per se rule in Illinois

2025Even in such circumstances, “[p]ersons who own, occupy, or control and maintain land are not ordinarily required to foresee and protect against injuries from potentially dangerous conditions that are open and obvious.” Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 447-48 (1996). ¶ 27 The open and obvious exception is not a per se rule to deny liability on the part of a defendant, who is still expected to exercise reasonable care proportionate to the circumstances.

2016App. 3d at 7 (citing and quoting numerous cases). ¶ 57 In addition, "[t]he existence of an open and obvious danger is not a per se bar to finding that a defendant who owns, occupies or controls land has a duty to exercise reasonable care." Jackson, 185 Ill. 2d at 425 ; Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 449 (1996) (not "an automatic or per se bar").

1998See Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 148 , 554 N.E.2d at 230 , stating: “Certainly a condition may be so blatantly obvious and in such position on the defendant’s premises that he could not reasonably be expected to anticipate that people will fail to protect themselves from any danger posed by the condition.” The existence of an open and obvious condition is not a per se bar to the finding of a legal duty, however.

1998See Ward, 136 Ill. 2d at 148 , 554 N.E.2d at 230 , stating: “Certainly a condition may be so blatantly obvious and in such position on the defendant’s premises that he could not reasonably be expected to anticipate that people will fail to protect themselves from any danger posed by the condition.” The existence of an open and obvious condition is not a per se bar to the finding of a legal duty, however.

2018The court in Spreitzer also recognized that treating multiple representation of codefendants as creating a per se conflict would put an end to multiple representation altogether, “since a ‘possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,’ and a per se rule would ‘preclude multiple representation even in cases where “[a] common defense *** gives strength against a common attack.” ’ ” Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 17 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 , quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 92 ).

2017The court in Spreitzer also recognized that treating multiple representation of codefendants as creating a per se conflict would put an end to multiple representation altogether, "since a 'possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,' and a per se rule would 'preclude multiple representation even in cases where "[a] common defense * * * gives strength against a common attack." ' " Spreitzer , 123 Ill. 2d at 17 , 121 Ill.Dec. 224 , 525 N.E.2d 30 (quoting Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , quoting Glasser , 315 U.S. at 92 , 62 S.Ct. 457 ).

2023Fairness to both the accused as well as his attorney dictates application of a per se rule. [Citations.] In such case, it is unnecessary for the defendant to show actual prejudice in order to be entitled to a reversal of his conviction.” Id. at 217-18 . -4- Likewise, in the present case, defendant’s court-appointed defense counsel previously served as a prosecutor in the same criminal case.

2004This court has consistently held that a “possible conflict of interest” dictated “application of a per se rule.” See People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 217-18 (1994); see also People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 254 (1989) (potential conflict of interest may have precluded attorney from properly cross-examining certain witnesses the State indicated it may call at trial); People v. Thomas, 131 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1989) (defendant need not show prejudice under the per se rule when his attorney had “ ‘an actual or possible conflict of professional interests’ ”), quoting People v. Washington, 101 Ill

2024However, the Second District indicated that our supreme court’s decision in People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 14-15 (1988), “explained that the per se rule is applied in cases involving a direct conflict between the interests of two opposing clients or between a present client and a past personal commitment.” Johnson, 322 Ill.

2022See People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1988). ¶ 38 Indeed, applying the supreme court’s per se analysis to the specific facts of this case reveals that the justification for treating certain conflicts as per se can be exemplified by defense counsel’s desire for her daughter to succeed, which, in turn, conflicts with her professional obligation to defendant.

2004This court has consistently held that a “possible conflict of interest” dictated “application of a per se rule.” See People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 217-18 (1994); see also People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 254 (1989) (potential conflict of interest may have precluded attorney from properly cross-examining certain witnesses the State indicated it may call at trial); People v. Thomas, 131 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1989) (defendant need not show prejudice under the per se rule when his attorney had “ ‘an actual or possible conflict of professional interests’ ”), quoting People v. Washington, 101 Ill

2004This court has consistently held that' a "possible conflict of interest" dictated "application of a per se rule." See People v. Lawson, 163 Ill.2d 187, 217-18 , 206 Ill.Dec. 119 , 644 N.E.2d 1172 (1994); see also People v. Barrow, 133 Ill.2d 226, 254 , 139 Ill.Dec. 728 , 549 N.E.2d 240 (1989) (potential conflict of interest may have precluded attorney from properly cross-examining certain witnesses the State indicated it may call at trial); People v. Thomas, 131 Ill.2d 104, 111 , 137 Ill.Dec. 1 , 545 N.E.2d 654 (1989) (defendant need not show prejudice under the per se rule when his attorney h

