double jeopardy clause in Hawaii

2008In Lessary , this court held that the "same conduct" test applies under the double jeopardy clause of the Hawai`i constitution. 75 Haw. at 458-59 , 865 P.2d at 156 .

2008In Lessary , this court held that the "same conduct" test applies under the double jeopardy clause of the Hawai`i constitution. 75 Haw. at 458-59 , 865 P.2d at 156 .

2026See also State v. Quitog, 85 Hawaiʻi 128, 140, 938 P.2d 559, 571 (1997) (noting that the double jeopardy clause does not allow the state “to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, since the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense” (cleaned up)).

2026See also State v. Quitog, 85 Hawaiʻi 128, 140, 938 P.2d 559, 571 (1997) (noting that the double jeopardy clause does not allow the state “to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, since the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense” (cleaned up)).

2023Second, quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), Webster asserted that his sentence violated the double jeopardy clause of both the Hawaiʻi and the United States constitutions because “the guarantee against double jeopardy is violated when imprisonment already exacted for an offense is not fully credited.” On August 23, 2021, the Circuit Court of the First Circuit13 (circuit court) rejected Webster’s claims in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Dismissing and Denying Petition to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Judgment or to Release Petitioner from Custody (Or

1996The double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment “proteets against multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (footnote omitted).

2010However, “the protections of the double jeopardy clause are not absolute.” State v. Miyazaki, 64 Haw. 611, 618 , 645 P.2d 1340, 1345 (1982); see also United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 , 84 S.Ct. 1587 , 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964) (“Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he [has] obtained such a trial.

2010However, “the protections of the double jeopardy clause are not absolute.” State v. Miyazaki, 64 Haw. 611, 618 , 645 P.2d 1340, 1345 (1982); see also United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 , 84 S.Ct. 1587 , 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964) (“Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he [has] obtained such a trial.

2025See Davis, 133 Hawai#i at 120, 324 P.3d at 930 (holding that the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10 of the Hawai#i Constitution requires an appellate court to address a defendant's express claim of insufficiency of the evidence before remanding for dismissal based on a defective 8 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER charge"); Schwartz v. State, 136 Hawai#i 258, 265, 361 P.3d 1161, 1168 (2015) (same).

2025State v. Plichta, 116 Hawaiʻi 200, 214, 172 P.3d 512, 526 (2007); see also Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure Rule 57 ("Withdrawal of counsel shall require the approval of the court[.]"). 2 Sagapolutele also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the evidence adduced was insufficient to support his conviction "given that the complaining witness recanted [in a letter submitted before the sentencing hearing], and given that the testimony of the officers was improper and should have been stricken." We ordinarily review "challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence . . . on appeal, . . . becaus

2019Rogan, 91 Hawaiʻi at 412, 984 P.2d at 1238 . 47 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER *** We held that the misconduct was so egregious that it was necessary to reverse the defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence and that retrial was barred by the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution. 91 Hawaiʻi at 408, 984 P.2d at 1234 .

2019Rogan, 91 Hawaiʻi at 412, 984 P.2d at 1238 . 47 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND THE PACIFIC REPORTER *** We held that the misconduct was so egregious that it was necessary to reverse the defendant’s judgment of conviction and sentence and that retrial was barred by the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10 of the Hawai‘i Constitution. 91 Hawaiʻi at 408, 984 P.2d at 1234 .

2007Wallace only restricts a sufficiency of the evidence analysis to "properly admitted" evidence " for purposes of determining whether the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10 precludes retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been set aside because of insufficient evidence . . . ." Id. at 414 n. 30, 910 P.2d at 727 n. 30 (emphasis added).

2007Wallace only restricts a sufficiency of the evidence analysis to "properly admitted" evidence " for purposes of determining whether the double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10 precludes retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been set aside because of insufficient evidence . . . ." Id. at 414 n. 30, 910 P.2d at 727 n. 30 (emphasis added).

2022See State v. Brantley, 99 Hawai#i 463, 472, 56 P.3d 1252, 1261 (2002) (Levinson, J., concurring) ("[T]he HRS § 701–109(1)(a) prohibition against convictions for both a lesser included and the greater offense is grounded in the double jeopardy clause of the Hawai#i Constitution[.]" (citing State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai #i 128, 130 n.4, 938 P.2d 559 , 561 n.4 (1997)). 7 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER the same conduct, not separate conduct." State v. Kalua, 144 Hawai#i 7, 16, 434 P.3d 1202, 1211 (2019).

