double jeopardy clause in Illinois

2025People v. Sperry, 2020 IL App (2d) 180296, ¶ 30 ; see People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (1995) (the double jeopardy clause forbids a second trial to give the State another opportunity to supply evidence that it failed to introduce in the first trial).

2024However, as respondent acknowledges in his brief, “the double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose conviction has been set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to the conviction.” People v. Olivera, 164 Ill. 2d 382, 393 , 647 N.E.2d 926, 931 (1995).

2024Id. ¶ 43 Nor does the double jeopardy clause preclude the trial court from reconsidering and vacating the order granting defendant a new trial.

2020Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978); People v. Drake, 2019 IL 123734, ¶ 20 ; People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173 (1990). ¶ 57 The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose conviction is overturned because of an error in the trial proceedings leading to the conviction.

2025Yet, the double jeopardy clause precludes retrying a defendant “once it has been determined that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction.” People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 367 (2008).

2024“The double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to present in the first proceeding.” People v. Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d 322, 367 (2008).

2025Our supreme court has explained: “The cornerstone of the double jeopardy clause is ‘that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.’ ” People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1999) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). ¶ 150 Although the double jeopardy

2024The clause prohibits the retrial of a defendant “for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to present in the first proceeding.” Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 367 ; see also People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1999) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)) (“The cornerstone of the double jeopardy clause is ‘that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel

2025We decline. ¶ 40 “The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, provides that no person shall ‘be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.’ ” People v. Bellmyer, 199 Ill. 2d 529, 536-37 (2002) (quoting U.S. Const., amend.

2025Defendant argues that his De Kalb County AHC conviction (1) infringes double jeopardy protections because he was “formerly prosecuted for the same offense based upon the same facts” and (2) violates the one-act, one-crime rule because his “UPWF [conviction] merged into a conviction of AHC, *** [and] both convictions were based off the same warrant and gun.” ¶ 23 “The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, provides that no person shall ‘be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeo

2009“The double jeopardy clause protects a defendant from: (1) a second prosecution after an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution after a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” People v. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 516 (2007), citing People v. Gray, 214 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2005).

2009“The double jeopardy clause protects a defendant from: (1) a second prosecution after an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution after a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” People v. Whitfield, 228 Ill. 2d 502, 516 (2007), citing People v. Gray, 214 Ill. 2d 1, 6 (2005).

2025Our supreme court has explained: “The cornerstone of the double jeopardy clause is ‘that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.’ ” People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1999) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). ¶ 150 Although the double jeopardy

2024The clause prohibits the retrial of a defendant “for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to present in the first proceeding.” Lopez, 229 Ill. 2d at 367 ; see also People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1999) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)) (“The cornerstone of the double jeopardy clause is ‘that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel

2020Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1978); People v. Drake, 2019 IL 123734, ¶ 20 ; People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173 (1990). ¶ 57 The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial of a defendant whose conviction is overturned because of an error in the trial proceedings leading to the conviction.

2017“The cornerstone of the double jeopardy clause is ‘that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.’ ” People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293, 307 (1999) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). ¶ 67 “The double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial for the purpose

2017I, § 10; 720 ILCS 5/3-4 (West 2014); see also People v. Sienkiewicz, 208 Ill. 2d 1, 4 , 802 N.E.2d 767, 770 (2003). “[T]he double jeopardy clause of our state constitution is to be construed in the same manner as the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution.” In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 91 , 676 N.E.2d 656, 662 (1997). ¶ 14 The double jeopardy clause protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense following acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense following conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.

2017I, § 10; 720 ILCS 5/3-4 (West 2014); see also People v. Sienkiewicz, 208 Ill. 2d 1, 4 , 802 N.E.2d 767, 770 (2003). “[T]he double jeopardy clause of our state constitution is to be construed in the same manner as the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution.” In re P.S., 175 Ill. 2d 79, 91 , 676 N.E.2d 656, 662 (1997). ¶ 14 The double jeopardy clause protects against (1) a second prosecution for the same offense following acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense following conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.

2019People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138, 144 (1993). ¶ 20 We have the discretion not to remand the case, and with the principles underlying the double jeopardy clause in mind, remand here seems offensive to legal sensibilities.

2018People v. Levin , 157 Ill. 2d 138 , 144, 191 Ill.Dec. 72 , 623 N.E.2d 317 (1993). ¶ 20 We have the discretion not to remand the case, and with the principles underlying the double jeopardy clause in mind, remand here seems offensive to legal sensibilities.

2024Thus, defendant argues, because the State is precluded from prosecuting him on the theory that he possessed a gun, we should reverse the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the AUUW charge. ¶ 25 Issue preclusion, “in the criminal context, is a component of the double jeopardy clause.” People v. Fort, 2017 IL 118966, ¶ 34 ; People v. Carrillo, 164 Ill. 2d 144, 147-52 (1995) (separately analyzing double jeopardy and issue preclusion arguments).

2015Our supreme court, however, concluded that pursuant to Diaz, the felony murder and intentional murder charges were "not barred by the double jeopardy clause because the defendants could not have been prosecuted for [the victim's] murder until her death." Id. at 149 . ¶ 34 In this case, the defendant urges that the double jeopardy exception noted in Diaz does not apply in this instance because the first prosecution in Diaz resulted in a conviction with - 13 - 1-13-4049 respect to the decedent, whereas the defendant in this instance was acquitted (through a directed verdict) of the charges in th

2003See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill.2d 289, 309 , 29 Ill.Dec. 103 , 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979) (holding that the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial giving the State another opportunity to offer evidence not presented in the first trial).

