double jeopardy clause in Delaware

2017See Bailey, 521 A.2d at 1075 (finding that the double jeopardy analysis is identical “under either Constitutional provision”). 21 E.g., Brown v. Day, 69 A.3d 370 , 2013 WL 1633264 , at *2 (Del.

2016Disallowing retrials would negatively impact a defendant’s appeal rights, by discouraging reversals, and would infringe too much upon society’s interest in addressing one who may be found guilty after a fair trial.22 One situation in which the Double Jeopardy Clause does bar the retrial of a defendant who successfully appeals a conviction is where the reversal is based upon the insufficiency of the evidence presented to the trial court.23 In Burks v. United States, the Court noted that a reversal for insufficiency of evidence is the same as an acquittal, in that it means 20 Bailey v. State, 52

2016R. 35 (governing correction or reduction of sentence); Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998) (providing that relief under Rule 35(a) is available when the sentence imposed violates the double jeopardy clause). 4 See Webb v. State, 2007 WL 2310111 (Del.

2016Nov. i, 2013) (citing Bri'ttingham, 705 A.2d at 578 ). _3_ authorized limits, violates the Double Jeopardy clause, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory.12 (5) Walsh first argues his sentence is illegal because the two felonies that enhanced his mandatory minimum term occurred more than ten years prior to his current crimes.13 Under Delaware law, “any person who is a prohibited person . . . and who knowingly possesses, purchases, owns or controls a firearm . . . while so prohibited shall receive a minimum sentence of . . . [t]en years at Level V, if the person has been convicted on 2 or

2019Jury selection for Taylor’s retrial is to commence on September 23, 2019. 7 See Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 661 (Del. 2002) (State’s election of a retrial ripens a double jeopardy claim). (4) When a criminal defendant moves for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States!® and Delaware!!

2019State, 795 A.2d 653, 661 (Del. 2002) (State’s election of a retrial ripens a double jeopardy claim). (4) When a criminal defendant moves for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States'? and Delaware!' Constitutions bar retrial only when the mistrial was intentionally provoked by the State.'* This is a “narrow exception” to the general rule permitting retrial.'> When applying this narrow exception the Court as fact finder'* may infer intent." (5) In its cross-examination of Taylor regarding his prior criminal convictions, the State just reiterated'® that which had already been

2019Jd. a Sullins, 930 A.2d at 916 . ib Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76 . 6 Feb. 26, 2019 Defendant’s Cross/Recross-Examination Tr., at 12-13 (D.I. 52) (Prosecutor: “(Defense counsel] asked you on direct examination about your conspiracy and your criminal impersonation, right?”; Taylor: “Yes.”). direct examination’? in contravention of long-settled Delaware law.'® The prosecutor did this out of a failure to accurately understand (or perhaps even know of) this limitation imposed by relevant case law.'?

2019IS Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 675-76 . 6 Feb. 26, 2019 Defendant’s Cross/Recross-Examination Tr., at 12-13 (D.1. 52) (Prosecutor: “[Defense counsel] asked you on direct examination about your conspiracy and your criminal impersonation, right?”; Taylor: “Yes.”). direct examination’? in contravention of long-settled Delaware law.'® The prosecutor did this out of a failure to accurately understand (or perhaps even know of) this limitation imposed by relevant case law.'?

1988Getter applied the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 , 103 S.Ct. 673 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) that the double jeopardy clause only prevents imposing greater punishment than the legislature intended.

1988Getter applied the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 , 103 S.Ct. 673 , 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) that the double jeopardy clause only prevents imposing greater punishment than the legislature intended.

2019Generally, where a trial is not completed and a mistrial has been declared, the Double Jeopardy clause precludes a retrial of the defendant, unless the defendant consented to the mistrial or the mistrial was compelled by manifest necessity. 9 Here, the defense moved for a mistrial after learning that certain jurors were overheard discussing the case in public, in breach of the court’s admonitions to the jury. 8 Guinn v. State, 841 A.2d 1239, 1241 (Del. 2004). 9 Sullins v. State, 930 A.2d 911, 915-16 (Del. 2007). 8 In light of these facts, the Superior Court did not commit plain error in failin

2019Though irrelevant here, this “narrow exception” includes a mistrial provoked by judicial conduct; a double jeopardy claim in that circumstance is governed by this same standard. /d. 14 Sullins, 930 A.2d at 916 .

