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62 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1998Until joinder became permissible and commonplace, however, multiple punishment could result only from multiple trials.’” Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1149 , quoting Comment, Twice Put in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262 , 266 n.13 (1965). ¶37 In a related vein, this Court has previously acknowledged “a trend in prosecutions to use multiple count pleadings,” prompting our admonishment that “[p]rosecutors and trial courts should note the limitations and spirit behind the double jeopardy clause so that they may avoid potential constitutional problems.” State v. Lindseth (1983), 203 Mont. 115, 117 , 659 P.2d 844 1998Until joinder became permissible and commonplace, however, multiple punishment could result only from multiple trials.’” Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1149 , quoting Comment, Twice Put in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262 , 266 n.13 (1965). ¶37 In a related vein, this Court has previously acknowledged “a trend in prosecutions to use multiple count pleadings,” prompting our admonishment that “[p]rosecutors and trial courts should note the limitations and spirit behind the double jeopardy clause so that they may avoid potential constitutional problems.” State v. Lindseth (1983), 203 Mont. 115, 117 , 659 P.2d 844 | 3 | 5 |
State v. Baldwingreen2 sentences2000While we held that considering acquitted conduct did not offend the double jeopardy clause, we pointed out that “[a] defendant is entitled to have his sentence predicated on substantially correct information.” Baldwin, 192 Mont. at 524 , 629 P.2d at 224 (citations omitted). 2000While we held that considering acquitted conduct did not offend the double jeopardy clause, we pointed out that “[a] defendant is entitled to have his sentence predicated on substantially correct information.” Baldwin, 192 Mont. at 524 , 629 P.2d at 224 (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Zabawagreen2 sentences1997Zabawa, 279 Mont. at 323-26 , 928 P.2d at 161-63 (Leaphart, J., dissenting). 1997Zabawa, 279 Mont. at 323-26 , 928 P.2d at 161-63 (Leaphart, J., dissenting). | 2 | 2 |
Oregon v. Kennedygreen2 sentences1996In Oregon v. Kennedy (1981), 456 U.S. 667, 672 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087-88 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 , the Court held the following: Where the trial is terminated over the objection of the defendant, the classical test for lifting the double jeopardy bar to a second trial is the “manifest necessity” standard first enunciated in Justice Story’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Perez [citation omitted], Perez dealt with the most common form of “manifest necessity’: a mistrial declared by the judge following the jury’s declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict. 1996In Oregon v. Kennedy (1981), 456 U.S. 667, 672 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087-88 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 , the Court held the following: Where the trial is terminated over the objection of the defendant, the classical test for lifting the double jeopardy bar to a second trial is the “manifest necessity” standard first enunciated in Justice Story’s opinion for the Court in United States v. Perez [citation omitted], Perez dealt with the most common form of “manifest necessity’: a mistrial declared by the judge following the jury’s declaration that it was unable to reach a verdict. | 1 | 4 |
North Carolina v. Pearcered2 sentences1999In North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 , the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. 1999In North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 , the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. | 1 | 4 |
Abney v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025Ct., 2019 MT 274 , ¶ 11, 397 Mont. 541 , 452 P.3d 917 (considering petition that raised double jeopardy issue after mistrial); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 , 97 S. Ct. 2034, 2041 (1977) (concluding that a double jeopardy challenge must be reviewable before exposing accused to second trial). 2025Ct., 2019 MT 274 , ¶ 11, 397 Mont. 541 , 452 P.3d 917 (considering petition that raised double jeopardy issue after mistrial); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 , 97 S. Ct. 2034, 2041 (1977) (concluding that a double jeopardy challenge must be reviewable before exposing accused to second trial). | 1 | 3 |
Stilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See also Stilson v. State, 278 Mont. 20 , 924 P.2d 238 (1996). 10 ¶23 Any inquiry into a double jeopardy challenge must begin with an examination of the statutory offenses involved. 2024See also Stilson v. State, 278 Mont. 20 , 924 P.2d 238 (1996). 10 ¶23 Any inquiry into a double jeopardy challenge must begin with an examination of the statutory offenses involved. | 1 | 2 |
