double jeopardy clause in Maine

2023See infra ¶¶ 24-25. 12 [¶21] “The double jeopardy clauses of the Maine and federal constitutions prohibit, among other things, ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Armstrong, 2020 ME 97 , ¶ 7, 237 A.3d 185 (quoting State v. Martinelli, 2017 ME 217, ¶ 5 , 175 A.3d 636 ). [W]hen a trial results in multiple verdicts for the same offense, the appropriate procedure to prevent a double jeopardy violation is to merge, not dismiss, the duplicative counts.

2020See State v. Martinelli, 2017 ME 217, ¶¶ 5-10 , 175 A.3d 636 . 4 criminal act;2 if the duplicative counts are not identified and the problem resolved before conviction and sentencing, the double jeopardy clause is violated.

2023See infra ¶¶ 24-25. 12 [¶21] “The double jeopardy clauses of the Maine and federal constitutions prohibit, among other things, ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Armstrong, 2020 ME 97 , ¶ 7, 237 A.3d 185 (quoting State v. Martinelli, 2017 ME 217, ¶ 5 , 175 A.3d 636 ). [W]hen a trial results in multiple verdicts for the same offense, the appropriate procedure to prevent a double jeopardy violation is to merge, not dismiss, the duplicative counts.

2020See State v. Martinelli, 2017 ME 217, ¶¶ 5-10 , 175 A.3d 636 . 4 criminal act;2 if the duplicative counts are not identified and the problem resolved before conviction and sentencing, the double jeopardy clause is violated.

2020See State v. Thornton, 540 A.2d 773, 776-77 (Me. 1988); State v. Poulin, 538 A.2d 278, 279 (Me. 1988). [¶10] As this case demonstrates, the lack of attention we have given to the question of whether merger or dismissal is the proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation resulting from multiple punishments can cause uncertainty regarding the distinct question of whether resentencing is required on the single remaining conviction.

2020See State v. Thornton, 540 A.2d 773, 776-77 (Me. 1988); State v. Poulin, 538 A.2d 278, 279 (Me. 1988). [¶10] As this case demonstrates, the lack of attention we have given to the question of whether merger or dismissal is the proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation resulting from multiple punishments can cause uncertainty regarding the distinct question of whether resentencing is required on the single remaining conviction.

2020See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985) (“[A] second conviction [for the same offense], even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment.”); State v. Allard, 557 A.2d 960, 962 (Me. 1989). [¶8] In addressing cases where the double jeopardy issue was addressed by the trial court, we have uniformly held that the trial court practice of consolidation or merger is appropriate.

2020See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985) (“[A] second conviction [for the same offense], even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment.”); State v. Allard, 557 A.2d 960, 962 (Me. 1989). [¶8] In addressing cases where the double jeopardy issue was addressed by the trial court, we have uniformly held that the trial court practice of consolidation or merger is appropriate.

2020See State v. Thornton, 540 A.2d 773, 776-77 (Me. 1988); State v. Poulin, 538 A.2d 278, 279 (Me. 1988). [¶10] As this case demonstrates, the lack of attention we have given to the question of whether merger or dismissal is the proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation resulting from multiple punishments can cause uncertainty regarding the distinct question of whether resentencing is required on the single remaining conviction.

2020See State v. Thornton, 540 A.2d 773, 776-77 (Me. 1988); State v. Poulin, 538 A.2d 278, 279 (Me. 1988). [¶10] As this case demonstrates, the lack of attention we have given to the question of whether merger or dismissal is the proper remedy for a double jeopardy violation resulting from multiple punishments can cause uncertainty regarding the distinct question of whether resentencing is required on the single remaining conviction.

2020See, e.g., United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006).

2020See, e.g., United States v. Josephberg, 459 F.3d 350, 355 (2d Cir. 2006).

2020See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985) (“[A] second conviction [for the same offense], even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment.”); State v. Allard, 557 A.2d 960, 962 (Me. 1989). [¶8] In addressing cases where the double jeopardy issue was addressed by the trial court, we have uniformly held that the trial court practice of consolidation or merger is appropriate.

2020See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864-65 (1985) (“[A] second conviction [for the same offense], even if it results in no greater sentence, is an impermissible punishment.”); State v. Allard, 557 A.2d 960, 962 (Me. 1989). [¶8] In addressing cases where the double jeopardy issue was addressed by the trial court, we have uniformly held that the trial court practice of consolidation or merger is appropriate.

