double jeopardy clause in Iowa

2015“In considering a double jeopardy claim within the multiple punishments context, we are guided by the general principle that the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is no different from the question of what punishments the legislature intended to be imposed.” Id. at 4–5; see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 , 366–68 (1983); State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 57 (Iowa 1992).

2014“In considering a double jeopardy claim within the multiple punishments context, we are guided by the general principle that the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is no different from the question of what punishments the legislature intended to impose.” Id. at 57 .

2019Id. at 368 , 103 S.Ct. at 679 .

2015“In considering a double jeopardy claim within the multiple punishments context, we are guided by the general principle that the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is no different from the question of what punishments the legislature intended to be imposed.” Id. at 4–5; see also Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 , 366–68 (1983); State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 57 (Iowa 1992).

1992In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 , 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2226 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187, 194-95 (1977), the Supreme Court established the general rule that the double jeopardy clause prohibits a state from trying a defendant for a greater offense after it has convicted the defendant of a Iesser-included offense.

1992In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 , 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2226 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187, 194-95 (1977), the Supreme Court established the general rule that the double jeopardy clause prohibits a state from trying a defendant for a greater offense after it has convicted the defendant of a Iesser-included offense.

1999The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The clause “protects against successive prosecutions after acquittal or conviction; and, pertinent to this appeal, it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); Dressler v. I

1999The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The clause “protects against successive prosecutions after acquittal or conviction; and, pertinent to this appeal, it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); Dressler v. I

2016In addition, we had previously ruled that license revocation as a consequence of an OWI conviction was “not punishment for purposes of the double jeopardy clause.” Id.; see State v. Krebs, 562 N.W.2d 423 , 424–25 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam).

2016We reasoned that the purpose, of license revocation for those who had been convicted of OWI was “to protect the public by providing that drivers who have demonstrated a pattern of driving while intoxicated be removed from the highways.” Id. at 909 (quoting State v. Moore, 569 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Iowa 1997)), In addition, we had previously ruled that license revocation as a consequence of an OWI conviction was “not punishment for purposes of. the double jeopardy clause.” Id.; see State v. Krebs, 562 N.W.2d 423, 424-25 (Iowa 1997) (per curiam).

1992See id.; Corbin v. Grady, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990); State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 738-39 (Iowa 1988); State v. Newman, 326 N.W.2d 796, 802-03 (Iowa 1982).

1992See, e.g., State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 734-35 (Iowa 1988); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).

2022See State v. Newman, 970 N.W.2d 866 , ___, 2022 WL 627178 , at *4 (Iowa 2022) (McDermott, J., dissenting). 3 To the extent Graham alleges the district court gave an incorrect colloquy regarding his right to appeal, we need not reach the issue given our conclusion reached concerning the delayed appeal. 4 Graham does not raise a claim that the convictions violate a similar provision of the Iowa Constitution, article 1, section 12. 10 courts have consistently held that a double jeopardy analysis contains two components: (1) the so-called legal-elements or Blockburger test, when the court analyzes

2013Iowa’s second application of the one-homicide rule came more than two decades later when the supreme court decided in Wissing that judgments and sentences for both vehicular homicide and involuntary manslaughter, while not constituting the same offense under the double jeopardy test in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), could not be permitted under the Gilroy holding.

2017In light of the controlling precedent on the issue Wells raised in his motion to correct an illegal sentence, we conclude it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Wells the assistance of counsel for his motion. 2 While Wells cited the case of State v. Velez, in his motion to correct an illegal sentence, he made no claim the two willful injury convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause as a double punishment for the same offense. 829 N.W.2d 572, 584 (Iowa 2013) (finding no Double Jeopardy violation based on the defendant’s guilty pleas to two counts of the same offe

2015Without regard to the particular framework or rubric under which Sanchez makes the claim, we directly address the double jeopardy claim underlying all of Sanchez’s argument. “[T]he Federal Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three types of offenses: protection against a second prosecution after acquittal; protection against a second prosecution after conviction; and protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.” Velez, 829 N.W.2d at 584 .

