double jeopardy clause in Pennsylvania

2023However, Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution offers broader protection than its federal counterpart 'in that the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.' Commonwealth v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177 , 615 A.2d 321, 325 (1992).

2023However, Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution offers broader protection than its federal counterpart 'in that the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.' Commonwealth v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177 , 615 A.2d 321, 325 (1992).

2025It signals the breakdown of the integrity of the judicial proceeding, and represents the type of prosecutorial tactic which the double jeopardy clause was designed to protect against. - 20 - J-S42019-24 Commonwealth v. Starks, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (Pa. 1980) (citations omitted).

2023In distinguishing prosecutorial overreaching from other forms of error, the Court explained “overreaching signals that the judicial process has fundamentally broken down because it reflects that the prosecutor, as representative of an impartial ____________________________________________ 3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 et seq. - 11 - J-A15005-23 sovereign, is seeking conviction at the expense of justice,” which is “the very type of ‘tactic which the double jeopardy clause was designed to protect against.’” Id. at 824 (quoting Commonwealth v. Starks, 416 A.2d 498, 500 (Pa. 1980)).

2021However, because of the double jeopardy clause’s policy of prohibiting multiple trials, retrial is ‘only grudgingly allowed,’ and is limited to cases in which the defendant consented or the declaration of a mistrial was manifestly necessary.” Commonwealth v. Bolden, 373 A.2d 90, 101 (Pa. 1977) (plurality) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975)).

2021Further, the double jeopardy clause, in its most general sense, “protects against a [criminal] defendant being harassed by multiple prosecutions for the same wrongful act and against multiple punishments for the same crime.” Commonwealth v. Rightley, 617 A.2d 1289, 1292 (Pa. Super. 1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bolden, 373 A.2d 90, 97-98 (Pa. 1977)).

2025The Court concluded it did not need to decide that point, however, as “the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a defendant not only when prosecutorial misconduct is intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, but also when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to prejudice the defendant to the point of the denial of a fair trial.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Martorano, 741 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. 1999) (holding that the Smith standard was “deliberately nonspecific, allowing for any number of scenarios in which prosec

2022Commonwealth v. Martorano, 741 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Pa. 1999) While prosecutorial intent is essential to raising the double jeopardy bar to retrial under the Smith standard, the standard did not create a per se bar to retrial for every case of intentional prosecutorial misconduct but only those that “so prejudice the defendant as to deny him a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Kearns, 70 A.3d at 885 (Pa. Super 2013).

2021Further, our Supreme Court has held “that the imposition of multiple sentences upon a defendant whose single unlawful act injures multiple victims is legislatively authorized and, consequently, does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 506 Pa. 461, 467 , 485 A.2d 1098, 1101 (1984).

2021Further, our Supreme Court has held “that the imposition of multiple sentences upon a defendant whose single unlawful act injures multiple victims is legislatively authorized and, consequently, does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.” Commonwealth v. Frisbie, 506 Pa. 461, 467 , 485 A.2d 1098, 1101 (1984).

1990In sum, the purpose of the double jeopardy clause is “to protect the integrity of a final judgment.” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 92, 98 S.Ct. at 2194 .

1990In sum, the purpose of the double jeopardy clause is “to protect the integrity of a final judgment.” United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 92, 98 S.Ct. at 2194 .

2018Our Supreme Court has established that “orders denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds are appealable as collateral orders, so long as the motion is not found to be frivolous.” Id. at 1021-22 (citing Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 336, 345-46 , 508 A.2d 286, 291 (Pa. 1986)).1 “A [m]otion to [d]ismiss on the basis of the compulsory joinder rule of [18 Pa.C.S.A.] § 110 embodies the same constitutional protections underlying the double jeopardy clause justifying interlocutory appeal of such claims.” Commonwealth v. Anthony, 553 Pa. 55, 60 , 717 A.2d 1015, 1017 (1998). _

2018Our Supreme Court has established that “orders denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds are appealable as collateral orders, so long as the motion is not found to be frivolous.” Id. at 1021-22 (citing Commonwealth v. Brady, 510 Pa. 336, 345-46 , 508 A.2d 286, 291 (Pa. 1986)).1 “A [m]otion to [d]ismiss on the basis of the compulsory joinder rule of [18 Pa.C.S.A.] § 110 embodies the same constitutional protections underlying the double jeopardy clause justifying interlocutory appeal of such claims.” Commonwealth v. Anthony, 553 Pa. 55, 60 , 717 A.2d 1015, 1017 (1998). _

1994As stated in Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 169 , 286 A.2d 638, 641 (1971), “The judiciary views these rules as expressions of self-evident moral precepts: It is wrong to retry a man for a crime of which he previously has been found innocent, wrong to harass him with vexatious prosecution, and wrong to punish him twice for the same offense.” The protections of the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution were made applicable to juvenile proceedings by the United States Supreme Court in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).

