double jeopardy clause in North Dakota

56 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1971–2025 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (47)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Zimmermangreen nd · 1995 · cited in 6 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1996–2005 2 sentences 2005State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 55-56 (N.D.1995). 2001Kelly argues the criminal charge against him involved the third type of double jeopardy violation. [¶ 12] In State v. Zimmerman, 539 N.W.2d 49, 55-56 (N.D.1995), we stated a remedial administrative sanction, as opposed to a punitive or deterrent one, does not constitute a basis for a double jeopardy claim.	5	6
State v. O'ROURKEgreen nd · 1996 · cited in 4 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2000–2011 2 sentences 2011Id. at 386. 2011Id. at 386.	2	4
State v. Voigtgreen nd · 2007 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2025 2 sentences 2025“Each case in which a double jeopardy violation is asserted must turn upon its own facts.” State v. Voigt, 2007 ND 100, ¶ 13 , 734 N.W.2d 787 . [¶12] “[T]he protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy.” Voigt, 2007 ND 100, ¶ 22 (quoting Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984)). 2025“Each case in which a double jeopardy violation is asserted must turn upon its own facts.” State v. Voigt, 2007 ND 100, ¶ 13 , 734 N.W.2d 787 . [¶12] “[T]he protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy.” Voigt, 2007 ND 100, ¶ 22 (quoting Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 325 (1984)).	2	3
State v. Knittelgreen nd · 1981 · cited in 3 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1987–2018 2 sentences 2018Id. at 381. [¶9] We dismissed the State’s appeal, concluding the trial court’s finding the defendant did not receive notice of an opportunity for a hearing involved a factual element of the offense of driving under suspension, which prohibited reprosecution of the defendant under the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution. 1999Id. at 381 . [¶ 7] We dismissed the State’s appeal, concluding the trial court’s finding the defendant did not receive notice of opportunity for a hearing involved a factual element of the offense of driving under suspension which prohibited reprosecution under the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution.	2	3
State v. Benniongreen idahoctapp · 1988 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St	2	2
United States v. Joseph Forcellatigreen ca1 · 1979 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); 174 United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court's review of a magistrate's decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court's review of a judicial referee's decision in No 2009*See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1082 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court’s review of a magistrate’s decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court’s review of a judicial referee’s decision in North D	2	2
United States v. Rafique Aslamgreen ca2 · 1991 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); 174 United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court's review of a magistrate's decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court's review of a judicial referee's decision in No 2009*See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1082 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court’s review of a magistrate’s decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court’s review of a judicial referee’s decision in North D	2	2
State v. Langegreen nd · 1993 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2002–2009 2 sentences 2009See, e.g., United States v. Laguna-Estela, 394 F.3d 54, 56 (1st Cir.2005); State v. Cantrell, 223 Or.App. 9 , 195 P.3d 451, 453 (2008); 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 594 (2008); cf. State v. Lange, 497 N.W.2d 83, 85 (N.D.1993) (defendant has burden of establishing collateral estoppel branch of double jeopardy). [¶ 7] This Court has not addressed whether a sanction imposed by a juvenile drug court for violation of its rules precludes, on double jeopardy grounds, further juvenile court delinquency proceedings based on the same conduct. 2002Lange , at 84, 86-87. (“[T]he Oliver County rape was a separate and distinct act which involved a separate and distinct determination of consent, and ... the Oliver County verdict was not based upon the same issue as determined by the Mercer County jury”).	2	2
State v. Derusseaugreen kanctapp · 1998 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St	2	2
United States v. Cecil B. Mooregreen ca4 · 1978 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); 174 United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court's review of a magistrate's decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court's review of a judicial referee's decision in No 2009*See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1082 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court’s review of a magistrate’s decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court’s review of a judicial referee’s decision in North D	2	2
