double jeopardy clause in Ohio

2023Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant. ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2nd Cir. 1965).

2020“Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 843 (1965), citing Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).

2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent

2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent

2022The reason for such a rule is clear: “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings,” State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350 , 2012-Ohio-5636 , 982 N.E.2d 684, ¶ 24 , and “ ‘[i]f a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause,’ ” id., quoting United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C.Cir.1987).

2016We do not agree. {¶22} “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings,” and that “‘[i]f a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.’” State v. Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350 , 2012-Ohio-5636, ¶24 , quoting United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 , 264 U.S. App. D.C. 292 (D.C.Cir.1987). {¶23} In T.W., supra, this court concluded the classification process under con

2023(Emphasis added.) Case No. 22 MA 0061 –9– In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the U.S. Supreme Court established that, in a double jeopardy analysis, there are two offenses if each of the two statutory provisions requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not.

2023(Emphasis added.) Case No. 22 MA 0061 –9– In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), the U.S. Supreme Court established that, in a double jeopardy analysis, there are two offenses if each of the two statutory provisions requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not.

2014“If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause.” Id., quoting United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C.Cir.1987). {¶20} The Court thus concluded the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality when the court sentenced him and double jeopardy principles prohibited the trial court from reopening his case, conducting a separate trial to determine whether the sexual activity at issue here was consensual, and then classifying the defendant as a sex offender.

2014Such statute also establishes that the pertinent portion of the double jeopardy clause is not violated here. {¶25} That is, as aforementioned, “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense in successive proceedings.” Raber, 134 Ohio St.3d 350 at ¶ 24 , citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99 .

2013"Although the -6- Clermont CA2012-07-051 Double Jeopardy Clause was commonly understood to prevent a second prosecution for the same offense, the United States Supreme Court has applied the clause to prevent a state from punishing twice, or from attempting a second time to criminally punish for the same offense." State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513, 528 (2000). {¶ 26} The threshold question in a double jeopardy analysis is whether the government's conduct involves criminal punishment.

2009"The threshold question in a double jeopardy analysis . . . is whether the government's conduct involves criminal punishment." Id. at 528 . {¶ 22} This Court has held that the expanded registration requirements of the Adam Walsh Act are civil and non-punitive in nature.

2018Additionally, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: (1) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’ (2) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,’ and (3) ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” Id., quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 (1989). {¶41} R.C. 2941.25, the codified version of the double jeopardy clause, provides Ohio’s statutory requirements for multiple counts.

2018Additionally, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses: (1) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal,’ (2) ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction,’ and (3) ‘multiple punishments for the same offense.’” Id., quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 (1989). {¶41} R.C. 2941.25, the codified version of the double jeopardy clause, provides Ohio’s statutory requirements for multiple counts.

2023Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant. ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2nd Cir. 1965).

2023Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant. ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977), quoting United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2nd Cir. 1965).

2025However, “a mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.” United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 386 (1992).

2025However, “‘mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.’” State v. Ferricci, 2019-Ohio-994 , ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 386 (1992).

2020The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits “(1) a second 17 prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432 , 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996). {¶56} A de novo standard of review is applied to the trial court’s determination regarding the application of the double jeopardy clause.

2020The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits “(1) a second 17 prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 432 , 668 N.E.2d 435 (1996). {¶56} A de novo standard of review is applied to the trial court’s determination regarding the application of the double jeopardy clause.

2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent

2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent

2002In short, the double jeopardy clause "protects a person who has been acquitted from having to run the gauntlet a second time." State v. Lovejoy (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 440 , 443 .

1999See State v. Lovejoy (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 440 , 443 , ("Once a tribunal has decided an issue of ultimate fact in the defendant's favor, the double jeopardy doctrine also precludes a second jury from ever considering that same or identical issue in a later trial."), citing Dowling v. United States (1990), 493 U.S. 342 , 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 672 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 , 717 .

2018Webster, 2014-Ohio-5647, at ¶ 10 , citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 . {¶34} Based on our de novo review we agree with the trial court that this case does not fit within “the narrow exception adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy * * * reserved for the limited set of circumstances where the nature of the state’s misconduct clearly and unquestionably demonstrates its intent to cause or invite a mistrial.” See State v. Kelly, 2015-Ohio-1948 , 34 N.E.3d 513 , ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).1 We overrule Kitchen’s first assignment of error. 1 Although the partie

2018Webster, 2014-Ohio-5647, at ¶ 10 , citing Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 . {¶34} Based on our de novo review we agree with the trial court that this case does not fit within “the narrow exception adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Kennedy * * * reserved for the limited set of circumstances where the nature of the state’s misconduct clearly and unquestionably demonstrates its intent to cause or invite a mistrial.” See State v. Kelly, 2015-Ohio-1948 , 34 N.E.3d 513 , ¶ 19 (1st Dist.).1 We overrule Kitchen’s first assignment of error. 1 Although the partie