2023In fact, in making its decision in Hubbard, the Delaware Supreme Court cites the opinion it rendered in Weber’s case and definitively states that the Delaware Supreme Court “reject[ed] [Weber’s] claim that ‘convictions and sentencing for 9 State v. Cook, 600 A.2d 352, 354 (Del. 1991) (citing Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090 (1990)); White v. State, 243 A.3d 381 , 396 (Del. 2020). 10 White, 243 A.3d at 396 (emphasis in original) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983)). 11 Id. at 397 . 12 Id; Cook, 600 A.2d at 355 . 13 238 A.3d 878 (Del. 2020) (Table). 14 Id. at 878. 5 both

1995United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , -, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2860 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (overruling Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (which had held that a second prosecution was prohibited if it required the government to “prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted[.]”)) However, this Court need not reach the question of whether § 206(b)(1) prevents this prosecution for Robbery First Degree because it finds that § 206(b)(3), the broadest of the three statutory definitions, is determinative of the questio

2023Cf. White v. State, 576 A.2d 1322 , 1324–29 (Del. 1990) (after appellate review vacates convictions on one charge in a case, the Superior Court may increase sentence for remaining charges without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause); Dabney v. State, 12 A.3d 1101, 1102 (Del. 2009).

2019Cf. White v. State , 576 A.2d 1322 , 1324-29 (Del. 1990) (after appellate review vacates convictions on one charge in a case, the Superior Court may increase sentence for remaining charges without running afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause); Dabney v. State , 12 A.3d 1101 , 1102 (Del. 2009). 16 United States v. Pridgeon , 153 U.S. 48 , 62, 14 S.Ct. 746 , 38 L.Ed. 631 (1894). 17 We recognize that our straightforward application of Rule 35(a) in this case results in an aggregate sentence for Longford-Myers that is more favorable to him than the aggregate sentence apparently contemplated by the

2022We proceed under the assumption that he is claiming a double jeopardy violation under only the U.S. Constitution.”)) (citing Poteat, 840 A.2d at 602 n.3). 9 retrying him for the greater offense. 43 That is not this case.

2019See generally Poteat v. State , 840 A.2d 599 , 602 n.3 (Del. 2003) ("This Court has not yet been required to determine whether the federal and state double jeopardy provisions are identical in scope in all respects, and we do not address that issue today.

2024Jan. 15, 2004); Melton v. State, 2013 WL 4538071 , at *1 (“Because [the defendant] pleaded guilty to the charges against him, he has waived any claim of a double jeopardy violation.”). 11 Joy v. Superior Ct., 298 A.2d 315, 316 (Del. 1972) (“It is quite clear that an indictment for a felony by the Grand Jury eliminates the need for a preliminary hearing.”). 4 attorney general.

2023In fact, in making its decision in Hubbard, the Delaware Supreme Court cites the opinion it rendered in Weber’s case and definitively states that the Delaware Supreme Court “reject[ed] [Weber’s] claim that ‘convictions and sentencing for 9 State v. Cook, 600 A.2d 352, 354 (Del. 1991) (citing Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090 (1990)); White v. State, 243 A.3d 381 , 396 (Del. 2020). 10 White, 243 A.3d at 396 (emphasis in original) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983)). 11 Id. at 397 . 12 Id; Cook, 600 A.2d at 355 . 13 238 A.3d 878 (Del. 2020) (Table). 14 Id. at 878. 5 both

2023In fact, in making its decision in Hubbard, the Delaware Supreme Court cites the opinion it rendered in Weber’s case and definitively states that the Delaware Supreme Court “reject[ed] [Weber’s] claim that ‘convictions and sentencing for 9 State v. Cook, 600 A.2d 352, 354 (Del. 1991) (citing Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090 (1990)); White v. State, 243 A.3d 381 , 396 (Del. 2020). 10 White, 243 A.3d at 396 (emphasis in original) (quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983)). 11 Id. at 397 . 12 Id; Cook, 600 A.2d at 355 . 13 238 A.3d 878 (Del. 2020) (Table). 14 Id. at 878. 5 both

2021A. Addressing Patrick’s evidentiary objection first, we review the Superior Court’s decision whether to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.2 Relevant evidence is generally admissible. 3 But relevant evidence may also be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”4 A police officer may testify about background facts to give the jury context and to ensure there are no holes in the State’s case that might lead the jury to infer improper conduct by police.5 If, however, the usefulness of that testimony to the jury is substa

2021A. Addressing Patrick’s evidentiary objection first, we review the Superior Court’s decision whether to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.2 Relevant evidence is generally admissible. 3 But relevant evidence may also be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”4 A police officer may testify about background facts to give the jury context and to ensure there are no holes in the State’s case that might lead the jury to infer improper conduct by police.5 If, however, the usefulness of that testimony to the jury is substa

2021Because Patrick did not 8 App. to Opening Br. at A28. 9 Id. at A91. 10 For example, each “person prohibited” offense required the State to prove possession of a deadly weapon, such as the firearm found in the closet. 11 Del.