United States v. Stantongreen ca9 · 2007 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); 174 United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court's review of a magistrate's decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court's review of a judicial referee's decision in No 2009*See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1082 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court’s review of a magistrate’s decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court’s review of a judicial referee’s decision in North D	2	2
State v. Campbellgreen mdctspecapp · 1969 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St	2	2
Garrett v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1985 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008If, however, the legislature “intended that there be only one offense— that is, a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for a single act, but not both — there would be no statutory authorization for” multiple convictions or punishments “and that would end the double jeopardy analysis.” Garrett, at 778, 105 S.Ct. 2407 . [¶ 14] This focus upon legislative intent, and the recognition that “[c]ourts may not ‘prescrib[e] greater punishment than the legislature intended,’ ” Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 , 116 S.Ct. 1241 , 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (quoting Hunter, 2008If, however, the legislature “intended that there be only one offense–that is, a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for a single act, but not both–there would be no statutory authorization for” multiple convictions or punishments “and that would end the double jeopardy analysis.” Garrett , at 778. [¶14] This focus upon legislative intent, and the recognition that “[c]ourts may not ‘prescrib[e] greater punishment than the legislature intended,’” Rutledge v. United States , 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996) (quoting Hunter , 459 U.S. at 366 ), is an outgrowth of the constitutio	2	2
United States v. Douglas Jarvisgreen ca4 · 1993 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996	2	2
Edward Barker v. The State of Ohiogreen ca6 · 1964 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996	2	2
James Robert Grogan, III v. United Statesgreen ca5 · 1968 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996	2	2
United States v. Clayton E. Scottgreen cadc · 1972 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996	2	2
Patrick J. McClain v. Thomas Browngreen ca8 · 1978 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1996–1996	2	2
Serfass v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1975 · cited in 5 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1975–2004 2 sentences 2004Each case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn upon its own facts, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 , 83 S.Ct. 1033 , 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963), and the U.S. Supreme Court has “disparaged rigid, mechanical rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). [¶ 21] The landmark decision construing the Double Jeopardy Clause in the mistrial context is United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 , 22 U.S. 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). 2004Each case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn upon its own facts, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 , 83 S.Ct. 1033 , 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963), and the U.S. Supreme Court has “disparaged rigid, mechanical rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). [¶ 21] The landmark decision construing the Double Jeopardy Clause in the mistrial context is United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 , 22 U.S. 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824).	1	5
State v. Allesigreen nd · 1974 · cited in 4 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1975–2007 2 sentences 1996State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805 (N.D.1974), which appeared to adopt such a conclusive approach, recognized in Syllabus 8 by the Court that “[e]ach case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn on its own facts.” Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided the precise question we here consider although several State appellate courts have considered the issue under the Federal Constitution. 1996State v. Allesi, 216 N.W.2d 805 (N.D.1974), which appeared to adopt such a conclusive approach, recognized in Syllabus 8 by the Court that "[e]ach case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn on its own facts." Significantly, the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided the precise question we here consider although several State appellate courts have considered the issue under the Federal Constitution.	1	4
