per se rule in Washington

2024In Klem, we clarified that “a claim under the Washington CPA may be predicated upon a per se violation of statute, an act or practice that has the capacity to deceive substantial portions of the public, or an unfair or deceptive act or practice not regulated by statute but in violation of public interest.” 176 Wn.2d at 787 .

2024In Klem, we clarified that “a claim under the Washington CPA may be predicated upon a per se violation of statute, an act or practice that has the capacity to deceive substantial portions of the public, or an unfair or deceptive act or practice not regulated by statute but in violation of public interest.” 176 Wn.2d at 787 .

1985Absent a per se violation of the Consumer Protection Act, in order to establish an impact on the public interest, a plaintiff must satisfy the test enunciated in Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40, 46 , 614 P.2d 184 (1980): [T]he presence of public interest is demonstrated when the proof establishes that (1) the defendant by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce has induced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (2) the plaintiff suffers damage brought about by such action or failure to act; and (3) the defendant's deceptive acts or practices have the pote

1985Absent a per se violation of the Consumer Protection Act, in order to establish an impact on the public interest, a plaintiff must satisfy the test enunciated in Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40, 46 , 614 P.2d 184 (1980): [T]he presence of public interest is demonstrated when the proof establishes that (1) the defendant by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce has induced the plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (2) the plaintiff suffers damage brought about by such action or failure to act; and (3) the defendant's deceptive acts or practices have the pote

1984The Strouds first assign error to the finding the violation of the real estate brokers and salesmen act, RCW 18.85.230, constituted a per se violation of the CPA. 1 A violation of the CPA may be per se, State v. Reader’s Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn.2d 259, 276 , 501 P.2d 290 (1972), or de facto by showing an unfair or deceptive act which affects the public interest, Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40 , 614 P.2d 184 (1980).

1984The Strouds first assign error to the finding the violation of the real estate brokers and salesmen act, RCW 18.85.230, constituted a per se violation of the CPA. 1 A violation of the CPA may be per se, State v. Reader’s Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn.2d 259, 276 , 501 P.2d 290 (1972), or de facto by showing an unfair or deceptive act which affects the public interest, Anhold v. Daniels, 94 Wn.2d 40 , 614 P.2d 184 (1980).

2021Co., 90 Wn.2d 355, 359 , 581 P.2d 11 No. 54904-2-II 1349 (1978) (holding that the jury’s verdict that the insurance company breached its duty to exercise good faith in RCW 48.01.030 amounted to a per se violation of RCW 19.86.020).3 In Tank, the court explained that “[t]he duty to act in good faith or liability for acting in bad faith generally refers to the same obligation,” and these terms may be used “interchangeably.” 105 Wn.2d at 385.

1983Co., 90 Wn.2d 355, 358 , 581 P.2d 1349 (1978). *57 In order to recover for a per se violation, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the existence of a pertinent statute; (2) its violation; (3) that such violation was the proximate cause of damages sustained; and (4) that they were within the class of people the statute sought to protect.

1983App. 384, 393 , 589 P.2d 1265 (1979), to recover for a per se violation of the Consumer Protection Act, a party must prove: (1) the existence of a pertinent statute; (2) its violation; (3) that such violation was the proximate cause of damages sustained; and (4) that they were within the class of people the statute sought to protect.

1983App. 384, 393 , 589 P.2d 1265 (1979) set forth four elements which must be present for the court to find a per se violation of the CPA: (1) the existence of a pertinent statute; (2) its violation; (3) that such violation was the proximate cause of damages sustained; and (4) that they were within the class of people the statute sought to protect.

2020Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 162 Wn.2d 59, 74 , 170 P.3d 10 (2007). [A] claim under the Washington CPA may be predicated upon a per se violation of statute, an act or practice that has the capacity to deceive substantial portions of the public, or an unfair or deceptive act or practice not regulated by statute but in violation of public interest.

2013Indoor Billboard, 162 Wn.2d at 84 . 166 Wn.2d 27 , 57, 204 P.3d 885 (2009) (quoting Mason v. Mortg.

2014App. 151, 155 , 803 P.2d 10 (1991) (violation of WCAA is a per se violation of the CPA).

2014App. 151, 155 , 803 P.2d 10 (1991) (violation of WCAA is a per se violation of the WCPA).

1985As succinctly put in Sato v. Century 21 Ocean Shores Real Estate, 101 Wn.2d 599, 601 , 681 P.2d 242 (1984), "not every violation of a statute results in a per se consumer protection action." It would serve no useful purpose to recite all of the Attorney General's arguments herein other than to note that in substantial part they track the above referenced law review commentators.