2013People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 111-12 (1968) (quoting Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1962)). -4- 2013 IL App (2d) 120359 ¶ 11 The Spreitzer court explained the justification underlying the per se rule, noting that counsel’s knowledge that a result favorable to his other client or association would inevitably conflict with a defendant’s interest “might ‘subliminally’ affect counsel’s performance in ways [that are] difficult to detect and demonstrate.” Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 16 .

2013People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 111-12 (1968) (quoting Porter v. United States, 298 F.2d 461, 463 (5th Cir. 1962)). ¶ 11 The Spreitzer court explained the justification underlying the per se rule, noting that counsel’s knowledge that a result favorable to his other client or association would inevitably conflict with a defendant’s interest “might ‘subliminally’ affect counsel’s performance in ways [that are] difficult to detect and demonstrate.” Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 16 .

2021As such, no active representation [of the victim] is necessary and, thus, we need not inquire into the specific facts of the nature and extent of the representation to determine whether the per se rule applies.” Id.

2021In Juan Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d at 151 , the court stated that the first category of per se conflicts arises from “counsel’s association, relationship, commitment, professional connection, or some tie with the victim, a party, or the prosecution, which is either prior or current or previous or current.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Also, the “very nature of a per se conflict rule precludes inquiry into the specific facts of a case,” and the fact of actual commitment to another, and not the degree or extent of the commitment, dictates applying the per se rule.

2004This court has consistently held that a “possible conflict of interest” dictated “application of a per se rule.” See People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187, 217-18 (1994); see also People v. Barrow, 133 Ill. 2d 226, 254 (1989) (potential conflict of interest may have precluded attorney from properly cross-examining certain witnesses the State indicated it may call at trial); People v. Thomas, 131 Ill. 2d 104, 111 (1989) (defendant need not show prejudice under the per se rule when his attorney had “ ‘an actual or possible conflict of professional interests’ ”), quoting People v. Washington, 101 Ill

2004This court has consistently held that' a "possible conflict of interest" dictated "application of a per se rule." See People v. Lawson, 163 Ill.2d 187, 217-18 , 206 Ill.Dec. 119 , 644 N.E.2d 1172 (1994); see also People v. Barrow, 133 Ill.2d 226, 254 , 139 Ill.Dec. 728 , 549 N.E.2d 240 (1989) (potential conflict of interest may have precluded attorney from properly cross-examining certain witnesses the State indicated it may call at trial); People v. Thomas, 131 Ill.2d 104, 111 , 137 Ill.Dec. 1 , 545 N.E.2d 654 (1989) (defendant need not show prejudice under the per se rule when his attorney h

2015“Thus, whether a duty exists to guard against harm from an open and obvious condition depends on whether an exception applies.” Id. (citing Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 15-16 (2002)). ¶ 30 Essentially, then, in Suchy we recognized a per se rule for open-and-obvious conditions, albeit one with several moving parts: if (1) the condition is open and obvious; and (2) no exception applies, then there is no duty.

2008See Sollami v. Eaton, 201 Ill. 2d 1, 15 , 772 N.E.2d 215, 223 (2002) (explaining that “the existence of an open and obvious condition is not a per se bar to a finding of legal duty on the part of a premises owner or occupier”).

2020Illinois courts have applied the per se rule where the defendant’s attorney previously appeared in the same proceeding on behalf of the prosecution (People v. Kester, 66 Ill. 2d 162 (1977)) and where a mother’s court-appointed attorney previously represented the children as the GAL in the same juvenile proceeding (S.G., 347 Ill.

2002Lawson , 163 Ill. 2d at 217-18 , 644 N.E.2d at 1186 (finding that a "possible conflict of interests existed" dictating "application of a per se rule"); People v. Barrow , 133 Ill. 2d 226, 254 , 549 N.E.2d 240, 252 (1989) (affirming the trial court's disqualification of one of defendant's attorneys where "a potential conflict of interest existed *** which may have precluded [the attorney] from properly cross-examining certain witnesses the State indicated it may call at trial"); People v. Thomas , 131 Ill. 2d 104, 111 , 545 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1989) (stating that defendant need not show prejudice

2023The court stated that “whether Hernandez wanted a particular result from [the] defendant’s trial depend[ed] on unknown facts about Hernandez” and that “[s]peculation that Hernandez might have stood to benefit from a verdict against defendant [did] not support application of the per se rule.” Id. at 347 . ¶ 39 The circumstances of the present case are similar to Morales.

