47 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1983–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See McIntosh v. State, 113 Nev. 224, 225 , 932 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1997) (stating that Nevada follows the double jeopardy test set forth in Blockburger). 284 U.S. at 304 . 1997Nevada has long followed the double jeopardy test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), in which the Court held that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Id. | 4 | 6 |
United States v. Tateogreen2 sentences2017United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964) ("The principle that [the Double Jeopardy Clause) does not preclude the Government's retrying a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction is a well- established part of our constitutional jurisprudence."); Collier v. State, 103 Nev. 563, 565 , 747 P.2d 225, 226 (1987) ("It has long been held that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial when a conviction is reversed on appeal."). 2017United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964) ("The principle that [the Double Jeopardy Clause) does not preclude the Government's retrying a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction is a well- established part of our constitutional jurisprudence."); Collier v. State, 103 Nev. 563, 565 , 747 P.2d 225, 226 (1987) ("It has long been held that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial when a conviction is reversed on appeal."). | 3 | 4 |
Maresca v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Because it is appellant's responsibility to provide relevant authority, see Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673 , 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987), and Brown does not address this situation, we decline to consider Whitener's double-jeopardy challenge. 2019Because it is appellant's responsibility to provide relevant authority, see Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673 , 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987), and Brown does not address this situation, we decline to consider Whitener's double-jeopardy challenge. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Michael J.green2 sentences2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. 2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. | 3 | 3 |
Tomlin v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. 2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. | 3 | 3 |
State v. DeMarcogreen2 sentences2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. 2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Nathaniel Coleman, A/K/A \Boo Tee Colemangreen2 sentences2017See United States v. Coleman, 862 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1988) ("[A]ssuming arguendo a number of Brady violations prior to the first trial, the double jeopardy clause [still] is not implicated. 2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br | 3 | 3 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br 2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br | 3 | 3 |
United States v. David Gene Lewisgreen2 sentences2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br 2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br | 3 | 3 |
Dinning v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. 2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. | 3 | 3 |
Collier v. Stategreen2 sentences2017United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964) ("The principle that [the Double Jeopardy Clause) does not preclude the Government's retrying a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction is a well- established part of our constitutional jurisprudence."); Collier v. State, 103 Nev. 563, 565 , 747 P.2d 225, 226 (1987) ("It has long been held that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial when a conviction is reversed on appeal."). 2017United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964) ("The principle that [the Double Jeopardy Clause) does not preclude the Government's retrying a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction is a well- established part of our constitutional jurisprudence."); Collier v. State, 103 Nev. 563, 565 , 747 P.2d 225, 226 (1987) ("It has long been held that the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial when a conviction is reversed on appeal."). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Mortongreen2 sentences2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. 2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Jorgensongreen2 sentences2017See State v. Jorgenson, 10 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Ariz. 2000) (affirming dismissal of first-degree murder charges following reversal and remand of judgment of conviction based on intentional and egregious prosecutorial misconduct). 2017See State v. Jorgenson, 10 P.3d 1177, 1180 (Ariz. 2000) (affirming dismissal of first-degree murder charges following reversal and remand of judgment of conviction based on intentional and egregious prosecutorial misconduct). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Chasegreen2 sentences2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. 2017Most . . . have followed the federal [Oregon v. Kennedy] standard." See Tomlin v. State, 695 So. 2d 157, 165 (Ala. 1996); Green, 380 S.W. at 374-75; State v. Michael J., 875 A.2d 510, 534-35 (Conn. 2005); Dinning v. State, 485 S.E.2d 464, 465-66 (Ga. 1997); State v. Morton, 153 P.3d 532,537-38 (Kan. 2007); State v. Chase, 754 A.2d 961, 963-64 (Me. 2000); State v. DeMarco, 511 A.2d 1251, 1253-54 (N.J. | 3 | 3 |
