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425 Ohio opinions name it 7 courts 1971–2026 47 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. John Christopher Doylegreen2 sentences2026Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant. ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.'" State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir. 1965). {¶17} In State v. Bowser the Court observed, [I]t is well established in Ohio law that the court may consider information beyond that strictly related to the conviction offense. 2023Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant. ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2nd Cir. 1965). | 7 | 16 |
Arizona v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent 2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent | 6 | 12 |
United States v. Carl P. Fogelgreen2 sentences2022The reason for such a rule is clear: “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings,” State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350 , 2012-Ohio-5636 , 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 24 , and “ ‘[i]f a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause,’ ” id., quoting United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C.Cir.1987). 2016We do not agree. {¶22} “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings,” and that “‘[i]f a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.’” State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350 , 2012-Ohio-5636, ¶24 , quoting United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 , 264 U.S. App. D.C. 292 (D.C.Cir.1987). {¶23} In T.W., supra, this court concluded the classification process under con | 5 | 7 |
| City of Maple Heights v. Dickardgreen | 5 | 5 |
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023(Emphasis added.) In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the U.S. Supreme Court established that, in a double jeopardy analysis, there are two offenses if each of the two statutory provisions requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. 2023(Emphasis added.) In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the U.S. Supreme Court established that, in a double jeopardy analysis, there are two offenses if each of the two statutory provisions requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. | 4 | 28 |
State v. Burtongreen2 sentences2026Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant. ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.'" State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir. 1965). {¶17} In State v. Bowser the Court observed, [I]t is well established in Ohio law that the court may consider information beyond that strictly related to the conviction offense. 2023Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant. ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2nd Cir. 1965). | 4 | 13 |
North Carolina v. Pearcered2 sentences2022Further, the prohibition against the double jeopardy clause “protects against three abuses”: (1) “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’” (2) “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction’” and (3) “‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10 , quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). 2022Further, the prohibition against the double jeopardy clause “protects against three abuses”: (1) “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’” (2) “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction’” and (3) “‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10 , quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). | 3 | 16 |
United States v. Felixgreen2 sentences2025However, “a mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.” United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 386 (1992). 2025However, “‘mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.’” State v. Ferricci, 2019-Ohio-994 , ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 386 (1992). | 3 | 9 |
| Grady v. Corbinred | 3 | 6 |
| State v. Mossgreen | 3 | 4 |
| Smith v. Massachusettsgreen | 3 | 3 |
Hudson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Such statute also establishes that the pertinent portion of the double jeopardy clause is not violated here. {¶25} That is, as aforementioned, “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings.” Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350 at ¶ 24 , citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 . 2014“If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.” Id., quoting United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C.Cir.1987). {¶20} The Court thus concluded the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality when the court sentenced him and double jeopardy principles prohibited the trial court from reopening his case, conducting a separate trial to determine whether the sexual activity at issue here was consensual, and then classifying the defendant as a sex offender. | 2 | 30 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2013"Although the -6- Clermont CA2012-07-051 Double Jeopardy Clause was commonly understood to prevent a second prosecution for the same offense, the United States Supreme Court has applied the clause to prevent a state from punishing twice, or from attempting a second time to criminally punish for the same offense." State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 528 (2000). {¶ 26} The threshold question in a double jeopardy analysis is whether the government's conduct involves criminal punishment. 2009"The threshold question in a double jeopardy analysis . . . is whether the government's conduct involves criminal punishment." Id. at 528 . {¶ 22} This Court has held that the expanded registration requirements of the Adam Walsh Act are civil and non-punitive in nature. | 2 | 16 |
State v. Gustafsongreen2 sentences2020The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits “(1) a second 17 prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432 , 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996). {¶56} A de novo standard of review is applied to the trial court’s determination regarding the application of the double jeopardy clause. 2020The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits “(1) a second 17 prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432 , 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996). {¶56} A de novo standard of review is applied to the trial court’s determination regarding the application of the double jeopardy clause. | 2 | 10 |