1994As stated in Commonwealth v. Mills, 447 Pa. 163, 169 , 286 A.2d 638, 641 (1971), “The judiciary views these rules as expressions of self-evident moral precepts: It is wrong to retry a man for a crime of which he previously has been found innocent, wrong to harass him with vexatious prosecution, and wrong to punish him twice for the same offense.” The protections of the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution were made applicable to juvenile proceedings by the United States Supreme Court in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 , 95 S.Ct. 1779 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975).

1995Presently, both the trial court and the Superior Court applied the double jeopardy rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), which required that charges resting on proof of the same criminal conduct be joined for prosecution except where facts necessary to joinder were not discovered despite the exercise of “due diligence” by prosecuting authorities. 495 U.S. at 510 , 516 n. 7, 110 S.Ct. at 2087 , 2090 n. 7, 109 L.Ed.2d at 557 , 561 n. 7.

1995Presently, both the trial court and the Superior Court applied the double jeopardy rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), which required that charges resting on proof of the same criminal conduct be joined for prosecution except where facts necessary to joinder were not discovered despite the exercise of “due diligence” by prosecuting authorities. 495 U.S. at 510 , 516 n. 7, 110 S.Ct. at 2087 , 2090 n. 7, 109 L.Ed.2d at 557 , 561 n. 7.

2022Nevertheless, in cases involving prosecutorial misconduct, the double jeopardy clause “is no bar to retrial when the defendant moves for a mistrial.” (emphasis added) Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982).

2020In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 679 (1982), the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution bars retrial in cases where the prosecutor’s conduct “was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Pennsylvania initially adopted this test in Commonwealth v. Simons, 522 A.2d 537, 540 (Pa. 1987), finding our state constitution’s double jeopardy provision coextensive with the federal provision, only to later determine that our provision afforded broader double jeopardy protection than its federal counterpart.

1983Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 494 Pa. 600, 601 , 432 A.2d 149, 150-151 (1981) (Nix, J., Opinion In Support of Affirmance); Commonwealth v. Starks, 490 Pa. 336, 344 , 416 A.2d 498, 502 (1980) (Nix, J., dissenting opinion); Commonwealth v. Lee, 490 Pa. 346, 350-351 , 416 A.2d 503, 505-506 (1980) (Nix, J., concurring opinion); Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 287 , 386 A.2d 918, 936 (1978) (Nix, J., Opinion In Support of Reversal). *283 Further, in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) the Supreme Court of the United States held: . . . that a criminal defendant w

1983Commonwealth v. Hoskins, 494 Pa. 600, 601 , 432 A.2d 149, 150-151 (1981) (Nix, J., Opinion In Support of Affirmance); Commonwealth v. Starks, 490 Pa. 336, 344 , 416 A.2d 498, 502 (1980) (Nix, J., dissenting opinion); Commonwealth v. Lee, 490 Pa. 346, 350-351 , 416 A.2d 503, 505-506 (1980) (Nix, J., concurring opinion); Commonwealth v. Potter, 478 Pa. 251, 287 , 386 A.2d 918, 936 (1978) (Nix, J., Opinion In Support of Reversal). *283 Further, in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) the Supreme Court of the United States held: . . . that a criminal defendant w

2020Id. at ___, 22 A.3d at 1024 .

2017In Brady, 508 A.2d at 290-91 , and Commonwealth v. Orie, 22 A.3d 1021, 2024-28 (Pa. 2011), the Supreme Court concluded that because a right to immediately appeal an order denying a double jeopardy defense may encourage the filing of frivolous and dilatory motions by some defendants, it would not recognize orders disposing of frivolous double jeopardy motions as collateral orders.

2023Instantly, like the Court in Sanchez, we conclude “the Commonwealth’s unfortunate errors … do not rise to the level of recklessness displayed in Johnson[,]” Sanchez, 262 A.3d at 1294 ; therefore, “the remedy for the Commonwealth’s actions is precisely what the court ordered here—a new trial.” Id. (citing Kearns, supra); see also King, 271 A.3d at 450 (distinguishing Johnson and concluding “the prosecutor’s [violation of Brady for failing to disclose to the defense a certain] … letter, although significant, does not constitute overreaching that would require the imposition of the double jeopard

2020Appellant further argues that the double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart, citing Commonwealth v. Kearns, 70 A.3d 881, 884 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2020A “mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.” Commonwealth v. Caufman, 541 Pa. 299, 304 , 662 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1995).