2003See Brantley , 99 Hawai`i at 474, 56 P.3d at 1263 (Ramil, J., concurring, joined by Nakayama, J.) (stating that "[t]he first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to determine whether the legislature intended that each violation be a separate offense[ ]" and, if so, "the court's inquiry is at an end[ ]" and, "[t]herefore,... the `lesser included offense' analysis" is misplaced).

2014This is because the double jeopardy clause bars retrial of a defendant once a reviewing court has found the evidence at trial to be legally insufficient to support a conviction.’” 14 Id. at 59, 237 P.3d at 1125 (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting Malufau I, 80 Hawai'i at 132 , 906 P.2d at 618 ) (quotation marks omitted).

2014This is because the double jeopardy clause bars retrial of a defendant once a reviewing court has found the evidence at trial to be legally insufficient to support a conviction.’”14 Id. at 59, 237 P.3d at 1125 (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting Malufau I, 80 Hawai#i at 132, 906 P.2d at 618 ) (quotation marks omitted)).

2024This is because the double jeopardy clause bars retrial of a defendant once a reviewing court has found the evidence at trial to be legally insufficient to support a conviction." State v. Kalaola, 124 Hawaiʻi 43, 59, 237 P.3d 1109, 1125 (2010) (cleaned up); see Pomroy, 132 Hawaiʻi at 94, 319 P.3d at 1102 (addressing evidentiary sufficiency after finding that the violation of constitutional right to testify was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2014This is because the double jeopardy clause bars retrial of a defendant once a reviewing court has found the evidence at trial to be legally insufficient to support a conviction.’”14 Id. at 59, 237 P.3d at 1125 (emphasis added) (brackets omitted) (quoting Malufau I, 80 Hawai#i at 132, 906 P.2d at 618 ) (quotation marks omitted)).

2010Put another way, the double jeopardy clause was not implicated because there was sufficient evidence “to support a conviction.” 11 Id.; see also Arceo, 84 Hawai'i at 33 n. 40, 928 P.2d at 875 n. 40.

2010Put another way, the double jeopardy clause was not implicated because there was sufficient evidence “to support a conviction.” 11 Id.; see also Arceo, 84 Hawai'i at 33 n. 40, 928 P.2d at 875 n. 40.

2015This court has also “recognized that there are three separate and distinct aspects to the protections offered by the double jeopardy clause.” Quitog, 85 Hawai'i at 141 , 938 P.2d at 572 (quoting State v. Ontiveros, 82 Hawai'i 446, 450 , 923 P.2d 388, 392 (1996)).

2015This court has also “recognized that there are three separate and distinct aspects to the protections offered by the double jeopardy clause.” Quitog, 85 Hawai'i at 141 , 938 P.2d at 572 (quoting State v. Ontiveros, 82 Hawai'i 446, 450 , 923 P.2d 388, 392 (1996)).

2022In analyzing cases addressing double jeopardy, the Hawai#i Supreme Court stated: The [U.S. Supreme Court] further explained that "the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. [Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978)].

2019The double jeopardy clause "forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding." State v. Quitog , 85 Hawai'i 128 , 140, 938 P.2d 559 , 571 (1997) (quoting Burks v. United States , 437 U.S. 1 , 11 (1978) ).

2010The defendant’s double jeopardy defense was rejected by the trial court, and “a new jury found [the defendant] guilty of first degree murder[.]” Id. at 186 , 78 S.Ct. 221 .

2010The defendant’s double jeopardy defense was rejected by the trial court, and “a new jury found [the defendant] guilty of first degree murder[.]” Id. at 186 , 78 S.Ct. 221 .

2019Accordingly, "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars appeal[s] from an acquittal." United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. , 430 U.S. 564 , 575 (1977) ; accord Smith v. Massachusetts , 543 U.S. 462 , 467 (2005) ("[W]e have long held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by jury verdict."); see also HRS § 701-110(1) ("When a prosecution is for an offense under the same statutory provision and is based on the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by the former

1999See Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 571 , 97 S.Ct. 1349 (citing Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 , 82 S.Ct. 671 , 7 L.Ed.2d 629 (1962)); see also Sanabria, 437 U.S. at 69 , 98 S.Ct. 2170 .