State v. Glovergreen2 sentences2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent 2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent | 2 | 7 |
State v. Lovejoygreen2 sentences2002In short, the double jeopardy clause "protects a person who has been acquitted from having to run the gauntlet a second time." State v. Lovejoy (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 440 , 443 . 1999See State v. Lovejoy (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 440 , 443 , ("Once a tribunal has decided an issue of ultimate fact in the defendant's favor, the double jeopardy doctrine also precludes a second jury from ever considering that same or identical issue in a later trial."), citing Dowling v. United States (1990), 493 U.S. 342 , 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 672 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 , 717 . | 2 | 6 |
Alabama v. Smithgreen2 sentences2022Further, the prohibition against the double jeopardy clause “protects against three abuses”: (1) “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’” (2) “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction’” and (3) “‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10 , quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). 2022Further, the prohibition against the double jeopardy clause “protects against three abuses”: (1) “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’” (2) “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction’” and (3) “‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10 , quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). | 2 | 6 |
Oregon v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2018Webster, 2014-Ohio-5647, at ¶ 10 , citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 . {¶34} Based on our de novo review we agree with the trial court that this case does not fit within “the narrow exception adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy * * * reserved for the limited set of circumstances where the nature of the state’s misconduct clearly and unquestionably demonstrates its intent to cause or invite a mistrial.” See State v. Kelly, 2015-Ohio-1948 , 34 N.E.3d 513 , ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).1 We overrule Kitchen’s first assignment of error. 1 Although the partie 2018Webster, 2014-Ohio-5647, at ¶ 10 , citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 . {¶34} Based on our de novo review we agree with the trial court that this case does not fit within “the narrow exception adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy * * * reserved for the limited set of circumstances where the nature of the state’s misconduct clearly and unquestionably demonstrates its intent to cause or invite a mistrial.” See State v. Kelly, 2015-Ohio-1948 , 34 N.E.3d 513 , ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).1 We overrule Kitchen’s first assignment of error. 1 Although the partie | 2 | 6 |
State v. Bestgreen2 sentences2014The “basic theory” underlying the doctrine of double jeopardy “is that it is wrong for one to be subjected more than once to the danger of being punished for an offense.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Best, 42 Ohio St.2d 530, 532 , 330 N.E.2d 421 (1975). {¶ 55} The denial of an interlocutory appeal to an accused arguing that a prosecution is barred by double jeopardy vitiates one of the very protections the Constitution provides: the right not to be improperly forced to stand trial repeatedly for the same offense. {¶ 56} As the Supreme Court has explained: [The] protections [of the Double Jeopard 2014The “basic theory” underlying the doctrine of double jeopardy “is that it is wrong for one to be subjected more than once to the danger of being punished for an offense.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Best, 42 Ohio St.2d 530, 532 , 330 N.E.2d 421 (1975). {¶ 55} The denial of an interlocutory appeal to an accused arguing that a prosecution is barred by double jeopardy vitiates one of the very protections the Constitution provides: the right not to be improperly forced to stand trial repeatedly for the same offense. {¶ 56} As the Supreme Court has explained: [The] protections [of the Double Jeopard | 2 | 6 |
| United States v. Dixongreen | 2 | 5 |
| Sattazahn v. Pennsylvaniagreen | 2 | 3 |
| Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Natural Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife (Slip Opinion)green | 2 | 2 |
| Yeager v. United Statesgreen | 2 | 2 |
Tibbs v. Floridagreen2 sentences2011The United States Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 , where the court held that, unlike a reversal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s disagreement with the jurors’ weighing of the evidence does not require special deference accorded verdicts of acquittal, i.e., invocation of the double jeopardy clause as a bar to relitigation. 2011The United States Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 , where the court held that, unlike a reversal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s disagreement with the jurors’ weighing of the evidence does not require special deference accorded verdicts of acquittal, i.e., invocation of the double jeopardy clause as a bar to relitigation. | 1 | 65 |
