double jeopardy clause in Rhode Island

2017Rule 12(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[t]he defense of. double jeopardy * * * may be raised only by motion before trial.” Therefore, “a defendant’s failure to raise such a motion before trial precludes that defendant from thereafter raising a double jeopardy challenge.” State v. Day, 925 A.2d 962, 977 (R.I. 2007) (citing State v. Feliciano, 901 A,2d 631, 647 (R.I. 2006)).

2013Relying upon our decision in Rodriguez , we noted in Marsich , “ ‘the General Assembly clearly has expressed its intent that a guilty defendant should receive consecutive sentences’ for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence.” Id. at 443 (quoting Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at 908 ). 11 Likewise, in State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I.2007), which involved a double-jeopardy claim for consecutive life sentences for murder and for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, we reaffirmed our decisions in State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 648 (R.I.2006) and R

2011Although it provides criminal defendants with a “complex of rights,” State v. Torres, 524 A.2d 1120, 1123 (R.I.1987), the essence of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the constitution prohibits “multiple prosecutions for the same offense.” State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1284 (R.I.1994) (quoting Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 , 97 S.Ct. 2207 , 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977)). 8 “A retrial after a *640 mistrial may present an issue of double jeopardy unless the mistrial is based on reasons of manifest necessity or unless the defendant consented or requested a mistrial.” Id. at 1286 n. 2 (cit

2007See State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1284 (R.I.1994) (analyzing defendant’s argument that first-degree murder and second-degree murder constitute the “same offense” under the double jeopardy clause).

1999As we have stated previously “[i]t has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the double jeopardy clause ‘protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette VIN: 1G1YY3388L5111488, 695 A.2d 502, 505 (R.I.1997) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496 (1989)).

1999As we have stated previously “[i]t has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the double jeopardy clause ‘protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette VIN: 1G1YY3388L5111488, 695 A.2d 502, 505 (R.I.1997) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496 (1989)).

2013At trial, defendant asserted a double-jeopardy claim, arguing that pursuant to Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), count 6, discharging a firearm in commission of a crime of violence in violation of § 11-47-3.2, merged with count 4, assault with intent to murder in violation of § 11-5-2.

2013At trial, defendant asserted a double-jeopardy claim, arguing that pursuant to Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), count 6, discharging a firearm in commission of a crime of violence in violation of § 11-47-3.2, merged with count 4, assault with intent to murder in violation of § 11-5-2.

2010Therefore, this case does not “give rise to one of the limited situations wherein this court will address a double jeopardy claim despite its improper assertion.” State v. Thomas, 654 A.2d 327, 330-31 (R.I.1995) (citing Grullon, 117 R.I. at 687-88 , 371 A.2d at 268 and Thomley v. Mullen, 115 R.I. 505, 510-11 , 349 A.2d 158, 161 (1975)).

2010Therefore, this case does not “give rise to one of the limited situations wherein this court will address a double jeopardy claim despite its improper assertion.” State v. Thomas, 654 A.2d 327, 330-31 (R.I.1995) (citing Grullon, 117 R.I. at 687-88 , 371 A.2d at 268 and Thomley v. Mullen, 115 R.I. 505, 510-11 , 349 A.2d 158, 161 (1975)).

1986The double-jeopardy clause protects a defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same offense. 6 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 (1982); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 273 (1976).

1986The double-jeopardy clause protects a defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same offense. 6 Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 671 , 102 S.Ct. 2083, 2087 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416, 422 (1982); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 273 (1976).

2011Although it provides criminal defendants with a “complex of rights,” State v. Torres, 524 A.2d 1120, 1123 (R.I.1987), the essence of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the constitution prohibits “multiple prosecutions for the same offense.” State v. Grabowski, 644 A.2d 1282, 1284 (R.I.1994) (quoting Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 , 97 S.Ct. 2207 , 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977)). 8 “A retrial after a *640 mistrial may present an issue of double jeopardy unless the mistrial is based on reasons of manifest necessity or unless the defendant consented or requested a mistrial.” Id. at 1286 n. 2 (cit

1994The double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Although the double-jeopardy clause has been interpreted as providing a “complex of rights,” State v. Torres, 524 A.2d 1120, 1123 (R.I.1987), at its heart lies the prohibition “against multiple prosecutions for ‘the same offense.’ ” Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 , 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2216 , 53 L.Ed.2d 168, 180 (1977).