2010The Hawaii Supreme Court noted that in Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), the United States Supreme Court had “reaffirmed the principle that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial after a conviction is overturned on the basis of trial error.” Malufau, 80 Hawai'i at 136 , 906 P.2d at 622 .

2010The Hawaii Supreme Court noted that in Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 , 109 S.Ct. 285 , 102 L.Ed.2d 265 (1988), the United States Supreme Court had “reaffirmed the principle that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial after a conviction is overturned on the basis of trial error.” Malufau, 80 Hawai'i at 136 , 906 P.2d at 622 .

2010Nor is the instant case controlled by Whiting v. State, 88 Hawai'i 356 , 966 P.2d 1082 (1998), 21 or State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335 , 926 P.2d 1258 (1996), 22 inasmuch as both those eases also involved the double jeopardy bar to retrial after a conviction for a lesser included offense.

2010Nor is the instant case controlled by Whiting v. State, 88 Hawai'i 356 , 966 P.2d 1082 (1998), 21 or State v. Loa, 83 Hawai'i 335 , 926 P.2d 1258 (1996), 22 inasmuch as both those eases also involved the double jeopardy bar to retrial after a conviction for a lesser included offense.

2010However, despite determining that there was a “possibility that the verdict was based on an alternative means of establishing guilt not supported by legally sufficient evidence,” this court concluded that “the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial on the means of establishing guilt for which there was sufficient evidence presented at trial” because “the error in this case was trial error.” Id. at 184 n. 30, 29 P.3d at 374 n. 30.

2010However, despite determining that there was a “possibility that the verdict was based on an alternative means of establishing guilt not supported by legally sufficient evidence,” this court concluded that “the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial on the means of establishing guilt for which there was sufficient evidence presented at trial” because “the error in this case was trial error.” Id. at 184 n. 30, 29 P.3d at 374 n. 30.

1996The double jeopardy clause 7 in article I, section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution affords the same protection to Hawaii’s citizens as the United States Constitution’s fifth amendment 8 guarantee that no person “subject for the same offence” shall be “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The Hawaii Supreme Court “has always been mindful of its obligation to ‘afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the [fourteenth [ajmendment to the Federal Constitution....’” State v. Hutch, 75 Haw. 307, 321 , 861 P.2d 11, 19 (1993) (quoting State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138

1996The double jeopardy clause 7 in article I, section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution affords the same protection to Hawaii’s citizens as the United States Constitution’s fifth amendment 8 guarantee that no person “subject for the same offence” shall be “twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” The Hawaii Supreme Court “has always been mindful of its obligation to ‘afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the [fourteenth [ajmendment to the Federal Constitution....’” State v. Hutch, 75 Haw. 307, 321 , 861 P.2d 11, 19 (1993) (quoting State v. Texeira, 50 Haw. 138

1999The United States Supreme Court— The Specific Intent Test In Kennedy , the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar a subsequent re-prosecution unless the prosecution acted with the specific intent to cause the defendant to move for a mistrial. 456 U.S. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 .

1999The United States Supreme Court— The Specific Intent Test In Kennedy , the United States Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution does not bar a subsequent re-prosecution unless the prosecution acted with the specific intent to cause the defendant to move for a mistrial. 456 U.S. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 .

1999In this connection, we have held “that retrial is barred where ‘the defendant’s mistrial motion is the necessary response to ... prosecutorial misconduct designed to avoid an acquittal, or is necessitated by deliberate misconduct which has for its intended purpose the denial of the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial[.]’ ” State v. Baranco, 77 Hawaii 351, 355 , 884 P.2d 729, 733 (1994) (quoting State v. Pulawa, 58 Haw. 377, 382 , 569 P.2d 900, 905 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 925 , 98 S.Ct. 2818 , 56 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978)) (brackets in original).

1999In this connection, we have held “that retrial is barred where ‘the defendant’s mistrial motion is the necessary response to ... prosecutorial misconduct designed to avoid an acquittal, or is necessitated by deliberate misconduct which has for its intended purpose the denial of the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial[.]’ ” State v. Baranco, 77 Hawaii 351, 355 , 884 P.2d 729, 733 (1994) (quoting State v. Pulawa, 58 Haw. 377, 382 , 569 P.2d 900, 905 (1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 925 , 98 S.Ct. 2818 , 56 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978)) (brackets in original).

