double jeopardy clause in Michigan

2025“Where the trial ends before a verdict—where a mistrial is declared—the Double Jeopardy Clause may bar a retrial.” Id.

2025“The Double Jeopardy clause does not bar all retrials.” Id. at 252 .

1987In People v Stewart, 138 Mich App 629 ; 361 NW2d 16 (1984), the Michigan Court of Appeals, citing People v White, supra, held that jurisdictional restraints do not prevent the erection of the double jeopardy bar to further prosecution; of course, the defendant may still waive the right to a single trial on all charges by pleading guilty to one charge with full awareness that the prosecutor intends to proceed to trial on another charge which is still pending.

1986The following passage from Justice Brennan’s opinion was quoted in White, supra, and sets forth the relevant considerations: "[The Double Jeopardy Clause] guarantee is expressed as a prohibition against multiple prosecutions for the 'same offence.’ Although the phrase 'same offence’ appeared in most of the early common-law articulations of the double-jeopardy principle, questions of its precise meaning rarely arose prior to the 18th century, and by the time the Bill of Rights was adopted it had not been authoritatively defined.

2018Id. at 632 . -5- However, after this Court decided Meshell, the Legislature amended MCL 333.7401c.3 Our Supreme Court considered the amended statute in the context of a similar double jeopardy claim in People v Routley, 485 Mich 1075 ; 777 NW2d 160 (2010).4 In Routley, the defendant was convicted under both MCL 333.7401c(2)(d) and (2)(f).

2010In his application, defendant, for the first time, raises a double jeopardy challenge, relying on People v. Meshell, 265 Mich. App. 616 , 696 N.W.2d 754 (2005).

1982People v Cook, 236 Mich 333 ; 210 NW 296 (1926); People v Martin, 398 Mich 303 ; 247 NW2d 303 (1976); People v Stewart (On Rehearing), 400 Mich 540 ; 256 NW2d 31 (1977); People v Jankowski, 86.” (Footnotes omitted.) In People v Jankowski, 408 Mich 79, 91 ; 289 NW2d 674 (1980), the Supreme Court stated: "For purposes of the double jeopardy analysis, as a matter of state constitutional law, the question is not whether the challenged lesser offense is by definition necessarily included within the greater offense also charged, but whether, on the facts of the case at issue, it is.” It is necessary

1982People v Cook, 236 Mich 333 ; 210 NW 296 (1926); People v Martin, 398 Mich 303 ; 247 NW2d 303 (1976); People v Stewart (On Rehearing), 400 Mich 540 ; 256 NW2d 31 (1977); People v Jankowski, 86.” (Footnotes omitted.) In People v Jankowski, 408 Mich 79, 91 ; 289 NW2d 674 (1980), the Supreme Court stated: "For purposes of the double jeopardy analysis, as a matter of state constitutional law, the question is not whether the challenged lesser offense is by definition necessarily included within the greater offense also charged, but whether, on the facts of the case at issue, it is.” It is necessary

2025“A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law reviewed de novo on appeal.” People v Ackah- Essien, 311 Mich App 13, 30 ; 874 NW2d 172 (2015).

2025“A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law reviewed de novo on appeal.” People v Ackah- Essien, 311 Mich App 13, 30 ; 874 NW2d 172 (2015).

1981In Jankowski we said: "We note at the outset that the defendant's double jeopardy challenge is not addressed to a legislative scheme of criminal punishment where a clear legislative intent to create more than a single crime exists." Jankowski, supra, 85 . *357 In Wayne County Prosecutor , we chose to disregard a line of authority that used a lesser included offense approach to resolve questions of multiple punishment. [10] We found the authority "inapposite because the Legislature ha[d] clearly expressed in the felony-firearm statute an intent to authorize multiple convictions and cumulative p

1981As we held in People v Jankowski, supra : "For purposes of the double jeopardy analysis, as a matter of state constitutional law, the question is not whether the challenged lesser offense is by definition necessarily included within the greater offense also charged, but whether, on the facts of the case at issue, it is." 408 Mich 79, 91 . [13] See Whalen v United States, supra, 712 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("If the polestar in this case is to be legislative intent, I see no reason to apply Blockburger unless it advances that inquiry."). [14] Other examples of predicate-based offenses includ

2015People v Clark, 243 Mich App 424, 429 ; 622 NW2d 344 20 See Kowalski, 489 Mich at 504–505 n 28 (approvingly citing multiple Court of Appeals decisions holding that an attorney’s statement, “I have no objections,” embodied “express and unequivocal indications that he approved of the instructions,” and affirmatively waived and extinguished claims of appellate error). 21 See section A2, supra, for a discussion on the relevant legal standards for evaluating a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 22 Because defendant failed to raise a double jeopardy claim before the trial court, the issue