2017Wells’s claim is based on his belief that the double jeopardy clause requires the willful injury convictions to merge into the attempted murder conviction.2 This merger argument has been rejected by the Iowa Supreme Court in Clark, 475 N.W.2d at 195–96: “[W]e see nothing to prevent the State from charging and convicting an individual for both attempting to murder and, at the same time, willfully injuring a victim.

1993State v. Clarke, 475 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa 1991).

2013In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975), the Court addressed a subsequent prosecution following a conviction for the same offense, holding: “Where the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.” The Menna Court emphasized it was not holding “a double jeopardy claim may never be waived” but that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on

2013In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975), the Court addressed a subsequent prosecution following a conviction for the same offense, holding: “Where the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.” The Menna Court emphasized it was not holding “a double jeopardy claim may never be waived” but that “a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on

2025It’s just random that they 2 “Under the doctrine of manifest necessity, a court has a duty to declare a mistrial when the ends of public justice demand it.” State v. Harrison, 578 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 1998); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978) (requiring the prosecutor to “shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar” by “demonstrate[ing] ‘manifest necessity’ for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant”). 13 were not called.

1998Cf State v. Harrison, 578 N.W.2d 234, 237 (Iowa 1998) (In a mistrial case, a defendant is not bound by rule 10 to a forty-day limit in raising a double jeopardy claim.

2018See United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez , 825 F.2d 572 , 588 n.56 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The double jeopardy clause does not prevent the retrial of a defendant after his conviction has been reversed on appeal unless the reversal was grounded on the insufficiency of the evidence at trial ....

2018See United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez , 825 F.2d 572 , 588 n.56 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The double jeopardy clause does not prevent the retrial of a defendant after his conviction has been reversed on appeal unless the reversal was grounded on the insufficiency of the evidence at trial. ...

2014State v. Huss, 657 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Iowa 2003). “[W]hether under the Double Jeopardy Clause there can be a new trial after a mistrial has been declared without the defendant’s request or consent depends on whether ‘there is a manifest necessity for the (mistrial) or the ends of public justice would otherwise be 5 defeated.’” United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606-07 (1976) (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 461 (1973)) (other citations omitted).

2004State v. Huss, 657 N.W.2d 447, 453-54 (Iowa 2003).

2014For example, in State v. Iowa District Court, 464 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa 1990), the court denied the defendant’s double jeopardy challenge where “the county attorney took no part in, and in fact resisted, the guilty plea proceedings initiated by the defendant.” Likewise, in State v. Randell, No. 08-1290, 2009 WL 1492781 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 29, 2009), the court concluded the Double Jeopardy Clause was no bar to second prosecution where the “State did not approve, have knowledge, nor consent to the plea on the lesser offense” and the defendant “pled guilty to the lesser offense in an attem

2004Our action is similar to the procedure that was sustained against a double-jeopardy challenge in State v. Iowa District Court, 464 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Iowa 1990).

2014See Johnson, 467 U.S. at 502 (“Notwithstanding the trial court’s acceptance of respondent’s guilty pleas, respondent should not be entitled to use the Double Jeopardy Clause as a sword to prevent the State from completing its prosecution on the remaining charges.”); Trainer, 762 N.W.2d at 158 (stating the defendant should not be allowed to “manipulate the proceedings . . . to use the double jeopardy clause as a sword”).

2014In Johnson, the defendant pleaded guilty “[o]ver the State’s objection,” to lesser-included offenses contained in a single indictment in an apparent attempt to preclude prosecution on the greater offenses. 467 U.S. at 494 .

2007See generally Jay A. Sigler, Double Jeopardy 1– 37 (1969) (tracing history of the double jeopardy doctrine); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 795–96, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 , 23 L.

2007See generally Jay A. Sigler, Double Jeopardy 1– 37 (1969) (tracing history of the double jeopardy doctrine); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 795–96, 89 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 , 23 L.

2007See State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 1999) (recognizing the goal of statutory interpretation is not to decide what the supreme court thinks the law should be).