Dowling v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006ACCORDINGLY, THE SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AS SET FORTH IN THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I , SECTION 10 AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT[S] V, VI AND XIV." {¶ 11} Davis cites Dowling v. United States (1990), 493 U.S. 342 , 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 672 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 , 717 , for the proposition that: "Once a tribunal has decided an issue in defendant's favor, the Double Jeopardy [clause] also precludes a second trier of fact from ever considering that same or identical issue in a later trial." In Dowling , the court distinguish 2006ACCORDINGLY, THE SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AS SET FORTH IN THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I , SECTION 10 AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT[S] V, VI AND XIV." {¶ 11} Davis cites Dowling v. United States (1990), 493 U.S. 342 , 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 672 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 , 717 , for the proposition that: "Once a tribunal has decided an issue in defendant's favor, the Double Jeopardy [clause] also precludes a second trier of fact from ever considering that same or identical issue in a later trial." In Dowling , the court distinguish | 1 | 10 |
United States v. Matthew Metz Appeal of James Davenportgreen2 sentences2014Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v. 2013Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v. | 1 | 9 |
Kansas v. Hendricksgreen2 sentences2009III. {¶ 11} In his first constitutional challenge, Sewell argues that SB 10 violates the double jeopardy clause set forth in Ohio's Constitution by imposing multiple punishments. {¶ 12} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Likewise, Section 10 , Article I , of the Ohio Constitution provides, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." The double jeopardy clauses prevent states "from punishing twice, or from attempting a 1999The double jeopardy clause is not implicated unless the additional sanction is "punishment." See Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 . | 1 | 7 |
State v. Widnergreen2 sentences2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent 2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent | 1 | 6 |
| State v. Thompkinsred | 1 | 5 |
| Arizona v. Rumseygreen | 1 | 5 |
| State v. Rancered | 1 | 5 |
| Brown v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 5 |
| United States v. Urserygreen | 1 | 4 |
| State v. Worthygreen | 1 | 4 |
| Michael E. Valentine v. Khelleh Konteh, Wardengreen | 1 | 3 |
| Missouri v. Huntergreen | 1 | 3 |
| State v. Martellogreen | 1 | 3 |
| State v. Casalicchiogreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Larabeegreen | 1 | 2 |
| Jones v. Thomasgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Martin
green
2 sentences2009The United States Supreme Court recognized these distinctions in Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 , where the court held that unlike a reversal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court's disagreement with the jurors' weighing of the evidence does not require special deference accorded *Page 18 verdicts of acquittal, i.e., invocation of the double jeopardy clause as a bar to relitigation. {¶ 47} Upon application of the standards enunciated in Tibbs , the court in State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172 , 485 N.E.2d 717 , has set f 2009The United States Supreme Court recognized these distinctions in Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 , where the court held that unlike a reversal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court's disagreement with the jurors' weighing of the evidence does not require special deference accorded *Page 18 verdicts of acquittal, i.e., invocation of the double jeopardy clause as a bar to relitigation. {¶ 47} Upon application of the standards enunciated in Tibbs , the court in State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172 , 485 N.E.2d 717 , has set f | 27 | 2002–2009 |
Doyle v. United States
green
2 sentences2020“Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 843 (1965), citing Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959). 2014Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v. | 11 | 1999–2020 |
State v. Cook
yellow
2 sentences2009In State v. Williams , the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge to a previous version of Chapter 2950, based on its holding in State v. Cook , 83 Ohio St. 3d 404 , 418-20 (1998). 2008Cook , 83 Ohio St. 3d at 423 . {¶ 36} In Williams , the Ohio Supreme Court addressed whether Ohio's sex offender statutes violated the double jeopardy clause. | 10 | 1999–2009 |
State v. Thomas
red
2 sentences2017Although the evidence the state used to prove the charges set forth in Counts 2 through 10 of the Warren County case overlapped evidence relevant to appellant's conviction in the Clermont County case, the test for double jeopardy "focuses upon the elements of the two statutory provisions, not upon the evidence proffered." Thomas , 61 Ohio St.2d at 259 , 400 N.E.2d 897 . "[A] mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation." United States v. Felix , 503 U.S. 378 , 386, 112 S.Ct. 1377 , 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (1992). {¶ 39} Accordingly, as Counts 2 through 1 2017Although the evidence the state used to prove the charges set forth in Counts 2 through 10 of the Warren County case overlapped evidence relevant to appellant's conviction in the Clermont County case, the test for double jeopardy "focuses upon the elements of the two statutory provisions, not upon the evidence proffered." Thomas , 61 Ohio St.2d at 259 , 400 N.E.2d 897 . "[A] mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation." United States v. Felix , 503 U.S. 378 , 386, 112 S.Ct. 1377 , 118 L.Ed.2d 25 (1992). {¶ 39} Accordingly, as Counts 2 through 1 | 9 | 1980–2017 |
State v. Ruff
green
