double jeopardy clause in Massachusetts

2009The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against three distinct abuses: (1) “a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal”; (2) “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction”; and (3) “multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).

1999The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal ... a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction . . . [and] against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).

2002The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969), provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” General Laws c. 263, § 7, encompasses the same principle: “A person shall not be held to answer on a second indictment or complaint for a crime of which he has been acquitted upon the facts and merits; but he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent prosecution for the same crime-. ...”

1999The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” Our statutory law encompasses the same principle.

2015L. c. 263, § 7. 15 The double jeopardy principle “protects against three specific evils — ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” Marshall, supra, quoting Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 278, 283 (1993).

2015The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The double jeopardy clause “protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.” Commonwealth v. Crawford, 430 Mass. 683, 686 (2000), quoting Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 278, 283 (1993).

2023See Bishay v. Land Court Dep't of the Trial Court, 477 Mass. 1032 , 1033 n.2 (2017) ("[t]his presents a further reason not to disturb the judgment"). 5 We have recognized a limited exception to this rule, where a "criminal defendant . . . raises a double jeopardy claim of substantial merit." Neverson v. Commonwealth, 406 Mass. 174, 175 (1989).

2018We have recognized a limited exception to this rule in cases raising a double jeopardy claim of substantial merit, see **1027 Neverson v. Commonwealth , 406 Mass. 174 , 175-176, 546 N.E.2d 876 (1989), but that exception does not apply here. 1 If Quigley is convicted of any offense, there is no reason he cannot raise his claims on direct appeal and, if warranted, obtain relief.

2009Luk, 421 Mass. at 430 (concluding that because license suspension “is a reasonable sanction primarily designed to promote public safety,” the state “may suspend a license pursuant to c. 90, §24(1) (f)(1), and later bring criminal charges under c. 90, §24(l)(a)(l), without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution or Massachusetts common or statutory law”).

1998The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents multiple punishments for the same offense. 5 Luk v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 415, 419 (1995), citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).

2023See Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989), quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989) ("in the multiple punishments context, that interest [which the double jeopardy clause seeks to protect] is 'limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature'"); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981) ("the question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishments the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed").

1997The double jeopardy clause prohibits “a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction . . . and multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).

2000See Fadden v. Commonwealth, 376 Mass. 604, 606 (1978), quoting Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 680 (1978) (“a criminal defendant who presents a double jeopardy claim of substantial merit is entitled to review of that claim before the second trial ‘under our general superintendence power’ ”).

1993“Two offenses are not the ‘same’ within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause merely because they stem from the same conduct.” Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 683 (1978), citing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).

1998He points, for example, to Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 347 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993), in which the Supreme Judicial Court stated, quoting from Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), that in applying the double jeopardy rule “the critical inquiry is what conduct the State [must] prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove that conduct” (emphasis added in Woods).

1998This limited reading of Grady is echoed in the Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. at 349 , in which the court said: “We read the Grady opinion as redefining the phrase ‘same offense’ in the double jeopardy clause.

1994In order for the collateral estoppel aspect of the double jeopardy doctrine to apply, there must be “a valid and final judgment.” Ashe v. Swenson, supra at 443 .

1990See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-460 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that a “same transaction” test is constitutionally required as supportive of the double jeopardy principle).

1992Our holding today thus merely recreates the situation that would have been obtained if the trial court had excluded [the improperly admitted] evidence.” Id. at 42 . “[W]e agree with those cases which hold that the double jeopardy principle does not automatically bar retrial ‘where an insufficiency of evidence appeared only when material held on appellate review to have been erroneously admitted was notionally removed from the case.’ ” Commonwealth v. Brouillet, 389 Mass. 605, 608 (1983), quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor, 383 Mass. 272, 284 (1981).

1991The principle established in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment bars retrial when an appellate court reverses a conviction on the *445 basis of insufficient evidence does not bar retrial of this case. “[W]e agree with those cases which hold that the double jeopardy principle does not automatically bar retrial ‘where an insufficiency of evidence appeared only when material held on appellate review to have been erroneously admitted was notionally removed from the case.’ ” Commonwealth v. Brouillet, 389 Mass. 605, 608 (1983), quoting

2017In sum, the double jeopardy bar does not prohibit the Commonwealth from seeking to retry a defendant “where other theories (supported by evidence at a first trial) would support a defendant’s conviction in the second.” Marshall v. Commonwealth, 463 Mass. 529, 538 (2012).