2009Alternatively, in State v. Haney, 842 A.2d 1083, 1084-85 (R.I.2004), we considered whether a defendant’s two domestic-assault convictions on the same complainant on the same night could withstand scrutiny under a double-jeopardy analysis.

2007See State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 647 (R.I.2006); Grayhurst, 852 A.2d at 500 ; State v. Haney, 842 A.2d 1083, 1084 (R.I.2004); State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109, 1115 (R.I.2003).

2007Indeed, contrary to defendant’s assertion, this Court’s reasoning in Ashness, 461 A.2d at 666-67 , establishes that dual convictions for carrying a dangerous weapon when committing a crime of violence and first-degree robbery do not constitute a double jeopardy violation.

2003In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that: “[w]here * * * [the Missouri] legislature specifically authorize[d] cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe[d] the ‘same’ conduct under Blockburger , a court’s task of statutory construction [was] at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.” Id. at 368-69 , 103 S.Ct. at 679 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 544 ; see also Ashness, 461 A.2d at 667 (explaining that either the charge of committing a crime of viole

1985He argues that convictions on both murder and burglary were in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s double-jeopardy clause, which “prohibits both successive prosecution for the same offense as well as multiple punishment for the same offense.” State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641, 654 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1165 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (quoting Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263 , 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977)).

1985He argues that convictions on both murder and burglary were in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s double-jeopardy clause, which “prohibits both successive prosecution for the same offense as well as multiple punishment for the same offense.” State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641, 654 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1165 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (quoting Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263 , 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977)).

2010Therefore, this case does not “give rise to one of the limited situations wherein this court will address a double jeopardy claim despite its improper assertion.” State v. Thomas, 654 A.2d 327, 330-31 (R.I.1995) (citing Grullon, 117 R.I. at 687-88 , 371 A.2d at 268 and Thomley v. Mullen, 115 R.I. 505, 510-11 , 349 A.2d 158, 161 (1975)).

2010Therefore, this case does not “give rise to one of the limited situations wherein this court will address a double jeopardy claim despite its improper assertion.” State v. Thomas, 654 A.2d 327, 330-31 (R.I.1995) (citing Grullon, 117 R.I. at 687-88 , 371 A.2d at 268 and Thomley v. Mullen, 115 R.I. 505, 510-11 , 349 A.2d 158, 161 (1975)).

2009In Perkins, 460 A.2d at 1248 , we held that when a trial justice grants this motion, the double jeopardy clause bars a retrial of the accused; this holding is in accord with the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 , 101 S.Ct. 970 , 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), and Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).

2009In Perkins, 460 A.2d at 1248 , we held that when a trial justice grants this motion, the double jeopardy clause bars a retrial of the accused; this holding is in accord with the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982); Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 , 101 S.Ct. 970 , 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981), and Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , 98 S.Ct. 2141 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).

1978The elements then in this case would be the unlawful killing of a human being while in the commission of a felony, one of the listed felonies, which is robbery.” In State v. Boudreau, 113 R.I. 497 , 322 A.2d 626 (1974), we found a violation of the double jeopardy clause when a defendant was convicted of both assault with a dangerous weapon and the commission of a crime of violence while armed with a pistol.

1978The elements then in this case would be the unlawful killing of a human being while in the commission of a felony, one of the listed felonies, which is robbery.” In State v. Boudreau, 113 R.I. 497 , 322 A.2d 626 (1974), we found a violation of the double jeopardy clause when a defendant was convicted of both assault with a dangerous weapon and the commission of a crime of violence while armed with a pistol.

2021We have stated that “failure to raise such a motion before trial precludes that defendant from thereafter raising a double jeopardy challenge.” Day, 925 A.2d at 977 .

2018In addition, Rule 12(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[t]he defense of double jeopardy * * * may be raised only by motion before trial." Therefore, "a defendant's failure to raise such a motion before trial precludes that defendant from thereafter raising a double jeopardy challenge." State v. Day , 925 A.2d 962 , 977 (R.I. 2007).

2019We have recognized that “the double jeopardy clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Ciolli, 725 A.2d 268, 270 (R.I. 1999) (quoting One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 505 ).

1999As we have stated previously “[i]t has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the double jeopardy clause ‘protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.’ ” State v. One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette VIN: 1G1YY3388L5111488, 695 A.2d 502, 505 (R.I.1997) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496 (1989)).