United States v. Perezgreen scotus · 1824 · cited in 4 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1974–2004 2 sentences 2004Each case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn upon its own facts, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 , 83 S.Ct. 1033 , 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963), and the U.S. Supreme Court has “disparaged rigid, mechanical rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). [¶ 21] The landmark decision construing the Double Jeopardy Clause in the mistrial context is United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 , 22 U.S. 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). 2004Each case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn upon its own facts, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 , 83 S.Ct. 1033 , 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963), and the U.S. Supreme Court has “disparaged rigid, mechanical rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). [¶ 21] The landmark decision construing the Double Jeopardy Clause in the mistrial context is United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 , 22 U.S. 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824).	1	4
Downum v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1963 · cited in 4 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1974–2004 2 sentences 2004Each case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn upon its own facts, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 , 83 S.Ct. 1033 , 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963), and the U.S. Supreme Court has “disparaged rigid, mechanical rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). [¶ 21] The landmark decision construing the Double Jeopardy Clause in the mistrial context is United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 , 22 U.S. 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). 2004Each case in which a double-jeopardy violation is asserted must turn upon its own facts, Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 , 83 S.Ct. 1033 , 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963), and the U.S. Supreme Court has “disparaged rigid, mechanical rules in the interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 390 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (internal quotations omitted). [¶ 21] The landmark decision construing the Double Jeopardy Clause in the mistrial context is United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579 , 22 U.S. 579, 580 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824).	1	4
Rutledge v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1996 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008If, however, the legislature “intended that there be only one offense— that is, a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for a single act, but not both — there would be no statutory authorization for” multiple convictions or punishments “and that would end the double jeopardy analysis.” Garrett, at 778, 105 S.Ct. 2407 . [¶ 14] This focus upon legislative intent, and the recognition that “[c]ourts may not ‘prescrib[e] greater punishment than the legislature intended,’ ” Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 , 116 S.Ct. 1241 , 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (quoting Hunter, 2008If, however, the legislature “intended that there be only one offense— that is, a defendant could be convicted under either statutory provision for a single act, but not both — there would be no statutory authorization for” multiple convictions or punishments “and that would end the double jeopardy analysis.” Garrett, at 778, 105 S.Ct. 2407 . [¶ 14] This focus upon legislative intent, and the recognition that “[c]ourts may not ‘prescrib[e] greater punishment than the legislature intended,’ ” Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 , 116 S.Ct. 1241 , 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (quoting Hunter,	1	2
North Carolina v. Pearcered scotus · 1969 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008Department of Revenue v. Kurtk Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 , 769 n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1937 , 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). 2008Department of Revenue v. Kurtk Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 , 769 n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1937 , 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).	1	2
State v. Jonesgreen nd · 1988 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1990–2004	1	2
Illinois v. Somervillegreen scotus · 1973 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004	1	2
State v. Storbakkengreen nd · 1996 · cited in 2 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999	1	2
Richardson v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1984 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025	1	1
City of Minot v. Knudsongreen nd · 1971 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021	1	1
Tibbs v. Floridagreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021	1	1
State v. Desjarlaisgreen nd · 2008 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019	1	1
Peterka v. Stategreen nd · 2015 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019	1	1
State v. Kringstadgreen nd · 1984 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017	1	1
State v. Putneygreen nd · 2016 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016	1	1
United States v. Hinkeldeygreen ca8 · 2010 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015	1	1
State v. Moosgreen nd · 2008 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015	1	1
United States v. Benjamin Godfrey Chipps, Sr.green ca8 · 2005 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015	1	1
Hudson v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1997 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010	1	1