2023In setting forth his rationale for finding a per se conflict, Justice Kilbride noted that the supreme court had “consistently held that a ‘possible conflict of interest’ dictated ‘application of a per se rule.’ ” Id.

2018The court in Spreitzer also recognized that treating multiple representation of codefendants as creating a per se conflict would put an end to multiple representation altogether, “since a ‘possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,’ and a per se rule would ‘preclude multiple representation even in cases where “[a] common defense *** gives strength against a common attack.” ’ ” Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d at 17 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 , quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 92 ).

2017The court in Spreitzer also recognized that treating multiple representation of codefendants as creating a per se conflict would put an end to multiple representation altogether, "since a 'possible conflict inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation,' and a per se rule would 'preclude multiple representation even in cases where "[a] common defense * * * gives strength against a common attack." ' " Spreitzer , 123 Ill. 2d at 17 , 121 Ill.Dec. 224 , 525 N.E.2d 30 (quoting Cuyler , 446 U.S. at 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , quoting Glasser , 315 U.S. at 92 , 62 S.Ct. 457 ).

2007Nevertheless, “the mere fact of joint representation of multiple criminal defendants does not establish a per se violation of the right to effective counsel.” People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 156 , 659 N.E.2d 935, 943 (1995), citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 , 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 , 55 L.

2007Nevertheless, “the mere fact of joint representation of multiple criminal defendants does not establish a per se violation of the right to effective counsel.” People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138, 156 , 659 N.E.2d 935, 943 (1995), citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 , 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 , 55 L.

2016App. 3d at 7 (citing and quoting numerous cases). ¶ 58 In addition, "[t]he existence of an open and obvious danger is not a per se bar to finding that a defendant who owns, occupies or controls land has a duty to exercise reasonable care." Jackson, 185 Ill. 2d at 425 ; Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 449 (1996) (not "an automatic or per se bar").

2016App. 3d at 7 (citing and quoting numerous cases). ¶ 57 In addition, "[t]he existence of an open and obvious danger is not a per se bar to finding that a defendant who owns, occupies or controls land has a duty to exercise reasonable care." Jackson, 185 Ill. 2d at 425 ; Bucheleres v. Chicago Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 435, 449 (1996) (not "an automatic or per se bar").

2008The court stated: “This per se rule applies to the specific exemptions set forth in the subsections of section 7(l)(b) of the Act [citation], which pertains to ‘[information that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,’ just as it does to the other exemptions in section 7.” Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408 , quoting 5 ILCS 140/7(l)(b) (West 1994).

2008The court stated: "This per se rule applies to the specific exemptions set forth in the subsections of section 7(1)(b) of the Act [citation], which pertains to '[i]nformation that, if disclosed, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,' just as it does to the other exemptions in section 7." Lieber, 176 Ill. 2d at 408 , quoting 5 ILCS 140/7(1)(b) (West 1994).

1999The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari “to review this per se rule.” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36 , 136 L.

1999The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari “to review this per se rule.” Robinette, 519 U.S. at 36 , 136 L.

1986(People v. Franklin (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 173, 176 ; People v. Coslet (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 127, 133 ; People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 113 .) This court has held that when an attorney is disqualified due to a conflict of interest another attorney from the same law firm may not assume the representation (People v. Fife (1978), 76 Ill. 2d 418 ), but the disqualification of one public defender will not necessarily disqualify all members of that office (People v. Miller (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 454 ; People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 147 ).” ( 112 Ill. 2d 154, 167 , 492 N.E.2d 1269 .) The court h

1984This court applied the per se rule in reversing the conviction due to “the possible, perhaps subliminal pressure a defense counsel who is also a special assistant for workmen’s compensation cases might receive from the Attorney General’s office.” ( 76 Ill. 2d 418, 424-25 .) The concern here, too, is the subtle and subconscious pressure the suggested conflict may have had on counsel.