Crist v. Bretzgreen2 sentences2009This is so because once a jury has been emplaneled and sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 , 98 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (1978), or the court accepts a plea of guilty, jeopardy has attached under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 25 of the Montana Constitution. “[a]s a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.” See U.S. v. Patterson, 381 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2004), U.S. v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating “it is axiomatic of the double jeopardy clause that je 2009This is so because once a jury has been emplaneled and sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 , 98 S. Ct. 2156, 2161 (1978), or the court accepts a plea of guilty, jeopardy has attached under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, § 25 of the Montana Constitution. “[a]s a general rule, jeopardy attaches in a criminal case at the time the district court accepts the defendant’s guilty plea.” See U.S. v. Patterson, 381 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2004), U.S. v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 637 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating “it is axiomatic of the double jeopardy clause that je | 1 | 2 |
State v. Egelhoffgreen2 sentences2000Egelhoff, 272 Mont. at 126 , 900 P.2d at 267 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076 ). ¶21 In Nichols , we refused to retroactively apply to Nichols’ case the new rule declared in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29 , 293 Mont. 224 , 975 P.2d 312 , which afforded broader protection under the Montana Constitution than the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution with respect to weapons enhancement. 2000Egelhoff, 272 Mont. at 126 , 900 P.2d at 267 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076 ). ¶21 In Nichols , we refused to retroactively apply to Nichols’ case the new rule declared in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29 , 293 Mont. 224 , 975 P.2d 312 , which afforded broader protection under the Montana Constitution than the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution with respect to weapons enhancement. | 1 | 2 |
Bauer v. Stategreen2 sentences2000In Anderson, we did not consider a due process challenge, but decided the issue solely pursuant to the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. ¶100 We have previously held that a convicted defendant “ ‘has a due process guarantee against a sentence predicated on misinformation.’ ” Bauer v. State, 1999 MT 185, ¶ 21 , 295 Mont. 306, ¶ 21 , 983 P.2d 955, ¶ 21 (citing State v. Orsborn (1976), 170 Mont. 480, 486 , 555 P.2d 509, 513 ). 2000In Anderson, we did not consider a due process challenge, but decided the issue solely pursuant to the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. ¶100 We have previously held that a convicted defendant “ ‘has a due process guarantee against a sentence predicated on misinformation.’ ” Bauer v. State, 1999 MT 185, ¶ 21 , 295 Mont. 306, ¶ 21 , 983 P.2d 955, ¶ 21 (citing State v. Orsborn (1976), 170 Mont. 480, 486 , 555 P.2d 509, 513 ). | 1 | 2 |
Hudson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1999Kurth, 511 U.S. at 800 , 114 S.Ct. at 1956 , (Scalia, J., dissenting). ¶39 Halper has, of course, now been abrogated, see Hudson v. United States (1997), 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 ), and the U.S. Supreme Court has returned to its pre-Halper interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause which acknowledges a constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments but requires successive criminal prosecutions. 1999Kurth, 511 U.S. at 800 , 114 S.Ct. at 1956 , (Scalia, J., dissenting). ¶39 Halper has, of course, now been abrogated, see Hudson v. United States (1997), 522 U.S. 93 , 118 S.Ct. 488 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 ), and the U.S. Supreme Court has returned to its pre-Halper interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause which acknowledges a constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments but requires successive criminal prosecutions. | 1 | 2 |
Serfass v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998See Serfass, 420 U.S. at 390 , 95 S.Ct. at 1064 , 43 L.Ed.2d at 275 , quoting Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U.S. 458, 467 , 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 432 . [7] Moreover, I would agree with Justice Stevens' dissent that "the safeguards in the Guidelines do not eliminate the double jeopardy violation." Witte, 515 U.S. at 415 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 2214 n. 4, 132 L.Ed.2d at 374 n. 4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 1998See Serfass, 420 U.S. at 390 , 95 S.Ct. at 1064 , 43 L.Ed.2d at 275 , quoting Illinois v. Somerville (1973), 410 U.S. 458, 467 , 93 S.Ct. 1066, 1072 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425, 432 . [7] Moreover, I would agree with Justice Stevens' dissent that "the safeguards in the Guidelines do not eliminate the double jeopardy violation." Witte, 515 U.S. at 415 n. 4, 115 S.Ct. at 2214 n. 4, 132 L.Ed.2d at 374 n. 4 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). | 1 | 2 |
