double jeopardy clause in Arizona

2024See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n.2 (1975) (guilty plea does not waive double jeopardy violation claim “that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt is established”); State v. Millanes, 180 Ariz. 418, 421 (App. 1994) (“A double jeopardy claim is inherently different than the usual claim of error in that double jeopardy is independent of the issue of guilt.”). ¶6 For the foregoing reason, we vacate one of Maser’s two convictions and sentences for possession of drug paraphernalia in Case No. V1300CR202180183 and modify the judgment to reflect a single

2013While Williams did not ask the superior court to vacate his conviction for second-degree murder once the jury convicted him of felony murder, any such error is fundamental, requiring vacation of the lesser conviction. 5 Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607; Canion, 199 Ariz. at 230, ¶ 10, 16 P.3d at 791 (“An illegal sentence can be reversed on appeal despite the lack of an objection.”); State v. Millanes, 180 Ariz. 418, 421 , 885 P.2d 106, 109 (App.1994) (holding that “the prohibition against double jeopardy is a fundamental right that is not waived by the failure to raise it in

2016State v. Eagle, 196 Ariz. 188, 190, ¶ 5 (2000). ¶8 The double jeopardy bar applies when “the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the ‘same- elements’ test . . . sometimes referred to as the ‘Blockburger’ test.” United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).

2008See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 708 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (rejecting view that, after finding no double jeopardy violation under Blockburger test, court should nevertheless analyze “whether the nature of the acts as alleged supported such a claim”); see also Lemke, 213 Ariz. 232, n. 2 , 141 P.3d at 412 n. 2 (Arizona and federal double jeopardy protections "coextensive”); State v. Sanders, 205 Ariz. 208 , V 65, 68 P.3d 434, 448 (App.2003) (stating Supreme Court in Dixon held Blockburger test "is the only permissible interpretation of the double jeopardy claus

2008See Price, 218 Ariz. 311, n. 1 , 183 P.3d at 1281 n. 1. [2] In Dixon , the Supreme *774 Court held that when two offenses cannot survive the Blockburger "same elements" test, the double jeopardy bar applies, and the defendant may not be convicted of both offenses. 509 U.S. at 696 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 .

2008See Price, 218 Ariz. 311, n. 1 , 183 P.3d at 1281 n. 1. [2] In Dixon , the Supreme *774 Court held that when two offenses cannot survive the Blockburger "same elements" test, the double jeopardy bar applies, and the defendant may not be convicted of both offenses. 509 U.S. at 696 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 .

2024State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 153, ¶ 21 (2006). ¶7 Collins contends his convictions and sentences for molestation (Count 2) and sexual conduct with a minor (Count 5) violate the right to be free from double jeopardy.

2019The State offers no legal authority to support its argument that carrying a package of drugs into a post office and paying to mail the package of drugs may be punished under both statutes. ¶30 Because a double jeopardy violation constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error, see State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 153, ¶ 21 (2006), we vacate White's conviction of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and the resulting sentence, see Chabolla-Hinojosa, 192 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 21 .

2021The double jeopardy clause bars retrial when the prosecutor engages in intentional conduct which he “knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial or reversal.” Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98 , 108–09 (1984).

2021Because we pay substantial deference to the superior court’s firsthand observations of a prosecutor’s behavior, State v. Martinez, 230 Ariz. 208, 215 , ¶¶ 30–31 (2012), we find no support from the record that the prosecutor’s error barred retrial under the double jeopardy clause, Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108–09. ¶36 To the extent Ricci argues the prosecutor intended to cause the mistrial to cure potential disclosure violations, the record does not substantiate this claim.

2012State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 550 , 65 P.3d 915, 931 (2003) (Ring III). 10 18.

2012State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 550 , 65 P.3d 915, 931 (2003) (Ring III). 10 18.

2021Special Action Jurisdiction ¶16 Although a special action petition is not the exclusive way for a defendant to obtain appellate review of a double jeopardy claim, see State v. Felix, 214 Ariz. 110, 111-12, ¶ 8 (App. 2006), it “is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim,” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 438, ¶ 22 (2004) (quoting Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 (App. 1989)).

2021State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 437, 448, ¶¶ 18, 75 (2004). 9 STATE v. RICCI Decision of the Court ¶31 “The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same offense.” State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 437, ¶ 27 (2002).

