double jeopardy clause in Minnesota

2025State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (applying the standards for double jeopardy following a mistrial as 5 Lerma does not argue that the double jeopardy standard under the Minnesota Constitution differs from the federal constitution.

2012See id. at 727 (“We do not believe that this is an appropriate case in which to decide whether the double jeopardy clause of the Minnesota Constitution gives a criminal defendant greater protection than the federal constitution.... ”); see also State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56 , 61 n. 2 (Minn.2011) (drawing no distinction between the Minnesota and federal double-jeopardy provisions and, “[f]or ease of reference, ... referring] to both clauses collectively as ‘the Double Jeopardy Clause’”).

2025See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 307–08 (1991); Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347 , 358 (Minn. 2022); see also State v. Harris, 533 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1995) (affirming district court’s denial of an order barring retrial on the basis of double jeopardy after a reversal due to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, stating that “the double jeopardy clause in such circumstances [reversal on error] does not bar retrial”).

2017See State v. Harris, 533 N.W.2d 35 , 36 n.1 (Minn. 1995) (“If a defendant obtains a reversal because of the insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law, then the double jeopardy clause clearly precludes further prosecution.”).

2014See, e.g., State v. Castillo-Alvarez, 836 N.W.2d 527, 535-36 (Minn.2013) (adopting the dual-sovereignty doctrine for double-jeopardy challenges under the Minnesota Constitution); State v. Hanson, 543 N.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Minn.1996) (following the Supreme Court’s lead in replacing the double-jeopardy test from Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 , 100 S.Ct. 2636 , with the “solely deterrent/retributive” test from Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 , 109 S.Ct. 1892 ). 10 We have done so in large part because the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Minnesota Constitution contains “substantially similar language” to its coun

2014In Hanson , we adopted the “solely deterrent/retributive'' test from Halper to determine whether a sanction is a criminal penalty or a civil remedy in the context of a double-jeopardy challenge brought under both the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution. 543 N.W.2d at 88 .

2026State v. Large, 607 N.W.2d 774 , 778 n.2 (Minn. 2000) (“Because it is not necessary in order to resolve this case, we decline to decide whether the Minnesota Constitution affords greater double jeopardy protection than the United States Constitution.”); State v. Lerma, 25 N.W.3d 40 , 46 n.5 (Minn. 2025) (“We have not resolved [whether the double jeopardy standard under the Minnesota Constitution differs from the federal Constitution] and decline to do so here.”). 8 been entered by the trier of fact.” Wilson, 420 U.S. at 352 .

2012As discussed above, we reached a similar conclusion in Large, 607 N.W.2d at 779-80 , when we concluded that the district court’s midtrial dismissal implicated the underlying double jeopardy principle, even if the court’s legal ruling was erroneous.

2016See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150-51 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (concluding that the double-jeopardy clause bars retrial when conviction is reversed because evidence is legally insufficient).

2016See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 , 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2150-51 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (concluding that the double-jeopardy clause bars retrial when conviction is reversed because evidence is legally insufficient).

1984ANALYSIS The Minnesota Constitution, Art. 1 § 7 provides: [N]o person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense State v. Spann, 287 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn.1979), explains the test for determining whether double jeopardy is present: The applicable double jeopardy test is the so-called Blockburger test — see, Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).

1984ANALYSIS The Minnesota Constitution, Art. 1 § 7 provides: [N]o person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense State v. Spann, 287 N.W.2d 406, 408 (Minn.1979), explains the test for determining whether double jeopardy is present: The applicable double jeopardy test is the so-called Blockburger test — see, Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 , 97 S.Ct. 2221 , 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977).

2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal

2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal

2000See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-102 , 118 S.Ct. 488, 493-95 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (noting that Halper deviated from traditional double jeopardy analysis and reaffirming that double jeopardy analysis must always include consideration of whether punishment is “criminal” and whether the statute, on its face, rather than by the character of the actual sanctions imposed, provides for a criminal sanction); see also State v. McKinney, 575 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn.App.1998) (“[i]n Hudson, the Supreme Court disavowed its method of analysis in Halper and reaffirmed the double jeopardy doctr

2000See Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-102 , 118 S.Ct. 488, 493-95 , 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997) (noting that Halper deviated from traditional double jeopardy analysis and reaffirming that double jeopardy analysis must always include consideration of whether punishment is “criminal” and whether the statute, on its face, rather than by the character of the actual sanctions imposed, provides for a criminal sanction); see also State v. McKinney, 575 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn.App.1998) (“[i]n Hudson, the Supreme Court disavowed its method of analysis in Halper and reaffirmed the double jeopardy doctr

2025But “[c]ircumstances may arise even after the jury has been impaneled and sworn in which the trial court may abort the proceedings and retry the defendant without violating the double jeopardy clause.” Id. at 609 .

