifest necessity’ for a mistrial declared over a defendant’s objection * * Id. at 222 (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 , 98 S.Ct. 824, 830 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 728 (1978)).

2021A jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict on any of the charges prosecuted in a criminal trial "results in a 'manifest necessity' for the trial court to declare a mistrial, and that re[-]prosecution for the same offense does not A-5417-18 11 violate the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause." State v. Cruz, 171 N.J. 419, 425 (2002), (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824)).

2002United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671-72 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 (1982) (citing Perez with approval, and noting *426 that double jeopardy clause “does not offer a guarantee to the defendant that the State will vindicate its societal interest in the enforcement of the criminal laws in one proceeding.”); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834, 837 , 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949) (noting that retrial following jury’s failure to agree on verdict is “not the type of oppressive practice[] at w

2015Ed. 2d 228 (1980), the Double Jeopardy clause will preclude a later prosecution of a greater offense where a defendant already has been convicted of a lesser offense: (1) when "the lesser-included offense require[d] no proof beyond that required in the greater offense," and (2) "also the proof of the greater offense must establish the lesser offense." Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 581 .

2015Ed. 2d 228 (1980), the Double Jeopardy clause will preclude a later prosecution of a greater offense where a defendant already has been convicted of a lesser offense: (1) when "the lesser-included offense require[d] no proof beyond that required in the greater offense," and (2) "also the proof of the greater offense must establish the lesser offense." Dively, supra, 92 N.J. at 581 .

2025See State v. Miles, 229 N.J. 83, 96 (2017) ("We resolve the question of which test applies in our courts by adopting the same-elements test as the sole double-jeopardy analysis, thereby realigning New Jersey law with federal law.

2024Common to all three protections is the concept of "same offense." Accordingly, a prime concern when reviewing a double-jeopardy claim is "whether the second prosecution is for the same offense involved in the first." State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989) (quoting [State v. De Luca, 108 N.J. 98, 102 (1987)]). [Miles, 229 N.J. at 92-93 .] Here, the Borough's second complaint against defendant is not for the same offense involved in the first complaint.

2017Ed. 2d at 12-13 ). "[A]lthough a remand for a new trial is proper where reversal of a criminal conviction is predicated on trial error, the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial where the conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial." Tropea, supra, 78 N.J. at 314-16 (citation omitted).

2017Ed. 2d at 12-13 ). "[A]lthough a remand for a new trial is proper where reversal of a criminal conviction is predicated on trial error, the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial where the conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial." Tropea, supra, 78 N.J. at 314-16 (citation omitted).

1999We note that the former double jeopardy test, set forth in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901-02 , 104 L.

1999We note that the former double jeopardy test, set forth in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1901-02 , 104 L.

1980Compare United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), reh. den. 439 U.S. 883 , 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed.2d 197 (1978).

1980Compare United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), reh. den. 439 U.S. 883 , 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed.2d 197 (1978).

2025Thus, courts evaluating a double jeopardy claim must ask "whether the second prosecution is for the same offense involved in the first." Id. at 93 (quoting State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989)).

2019"Common to all three protections is the concept of 'same offense.' Accordingly, a prime concern when reviewing a double-jeopardy claim is 'whether the second prosecution is for the same offense involved in the first.'" Id. at 92-93 (quoting State v. Yoskowitz, 116 N.J. 679, 689 (1989)). "[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Id. at 93 (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 ).

2021Super. 32 , 36 (App. Div. 1981) ("[A] defendant who chooses to seek termination of proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt of the offense of which he has been accused cannot claim injury cognizable under the double jeopardy concept if the government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling . . . ."); State v. Barnes, 84 N.J. 362, 371 (1980) ("Where the proceedings against an accused are terminated during trial on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, the State may appeal from a ruling of the trial court in favor of the defendant without offending the princ ipl

1999In certain circumstances, i.e., “[w]here the proceedings against an accused are terminated during trial on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, the State may appeal from a ruling of the trial court in favor of the defendant without offending the principles expressed in the double jeopardy clause.” State v. *491 Barnes, 84 N.J. 362, 371 , 420 A.2d 303 (1980).

2020The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected the notion of a bright line rule because "the double jeopardy clause does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be." DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 137 .

1995See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980) (holding that increase in original sentence was constitutional because defendant had no expectation of finality in sentence where statute specifically authorized sentence to be increased); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (holding that increase in sentence following remand and retrial constitutional because defendant had no expectation of finality in sentence when he appealed underlying conviction as well as sentence); Sanders, supra, 107 N.J. at 619, 527 A.2d 44

2000"Merger implicates a defendant's substantive constitutional rights," Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 116 , 527 A. 2d 1362 (citing State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 522 , 480 A. 2d 912 (1984); State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263, 271 , 478 A. 2d 408 (1984); State v. Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 77 , 342 A. 2d 841 ), and requires an analysis similar to a double jeopardy analysis.