2021“It is well established that a voluntary guilty plea waives any claim of a double jeopardy violation.”1 Therefore, although 1 Lanzo v. State, 2015 WL 5120872, at *1 (Del.

2021A. Addressing Patrick’s evidentiary objection first, we review the Superior Court’s decision whether to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.2 Relevant evidence is generally admissible. 3 But relevant evidence may also be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”4 A police officer may testify about background facts to give the jury context and to ensure there are no holes in the State’s case that might lead the jury to infer improper conduct by police.5 If, however, the usefulness of that testimony to the jury is substa

2020“Both the United States and Delaware Constitutions provide that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense.”65 “[T]he effect of the double jeopardy clause is to afford to criminal defendants several basic protections.”66 Specifically, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against: (1) successive prosecutions; (2) multiple charges under separate statutes; and (3) being charged multiple times under the same 62 Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Del. 2002). 63 Id. 64 Opening Br. at 31. 65 U.S. Const. amend.

2020“Both the United States and Delaware Constitutions provide that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same offense.”65 “[T]he effect of the double jeopardy clause is to afford to criminal defendants several basic protections.”66 Specifically, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against: (1) successive prosecutions; (2) multiple charges under separate statutes; and (3) being charged multiple times under the same 62 Williams v. State, 796 A.2d 1281, 1284 (Del. 2002). 63 Id. 64 Opening Br. at 31. 65 U.S. Const. amend.

2019Generally, where a trial is not completed and a mistrial has been declared, the Double Jeopardy clause precludes a retrial of the defendant, unless the defendant consented to the mistrial or the mistrial was compelled by manifest necessity. 9 Here, the defense moved for a mistrial after learning that certain jurors were overheard discussing the case in public, in breach of the court’s admonitions to the jury. 8 Guinn v. State, 841 A.2d 1239, 1241 (Del. 2004). 9 Sullins v. State, 930 A.2d 911, 915-16 (Del. 2007). 8 In light of these facts, the Superior Court did not commit plain error in failin

2019Second, McDougal argues his VOP sentence constituted a double jeopardy violation and otherwise violated his due process rights. (7) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for modification of sentence under Rule 35(b) for abuse of discretion.3 This standard is highly deferential.4 Under Rule 35(b), a motion for reduction of sentence must be filed within 90 days of sentencing unless the defendant can establish “extraordinary circumstances.”5 Rule 35(b) also provides that the Superior Court will not consider repetitive requests for sentence modifications.6 3 Benge v. State, 101 A.3d 97

2019Second, McDougal argues his VOP sentence constituted a double jeopardy violation and otherwise violated his due process rights. (7) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for modification of sentence under Rule 35(b) for abuse of discretion.3 This standard is highly deferential.4 Under Rule 35(b), a motion for reduction of sentence must be filed within 90 days of sentencing unless the defendant can establish “extraordinary circumstances.”5 Rule 35(b) also provides that the Superior Court will not consider repetitive requests for sentence modifications.6 3 Benge v. State, 101 A.3d 97

2018Thus, there was no multiplicity violation. (10) In a similar case, State v. Servello, the defendant was convicted of three counts of perjury after making three false statements about the same general subject.22 The Connecticut court found that convicting the defendant of multiple counts did not violate the double jeopardy clause because each instance of perjury were “separate and distinct crimes . . . susceptible of separation into parts, each of which in itself constitute[d] a completed offense.”23 The court explained that the three statements were not a single act of perjury because “the def

2018Thus, there was no multiplicity violation. (10) In a similar case, State v. Servello, the defendant was convicted of three counts of perjury after making three false statements about the same general subject.22 The Connecticut court found that convicting the defendant of multiple counts did not violate the double jeopardy clause because each instance of perjury were “separate and distinct crimes . . . susceptible of separation into parts, each of which in itself constitute[d] a completed offense.”23 The court explained that the three statements were not a single act of perjury because “the def