2018Even if preserved, the argument lacks merit because where a conviction is based on a plea, "jeopardy only attaches to those counts of an indictment to which the defendant pleads guilty" and a "pretrial dismissal of an indictment or count within an indictment does not invoke the double jeopardy clause because jeopardy cannot attach until a jury is sworn on such charges." United States v. Hawes , 774 F.Supp. 965 , 969-70 (E.D.N.C. 1991) ; see also United States v. Vaughan, 715 F.2d 1373 , 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1983).

2018Even if preserved, the argument lacks merit because where a conviction is based on a plea, “jeopardy only attaches to those counts of an indictment to which the defendant pleads guilty” and a “pretrial dismissal of an indictment or count within an indictment does not invoke the double jeopardy clause because jeopardy cannot attach until a jury is sworn on such charges.” United States v. Hawes, 774 F. Supp. 965, 969-70 (E.D.N.C. 1991); see also United States v. Vaughan, 715 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1983). 6 [¶9] On November 10, 2016, after obtaining the written approval of the Attorney Gene

2017In the instant case, the charges . . . stem from different acts or transactions.”); State v. Jordan, No. 14AP-978, 14AP-979, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 4353 , at ¶ 16 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2015) (“If the offenses charged are separate and distinct because they arise from different transactions, and different evidence is required to prove each, then double jeopardy is not applicable.” (quotation marks omitted)). 4 In his brief, Martinelli argues that his position is supported by the “same conduct” test announced by the Supreme Court in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), which we applied in 7

1992Thus, even if a subsequent prosecution meets the Blockburger test, a double jeopardy violation will arise if the prosecution requires “relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first.” Grady, 495 U.S. at 519 , 110 S.Ct. at 2092 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 , 166 n. 6, 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 2225-26 n. 6, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977)).

2013"The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects a defendant who has been convicted of a crime from a second prosecution for the same offense and .from multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Fairfield, 644 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Me. 1994) (emphasis added).

1999In considering a double jeopardy claim, the issue is not whether the two offenses involve the “same conduct,” but rather whether “a conviction pursuant to each [statutory] provision requires proof of a factual element that the other did not.” State v. Fairfield, 644 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Me.1994).

2002Henderson v. Wright, 533 F.Supp. 1373, 1374 (D.Me.1982).

1983The double jeopardy proscription, however, does not bar further proceedings following a mistrial declared by manifest necessity based upon the trial justice’s decision that the jury is unable to reach a verdict. 2 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. *566 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); Henderson v. Wright, 533 F.Supp. 1373, 1375-76 (D.Me. 1982); State v. Commeau, 438 A.2d 454, 456 (Me.1981); State v. Henderson, 435 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Me.1981); State v. Linscott, 416 A.2d 255, 258 (Me.1980).

1992See State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 341 (Me.1985).

1991State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 344 (Me.1985).

1983Our concept of the adjudication of criminal guilt is so important and the ideal of fair trial so multifaceted that neither can exist undiminished, in my view, side-by-side with a permitted practice of "patchwork litigation." NOTES [1] In State v. Howes, 432 A.2d 419, 423 (Me. 1981), we interpreted the double jeopardy clause of the Maine Constitution, Me.

1983In State v. Howes, 432 A.2d 419, 423 (Me. 1981), we interpreted the double jeopardy clause of the Maine Constitution, Me.

2025P. 52(b). [¶17] The double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution bars “multiple punishments for the same offense.”6 Armstrong, 2020 ME 97 , ¶ 7, 237 For example, Doe identified Ali by picking Ali out of a photo lineup and by explaining her 5 knowledge of Ali and his family.

2025Id. ¶ 27 (stating that “[a]lthough the jury might have found that separate incidents formed the basis of its verdicts” on two counts, “we cannot know that, and will not assume it.”). [¶24] Because Counts 1 and 2 do not each require proof of a fact that the other does not, and because the jury could have found Ali guilty of Counts 1 and 2 based on the same conduct, the court’s failure to merge the two convictions constitutes obvious error. “[W]hen a trial results in multiple verdicts for the same offense, the appropriate procedure to prevent a double jeopardy violation is to merge, not dismiss,

1992Prior to Grady , a double jeopardy analysis was governed by the test set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

1992Prior to Grady , a double jeopardy analysis was governed by the test set out in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).