2015People v Clark, 243 Mich App 424, 429 ; 622 NW2d 344 20 See Kowalski, 489 Mich at 504–505 n 28 (approvingly citing multiple Court of Appeals decisions holding that an attorney’s statement, “I have no objections,” embodied “express and unequivocal indications that he approved of the instructions,” and affirmatively waived and extinguished claims of appellate error). 21 See section A2, supra, for a discussion on the relevant legal standards for evaluating a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 22 Because defendant failed to raise a double jeopardy claim before the trial court, the issue

2017The trial court relied upon People v. Smith , 478 Mich. 292 , 315-316, 733 N.W.2d 351 (2007), in which the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the double-jeopardy test articulated in Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299 , 304, 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), under which a trial court must examine whether each offense required proof of an element that the other did not.

2017The trial court relied upon People v. Smith , 478 Mich. 292 , 315-316, 733 N.W.2d 351 (2007), in which the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the double-jeopardy test articulated in Blockburger v. United States , 284 U.S. 299 , 304, 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), under which a trial court must examine whether each offense required proof of an element that the other did not.

2025“A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 573 ; 677 NW2d 1 (2004).

2025“A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 573 ; 677 NW2d 1 (2004).

2002The judge has a right to clarify the form of the verdict if the jury has not been discharged; and the jury can always change the form and the substance of the verdict to coincide with its intention, before it is discharged. 21 See Rushin, supra at 395 (“The double jeopardy clause clearly enunciates a policy of finality in criminal proceedings in favor of the defendant.”), citing United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 479 ; 91 S Ct 547 ; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971). 22 People v Kinard, 129 Mich App 94, 98 ; 341 NW2d 820 (1983). 23 US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. 24 People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463,

2002The judge has a right to clarify the form of the verdict if the jury has not been discharged; and the jury can always change the form and the substance of the verdict to coincide with its intention, before it is discharged. 21 See Rushin, supra at 395 (“The double jeopardy clause clearly enunciates a policy of finality in criminal proceedings in favor of the defendant.”), citing United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 479 ; 91 S Ct 547 ; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971). 22 People v Kinard, 129 Mich App 94, 98 ; 341 NW2d 820 (1983). 23 US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. 24 People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463,

2002The judge has a right to clarify the form of the verdict if the jury has not been discharged; and the jury can always change the form and the substance of the verdict to coincide with its intention, before it is discharged. 21 See Rushin, supra at 395 (“The double jeopardy clause clearly enunciates a policy of finality in criminal proceedings in favor of the defendant.”), citing United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 479 ; 91 S Ct 547 ; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971). 22 People v Kinard, 129 Mich App 94, 98 ; 341 NW2d 820 (1983). 23 US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. 24 People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463,

2002The judge has a right to clarify the form of the verdict if the jury has not been discharged; and the jury can always change the form and the substance of the verdict to coincide with its intention, before it is discharged. 21 See Rushin, supra at 395 (“The double jeopardy clause clearly enunciates a policy of finality in criminal proceedings in favor of the defendant.”), citing United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 479 ; 91 S Ct 547 ; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971). 22 People v Kinard, 129 Mich App 94, 98 ; 341 NW2d 820 (1983). 23 US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. 24 People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463,

2025A. STANDARD OF REVIEW “A double-jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Ream, 481 Mich 223, 226 ; 750 NW2d 536 (2008).

2024“A double-jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Ream, 481 Mich 223, 226 ; 750 NW2d 536 (2008).

2024This section was added after this Court adopted our current formulation of the double-jeopardy inquiry, requiring courts to look for a clear sign of legislative intent before turning to the abstract-legal-elements test, see Smith, 478 Mich 292 , rather than our previous formulation of the double-jeopardy inquiry, which required a court to consider whether two criminal statutes prohibited conduct that was violative of the same social norm, see People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 487 ; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). 51 See 1913 PA 232 .

2021“A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo.” People v Smith, 478 Mich 292, 298 ; 733 NW2d 351 (2007).

2024We may not rewrite the statute in this manner.” 48 See, e.g., People v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 600 ; 628 NW2d 528 (2001) (“ ‘The principal thrust of double jeopardy protection by the very terms of our federal and state constitutional provision[s] is protection from repeated prosecutions for the same criminal offense arising 12 to be aware of judicial interpretations of existing law when passing legislation,” 49 it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature was cognizant when it enacted MCL 750.84(3) that the “arising out of the same conduct” language would be understood by this Court as infor

2024We may not rewrite the statute in this manner.” 48 See, e.g., People v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 600 ; 628 NW2d 528 (2001) (“ ‘The principal thrust of double jeopardy protection by the very terms of our federal and state constitutional provision[s] is protection from repeated prosecutions for the same criminal offense arising 12 to be aware of judicial interpretations of existing law when passing legislation,” 49 it is reasonable to presume that the Legislature was cognizant when it enacted MCL 750.84(3) that the “arising out of the same conduct” language would be understood by this Court as infor