United States v. Laguna-Estelagreen ca1 · 2005 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1
State v. Cantrellgreen orctapp · 2008 · cited in 1 North Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (33)

Case	Cited	Years
Blockburger v. United States green scotus · 1931 2 sentences 2015We analyze whether the statute constitutes a different offense when analyzed under the same-elements test formulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). 2015We analyze whether the statute constitutes a different offense when analyzed under the same-elements test formulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).	3	1999–2015
Sanabria v. United States green scotus · 1978 2 sentences 2009The State relies on Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (footnote omitted), in which the United States Supreme Court noted that “the primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to prevent successive trials, and not Government appeals per se,” and stated that “where an indictment is dismissed after a guilty verdict is rendered, the Double Jeopardy Clause d[oes] not bar an appeal since the verdict could simply be reinstated without a new trial if the Government were successful.” The State also relies on several federal courts of appeals decisio 2009The State relies on Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (footnote omitted), in which the United States Supreme Court noted that “the primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to prevent successive trials, and not Government appeals per se,” and stated that “where an indictment is dismissed after a guilty verdict is rendered, the Double Jeopardy Clause d[oes] not bar an appeal since the verdict could simply be reinstated without a new trial if the Government were successful.” The State also relies on several federal courts of appeals decisio	3	2009–2009
State v. Kurtenbach neutral nd · 2009 2 sentences 2024On May 31, 2023, the district court denied the motion citing State v. Kurtenbach and stating, “[a]n 2 unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional [sic] defects alleged to have occurred prior to the guilty plea, including a double jeopardy claim.” 2009 ND 190, ¶ 2 , 776 N.W.2d 582 . 2024On May 31, 2023, the district court denied the motion citing State v. Kurtenbach and stating, “[a]n 2 unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional [sic] defects alleged to have occurred prior to the guilty plea, including a double jeopardy claim.” 2009 ND 190, ¶ 2 , 776 N.W.2d 582 .	2	2024–2024
State v. Johnson neutral nd · 2009 2 sentences 2024On May 31, 2023, the district court denied the motion citing State v. Kurtenbach and stating, “[a]n 2 unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional [sic] defects alleged to have occurred prior to the guilty plea, including a double jeopardy claim.” 2009 ND 190, ¶ 2 , 776 N.W.2d 582 . 2024On May 31, 2023, the district court denied the motion citing State v. Kurtenbach and stating, “[a]n 2 unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional [sic] defects alleged to have occurred prior to the guilty plea, including a double jeopardy claim.” 2009 ND 190, ¶ 2 , 776 N.W.2d 582 .	2	2024–2024
State v. Carpenter green nd · 2011 2 sentences 2011“Our Court will not consider an argument that is not adequately articulated, supported, and briefed.” State v. Carpenter, 2011 ND 20, ¶ 10 , 793 N.W.2d 765 . 2011“Our Court will not consider an argument that is not adequately articulated, supported, and briefed.” State v. Carpenter , 2011 ND 20, ¶ 10 , 793 N.W.2d 765 .	2	2011–2011
State v. Carpenter green nd · 2011 2 sentences 2011“Our Court will not consider an argument that is not adequately articulated, supported, and briefed.” State v. Carpenter, 2011 ND 20, ¶ 10 , 793 N.W.2d 765 . 2011“Our Court will not consider an argument that is not adequately articulated, supported, and briefed.” State v. Carpenter , 2011 ND 20, ¶ 10 , 793 N.W.2d 765 .	2	2011–2011
State v. William P. neutral connsuperct · 1989 2 sentences 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant "is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried"); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision "that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate" violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution "terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation" in the judgment); St 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St	2	2009–2009
United States v. Bjerke green · 1986 2 sentences 2009See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); 174 United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court's review of a magistrate's decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court's review of a judicial referee's decision in No 2009*See United States v. Stanton, 501 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.2007); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643 , 646 (3d Cir.1986); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1082 (4th Cir.1978). [¶ 8] The federal circuit court cases relied upon by the State are not persuasive because the procedure for a federal district court’s review of a magistrate’s decision differs substantially from the current procedure for a state district court’s review of a judicial referee’s decision in North D	2	2009–2009