1991DOUBLE JEOPARDY The double jeopardy clause “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal[,] ... a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction[,] ... [a]nd ... multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969).

1991DOUBLE JEOPARDY The double jeopardy clause “protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal[,] ... a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction[,] ... [a]nd ... multiple punishments for the same offense.” North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969).

2018In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), the United States Supreme Court recognized, “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” ¶21 The double jeopardy bar prohibits dual punishment for the same offense unless each statutory provision applied “requires proof of a different element.” Id.

2018In Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), the United States Supreme Court recognized, “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” ¶21 The double jeopardy bar prohibits dual punishment for the same offense unless each statutory provision applied “requires proof of a different element.” Id.

2009State v. Chavez, 208 Ariz. 606, ¶ 2 , 96 P.3d 1093, 1094 (App.2004). ¶ 6 “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant against multiple punishments or repeated prosecutions for the same offense and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” McLaughlin v. Fahringer, 150 Ariz. 274, 277 , 723 P.2d 92, 95 (1986).

2009State v. Chavez, 208 Ariz. 606, ¶ 2 , 96 P.3d 1093, 1094 (App.2004). ¶ 6 “The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant against multiple punishments or repeated prosecutions for the same offense and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” McLaughlin v. Fahringer, 150 Ariz. 274, 277 , 723 P.2d 92, 95 (1986).

1994The Blockburger “Same-Elements” Test Before 1990, when the Supreme Court decided Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), overruled by Dixon, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2849 , the sole inquiry 4 when a defendant complained of multiple prosecutions or punishments for the same conduct was whether each offense contained an element not contained in the other; if not, they were “the same offence” and the double jeopardy clause barred the successive prosecution and additional punishment.

1994The Blockburger “Same-Elements” Test Before 1990, when the Supreme Court decided Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 , 110 S.Ct. 2084 , 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), overruled by Dixon, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 2849 , the sole inquiry 4 when a defendant complained of multiple prosecutions or punishments for the same conduct was whether each offense contained an element not contained in the other; if not, they were “the same offence” and the double jeopardy clause barred the successive prosecution and additional punishment.

2025A "special action is an appropriate procedural vehicle" for a double jeopardy claim, "because double jeopardy protects not only against convictions but also against multiple prosecutions." Fitzgerald v. Superior Court, 173 Ariz. 539, 543 (App. 1992) (citing Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 (App. 1989)).

2021Special Action Jurisdiction ¶16 Although a special action petition is not the exclusive way for a defendant to obtain appellate review of a double jeopardy claim, see State v. Felix, 214 Ariz. 110, 111-12, ¶ 8 (App. 2006), it “is the appropriate vehicle for a defendant to obtain judicial appellate review of an interlocutory double jeopardy claim,” State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 438, ¶ 22 (2004) (quoting Nalbandian v. Superior Court, 163 Ariz. 126, 130 (App. 1989)).

2019The State offers no legal authority to support its argument that carrying a package of drugs into a post office and paying to mail the package of drugs may be punished under both statutes. ¶30 Because a double jeopardy violation constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error, see State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 153, ¶ 21 (2006), we vacate White's conviction of possession of a narcotic drug for sale and the resulting sentence, see Chabolla-Hinojosa, 192 Ariz. at 365, ¶ 21 .

2008These cases have articulated the test “in the context of lesser-included offenses . . . as ‘whether [the purported lesser included offense] is, by its very nature, always a constituent part of the greater offense or whether the charging document describes the lesser offense even though it does not always make up a constituent part of the greater offense.’” State v. Siddle, 202 Ariz. 512, ¶ 10 , 47 P.3d 1150, 1154 (App. 2002), quoting State v. Chabolla-Hinojosa, 192 Ariz. 360, ¶ 12 , 965 P.2d 94, 97 (App. 1998) (emphasis omitted); see also State v. Welch, 198 Ariz. 554, ¶ 7 , 12 P.3d 229, 231 (

2021State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 437, 448, ¶¶ 18, 75 (2004). 9 STATE v. RICCI Decision of the Court ¶31 “The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same offense.” State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 437, ¶ 27 (2002).