1985As succinctly put in Sato v. Century 21 Ocean Shores Real Estate, 101 Wn.2d 599, 601 , 681 P.2d 242 (1984), "not every violation of a statute results in a per se consumer protection action." It would serve no useful purpose to recite all of the Attorney General's arguments herein other than to note that in substantial part they track the above referenced law review commentators.

2019We continue to apply the long-standing rule that “consideration of any material by a jury not properly admitted as evidence vitiates a verdict when there is a reasonable ground to believe that the defendant may have been preiudiced.” Pete, 152 Wn.2d at 555 n.412 (quoting State v. Rinkes, 70 Wn.2d 854, 862 , 425 P.2d 658 (1967)); see also Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d at 705 .

2019We continue to apply the long-standing rule that “consideration of any material by a jury not properly admitted as evidence vitiates a verdict when there is a reasonable ground to believe that the defendant may have been preiudiced.” Pete, 152 Wn.2d at 555 n.412 (quoting State v. Rinkes, 70 Wn.2d 854, 862 , 425 P.2d 658 (1967)); see also Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d at 705 .

2016The district is absolutely correct that "[f]or school pupils ... the essential rationale for imposing a duty 'is that the victim is placed under the control and protection of the other party, the school, with resulting loss of control to protect himself or herself.'" N.K. v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 175 Wn.

2016The district is absolutely correct that "[f]or school pupils ... the essential rationale for imposing a duty 'is that the victim is placed under the control and protection of the other party, the school, with resulting loss of control to protect himself or herself.'" N.K. v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 175 Wn.

2015The court cites the general rule that absent notice, “ ‘a broker-dealer owes no duty to a non-customer who has invested money through an independent investment advisor’ ” but notes that “ ‘this general proposition of non-liability is far from a per se rule.’ ” McGraw, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 1072 (quoting Bear Stearns & Co. v. Buehler, 23 F. App’x 773, 775 (9th Cir. 2001)).

2015The court cites the general rule that absent notice," 'a broker- dealer owes no duty to a non-customer who has invested money through an 30 No. 69625-4-1/31 independent investment advisor'" but notes " 'this general proposition of non-liability is far from a per se rule.'" McGraw, 756 F. Supp. 2d at 107224 (quoting Bear Stearns & Co. v. Buehler, 23 App'x 773, 775 (9th Cir. 2001)).

2009Green, 28 Wn.

2009Green, 28 Wash.App. 135 , 622 P.2d 869 .

2007Restraint of Whitesel, 111 Wn.2d 621, 631 , 763 P.2d 199 (1988) (holding that inmates do not have the right to an attorney during the Board’s minimum term redetermination); Arment v. Henry, 98 Wn.2d 775, 778-80 , 658 P.2d 663 (1983) (declining to adopt a per se rule mandating the right to counsel at Board disciplinary hearings that could increase the offender’s minimum term); In re Pers.

2007Restraint of Whitesel, 111 Wn.2d 621, 631 , 763 P.2d 199 (1988) (holding that inmates do not have the right to an attorney during the Board’s minimum term redetermination); Arment v. Henry, 98 Wn.2d 775, 778-80 , 658 P.2d 663 (1983) (declining to adopt a per se rule mandating the right to counsel at Board disciplinary hearings that could increase the offender’s minimum term); In re Pers.

2004Restraint of Brett, 142 Wash.2d 868, 873 , 16 P.3d 601 (2001). [27] State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 334-35 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Thomas, 109 Wash.2d 222, 225-26 , 743 P.2d 816 (1987)) (applying the two-prong test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). [28] Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . [29] Id. at 700 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . [30] McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 335 , 899 P.2d 1251 . [31] Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 , 104 S.

2004Restraint of Brett, 142 Wash.2d 868, 873 , 16 P.3d 601 (2001). [27] State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 334-35 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995) (citing State v. Thomas, 109 Wash.2d 222, 225-26 , 743 P.2d 816 (1987)) (applying the two-prong test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). [28] Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . [29] Id. at 700 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . [30] McFarland, 127 Wash.2d at 335 , 899 P.2d 1251 . [31] Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 384 , 106 S.Ct. 2574 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89 , 104 S.

2023Id.

2014Gomez, 180 Wn.2d at 348 .

2020The Sheppard court remanded the case for a trial to determine “what extent, if any, the forfeiture provision provides a reasonable restraint and to what extent it may be enforceable.” Id. at 934 .

2020The Sheppard court remanded the case for a trial to determine “what extent, if any, the forfeiture provision provides a reasonable restraint and to what extent it may be enforceable.” Id. at 934 .