2014The “basic theory” underlying the doctrine of double jeopardy “is that it is wrong for one to be subjected more than once to the danger of being punished for an offense.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Best, 42 Ohio St.2d 530, 532 , 330 N.E.2d 421 (1975). {¶ 55} The denial of an interlocutory appeal to an accused arguing that a prosecution is barred by double jeopardy vitiates one of the very protections the Constitution provides: the right not to be improperly forced to stand trial repeatedly for the same offense. {¶ 56} As the Supreme Court has explained: [The] protections [of the Double Jeopard

2014The “basic theory” underlying the doctrine of double jeopardy “is that it is wrong for one to be subjected more than once to the danger of being punished for an offense.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Best, 42 Ohio St.2d 530, 532 , 330 N.E.2d 421 (1975). {¶ 55} The denial of an interlocutory appeal to an accused arguing that a prosecution is barred by double jeopardy vitiates one of the very protections the Constitution provides: the right not to be improperly forced to stand trial repeatedly for the same offense. {¶ 56} As the Supreme Court has explained: [The] protections [of the Double Jeopard

2011The United States Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 , where the court held that, unlike a reversal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s disagreement with the jurors’ weighing of the evidence does not require special deference accorded verdicts of acquittal, i.e., invocation of the double jeopardy clause as a bar to relitigation.

2011The United States Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Tibbs v. Florida (1982), 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 , where the court held that, unlike a reversal based upon the insufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s disagreement with the jurors’ weighing of the evidence does not require special deference accorded verdicts of acquittal, i.e., invocation of the double jeopardy clause as a bar to relitigation.

2006ACCORDINGLY, THE SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AS SET FORTH IN THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I , SECTION 10 AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT[S] V, VI AND XIV." {¶ 11} Davis cites Dowling v. United States (1990), 493 U.S. 342 , 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 672 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 , 717 , for the proposition that: "Once a tribunal has decided an issue in defendant's favor, the Double Jeopardy [clause] also precludes a second trier of fact from ever considering that same or identical issue in a later trial." In Dowling , the court distinguish

2006ACCORDINGLY, THE SENTENCE WAS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND IN VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE AS SET FORTH IN THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I , SECTION 10 AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT[S] V, VI AND XIV." {¶ 11} Davis cites Dowling v. United States (1990), 493 U.S. 342 , 348 , 110 S.Ct. 668 , 672 , 107 L.Ed.2d 708 , 717 , for the proposition that: "Once a tribunal has decided an issue in defendant's favor, the Double Jeopardy [clause] also precludes a second trier of fact from ever considering that same or identical issue in a later trial." In Dowling , the court distinguish

2014Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v.

2013Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v.

2014Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v.

2014Few things can be so relevant as other criminal activity of the defendant: ‘To argue that the presumption of innocence is affronted by considering unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to bar reference to past convictions.’ United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (1965), certiorari denied 382 U.S. 843 , 15 L.Ed.2d 84 , 86 S.Ct. 89 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir.1972), certiorari denied 411 U.S. 919 , 36 L.Ed.2d 311 , 93 S.Ct. 1558 (1973).” State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St.2d 21, 23 , 368 N.E.2d 297 (1977); see also Maple Heights v.

2013A critical segment of Lamp’s analysis hinged on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153 , 2010-Ohio-6314, ¶ 44 , in which the high court clarified the application of Ohio’s allied offenses statute, R.C. 2941.25, and overruled State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632 (1999), “to the extent that it calls for a comparison of statutory elements solely in the abstract under R.C. 2941.25.” {¶7} While Lamp relied on Johnson in support of his motion, we note that the standard for determining whether a successive prosecution violates the double jeopardy clause is separate and

2005The trial counsel's failure to merge the lesser offense into the greater offenses violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 10 , Article I of the Ohio Constitution." 1 See Appendix. 2 (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261 , syllabus. 3 See, also, State v. Apanovitch (1987), 33 Ohio St.3d 19 , 23 ; State v. Davis (1988), 49 Ohio App.3d 109 , 113 . 4 (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 . 5 Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 6 State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 386-87 . 7 State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259 , paragraph one of the syllab

2009III. {¶ 11} In his first constitutional challenge, Sewell argues that SB 10 violates the double jeopardy clause set forth in Ohio's Constitution by imposing multiple punishments. {¶ 12} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Likewise, Section 10 , Article I , of the Ohio Constitution provides, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." The double jeopardy clauses prevent states "from punishing twice, or from attempting a

1999The double jeopardy clause is not implicated unless the additional sanction is "punishment." See Kansas v. Hendricks (1997), 521 U.S. 346 , 117 S.Ct. 2072 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501 .

2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent

2025If “the facts of the case do not reflect unfairness to the accused, the public interest in insuring that justice is served may take precedence.” Id. {¶13} If “under the double jeopardy clause, there can be a second trial, after a mistrial has been declared, sua sponte, depends on whether (1) there is a ‘manifest necessity’ or a ‘high degree’ of necessity for ordering a mistrial, or (2) ‘the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.’” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Widner, 68 Ohio St.2d 188, 189 (1981); see Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978). {¶14} A defendant’s consent