United States v. Wilson green scotus · 1975 2 sentences 2009The State relies on Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (footnote omitted), in which the United States Supreme Court noted that “the primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to prevent successive trials, and not Government appeals per se,” and stated that “where an indictment is dismissed after a guilty verdict is rendered, the Double Jeopardy Clause d[oes] not bar an appeal since the verdict could simply be reinstated without a new trial if . the Government were successful.” See also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 , 95 S.Ct. 1 2009The State relies on Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 63 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 , 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (footnote omitted), in which the United States Supreme Court noted that “the primary purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause was to prevent successive trials, and not Government appeals per se,” and stated that “where an indictment is dismissed after a guilty verdict is rendered, the Double Jeopardy Clause d[oes] not bar an appeal since the verdict could simply be reinstated without a new trial if . the Government were successful.” See also United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 345 , 95 S.Ct. 1	2	2009–2009
Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon green scotus · 1984 2 sentences 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St 2009Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 312 , 104 S.Ct. 1805 , 80 L.Ed.2d 311 (1984) (under two-tier system, if defendant “is acquitted at the first trial, he cannot be retried”); State v. William P., 41 Conn.Supp. 356 , 575 A.2d 715 , 718 (1990) (under two-tier system, provision “that the state may move for a trial de novo after an acquittal by the magistrate” violates the double jeopardy clause); State v. Bennion, 115 Idaho 181 , 765 P.2d 692, 695 (App.1988) (under two-tier system, prosecution “terminated when the magistrate found [defendant] not guilty and dismissed the citation” in the judgment); St	2	2009–2009
Missouri v. Hunter green scotus · 1983	2	2008–2008
Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch green scotus · 1994 2 sentences 2008Department of Revenue v. Kurtk Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 , 769 n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1937 , 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). 2008Department of Revenue v. Kurtk Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 , 769 n. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1937 , 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).	2	2008–2008
State v. Foley green nd · 2000	2	2001–2002
Aguilar v. United States green scotus · 1994	2	1996–1996
Harrell v. Columbia Electric Street Railway, Light & Power Co. green sc · 1911	2	1996–1996
United States v. Dixon green scotus · 1993	2	1994–1995
Oregon v. Kennedy green scotus · 1982	1	2021–2021
City of West Fargo v. Ekstrom green nd · 2020	1	2021–2021
State v. Palmer green nd · 2002	1	2019–2019
State v. Palmer green nd · 2002	1	2019–2019
Interest of M.H.P. green nd · 2013	1	2018–2018
State v. Gates green nd · 2015	1	2016–2016
Breed v. Jones green scotus · 1975	1	2013–2013
State v. Stewart green nd · 1999	1	2010–2010
State v. Stewart green nd · 1999	1	2010–2010
Clark v. State green nd · 1999	1	2007–2007
United States v. Jorn green scotus · 1971	1	2007–2007
State v. Backlund green nd · 2003	1	2004–2004
State v. Kelly green nd · 2001	1	2003–2003
Palko v. Connecticut red scotus · 1937	1	1996–1996
Benton v. Maryland green scotus · 1969	1	1996–1996
Grogan v. United States green scotus · 1968	1	1996–1996
Grady v. Corbin red scotus · 1990	1	1995–1995

Statutes the citing opinions construe

ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 29-28-07 (4) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 31-11-03 (4) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-01-03 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-07 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 29-06-15 (3) ND § N.D. Cent. Code § 29-28-06 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 1301 (1962–2026) FL 756 (1965–2026) IN 635 (1971–2026) WA 625 (1945–2026) IL 593 (1958–2026) PA 564 (1967–2026) CA 507 (1953–2026) NM 488 (1973–2026) OH 424 (1971–2025) CT 395 (1974–2026) MO 319 (1956–2025) MI 281 (1970–2026) MA 225 (1970–2026) TN 224 (1975–2026) AZ 205 (1960–2026) VA 199 (1970–2026) MS 192 (1977–2026) LA 179 (1974–2025) NY 175 (1960–2026) MD 169 (1956–2026) NJ 148 (1951–2025) KY 145 (1971–2026) GA 142 (1972–2026) WI 139 (1949–2026) AL 131 (1978–2026) KS 117 (1970–2026) CO 115 (1972–2026) AR 111 (1983–2026) NC 104 (1972–2026) WV 101 (1978–2025) DC 100 (1959–2026) HI 96 (1970–2026) AK 85 (1967–2025) IA 82 (1973–2026) MN 75 (1967–2026) WY 67 (1975–2024) NH 66 (1960–2025) OR 65 (1969–2025) MT 62 (1977–2025) ID 61 (1963–2025) NE 59 (1970–2025) SC 57 (1970–2025) ND 56 (1971–2025) RI 54 (1973–2023) OK 52 (1972–2020) UT 48 (1979–2026) ME 48 (1969–2026) DE 48 (1974–2025) NV 47 (1983–2024) SD 35 (1975–2025) VT 22 (1980–2024) VI 15 (1979–2024) GU 4 (2022–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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