2000"Merger implicates a defendant's substantive constitutional rights," Miller, supra, 108 N.J. at 116 , 527 A. 2d 1362 (citing State v. Truglia, 97 N.J. 513, 522 , 480 A. 2d 912 (1984); State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263, 271 , 478 A. 2d 408 (1984); State v. Davis, supra, 68 N.J. at 77 , 342 A. 2d 841 ), and requires an analysis similar to a double jeopardy analysis.

1993The doctrine of double jeopardy, which protects defendants from a second prosecution for the same offense after certain terminations of an initial trial, is based on principles of fundamental fairness: The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well

1993The doctrine of double jeopardy, which protects defendants from a second prosecution for the same offense after certain terminations of an initial trial, is based on principles of fundamental fairness: The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well

2002United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671-72 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 (1982) (citing Perez with approval, and noting *426 that double jeopardy clause “does not offer a guarantee to the defendant that the State will vindicate its societal interest in the enforcement of the criminal laws in one proceeding.”); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834, 837 , 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949) (noting that retrial following jury’s failure to agree on verdict is “not the type of oppressive practice[] at w

2002United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671-72 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 (1982) (citing Perez with approval, and noting *426 that double jeopardy clause “does not offer a guarantee to the defendant that the State will vindicate its societal interest in the enforcement of the criminal laws in one proceeding.”); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 , 69 S.Ct. 834, 837 , 93 L.Ed. 974, 978 (1949) (noting that retrial following jury’s failure to agree on verdict is “not the type of oppressive practice[] at w

2002For example, in Currie, supra, the defendant raised a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal and argued that his prior conviction in Municipal Court for the motor vehicle violations of reckless driv *291 ing and leaving the scene of an accident barred his subsequent prosecution on the same facts for atrocious assault and battery. 41 N.J. at 533-34 , 197 A.2d 678 .

2002For example, in Currie, supra, the defendant raised a double jeopardy claim for the first time on appeal and argued that his prior conviction in Municipal Court for the motor vehicle violations of reckless driv *291 ing and leaving the scene of an accident barred his subsequent prosecution on the same facts for atrocious assault and battery. 41 N.J. at 533-34 , 197 A.2d 678 .

2019In Menna, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant could raise a double jeopardy challenge, even though the defendant had pled guilty. 423 U.S. at 62 .

1984It is enough that “[a]n attack on grounds of merger clearly implicates the substantive and constitutional rights of a defendant.” State v. Rodriguez, 97 N.J. 263, 267 (1984). *523 Irrespective of its conceptual source, the guiding principle is as stated in Menna v. New York, 423 US. 61, 62 n. 2, 96 S.Ct. 241 , 242 n. 2, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 , 197 n. 2 (1975), in which the Supreme Court held that a counselled guilty plea does not automatically waive a claim that “the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” The Court concluded that although factual guilt is embraced by the g

2000First, “the lack of demonstrable ... prejudice [does not] preclude the defendant’s invocation of the double jeopardy bar in the absence of some important countervailing interest of proper judicial administration.” Illinois v. Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 471 , 93 S.Ct. at 1073 .

2000First, “the lack of demonstrable ... prejudice [does not] preclude the defendant’s invocation of the double jeopardy bar in the absence of some important countervailing interest of proper judicial administration.” Illinois v. Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 471 , 93 S.Ct. at 1073 .

1982This Court, however, recently has held that such overreaching occurs when the prosecutor ... intentionally provokes a mistrial in order to obtain a second opportunity to convict or even absent such a provocation ... if the ... prosecutorial error was motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice the petitioner. [ 633 F. 2d at 1011 ] That formulation of the applicable test accords with our Supreme Court's pre- Scott definitions contained in State v. Farmer and State v. Rechtschaffer, both supra. In State v. Lynch, supra , decided after Scott , Justice Schreiber observed that a sec

1982This Court, however, recently has held that such overreaching occurs when the prosecutor ... intentionally provokes a mistrial in order to obtain a second opportunity to convict or even absent such a provocation ... if the ... prosecutorial error was motivated by bad faith or undertaken to harass or prejudice the petitioner. [ 633 F. 2d at 1011 ] That formulation of the applicable test accords with our Supreme Court's pre- Scott definitions contained in State v. Farmer and State v. Rechtschaffer, both supra. In State v. Lynch, supra , decided after Scott , Justice Schreiber observed that a sec