Pool v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2017It replaces the goaded-mistrial test we adopted from Oregon v. Kennedy with the expansive criteria the Arizona Supreme Court developed in Pool v. Superior Court, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (Ariz. 1984), as appropriate for interpreting the Arizona Constitution's double jeopardy clause. 2017Majority, ante, at 12 ("when evaluating a double jeopardy claim following a defendant's motion for a mistrial, [Nevada] courts should consider whether: (1) mistrial is granted because of improper conduct or actions by the prosecutor; (2) such conduct is not merely the result of legal error, negligence, mistake, or insignificant impropriety, but, taken as a whole, amounts to intentional conduct which the prosecutor knows to be improper and prejudicial, and which he pursues for any improper purpose with indifference to a significant resulting danger of mistrial . . . [or SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA | 3 | 3 |
Lay v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br 2017See Coleman, SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 7 (0) 1947A 862 F.2d at 458-59 (rejecting argument that a Brady violation required dismissal of charges and noting, "Unlike the double jeopardy analysis, which places a premium upon the defendant's right to one prosecution, due process simply requires that the defendant be treated fairly."); United States v. Lewis, 368 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2004) (government's alleged Brady violations at first trial did not establish a double jeopardy bar to retrial); Green v. State, 380 S.W.3d 368, 374-75 (Ark. 2011) ("[o]ur law is well settled that the remedy for a Br | 3 | 3 |
Arizona v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2009Washington, 434 U.S. at 513 , 98 S.Ct. 824 (noting that "[t]he adoption of a stringent standard of appellate review in this area [of improper argument by defense counsel] . . . would seriously impede the trial judge in the proper performance of his `duty, in order to protect the integrity of the trial, to take prompt and affirmative action to stop . . . professional misconduct'") (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) (last alteration in original). 2009Washington, 434 U.S. at 513 , 98 S.Ct. 824 (noting that "[t]he adoption of a stringent standard of appellate review in this area [of improper argument by defense counsel] . . . would seriously impede the trial judge in the proper performance of his `duty, in order to protect the integrity of the trial, to take prompt and affirmative action to stop . . . professional misconduct'") (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612 , 96 S.Ct. 1075 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) (last alteration in original). | 2 | 4 |
Melchor-Gloria v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Melchor-Gloria v. State, 99 Nev. 174, 178 , 660 P.2d 109, 111-12 (1983). 2017See, e.g., Melchor-Gloria v. State, 99 Nev. 174, 178 , 660 P.2d 109, 111-12 (1983). | 2 | 3 |
Litteral v. Stategreen2 sentences1986Specifically, appellant points out that in a line of cases beginning with Litteral v. State, 97 Nev. 503 , 634 P.2d 1226 (1981), this court indicated that it would find a double jeopardy violation any time cumulative punishments were imposed for the same offense. 1986Specifically, appellant points out that in a line of cases beginning with Litteral v. State, 97 Nev. 503 , 634 P.2d 1226 (1981), this court indicated that it would find a double jeopardy violation any time cumulative punishments were imposed for the same offense. | 2 | 3 |
Lisby v. Stategreen2 sentences2013"The general test for determining the existence of a lesser included offense is whether the offense in question 'cannot be committed without committing the lesser offense." McIntosh v. State, 113 Nev. 224, 226 , 932 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1997) (quoting Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 184 , 414 P.2d 592, 594 (1966)). 3 The jurisdictional exception to the double jeopardy clause does not permit the continued prosecution of Blenka The State argues that the jurisdictional exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to these facts and does not bar Blenka's subsequent prosecution of the felony DUI offens 2013"The general test for determining the existence of a lesser included offense is whether the offense in question 'cannot be committed without committing the lesser offense." McIntosh v. State, 113 Nev. 224, 226 , 932 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1997) (quoting Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 184 , 414 P.2d 592, 594 (1966)). 3 The jurisdictional exception to the double jeopardy clause does not permit the continued prosecution of Blenka The State argues that the jurisdictional exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to these facts and does not bar Blenka's subsequent prosecution of the felony DUI offens | 2 | 2 |
McIntosh v. Stategreen2 sentences2013"The general test for determining the existence of a lesser included offense is whether the offense in question 'cannot be committed without committing the lesser offense." McIntosh v. State, 113 Nev. 224, 226 , 932 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1997) (quoting Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 184 , 414 P.2d 592, 594 (1966)). 3 The jurisdictional exception to the double jeopardy clause does not permit the continued prosecution of Blenka The State argues that the jurisdictional exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to these facts and does not bar Blenka's subsequent prosecution of the felony DUI offens 2013"The general test for determining the existence of a lesser included offense is whether the offense in question 'cannot be committed without committing the lesser offense." McIntosh v. State, 113 Nev. 224, 226 , 932 P.2d 1072, 1073 (1997) (quoting Lisby v. State, 82 Nev. 183, 184 , 414 P.2d 592, 594 (1966)). 3 The jurisdictional exception to the double jeopardy clause does not permit the continued prosecution of Blenka The State argues that the jurisdictional exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to these facts and does not bar Blenka's subsequent prosecution of the felony DUI offens | 2 | 2 |