2016We disagree. ¶18 “The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same offense.” State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 437, ¶ 27 , 55 P.3d 774, 780 (2002) (citation omitted).

2018Under those specific circumstances, we concluded, "The failure of a trial judge, presumably always by mistake or inadvertence, to submit any charge after jeopardy has attached bars retrial." Id. ; see also Oregon v. Kennedy , 456 U.S. 667 , 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (when trial terminated over defendant's objection, manifest necessity standard is "the classical test for lifting the double jeopardy bar to a second trial"). ¶ 32 But where "the defendant himself has elected to terminate the proceedings against him, ... the 'manifest necessity' standard has no place in the applic

2018Under those specific circumstances, we concluded, "The failure of a trial judge, presumably always by mistake or inadvertence, to submit any charge after jeopardy has attached bars retrial." Id. ; see also Oregon v. Kennedy , 456 U.S. 667 , 672, 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (when trial terminated over defendant's objection, manifest necessity standard is "the classical test for lifting the double jeopardy bar to a second trial"). ¶ 32 But where "the defendant himself has elected to terminate the proceedings against him, ... the 'manifest necessity' standard has no place in the applic

2014See State v. Lombardo, 104 Ariz. 598, 599 , 457 P.2d 275, 276 (1969) (“fully developed” information would bar subsequent action filed against defendant for same offense); see also State v. Barber, 133 Ariz. 572, 578 , 653 P.2d 29, 35 (App. 1982) (“A double jeopardy defense is not limited to the four corners of the indictment.”).

2014See State v. Lombardo, 104 Ariz. 598, 599 , 457 P.2d 275, 276 (1969) (“fully developed” information would bar subsequent action filed against defendant for same offense); see also State v. Barber, 133 Ariz. 572, 578 , 653 P.2d 29, 35 (App. 1982) (“A double jeopardy defense is not limited to the four corners of the indictment.”).

2008See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 708 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (rejecting view that, after finding no double jeopardy violation under Blockburger test, court should nevertheless analyze “whether the nature of the acts as alleged supported such a claim”); see also Lemke, 213 Ariz. 232, n. 2 , 141 P.3d at 412 n. 2 (Arizona and federal double jeopardy protections "coextensive”); State v. Sanders, 205 Ariz. 208 , V 65, 68 P.3d 434, 448 (App.2003) (stating Supreme Court in Dixon held Blockburger test "is the only permissible interpretation of the double jeopardy claus

2008See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 , 708 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2849 , 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993) (rejecting view that, after finding no double jeopardy violation under Blockburger test, court should nevertheless analyze “whether the nature of the acts as alleged supported such a claim”); see also Lemke, 213 Ariz. 232, n. 2 , 141 P.3d at 412 n. 2 (Arizona and federal double jeopardy protections "coextensive”); State v. Sanders, 205 Ariz. 208 , V 65, 68 P.3d 434, 448 (App.2003) (stating Supreme Court in Dixon held Blockburger test "is the only permissible interpretation of the double jeopardy claus

1997He relies on State v. Leyva, in which this court followed recent United States Supreme Court decisions to hold that a $20,000,000 in personam forfeiture judgment violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment because the defendant had already been sentenced in related criminal proceedings. 184 Ariz. 439, 445, 446 , 909 P.2d 506, 512, 513 (App.1995), (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 113 S.Ct. 2801 , 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), and United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)); but cf. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 , 116 S.Ct. 213

1997He relies on State v. Leyva, in which this court followed recent United States Supreme Court decisions to hold that a $20,000,000 in personam forfeiture judgment violated the Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment because the defendant had already been sentenced in related criminal proceedings. 184 Ariz. 439, 445, 446 , 909 P.2d 506, 512, 513 (App.1995), (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 113 S.Ct. 2801 , 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), and United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989)); but cf. United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 , 116 S.Ct. 213

2024State v. Torrez, 141 Ariz. 537, 539 (App. 1984) (finding the use of prior convictions does not constitute double jeopardy because "[s]tatutes authorizing the infliction of more serious penalties on one who is a persistent offender do not create a new, separate, distinct, independent or substantive offense"); see State v. Cooney, 233 Ariz. 335, 340, ¶ 15 (App. 2013) (concluding a statute designed to "punish a defendant more severely for a recent crime based on h[er] having committed previous crimes, [] is precisely what courts have long held is constitutionally permissible"); State v. Keith, 21

2014State v. Cooney, 233 Ariz. 335, 339-40, ¶ 11 , 312 P.3d 134, 138-39 (App. 2013). ¶24 Even assuming Delgado’s assertion that jeopardy attached to the dismissed counts, his argument is without merit as the double jeopardy clause would not have prevented the State from bringing new, legitimate charges of attempted second degree murder against Delgado.