2018Even if preserved, the argument lacks merit because where a conviction is based on a plea, "jeopardy only attaches to those counts of an indictment to which the defendant pleads guilty" and a "pretrial dismissal of an indictment or count within an indictment does not invoke the double jeopardy clause because jeopardy cannot attach until a jury is sworn on such charges." United States v. Hawes , 774 F.Supp. 965 , 969-70 (E.D.N.C. 1991) ; see also United States v. Vaughan, 715 F.2d 1373 , 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1983).

2018Even if preserved, the argument lacks merit because where a conviction is based on a plea, “jeopardy only attaches to those counts of an indictment to which the defendant pleads guilty” and a “pretrial dismissal of an indictment or count within an indictment does not invoke the double jeopardy clause because jeopardy cannot attach until a jury is sworn on such charges.” United States v. Hawes, 774 F. Supp. 965, 969-70 (E.D.N.C. 1991); see also United States v. Vaughan, 715 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1983). 6 [¶9] On November 10, 2016, after obtaining the written approval of the Attorney Gene

2002The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). 7 .Other examples of manifest necessity include “discovery of bias among the jurors; illness of a juror, judge, or the defendant; or when a fixed court term ends prior to verdict.’’ Nielsen, 2000 ME 202, ¶ 6 , 761 A.2d at 879 . 8 .

2002The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). 7 .Other examples of manifest necessity include “discovery of bias among the jurors; illness of a juror, judge, or the defendant; or when a fixed court term ends prior to verdict.’’ Nielsen, 2000 ME 202, ¶ 6 , 761 A.2d at 879 . 8 .

2014By consenting to not “hav[ing] his trial completed by a particular tribunal once jeopardy attach[ed],” Rowe, 480 A.2d at 782 , Johnson removed any double jeopardy barrier to a retrial so long as the court was correct in finding that intentional prosecutorial misconduct did not impose a constitutional bar.

1984See State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778, 781 (Me.1984).

1974The double jeopardy clause, they said, “requires the prosecution, except in the most limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction.” 397 U.S. at 453, 454 , 90 S.Ct. at 1199 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 481 .

1974The double jeopardy clause, they said, “requires the prosecution, except in the most limited circumstances, to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode or transaction.” 397 U.S. at 453, 454 , 90 S.Ct. at 1199 , 25 L.Ed.2d at 481 .

2000As to the conduct of the prosecutor, we have stated that, “[b] arring intentional prosecutorial misconduct, 3 a defendant’s motion for ... a declaration of mistrial eliminates any constitutional barrier, created by the double jeopardy clause of either the United States or Maine Constitutions, to retrial.” State v. Beaudoin, 600 A.2d 1097, 1098 (Me.1991) (emphasis added); see also Tribou, 598 A.2d at 175 (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982)).

2000As to the conduct of the prosecutor, we have stated that, “[b] arring intentional prosecutorial misconduct, 3 a defendant’s motion for ... a declaration of mistrial eliminates any constitutional barrier, created by the double jeopardy clause of either the United States or Maine Constitutions, to retrial.” State v. Beaudoin, 600 A.2d 1097, 1098 (Me.1991) (emphasis added); see also Tribou, 598 A.2d at 175 (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982)).

2026In order to be considered a continuing offense, the facts must demonstrate that at least one substantial or material element of the alleged sexual assault or robbery occurred within this state as part of a sequential chain of events.” (footnote omitted)); State v. Farr, 7 A.3d 1276, 1279-83 (N.H. 2010) (concluding that, for the purpose of a double jeopardy analysis, charges of possession and delivery of child pornography were duplicative because the criminal conduct at issue was a continuing offense in circumstances where the defendant continuously possessed the video clip at issue before, dur

2026In order to be considered a continuing offense, the facts must demonstrate that at least one substantial or material element of the alleged sexual assault or robbery occurred within this state as part of a sequential chain of events.” (footnote omitted)); State v. Farr, 7 A.3d 1276, 1279-83 (N.H. 2010) (concluding that, for the purpose of a double jeopardy analysis, charges of possession and delivery of child pornography were duplicative because the criminal conduct at issue was a continuing offense in circumstances where the defendant continuously possessed the video clip at issue before, dur