Ashe v. Swensongreen2 sentences2013We conclude that Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970), sets forth the proper analysis for determining whether an issue of ultimate fact has been decided and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial: The district court must examine the record of the first trial and determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on some other issue of fact. 2013We conclude that Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970), sets forth the proper analysis for determining whether an issue of ultimate fact has been decided and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial: The district court must examine the record of the first trial and determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on some other issue of fact. | 2 | 2 |
Givens v. Stategreen2 sentences1984Nevada has adopted the double jeopardy test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), in which that court held that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” See Givens v. State, 99 Nev. 50, 56 , 657 P.2d 97, 101 (1983); Litteral v. State, 97 Nev. 503, 508 , 634 P.2d 1226, 1229 (1981). 1984Nevada has adopted the double jeopardy test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), in which that court held that “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” See Givens v. State, 99 Nev. 50, 56 , 657 P.2d 97, 101 (1983); Litteral v. State, 97 Nev. 503, 508 , 634 P.2d 1226, 1229 (1981). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Halperred2 sentences2000In Hudson , the Court largely disavowed the double jeopardy analysis previously announced in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 2 Instead, Hudson articulated a two-part test, previously outlined in Ursery , for determining whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil. 1998In its recent Hudson decision, the Supreme Court in large part disavowed the double jeopardy analysis announced in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). | 1 | 3 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Jackson, 128 Nev. at 607 , 291 P.3d at 1279 . 2024Jackson, 128 Nev. at 607 , 291 P.3d at 1279 . | 1 | 2 |
Ricketts v. Adamsongreen2 sentences2017Id. at 10 . 2017Id. at 10. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Estella Jaramillogreen2 sentences2016Rejecting a double-jeopardy claim, the appellate court determined that the trial judge "properly concluded that a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts pertaining to the nature of the indictment would question the ability of a judge facing prosecution to remain impartial as the presiding jurist in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 1248 . 2016Rejecting a double-jeopardy claim, the appellate court determined that the trial judge "properly concluded that a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts pertaining to the nature of the indictment would question the ability of a judge facing prosecution to remain impartial as the presiding jurist in a criminal proceeding." Id. at 1248 . | 1 | 2 |
Shannon v. Stategreen2 sentences2016However, after "the United States Supreme Court ha [di ruled, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, that successive prosecutions by two states for the same conduct are not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment," this court reversed course and held "that NRS 171.020 should be given the full interpretation intended by the Nevada Legislature." Id. at 791 , 783 P.2d at 948 . 2016However, after "the United States Supreme Court ha [di ruled, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, that successive prosecutions by two states for the same conduct are not barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment," this court reversed course and held "that NRS 171.020 should be given the full interpretation intended by the Nevada Legislature." Id. at 791, 783 P.2d at 948. | 1 | 2 |
Hylton v. Eighth Judicial District Courtgreen2 sentences2009See also Hylton, 103 Nev. at 426 , 743 P.2d at 628 (noting that "[a]n important factor to be considered" in assessing a double jeopardy clause challenge based on improper argument "is the need to hold litigants on both sides to standards of responsible professional conduct in the clash of an adversary criminal process"). 2009See also Hylton, 103 Nev. at 426 , 743 P.2d at 628 (noting that "[a]n important factor to be considered" in assessing a double jeopardy clause challenge based on improper argument "is the need to hold litigants on both sides to standards of responsible professional conduct in the clash of an adversary criminal process"). | 1 | 2 |
| Bullington v. Missourigreen | 1 | 2 |
| Meador v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosas v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Dinitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Somervillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Brocegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Athey v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kepner v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Serfass v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lujangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2017Due process does not seek "punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 . 2017Due process does not seek "punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 . | 3 | 2017–2017 |
| Missouri v. Hunter green | 2 | 1986–1987 |
| Talancon v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Purcell green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Helm green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Carter v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Oregon v. Kennedy green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Whalen v. United States green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Owens v. State green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| United States v. Ball green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Benton v. Maryland green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Director, Nevada Department of Prisons v. Biffath red | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| State Ex Rel. Westfall v. Mason green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Green v. United States green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.