2011State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 73 , 906 P.2d 579, 606 (1995). (9) Subjecting Appellant to a second trial on the issue of aggravation and punishment before a new jury violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.

2011State v. Gulbrandson, 184 Ariz. 46, 73 , 906 P.2d 579, 606 (1995). (9) Subjecting Appellant to a second trial on the issue of aggravation and punishment before a new jury violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.

2024V; see also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (The Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy clause applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.).

2006See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796 , 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969) (protection against double jeopardy is “ ‘fundamental to the American scheme of justice’ ”), quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 , 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1447 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). ¶ 11 Moreover, our jurisprudence has characterized a special action as an appropriate vehicle for raising double jeopardy claims only because we have recognized the inadequacy of post-trial appeals in remedying some of the harms of a double jeopardy violation — forcing a defendant to endure the strain, embarrassment, and ex

2025State v. Rumsey, 136 Ariz. 166, 169 (1983) (If “the defendant has been acquitted or the conviction reversed on the ground the evidence was insufficient to convict, the principles underlying the double jeopardy clause demand that he not be retried.”).

1986State v. Tittle, 147 Ariz. 339 , 710 P.2d 449, 455 (1985); State v. Rumsey, 136 Ariz. 166, 168 , 665 P.2d 48, 50 (1983).

1995This point specifically was addressed in Mullet in which the court explained that, once it was determined that the Corporation Commission imposed a punishment in the administrative proceeding, "the double jeopardy clause clearly prohibit[ed] a second proceeding to punish for the same conduct. " 168 Ariz. at 598 , 816 P.2d at 255 (emphasis added).

1995This point specifically was addressed in Mullet in which the court explained that, once it was determined that the Corporation Commission imposed a punishment in the administrative proceeding, "the double jeopardy clause clearly prohibit[ed] a second proceeding to punish for the same conduct. " 168 Ariz. at 598 , 816 P.2d at 255 (emphasis added).

2024Subsections (A)(1), (A)(2), and (A)(3) of A.R.S. § 13-1204 describe separate offenses, not alternative means. ¶9 Kelly was convicted and sentenced for violating three subsections of the aggravated assault statute—A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(1), (2), and (3).2 A double jeopardy violation constitutes fundamental error, Jurden, 239 Ariz. at 528, ¶ 7 , even if a defendant receives concurrent sentences, Carter, 249 Ariz. at 314 , ¶ 1 n.1.

2024A double jeopardy violation constitutes fundamental error, Jurden, 239 Ariz. at 528, ¶ 7 , even if the defendant receives concurrent sentences, Carter, 249 Ariz. at 314 , ¶ 1 n.1. ¶17 Assuming that Hall injured Cindy by a single act, the resolution of his claim depends on whether Section 13-1204 subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) describe alternative means of committing a single aggravated assault offense or separate aggravated assault offenses.

2024See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 , 62 n.2 (1975) (guilty plea does not waive double jeopardy violation claim “that the State may not convict petitioner no matter how validly his factual guilt is established”); State v. Millanes, 180 Ariz. 418, 421 (App. 1994) (“A double jeopardy claim is inherently different than the usual claim of error in that double jeopardy is independent of the issue of guilt.”). ¶6 For the foregoing reason, we vacate one of Maser’s two convictions and sentences for possession of drug paraphernalia in Case No. V1300CR202180183 and modify the judgment to reflect a single

2019See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 322-25 (1999) (holding a defendant’s guilty plea and statements at plea colloquy did not function as a waiver of her right to remain silent at sentencing); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-63 (1975) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a defendant from raising a double jeopardy claim on review); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974) (holding a guilty plea does not preclude a petitioner from raising a prosecutorial vindictiveness claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding); Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 450, ¶ 12 (2002) (holding a