State v. D. Burtongreen2 sentences2025State v. Burton, 2017 MT 306, ¶¶ 18, 22 , 389 Mont. 499 , 407 P.3d 280 ; see also Lamb v. Mont. 2025State v. Burton, 2017 MT 306, ¶¶ 18, 22 , 389 Mont. 499 , 407 P.3d 280 ; see also Lamb v. Mont. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitlow v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Violettegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parini v. Missoula County High Schoolgreen | 1 | 1 |
| James E. Knight v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wardellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jackson WONG, Defendant-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rodney Dawson v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William J. Alt, M.D. Rosalinda Alt Karen Alt Robert W. Alt, William J. Alt, M.D.green | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 371774green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Bondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harold S. Alston v. Walter Redman, Warden Charles M. Oberly, Iii, Attorney General of the State of Delaware and the State of Delawaregreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Andrewsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Tadewaldtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Johnsonred | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Witte v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Somervillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Piercegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Richard B. Sandersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Guillaume
green
2 sentences2005I submit the Court errs in doing so. ¶18 The Court concedes, as it must, that, under Guillaume, enhancement of a felony assault sentence for use of a weapon violates the double jeopardy clause. 293 Mont. 224 , 975 P.2d 312 . 2005I submit the Court errs in doing so. ¶18 The Court concedes, as it must, that, under Guillaume, enhancement of a felony assault sentence for use of a weapon violates the double jeopardy clause. 293 Mont. 224 , 975 P.2d 312 . | 5 | 1999–2021 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
2 sentences2007Cech contends that his prosecution was barred under (1) Montana’s double jeopardy statute, § 46-11-504, MCA; (2) the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because the theft offense has the same elements as the Washington possession of stolen property offense, thus satisfying the elements test set out in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932); and (3) Article II, Section 25, of the Montana Constitution. ¶12 The State responds that its prosecution of theft of the vehicle was not precluded by Washington’s previous prosecution under any 2007Cech contends that his prosecution was barred under (1) Montana’s double jeopardy statute, § 46-11-504, MCA; (2) the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because the theft offense has the same elements as the Washington possession of stolen property offense, thus satisfying the elements test set out in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932); and (3) Article II, Section 25, of the Montana Constitution. ¶12 The State responds that its prosecution of theft of the vehicle was not precluded by Washington’s previous prosecution under any | 4 | 1996–2024 |
United States v. Halper
red
2 sentences1999Justice Scalia points out that the belief that there is a multiple-punishment component to the double jeopardy clause can be traced to dictum in Ex parte Lange (1874), 18 Wall. 163 , 21 L.Ed. 872 , but that it was not until United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 , that the Court actually invalidated a legislatively authorized successive punishment on the basis of the this dictum. 1999Justice Scalia points out that the belief that there is a multiple-punishment component to the double jeopardy clause can be traced to dictum in Ex parte Lange (1874), 18 Wall. 163 , 21 L.Ed. 872 , but that it was not until United States v. Halper (1989), 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 , that the Court actually invalidated a legislatively authorized successive punishment on the basis of the this dictum. | 3 | 1993–1999 |
United States v. Dinitz
green
2 sentences1990United States v. Dinitz (1976), 424 U.S. 600, 611 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 276 . 1990United States v. Dinitz (1976), 424 U.S. 600, 611 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1081 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 276 . | 3 | 1983–1990 |
State v. Cech
green
2 sentences2024However, in State v. Cech, 2007 MT 184 , 338 Mont. 330 , 167 P.3d 389 , we held that a double jeopardy challenge was not waived when the court, at the time it accepts the guilty plea, has a sufficient record to determine whether the government lacked the power to bring the charges at issue due to constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. 2024However, in State v. Cech, 2007 MT 184 , 338 Mont. 330 , 167 P.3d 389 , we held that a double jeopardy challenge was not waived when the court, at the time it accepts the guilty plea, has a sufficient record to determine whether the government lacked the power to bring the charges at issue due to constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. | 2 | 2008–2024 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2021Whether Valenzuela’s counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Valenzuela’s convictions based on a double jeopardy violation. ¶29 This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel through the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). 2021Whether Valenzuela’s counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Valenzuela’s convictions based on a double jeopardy violation. ¶29 This Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel through the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). | 2 | 2017–2021 |