2013Relying upon our decision in Rodriguez , we noted in Marsich , “ ‘the General Assembly clearly has expressed its intent that a guilty defendant should receive consecutive sentences’ for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence.” Id. at 443 (quoting Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at 908 ). 11 Likewise, in State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I.2007), which involved a double-jeopardy claim for consecutive life sentences for murder and for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, we reaffirmed our decisions in State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 648 (R.I.2006) and R

2013Relying upon our decision in Rodriguez , we noted in Marsich , “ ‘the General Assembly clearly has expressed its intent that a guilty defendant should receive consecutive sentences’ for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence.” Id. at 443 (quoting Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at 908 ). 11 Likewise, in State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I.2007), which involved a double-jeopardy claim for consecutive life sentences for murder and for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, we reaffirmed our decisions in State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 648 (R.I.2006) and R

1994The double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Although the double-jeopardy clause has been interpreted as providing a “complex of rights,” State v. Torres, 524 A.2d 1120, 1123 (R.I.1987), at its heart lies the prohibition “against multiple prosecutions for ‘the same offense.’ ” Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 , 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2216 , 53 L.Ed.2d 168, 180 (1977).

1994The double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” Although the double-jeopardy clause has been interpreted as providing a “complex of rights,” State v. Torres, 524 A.2d 1120, 1123 (R.I.1987), at its heart lies the prohibition “against multiple prosecutions for ‘the same offense.’ ” Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 , 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2216 , 53 L.Ed.2d 168, 180 (1977).

2007In State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109 (R.I.2003), a case decided on other grounds, we noted that were we to reach the question of merger and apply Rodriguez to the facts in McGuy , a conviction for second-degree murder and for carrying a dangerous weapon when committing a crime of violence would not violate the double-jeopardy bar because each offense “require[s] proof of a fact that the other did not; to wit: murder and carrying a dangerous weapon, respectively.” Id. at 1115-16 .

2007In State v. McGuy, 841 A.2d 1109 (R.I.2003), a case decided on other grounds, we noted that were we to reach the question of merger and apply Rodriguez to the facts in McGuy , a conviction for second-degree murder and for carrying a dangerous weapon when committing a crime of violence would not violate the double-jeopardy bar because each offense “require[s] proof of a fact that the other did not; to wit: murder and carrying a dangerous weapon, respectively.” Id. at 1115-16 .

2007It is settled law in Rhode Island that the double jeopardy clause bars a conviction of an underlying felony when that offense is used to form a basis for felony murder. 8 State v. Innis , 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978) (rev'd on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)); State v. Powers , 526 A.2d 489 (R.I. 1987); State v. Villani , 491 A.2d 976 (R.I. 1985); see also Harris v. Oklahoma , 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (United States Constitution).

1985He argues that convictions on both murder and burglary were in contravention of the Fifth Amendment’s double-jeopardy clause, which “prohibits both successive prosecution for the same offense as well as multiple punishment for the same offense.” State v. Innis, 120 R.I. 641, 654 , 391 A.2d 1158, 1165 (1978), rev’d on other grounds, 446 U.S. 291 , 100 S.Ct. 1682 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (quoting Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 263 , 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977)).

1978The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S. Ct. 2056 , 23 L.

1978The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, made obligatory upon the states by the fourteenth amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S. Ct. 2056 , 23 L.

1997It has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the double jeopardy clause “protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496 (1989); see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969).

1997It has long been recognized by the United States Supreme Court that the double jeopardy clause “protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.” United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 , 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897 , 104 L.Ed.2d 487, 496 (1989); see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969).

2023See State v. Dale, 812 A.2d 795, 798 (R.I. 2002) (“[W]hen applying a double jeopardy argument to the context of a Super.

2019We have recognized that “the double jeopardy clause protects against three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Ciolli, 725 A.2d 268, 270 (R.I. 1999) (quoting One 1990 Chevrolet Corvette, 695 A.2d at 505 ).

2013See State v. Burke, 529 A.2d 621, 627 (R.I.1987). 9 B Double Jeopardy The defendant also contends that the trial justice erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.

2013Relying upon our decision in Rodriguez , we noted in Marsich , “ ‘the General Assembly clearly has expressed its intent that a guilty defendant should receive consecutive sentences’ for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence.” Id. at 443 (quoting Rodriguez, 822 A.2d at 908 ). 11 Likewise, in State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I.2007), which involved a double-jeopardy claim for consecutive life sentences for murder and for using a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, we reaffirmed our decisions in State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 648 (R.I.2006) and R