2020A “mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.” Commonwealth v. Caufman, 541 Pa. 299, 304 , 662 A.2d 1050, 1052 (1995).

2020The double- jeopardy clause “prevents a prosecutor or judge from subjecting a defendant to a second prosecution by discontinuing the trial when it appears that the jury might not convict.” Green v. U.S., 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957).

1992While the Blockburger test protects an individual from multiple prosecutions and hence multiple punishments for the same offense, it does not fully address all of the harm caused by successive prosecutions. *135 The Court in Grady noted that the double jeopardy clause implicates greater concerns beyond the possibility of subjecting a person to an enhanced sentence: `The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual f

2023The majority examines each of the three bases for the trial court’s contempt order and determines that at least one was criminal in nature and requires a double jeopardy analysis under Commonwealth v. Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), to determine if double jeopardy precludes Stillwagon’s prosecution for interference with custody.

2020To that end, the Supreme Court of the United States has clarified that, “[i]n both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, . . . where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the ‘same elements’ test, the double jeopardy bar applies.” United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).

2021This argument ignores Ashe’s decision to enshrine the doctrine within the double jeopardy clause in order to remove it from “the broad bounds of ‘fundamental fairness[.]’” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 442-43 ; see id. at 445 (collateral estoppel “is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy”).

2021This argument ignores Ashe’s decision to enshrine the doctrine within the double jeopardy clause in order to remove it from “the broad bounds of ‘fundamental fairness[.]’” Ashe, 397 U.S. at 442-43 ; see id. at 445 (collateral estoppel “is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy”).

1995Although proof of the homicide by vehicle charge will involve proof of the manner in which appellee was driving, “mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.” 3 United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 379 , 112 S.Ct. 1377, 1379 , 118 L.Ed.2d 25, 34 (1992).

1995Although proof of the homicide by vehicle charge will involve proof of the manner in which appellee was driving, “mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy violation.” 3 United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 379 , 112 S.Ct. 1377, 1379 , 118 L.Ed.2d 25, 34 (1992).

1993Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 (1973), wherein this Court held that the double jeopardy clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a single criminal episode, and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 which provides that a prosecution is barred by a former *289 prosecution if it arose from the same criminal episode, was known to the prosecuting officer and was within the jurisdiction of a single court. 5 The Commonwealth does not dispute that a defendant cannot be acquitted of a § 1543(b) violation and

1993Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233 , 304 A.2d 432 (1973), wherein this Court held that the double jeopardy clause requires a prosecutor to bring, in a single proceeding, all known charges against a defendant arising from a single criminal episode, and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110 which provides that a prosecution is barred by a former *289 prosecution if it arose from the same criminal episode, was known to the prosecuting officer and was within the jurisdiction of a single court. 5 The Commonwealth does not dispute that a defendant cannot be acquitted of a § 1543(b) violation and

2014Subsequently, in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2014Subsequently, in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

2011Specifically, Appellee bases his motion for dismissal of the prosecution upon Pennsylvania’s double jeopardy clause, Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 1 The double jeopardy clause contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution is slightly broader than its federal counterpart. 2 As our Supreme Court explained in Martorano : Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] followed federal law in recognizing two types of prosecutorial misconduct that would implica

2011Specifically, Appellee bases his motion for dismissal of the prosecution upon Pennsylvania’s double jeopardy clause, Article 1, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 1 The double jeopardy clause contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution is slightly broader than its federal counterpart. 2 As our Supreme Court explained in Martorano : Prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982), [the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania] followed federal law in recognizing two types of prosecutorial misconduct that would implica

1994Foster was subsequently found in criminal contempt of that order in a proceeding in which “the court stated Anna Foster would have ‘to prove as an element, first that there was a civil protection order, and then [that] ... the assault as defined by the criminal code, in fact occurred.'’ ” (emphasis added) The Supreme Court stated: In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, this court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the ‘same-elements’ test, the double jeopardy bar applies, See e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432

1994Foster was subsequently found in criminal contempt of that order in a proceeding in which “the court stated Anna Foster would have ‘to prove as an element, first that there was a civil protection order, and then [that] ... the assault as defined by the criminal code, in fact occurred.'’ ” (emphasis added) The Supreme Court stated: In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, this court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the ‘same-elements’ test, the double jeopardy bar applies, See e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432

1986In Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323 , 362 A.2d 227 (1976), our Supreme Court refused to find waiver when appellant alleged that his sentences were duplicitous and violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.

1986In Commonwealth v. Walker, 468 Pa. 323 , 362 A.2d 227 (1976), our Supreme Court refused to find waiver when appellant alleged that his sentences were duplicitous and violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.