2018In the double-jeopardy context, our Supreme Court in People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392, 401 ; 397 NW2d 783 (1986), alluding to the same-transaction test, stated that the test in part required the joining of charges that “grew out of a continuous time sequence.” Although Nutt, 469 Mich at 568 , subsequently rejected the same-transaction test in favor of the same-elements test for purposes of defining the term “same offense” in our Constitution as part of a double-jeopardy analysis, the Sturgis Court’s definition that touched on the meaning of “same transaction” remains viable and useful in the con

2018In the double-jeopardy context, our Supreme Court in People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392, 401 ; 397 NW2d 783 (1986), alluding to the same-transaction test, stated that the test in part required the joining of charges that “grew out of a continuous time sequence.” Although Nutt, 469 Mich at 568 , subsequently rejected the same-transaction test in favor of the same-elements test for purposes of defining the term “same offense” in our Constitution as part of a double-jeopardy analysis, the Sturgis Court’s definition that touched on the meaning of “same transaction” remains viable and useful in the con

1983"For purposes of the double jeopardy analysis, as a matter of state constitutional law, the question is not whether the challenged lesser offense is by definition necessarily included within the greater offense also charged, but whether, on the facts of the case at issue, it is.” Jankowski, supra, p 91 .

1983"For purposes of the double jeopardy analysis, as a matter of state constitutional law, the question is not whether the challenged lesser offense is by definition necessarily included within the greater offense also charged, but whether, on the facts of the case at issue, it is." Jankowski, supra, p 91 .

2024This section was added after this Court adopted our current formulation of the double-jeopardy inquiry, requiring courts to look for a clear sign of legislative intent before turning to the abstract-legal-elements test, see Smith, 478 Mich 292 , rather than our previous formulation of the double-jeopardy inquiry, which required a court to consider whether two criminal statutes prohibited conduct that was violative of the same social norm, see People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 487 ; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). 51 See 1913 PA 232 .

2024This section was added after this Court adopted our current formulation of the double-jeopardy inquiry, requiring courts to look for a clear sign of legislative intent before turning to the abstract-legal-elements test, see Smith, 478 Mich 292 , rather than our previous formulation of the double-jeopardy inquiry, which required a court to consider whether two criminal statutes prohibited conduct that was violative of the same social norm, see People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458, 487 ; 355 NW2d 592 (1984). 51 See 1913 PA 232 .

2025“The double jeopardy bar prevents (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” Franklin, 298 Mich App at 546 .

2017The mere addition of the sexual delinquency classification to the indecent exposure conviction does not change the double jeopardy analysis, as the Court in Franklin, 298 Mich App at 547 , explained: To the extent that the prosecution argues that defendant’s convictions do not violate double jeopardy because the indecent exposure conviction required a showing of sexual delinquency, we note that sexual delinquency is not an actual element of that offense.

2024But if “without intending” did not bar cumulative punishments when a defendant is charged with both AWIGBH and 5 felonious assault for the same conduct, the phrase would mean nothing. 2 “Because we strive, when possible, to give effect to every word and phrase in a statute,” id., I am concerned that the majority’s interpretation drains the meaning of legislatively enacted text—an outcome that we expressly rejected in both Wafer, id., and Miller, 498 Mich at 25 . 3 2 The majority reasons that the “ ‘without intending’ language in MCL 750.82 does not itself create a double-jeopardy violation but

2021There is no double jeopardy violation if “a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes,” but there is a double jeopardy violation if “the Legislature expresses a clear intention in the plain language of a statute to prohibit multiple punishments.” Id. at 18 .

1996The dissent's strained reading of Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978), and United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), obfuscates the clear (and clearly stated) standard for what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause: "[W]hether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 571 , 97 S.Ct. at 1354-55 .

1996The dissent's strained reading of Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978), and United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 , 98 S.Ct. 2187 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), obfuscates the clear (and clearly stated) standard for what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause: "[W]hether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged." Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 571 , 97 S.Ct. at 1354-55 .

1987Wherever it is found that the result of the right asserted would be to prevent the trial from taking place, we follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court and hold a guilty plea does not waive that right. [Alvin Johnson, supra, pp 443-444.][ 2 ] The Court went on to hold that a double jeopardy defense was not waived by a plea of guilty.

1982Thus, an unqualified guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s right to challenge such jurisdictional defects as the constitutionality of the statute under which he has been charged nor does it foreclose defendant from raising a double jeopardy defense. 1 People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424 ; 240 NW2d 729 (1976).