State v. Orsborn
green
2 sentences2000In Anderson, we did not consider a due process challenge, but decided the issue solely pursuant to the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. ¶100 We have previously held that a convicted defendant “ ‘has a due process guarantee against a sentence predicated on misinformation.’ ” Bauer v. State, 1999 MT 185, ¶ 21 , 295 Mont. 306, ¶ 21 , 983 P.2d 955, ¶ 21 (citing State v. Orsborn (1976), 170 Mont. 480, 486 , 555 P.2d 509, 513 ). 2000In Anderson, we did not consider a due process challenge, but decided the issue solely pursuant to the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. ¶100 We have previously held that a convicted defendant “ ‘has a due process guarantee against a sentence predicated on misinformation.’ ” Bauer v. State, 1999 MT 185, ¶ 21 , 295 Mont. 306, ¶ 21 , 983 P.2d 955, ¶ 21 (citing State v. Orsborn (1976), 170 Mont. 480, 486 , 555 P.2d 509, 513 ). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Teague v. Lane
green
2 sentences2000Egelhoff, 272 Mont. at 126 , 900 P.2d at 267 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076 ). ¶21 In Nichols , we refused to retroactively apply to Nichols’ case the new rule declared in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29 , 293 Mont. 224 , 975 P.2d 312 , which afforded broader protection under the Montana Constitution than the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution with respect to weapons enhancement. 2000Egelhoff, 272 Mont. at 126 , 900 P.2d at 267 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 310-11 , 109 S.Ct. at 1076 ). ¶21 In Nichols , we refused to retroactively apply to Nichols’ case the new rule declared in State v. Guillaume, 1999 MT 29 , 293 Mont. 224 , 975 P.2d 312 , which afforded broader protection under the Montana Constitution than the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution with respect to weapons enhancement. | 2 | 1999–2000 |
Missouri v. Hunter
green
2 sentences1999Specifically, we were bound to follow Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359 , 103 S.Ct. 673 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535 , wherein the United States Supreme Court held that, where legislative intent is clear, cumulative punishments imposed in a single trial do not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1999Specifically, we were bound to follow Missouri v. Hunter (1983), 459 U.S. 359 , 103 S.Ct. 673 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535 , wherein the United States Supreme Court held that, where legislative intent is clear, cumulative punishments imposed in a single trial do not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. | 2 | 1996–1999 |
State v. Lindseth
green
2 sentences1998Until joinder became permissible and commonplace, however, multiple punishment could result only from multiple trials.’” Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1149 , quoting Comment, Twice Put in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262 , 266 n.13 (1965). ¶37 In a related vein, this Court has previously acknowledged “a trend in prosecutions to use multiple count pleadings,” prompting our admonishment that “[p]rosecutors and trial courts should note the limitations and spirit behind the double jeopardy clause so that they may avoid potential constitutional problems.” State v. Lindseth (1983), 203 Mont. 115, 117 , 659 P.2d 844 1998Until joinder became permissible and commonplace, however, multiple punishment could result only from multiple trials.’” Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1149 , quoting Comment, Twice Put in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262 , 266 n.13 (1965). ¶37 In a related vein, this Court has previously acknowledged “a trend in prosecutions to use multiple count pleadings,” prompting our admonishment that “[p]rosecutors and trial courts should note the limitations and spirit behind the double jeopardy clause so that they may avoid potential constitutional problems.” State v. Lindseth (1983), 203 Mont. 115, 117 , 659 P.2d 844 | 2 | 1986–1998 |
Benton v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1993Since Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 [ 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 ] (1969), the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment as a “fundamental right.” In this bench trial case, jeopardy attached when the first State’s witness was sworn by the Justice of the Peace. [See] Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 [ 98 S.Ct. 2156 , 57 L.Ed.2d 24 ] (1978). 1993Since Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 [ 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 ] (1969), the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment as a “fundamental right.” In this bench trial case, jeopardy attached when the first State’s witness was sworn by the Justice of the Peace. [See] Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 [ 98 S.Ct. 2156 , 57 L.Ed.2d 24 ] (1978). | 2 | 1987–1993 |