2003See People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309 (1979) (holding that the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial giving the State another opportunity to offer evidence not presented in the first trial).

1995Ed. 2d 265 , 109 S. Ct. 285 , that when a reviewing court determines that a defendant’s conviction must be set aside because certain evidence was erroneously admitted against him, and further finds that once that evidence is discounted, there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction, the double jeopardy clause does not forbid his retrial so long as the sum of the evidence offered by the trial court, whether erroneously or not, would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.

1990App. 3d 978 , 523 N.E.2d 130 ), also found the State did not meet its burden of proving the requirements of section 5—5—3(cX8) of the Code, the parties did not raise the issue of whether the double jeopardy clause would bar resentencing under this provision on remand. 2 The Supreme Court has held in a case involving a habitual criminal statute that resentencing would not be barred by the double jeopardy clause because the reversal involved a “trial error” instead of the sufficiency of the evidence (Lockhart v. Nelson (1988), 488 U.S. 33 , 102 L.

2025“The double jeopardy clause protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 376-77 (1998).

2022“The double jeopardy clause protects against three distinct abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.” People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 376-77 (1998). ¶ 26 The United States Supreme Court has “long recognized that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the imposition of all additional sanctions that could, in common parlance, be described as punishment.” Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1997) (internal citations and quotations omit

2026The fourth exception, stated in Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), occurs when a defendant unilaterally deprives the State of its interest in completing its prosecution through the offensive use of the double jeopardy clause, either over the State’s objection or otherwise through the use of “procedural wangling to unilaterally deprive ‘the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.’ ” State v. Fox, No. 13-1429, 2014 WL 5243365 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (quoting Johnson, 467 U.S. at 502 ).

2026The fourth exception, stated in Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984), occurs when a defendant unilaterally deprives the State of its interest in completing its prosecution through the offensive use of the double jeopardy clause, either over the State’s objection or otherwise through the use of “procedural wangling to unilaterally deprive ‘the State its right to one full and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.’ ” State v. Fox, No. 13-1429, 2014 WL 5243365 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2014) (quoting Johnson, 467 U.S. at 502 ).

2026See People v. Drake, 2019 IL 123734, ¶ 20 (“The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial when a conviction has been overturned because of an error in the trial proceedings, but retrial is barred if the evidence introduced at the initial trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction.”).

2025“The double jeopardy clause does not preclude retrial when a conviction has been overturned because of an error in the trial proceedings, but retrial is barred if the evidence introduced at the initial trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction.” People v. Drake, 2019 IL 123734, ¶ 20 .

1997The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment (Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 23 L.

1997The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment (Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 23 L.

1997The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment ( Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969)), protects against three perils: a second prosecution after acquittal, a second prosecution after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense ( North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969)).

1997The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment ( Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969)), protects against three perils: a second prosecution after acquittal, a second prosecution after conviction, and multiple punishments for the same offense ( North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969)).

2026We do not hesitate to hold that it is.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 443, 445 . -6- ¶ 27 The Currier majority ignored the reasoning of Ashe and reinterpreted the decision to apply issue preclusion as part of the double jeopardy clause only when a trial on the second charge “would be tantamount to the forbidden relitigation of the same offense resolved at the first trial.” Currier, 585 U.S. at 499 .

2024The appellate court noted, however, that because it had not made a final determination on the merits of Jefferson’s preclusion argument, he was not prevented from raising and relitigating the application of “issue preclusion as it relates to his case on remand.” Id. ¶ 50 . ¶ 17 Returning again to the trial court, Jefferson filed a “Collateral Estoppel Motion to Bar Evidence” in which he argued that, under Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970), the doctrine of issue preclusion as embodied within the double jeopardy clause of the federal constitution barred the State from arguing or introducing -

2003“The double jeopardy clause precludes the State from retrying a defendant once a reviewing court has determined that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to convict.” People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173-74 (1990); see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 , 72 L.

2003“The double jeopardy clause precludes the State from retrying a defendant once a reviewing court has determined that the evidence introduced at trial was legally insufficient to convict.” People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 173-74 (1990); see also Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31 , 72 L.

2022App. 3d 194, 199 (1994), for the proposition that a defendant’s acquiescence in a mistrial “will generally remove any bar to reprosecution unless the conduct of the judge or prosecutor was calculated to provoke the defendant to move for a mistrial.” 2 This “narrow exception” to the rule that the double jeopardy clause is not a bar to retrial where the defendant moves for the mistrial was announced by the United States Supreme Court in Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982).

2004In such a case, the double jeopardy clause does not bar retrial, unless “the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial.” Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 , 72 L.

2013We further explained that “what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the double jeopardy clause is not necessarily controlled by the form of the judge’s action” or “what the judge calls it.” Id. at 388-89 (citing Martin Linen Supply, 430 U.S. at 571 , and Jorn, 400 U.S. at 478 n.7). ¶ 30 Applying these principles to the facts before us, we looked beyond the form to the substance of what occurred in the circuit court and held that “[w]hile the judge denominated his action an ‘acquittal,’ it bore none of those characteristics except the label.” Deems, 81 Ill. 2d at 389 .

1988The interests which the double jeopardy clause seeks to protect are not implicated unless a defendant is put in jeopardy. ( Serfass v. United States (1975), 420 U.S. 377 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 ; People v. Shields (1979), 76 Ill.2d 543 .) In nonjury trials, jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn and the court begins to hear evidence. ( People v. Shields (1979), 76 Ill.2d 543, 546-47 ; Serfass v. United States (1975), 420 U.S. 377 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 , 95 S.Ct. 1055 .) The defendant must be "`put to trial before the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.'" Serf