2007See State v. Wagner, 596 N.W.2d 83, 87 (Iowa 1999) (recognizing the goal of statutory interpretation is not to decide what the supreme court thinks the law should be).

2007Generally, the double jeopardy principle protects persons “from prosecution for the same offense after conviction or acquittal, and against multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2001).

2007Generally, the double jeopardy principle protects persons “from prosecution for the same offense after conviction or acquittal, and against multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 568 (Iowa 2001).

2000See Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991) (holding that an issue must be raised "with sufficient precision to alert the [court] to the error being claimed").

2000See Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm’n, 465 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991) (holding that an issue must be raised “with sufficient precision to alert the [court] to the error being claimed”).

1992Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 , 109 S.Ct. 2522, 2525 , 105 L.Ed.2d 322, 331 (1989), reh. den., 492 U.S. 932 , 110 S.Ct. 12 , 106 L.Ed.2d 627 ; United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 503 (1989); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2540-541 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1984), reh. den., 468 U.S. 1224 , 105 S.Ct. 20 , 82 L.Ed.2d 915 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 , 103 S.Ct. 673, 679 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535, 543 (1983); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1145 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275, 285 (1981).

1992Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 , 109 S.Ct. 2522, 2525 , 105 L.Ed.2d 322, 331 (1989), reh. den., 492 U.S. 932 , 110 S.Ct. 12 , 106 L.Ed.2d 627 ; United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1903 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 503 (1989); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 , 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2540-541 , 81 L.Ed.2d 425, 433 (1984), reh. den., 468 U.S. 1224 , 105 S.Ct. 20 , 82 L.Ed.2d 915 Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 , 103 S.Ct. 673, 679 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535, 543 (1983); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 , 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1145 , 67 L.Ed.2d 275, 285 (1981).

1997A majority of the justices voted to overrule Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), a case which had expanded Blockburger by adding a “same-conduct” test which had to be overcome in order to avoid the double jeopardy bar for subsequent conviction.

1997A majority of the justices voted to overrule Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), a case which had expanded Blockburger by adding a “same-conduct” test which had to be overcome in order to avoid the double jeopardy bar for subsequent conviction.

2025It’s just random that they 2 “Under the doctrine of manifest necessity, a court has a duty to declare a mistrial when the ends of public justice demand it.” State v. Harrison, 578 N.W.2d 234, 238 (Iowa 1998); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978) (requiring the prosecutor to “shoulder the burden of justifying the mistrial if he is to avoid the double jeopardy bar” by “demonstrate[ing] ‘manifest necessity’ for any mistrial declared over the objection of the defendant”). 13 were not called.

1995Arizona, 434 U.S. at 506 , 98 S.Ct. at 831 , 54 L.Ed.2d at 728-29 ; Givens, 778 P.2d at 646 .

2021See Eckrich, 670 N.W.2d at 649 (limiting discussion to “the asserted double jeopardy as it relates to the imposition of multiple punishments and merger of sentences” (emphasis added)).

2018We concluded “[b]ecause there is clear legislative intent to authorize multiple punishments . . . , [the defendant’s] claim as to a double jeopardy violation would fail even with his assertion that OWI and possession are lesser-included offenses of felony eluding.” Eckrich, 670 N.W.2d at 650 .

2020See State v. LaRue, 619 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Iowa 2000) (providing a defendant may (1) challenge the sufficiency of the trial information or facial constitutional vagueness of the relevant statutes; (2) claim his plea was uninformed or involuntary; (3) assert a double jeopardy claim; (4) challenge the sentencing statute; or (5) claim counsel was ineffective).

2014Id.

2016State v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2013).

2016State v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2013).

1973In Illinois v. Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 467 , 93 S.Ct. at 1072 , 35 L.Ed.2d at 433 , the court notes the finding that jeopardy has attached only begins, rather than ends, the inquiry whether the double jeopardy clause bars retrial.

1973In Illinois v. Somerville, supra, 410 U.S. at 467 , 93 S.Ct. at 1072 , 35 L.Ed.2d at 433 , the court notes the finding that jeopardy has attached only begins, rather than ends, the inquiry whether the double jeopardy clause bars retrial.