Burks v. United States
green
2 sentences1986The purposes of the double jeopardy clause “would be negated were we to afford the government an opportunity for the proverbial ‘second bite of the apple.’ ” Burks v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 1, 17 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150 . 57 L.Ed.2d 1, 13 . *193 In conclusion, the State’s prosecution of Hall in the original trial, on a charge of incest, bars Hall’s retrial on a charge of sexual assault. 1986The purposes of the double jeopardy clause “would be negated were we to afford the government an opportunity for the proverbial ‘second bite of the apple.’ ” Burks v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 1, 17 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150 . 57 L.Ed.2d 1, 13 . *193 In conclusion, the State’s prosecution of Hall in the original trial, on a charge of incest, bars Hall’s retrial on a charge of sexual assault. | 2 | 1979–1986 |
Shagloak v. State
green
2 sentences1980A third approach, and one reached after the decision in Pearce, is that taken by the Alaska Supreme Court in Shagloak v. State (Alaska ), 597 P.2d 142 . 1980A third approach, and one reached after the decision in Pearce , is that taken by the Alaska Supreme Court in Shagloak v. State (Alaska 1979), 597 P.2d 142 . | 2 | 1980–1980 |
State v. J. Stone
green
2 sentences2025Accordingly, we proceed to address the merits of Wood’s claim. ¶9 “A district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss criminal charges on double jeopardy grounds presents a question of law, which we review for correctness.” State v. Stone, 2017 MT 189, ¶ 10 , 388 Mont. 239 , 400 P.3d 692 . 2025Accordingly, we proceed to address the merits of Wood’s claim. ¶9 “A district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss criminal charges on double jeopardy grounds presents a question of law, which we review for correctness.” State v. Stone, 2017 MT 189, ¶ 10 , 388 Mont. 239 , 400 P.3d 692 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
McElrath v. Georgia
green
1 sentence2025The focus of the double jeopardy inquiry is whether, in overturning Wood’s conviction, this Court “acted on its view that the prosecution had failed to prove 6 its case.” McElrath, 601 U.S. at 96 , 144 S. Ct. at 660 (citation omitted). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Duncan
green
2 sentences2024State v. Duncan, 2012 MT 241, ¶ 5 , 366 Mont. 443 , 291 P.3d 106 . ¶17 “We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 2021 MT 148 , ¶ 14, 404 Mont. 245 , 488 P.3d 531 . 2024State v. Duncan, 2012 MT 241, ¶ 5 , 366 Mont. 443 , 291 P.3d 106 . ¶17 “We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 2021 MT 148 , ¶ 14, 404 Mont. 245 , 488 P.3d 531 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. W. Smith
green
2 sentences2024State v. Duncan, 2012 MT 241, ¶ 5 , 366 Mont. 443 , 291 P.3d 106 . ¶17 “We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 2021 MT 148 , ¶ 14, 404 Mont. 245 , 488 P.3d 531 . 2024State v. Duncan, 2012 MT 241, ¶ 5 , 366 Mont. 443 , 291 P.3d 106 . ¶17 “We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 2021 MT 148 , ¶ 14, 404 Mont. 245 , 488 P.3d 531 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Pengra v. State green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. G. Makarchuk green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Sor-Lokken green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Toth neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Brooks green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Dodson green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Toby C. Patterson green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Keating v. Sherlock green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Condo green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Keith green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Beavers green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Matt green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Payton v. New York green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Park neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Wells green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Waller v. Florida green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Ex Parte Lange green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Savaria green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| United States Ex Rel. Marcus v. Hess green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| In Re Bradley green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Herron neutral | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| United States v. Carl P. Fogel green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.