1985If, on the other hand, the defendant wishes to proceed to a verdict by the jury and the court declares a mistrial over the defendant’s objection, the double jeopardy clause will bar retrial unless the mistrial was dictated by “manifest necessity” or the “ends of public justice.” See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 , 98 S.Ct. 824, 830 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978); State v. McDonald, 298 Minn. 449, 453 , 215 N.W.2d 607, 609 (1974).

2015In Jeffries , however, the supreme court noted that “a counseled guilty plea does not bar a defendant from raising a double-jeopardy claim on appeal if that claim can be decided on the existing record at the time the defendant pleads guilty.” 806 N.W.2d at 65 .

2012See id. at 727 (“We do not believe that this is an appropriate case in which to decide whether the double jeopardy clause of the Minnesota Constitution gives a criminal defendant greater protection than the federal constitution.... ”); see also State v. Jeffries, 806 N.W.2d 56 , 61 n. 2 (Minn.2011) (drawing no distinction between the Minnesota and federal double-jeopardy provisions and, “[f]or ease of reference, ... referring] to both clauses collectively as ‘the Double Jeopardy Clause’”).

2012In describing the principle underlying double jeopardy protection, we have said, “[t]he protective doctrine of double jeopardy [whether pursuant to constitutional provision or statute] is nothing more than the declaration of an ancient and well-established public policy that no man should be unduly harassed by the state’s being permitted to try him for the same offense again and again until the desired result is achieved.” State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62 , 62 N.W.2d 512, 516 (1954).

2012In describing the principle underlying double jeopardy protection, we have said, “[t]he protective doctrine of double jeopardy [whether pursuant to constitutional provision or statute] is nothing more than the declaration of an ancient and well-established public policy that no man should be unduly harassed by the state’s being permitted to try him for the same offense again and again until the desired result is achieved.” State v. Thompson, 241 Minn. 59, 62 , 62 N.W.2d 512, 516 (1954).

2011Men-na v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).

2011Men-na v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 , 96 S.Ct. 241 , 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975).

2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal

2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal

1974This is so because the prohibition of the double jeopardy clause is “not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.” United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 669 , 16 S. Ct. 1192, 1194 , 41 L. ed. 300, 302 (1896).

1974This is so because the prohibition of the double jeopardy clause is “not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy.” United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 662, 669 , 16 S. Ct. 1192, 1194 , 41 L. ed. 300, 302 (1896).

1979A criminal trial imposes great psychological, physical and financial burdens on the defendant, and the double jeopardy clause guarantees that he experience these burdens only once “for the same offense.” Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 , 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1786 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 355 (1975). 6 Prison inmates may, of course, experience some pressures as a result of the prison discipline process, but these pressures are of a much lesser degree than those incident to a full criminal prosecution.

1979A criminal trial imposes great psychological, physical and financial burdens on the defendant, and the double jeopardy clause guarantees that he experience these burdens only once “for the same offense.” Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529 , 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1786 , 44 L.Ed.2d 346, 355 (1975). 6 Prison inmates may, of course, experience some pressures as a result of the prison discipline process, but these pressures are of a much lesser degree than those incident to a full criminal prosecution.

2025See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 307–08 (1991); Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347 , 358 (Minn. 2022); see also State v. Harris, 533 N.W.2d 35, 36 (Minn. 1995) (affirming district court’s denial of an order barring retrial on the basis of double jeopardy after a reversal due to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, stating that “the double jeopardy clause in such circumstances [reversal on error] does not bar retrial”).

2025“When a mistrial has been declared, ‘the conclusion that jeopardy has attached begins, rather than ends, the inquiry as to whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial.’ ” State v. Long, 562 N.W.2d 292, 296 (Minn. 1997) (quoting Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973)).

2017Based on Howard’s failure to argue in district court that the .410 shell was not “ammunition” and the obvious disadvantage to the state in not having a district court ruling on the issue, we do not consider Howard’s statutory-interpretation argument.1 Because 1 We acknowledge the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent statement that, “[b]ecause the meaning of a criminal statute is intertwined with the issue of whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the statute, it is often necessary to interpret a criminal statute when evaluating an insufficiency-of-the-eviden