2 sentences2022State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398 , 2002- Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7 . {¶ 29} In practice, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10 . {¶ 30} Somerset’s complaint -- that he was charged with multiple crimes stemming from the same course of events -- does not implicate any of the protections of the double jeopardy clause; 2022State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398 , 2002- Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7 . {¶ 29} In practice, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114 , 2015-Ohio-995 , 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10 . {¶ 30} Somerset’s complaint -- that he was charged with multiple crimes stemming from the same course of events -- does not implicate any of the protections of the double jeopardy clause; | 7 | 2016–2022 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2024We construe Duncan’s argument as asserting a double jeopardy violation from the trial court’s failure to merge the firearm specification with the aggravated robbery conviction. {¶ 69} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution, “ensures that a state may not put a defendant in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264 , 2014-Ohio- 542, ¶ 54, citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). 2023State v. Anderson, 138 Ohio St.3d 264 , 2014-Ohio-542 , 6 N.E.3d 23 . {¶7} “Appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review when reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on the grounds of double jeopardy.” State v. Anderson, 148 Ohio St.3d 74 , 2016-Ohio-5791 , 68 N.E.3d 790, ¶ 20 . {¶8} The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “No person shall * * * be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Similarly, Ohio's Constitution at Section 10 of Article I states: “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offens | 6 | 2014–2024 |
Lockhart v. Nelson
green
2 sentences2021In so holding, the Court chose to expressly follow the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), in which it was held that “the Double Jeopardy clause does not bar retrial when all the evidence admitted by the trial court is sufficient to support a guilty verdict.” Brewer at ¶ 13, citing Lockhart at 40-41 . 2021In so holding, the Court chose to expressly follow the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), in which it was held that “the Double Jeopardy clause does not bar retrial when all the evidence admitted by the trial court is sufficient to support a guilty verdict.” Brewer at ¶ 13, citing Lockhart at 40-41 . | 6 | 1997–2021 |
Valdez v. California Selective Service Local Board No. 44
green
2 sentences2014Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v. 2013Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v. | 6 | 2005–2014 |
Ashe v. Swenson
green
2 sentences2006ACCORDINGLY, THE SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AS SET FORTH IN THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I , SECTION 10 AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT[S] V, VI AND XIV." {¶ 11} Davis cites Dowling v. United States (1990), 493 U.S. 342 , 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 672 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 , 717 , for the proposition that: "Once a tribunal has decided an issue in defendant's favor, the Double Jeopardy [clause] also precludes a second trier of fact from ever considering that same or identical issue in a later trial." In Dowling , the court distinguish 2006ACCORDINGLY, THE SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AS SET FORTH IN THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I , SECTION 10 AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT[S] V, VI AND XIV." {¶ 11} Davis cites Dowling v. United States (1990), 493 U.S. 342 , 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 672 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 , 717 , for the proposition that: "Once a tribunal has decided an issue in defendant's favor, the Double Jeopardy [clause] also precludes a second trier of fact from ever considering that same or identical issue in a later trial." In Dowling , the court distinguish | 6 | 1976–2014 |
State v. Johnson
yellow
2 sentences2014In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled its prior decision and concluded that the defendant’s conduct must be considered in analyzing the first prong of the allied offenses analysis. {¶20} Although Johnson abandoned the abstract component of the first prong, it did not change the second prong, which has always required courts to determine whether the offenses “were committed separately or with a separate animus.” Washington at ¶ 12. {¶21} Regarding aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, before Johnson, the Supreme Cour 2014In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314 , 942 N.E.2d 1061 , the Supreme Court of Ohio overruled its prior decision and concluded that the defendant’s conduct must be considered in analyzing the first prong of the allied offenses analysis. {¶20} Although Johnson abandoned the abstract component of the first prong, it did not change the second prong, which has always required courts to determine whether the offenses “were committed separately or with a separate animus.” Washington at ¶ 12. {¶21} Regarding aggravated murder and aggravated robbery, before Johnson, the Supreme Cour | 6 | 2011–2014 |
| Benton v. Maryland green | 5 | 2007–2024 |
| State v. Simpkins yellow | 5 | 2008–2014 |
| State v. Rance red | 5 | 2005–2008 |
| In Re A.G. green | 4 | 2018–2025 |
| State v. Raber green | 4 | 2014–2022 |
| Ohio v. Johnson green | 4 | 1993–2017 |
| State v. Midcap, Unpublished Decision (6-7-2006) green | 4 | 2007–2014 |
| State v. Stillwell, 2006-L-010 (6-22-2007) green | 4 | 2007–2011 |
| Witte v. United States green | 4 | 2009–2009 |
| State Ex Rel. Squire v. City of Cleveland green | 4 | 2007–2008 |
| United States v. Halper red | 4 | 1990–2002 |
| State v. Zima green | 3 | 2006–2013 |
| State v. Lewis yellow | 3 | 2003–2011 |
| State v. Bistricky green | 3 | 1998–2007 |
| State v. Blankenship green | 3 | 1990–2005 |
| United States v. Ward green | 3 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Anderson (Slip Opinion) green | 2 | 2023–2024 |
| State v. Harrison neutral | 2 | 2022–2024 |
| State v. Mutter (Slip Opinion) green | 2 | 2019–2024 |
| State v. Carpenter green | 2 | 2017–2019 |
| Bullington v. Missouri green | 2 | 2002–2019 |
| State v. Perry green | 2 | 2006–2016 |
| State v. Coley green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Boda green | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Roberts green | 2 | 2008–2014 |
| State v. Gilbert neutral | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Gilbert neutral | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.