double jeopardy clause in Oklahoma

1979Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) held “that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” This was applied in Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978) which held that Appellants’ guilty pleas did not constitute a waiver of their contention that consecutive sentences imposed upon them under multiplicious information violated the double jeopardy clause.

1979Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) held “that a plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that — judged on its face — the charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.” This was applied in Launius v. United States, 575 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1978) which held that Appellants’ guilty pleas did not constitute a waiver of their contention that consecutive sentences imposed upon them under multiplicious information violated the double jeopardy clause.

2012Mooney v. State, 1999 OK CR 34, ¶ 14 , 990 P.2d 875, 882-883 . 127 The proper analysis of a Section 11 claim focuses on the relationship between the crimes.

2012Mooney v. State, 1999 OK CR 34, ¶ 14 , 990 P.2d 875, 882-883 . 127 The proper analysis of a Section 11 claim focuses on the relationship between the crimes.

2006Johnson v. State, 1980 OK CR 45 , 1 30, 611 P.2d 1137, 1145 .

2006Johnson v. State, 1980 OK CR 45 , 1 30, 611 P.2d 1137, 1145 .

1977The test in a possible double jeopardy situation is found in Branch v. Mills, Okl.Cr., 500 P.2d 590, 593 (1972), which quotes from Hattaway v. United States, 399 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1968): “ ‘For a double jeopardy claim to be viable, it must be shown that the two offenses charged are in law and in fact the same offense. * * * Offenses are not the same if, upon the trial of one, proof of an additional fact is required that is not necessary to be proved in the trial of the other, although the same acts may be necessary to be proved in the trial of each.’ ” We can also look to Marshall v. United S

1977In Draper v. State, Okl.Cr., 562 P.2d 155 (1977), this Court adopted the Federal rule when it stated: “The test in a possible double jeopardy situation is found in Branch v. Mills, Okl.Cr., 500 P.2d 590, 593 (1972), which quotes from Hattaway v. United States, 399 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1968): “ ‘For a double jeopardy claim to be viable, it must be shown that the two offenses charged are in law and in fact the same offense. * * * Offenses are not the same if, upon the trial of one, proof of an additional fact is required that is not necessary to be proved in the trial of the other, although the sa

2015Id., 488 U.S. at 576 , 109 S.Ct. at 765 , citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 , 96 S.Ct. 241, 242 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).

2015Id., 488 U.S. at 576 , 109 S.Ct. at 765 , citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 , 96 S.Ct. 241, 242 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).

2015Id., 488 U.S. at 576 , 109 S.Ct. at 765 , citing Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 , 96 S.Ct. 241, 242 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).

2015Id. , 488 U.S. at 576 , 109 S.Ct. at 765 , citing Menna v. New York , 423 U.S. 61, 62 , 96 S. Ct. 241, 242 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).

2006Id.

2006Id.

1998The Court stated: Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 , 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and therefore do not implicate double jeopardy concerns, see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 , 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (application of the double jeopardy clause is limited to proceedings which are "essentially criminal"). ¶ 6 In discussing what is a criminal punishment, the Court in Hudson recognized the previous holding in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 , 16 S.Ct. 977, 980 , 41 L.Ed. 14

1998The Court stated: Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 , 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2974 , 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), and therefore do not implicate double jeopardy concerns, see Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 , 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (application of the double jeopardy clause is limited to proceedings which are "essentially criminal"). ¶ 6 In discussing what is a criminal punishment, the Court in Hudson recognized the previous holding in Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 , 16 S.Ct. 977, 980 , 41 L.Ed. 14

1983Double jeopardy is a concept derived from the Fifth Amendment, which states that “... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy ...” In the Supreme Court case of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), collateral estop-pel was for the first time held to be an ingredient of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).

1983Double jeopardy is a concept derived from the Fifth Amendment, which states that “... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy ...” In the Supreme Court case of Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 , 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), collateral estop-pel was for the first time held to be an ingredient of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969).