2002The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 ... (1969), provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” Analogously, article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides that no person "shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy[.]” We have not always construed the two clauses as coterminous.

2002The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, see Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 ... (1969), provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” Analogously, article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution provides that no person "shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy[.]” We have not always construed the two clauses as coterminous.

2002Jumila, 87 Hawai'i at 4 n. 7, 950 P.2d at 1204 n. 7 (emphases added.) Because the Jumila majority refused to consider the double jeopardy claim, it cannot now be reasonably argued that most of the Jumila rationale must be maintained to preserve double jeopardy rights.

2002Jumila, 87 Hawai`i at 4 n. 7, 950 P.2d at 1204 n. 7 (emphases added.) Because the Jumila majority refused to consider the double jeopardy claim, it cannot now be reasonably argued that most of the Jumila rationale must be maintained to preserve double jeopardy rights.

1999Interests Underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” Similarly, article I, section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution provides in relevant part that “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy[.]” Based upon these provisions, we have long recognized “that there are three separate and distinct aspects to the p

1999Interests Underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, guarantees that no person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]” Similarly, article I, section 10 of the Hawaii Constitution provides in relevant part that “nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy[.]” Based upon these provisions, we have long recognized “that there are three separate and distinct aspects to the p

1997See also State v. Minn, 79 Hawai'i 461, 464 , 903 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1995); United States v. Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d 405, 414 (8th Cir.1991) (noting that, although protections against second prosecution for same offense after acquittal or conviction and against multiple punishments for same offense are primary purposes of the double jeopardy clause, “the [United States Supreme] Court has emphasized that there is ‘the separate but related interest of a defendant in avoiding multiple prosecutions even where no final determination of guilt or innocence has been made’” (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 82 , 9

1997See also State v. Minn, 79 Hawai'i 461, 464 , 903 P.2d 1282, 1285 (1995); United States v. Cavanaugh, 948 F.2d 405, 414 (8th Cir.1991) (noting that, although protections against second prosecution for same offense after acquittal or conviction and against multiple punishments for same offense are primary purposes of the double jeopardy clause, “the [United States Supreme] Court has emphasized that there is ‘the separate but related interest of a defendant in avoiding multiple prosecutions even where no final determination of guilt or innocence has been made’” (quoting Scott, 437 U.S. at 82 , 9

2025Sheffield, 146 Hawai#i at 61, 456 P.3d at 134 .

2020"The double jeopardy clause of article I, section 10 of the Hawai#i Constitution requires a[n] appellate court to address a defendant's express claim of insufficiency of the evidence prior to remanding for a new trial based on trial error." State v. Sheffield, 146 Hawai#i 49, 61, 456 P.3d 122, 134 (2020) (citation omitted).

2023Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665, 667 (7th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted); see also Vaden, SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX at 2 (“[W]hen detention or prison time is accrued before sentencing . . . the double jeopardy clause’s prohibition on multiple punishment is not violated so long as the defendant’s total period of detention and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum term for the offenses at issue.”).

2023It stands to reason that the double jeopardy clause would also prohibit a court from imposing terms of imprisonment following the revocation of probation that, if combined with time already served pursuant to the probation, would exceed the maximum statutory total punishment for the crimes at issue in the case. 14 The record is unclear as to how many of the 340 days were accrued before sentencing and how many were accrued in connection with Vaden’s probation sentence. 15 The Faye court viewed “the statutory maximum penalty” as the maximum consecutive terms a court can impose for the offenses a

2023Cf. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980) (stating that the double jeopardy clause “does not provide the defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be” and observing that “there is no double jeopardy protection against revocation of probation and the imposition of imprisonment”). 14 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** exceeded the maximum statutory penalty for the crimes at issue. 13 Cf. Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (“[I]n the multiple punishments contex

2010It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction.”). 7 For example, “[t]he double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial where a defendant was not acquitted of the charged offense[,]” Whiting, 88 Hawai'i at 359 , 966 P.2d at 1085 , and “imposes no limitations whatever upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside[,]” for reasons other than insufficiency of the evidence, State v. Jess,