2015L. c. 263, § 7. 15 The double jeopardy principle “protects against three specific evils — ‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” Marshall, supra, quoting Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 415 Mass. 278, 283 (1993).

2010Cf. United States v. Fogel, supra at 87 ("If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause"); Burns v. United States, 552 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 1977) (general rule that Federal court cannot increase legal sentence once execution of sentence has begun).

2010Cf. United States v. Fogel, supra at 87 (“If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause”); Burns v. United States, 552 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 1977) (general rule that Federal court cannot increase legal sentence once execution of sentence has begun).

2021See Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 45 (1992), quoting Commonwealth v. Brouillet, 389 Mass. 605, 608 (1983) ("the double jeopardy principle does not automatically bar retrial 'where an insufficiency of evidence appeared only when material held on appellate review to have been erroneously admitted was notionally removed from the case'").

2007Whether there should be a new trial has not been raised or briefed by the parties, but we are instructed by Commonwealth v. DiBenedetto, 414 Mass. 37, 45 (1992), citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 34 (1988), “that, even if there would be insufficient properly admitted evidence to justify a conviction [which we need not decide in this case] after improperly admitted evidence is excluded from consideration, the double jeopardy clause would not bar retrial of the defendant” where, as here, “the Commonwealth has shown a reasonable prospect of filling the gap in its proof,” Commonwealth v. Cam

2016See Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 523-526 (2005). ‘“The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against three distinct abuses: [1] a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; [2] a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and [3] multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. at 523 (quotation omitted).

2016See Commonwealth v. Constantino, 443 Mass. 521, 523-526 (2005). ‘“The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against three distinct abuses: [1] a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; [2] a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and [3] multiple punishments for the same offense.” Id. at 523 (quotation omitted).

2010Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).

1985The principal purpose of the double jeopardy clause is “to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.” Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).

2009See also Powers v. Commonwealth, 426 Mass. 534 , 537 n.5, 540 n.13 (1998) (Massachusetts has common-law and statutory protections equivalent to those provided for in the double jeopardy clause).

2000However, as in Powers v. Commonwealth, 426 Mass. 534, 534 (1998), “because the defendant’s [appeal] is based on a double jeopardy claim, successful appellate review after conviction would not provide adequate relief.” The defendant pursued his appeal according to the regular appellate process.

2001See Department of Rev. of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 780-783 (1994) (heavy tax on possession of marijuana, applicable only to persons arrested for that offense, constituted punishment within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause; where a criminal penalty had already been imposed, the subsequent imposition of this tax amounted to a second punishment for the same offense and was therefore unconstitutional); Commissioner of Rev. v. Mullins, 428 Mass. 406, 411-416 (1998) (under Kurth Ranch analysis, the controlled substances tax [CST], G.

1998Relying primarily on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994) (Kurth Ranch), the board determined that the assessment constituted a “punishment” for purposes of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

1995If “punished” at all, she is being “punished” for two separate offenses, a situation which the double jeopardy clause does not prohibit. 18 See Morey, supra. Judgment affirmed.

1993“Two offenses are not the ‘same’ within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause merely because they stem from the same conduct.” Costarelli v. Commonwealth, 374 Mass. 677, 683 (1978), citing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).

2025Moreover, if a defendant successfully challenges one sentence imposed as part of a sentencing package, it "opens up all the interdependent, lawful sentences for reconsideration without violating the double jeopardy clause." Id. at 391, quoting Shabazz v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 291, 295-296 (1982).

2021And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.'" Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 509 (2014), quoting Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260 , 271- 272, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 864 (1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 438 (1983).6 The third protection generally implies that "[a]fter a sentence is final, . . . a defendant may not be sentenced again for that same conviction." Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11 , 19–20 (2010). 6 "Unlike the United States Constitution, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not include a double jeopardy clause, but our statutory and common

2016Citing United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 601 (1976), the defendant claims error in the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictments on the ground that the double jeopardy clause bars retrial where a prosecutor’s bad faith results in a reversal of the first conviction and the defendant is subjected to a second trial.