1978We note that the State in its brief relies on the following language from Draper v. State, Okl.Cr., 562 P.2d 155 (1977) and Branch v. Mills, Okl.Cr., 500 P.2d 590 (1972): “For a double jeopardy claim to be viable, it must be shown that the two offenses charged are in law and in fact the same offense. * * * Offenses are not the same if, upon the trial of one, proof of an additional fact is required that is not necessary to be proved in the trial of the other, although the same acts may be necessary to be proved in the trial of each.” In light of the test set forth in Brown, supra, it is readily

1978We note that the State in its brief relies on the following language from Draper v. State, Okl.Cr., 562 P.2d 155 (1977) and Branch v. Mills, Okl.Cr., 500 P.2d 590 (1972): "For a double jeopardy claim to be viable, it must be shown that the two offenses charged are in law and in fact the same offense. * * * Offenses are not the same if, upon the trial of one, proof of an additional fact is required that is not necessary to be proved in the trial of the other, although the same acts may be necessary to be proved in the trial of each." In light of the test set forth in Brown, supra, it is readily

2017Thus, under Spivey, in order for there to be -a double jeopardy violation under the actual-evidence test the eviden-tiary - footprint for all the elements required to prove one offense must be the same evidentiary footprint as that required to prove all,.the elements of another offense, See 761 N.E.2d at 833 .

2017To find a double jeopardy violation under this test, we must conclude that there is “a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense.” Id.

2012In an appeal from a driver's license revocation order the focus is hence not on the double jeopardy clause but rather on the due process standards that are built into the regulatory scheme and were applied in the proceedings below. 1986 OK 48, ¶ 11 , 725 P.2d at 1259-60 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted). 7 124 Further, the burdens of proof are different in a driver's license revocation proceeding and a criminal prosecution.

2006He argues that Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 , 123 S.Ct. 732 , 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) requires that holding in this case.

2006He argues that Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 , 123 S.Ct. 732 , 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003) requires that holding in this case.

2006Edwards v. State, 1991 OK CR 71, ¶ 7 , 815 P.2d 670, 672 . ¶ 9 In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that under the double jeopardy clause, the history of sentencing practices, and the pertinent rulings of the Court, a criminal sentence, once pronounced, is not to be accorded constitutional finality and conclusiveness similar to that which attaches to a jury’s verdict of acquittal. 449 U.S. at 132 , 101 S.Ct at 435 .

2006Edwards v. State, 1991 OK CR 71, ¶ 7 , 815 P.2d 670, 672 . ¶ 9 In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that under the double jeopardy clause, the history of sentencing practices, and the pertinent rulings of the Court, a criminal sentence, once pronounced, is not to be accorded constitutional finality and conclusiveness similar to that which attaches to a jury’s verdict of acquittal. 449 U.S. at 132 , 101 S.Ct at 435 .

2006Edwards v. State, 1991 OK CR 71, ¶ 7 , 815 P.2d 670, 672 . ¶ 9 In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that under the double jeopardy clause, the history of sentencing practices, and the pertinent rulings of the Court, a criminal sentence, once pronounced, is not to be accorded constitutional finality and conclusiveness similar to that which attaches to a jury’s verdict of acquittal. 449 U.S. at 132 , 101 S.Ct at 435 .

2006Edwards v. State, 1991 OK CR 71, ¶ 7 , 815 P.2d 670, 672 . ¶ 9 In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 , 101 S.Ct. 426 , 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that under the double jeopardy clause, the history of sentencing practices, and the pertinent rulings of the Court, a criminal sentence, once pronounced, is not to be accorded constitutional finality and conclusiveness similar to that which attaches to a jury’s verdict of acquittal. 449 U.S. at 132 , 101 S.Ct at 435 .

2003Brown, 1998 OK CR 77, ¶ 66 , 989 P.2d at 930 .

2003Brown, 1998 OK CR 77, ¶ 66 , 989 P.2d at 930 .

2001Eg. Marutzky v. State, 514 P.2d 430 (Okl.Cr. 1973); Degraffenreid v. State, 599 P.2d 1107 (Okl.Cr.1979).