1990Thus, the defendant’s testimony would not establish a prima facie case of rape. 5 The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects a criminal defendant from repeated prosecutions for the same offense, United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976), and is applicable to the States through the due process clause of *655 the Fourteenth Amendment.

2013Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 431 , 433 n.15 (2009).

2013“The traditional rule in Massachusetts, as embodied in Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871) {Morey), and its progeny, is that ‘a defendant may properly be punished for two crimes arising out of the same course of conduct provided that each crime requires proof of an element that the other does not.’ ” Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 431 (2009), quoting from Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366, 371 (2002).

2013The legislature remains free under the double jeopardy clause to define crimes and fix punishments; but once the legislature has acted courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial.” Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977). 4 See Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224, 231 (1992) (Legislature has “broad power to define crimes” and therefore to impose multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct).

1980In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977), the Supreme Court of the United States described the function of the double jeopardy clause applicable in this case: “Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.” See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).

2012“The common law is important in the [context of a double jeopardy challenge to a sentence], for our Double Jeopardy Clause was drafted with the common-law protections in mind.” United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134 (1980).

2012The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution was “drafted with the common-law protections in mind.” United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134 (1980).

1992In Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. at 311 , the Supreme Judicial Court held that delayed disclosure of exculpatory evidence by the prosecutor is not sufficient to invoke the double jeopardy bar to further prosecution.

1989“Usually a mistrial granted upon the defendant’s request does not present a bar to retrial on double jeopardy grounds.... *374 [However, when] a defendant’s motion ... for a mistrial based upon ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ is allowed, the double jeopardy clause may be a bar to further prosecution.” Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 310-311 (1984).

2001The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The double jeopardy clause is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 510 n.l (1990), and has been recognized as part of the Massachusetts common and statutory laws.

1998He points, for example, to Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 347 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993), in which the Supreme Judicial Court stated, quoting from Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), that in applying the double jeopardy rule “the critical inquiry is what conduct the State [must] prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove that conduct” (emphasis added in Woods).

2001The defendant’s appeal on double jeopardy grounds directed to the conditions of confinement in the DDU is without merit because, as found by the trial judge and confirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant (and the other petitioners joining with him in their application for extraordinary relief) “have not shown ‘by the clearest proof that DDU confinement is so extreme ... in relation to (each petitioner’s) wrongdoing that the double jeopardy clause is implicated.’ ” Clark v. Commonwealth, 428 Mass, at 1012, quoting from Commonwealth v. Forte, 423 Mass. 672, 678 (1996).

1998The court stated that “on the clearest proof, a civil penalty might be shown to be so extreme in purpose or effect as to be equivalent to a criminal proceeding and the penalty, therefore, subject to the double jeopardy clause.” Id. at 677 .

1995Mitchell, supra at 399 .

1981Id. at 397-398 .” The Supreme Judicial Court then went on to hold that “[proceedings to secure pregnancy expenses and support payments for a child are designed to be remedial, not punitive, and hence the double jeopardy clause is not applicable.

2023Unlike the United States Constitution, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not contain a double jeopardy clause; nonetheless, "we consider our common law to embrace the same principles and protections." Selavka, 469 Mass. at 509 n.8.8 In "[T]he guarantee against double jeopardy became firmly entrenched in the common law in the form of the pleas of autrefoits acquit (a former acquittal), autrefoits convict (a former conviction), and pardon." Id. at 204. 8 "The first colonial enactment containing an express guarantee against double jeopardy appeared in 1641 when the General Court of the

2021And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.'" Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502, 509 (2014), quoting Aldoupolis v. Commonwealth, 386 Mass. 260 , 271- 272, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 864 (1982), S.C., 390 Mass. 438 (1983).6 The third protection generally implies that "[a]fter a sentence is final, . . . a defendant may not be sentenced again for that same conviction." Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11 , 19–20 (2010). 6 "Unlike the United States Constitution, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights does not include a double jeopardy clause, but our statutory and common

2015Id.

2012Id.

2015See Commonwealth v. Selavka, 469 Mass. 502 , 509 n.8 (2014); Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 346 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993).

1998He points, for example, to Commonwealth v. Woods, 414 Mass. 343, 347 , cert. denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993), in which the Supreme Judicial Court stated, quoting from Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), that in applying the double jeopardy rule “the critical inquiry is what conduct the State [must] prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove that conduct” (emphasis added in Woods).