per se rule in Maine

2012See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2399, 2408 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (noting that neither school administrators nor police officers contacted a thirteen-year-old student's legal guardian before interrogating the juvenile at school, but drawing no conclusion from this evidence alone and remanding the case to determine custody); see also State v. Ann Marie C., 407 A.2d 715, 725 (Me.1979) (concluding that neither the federal nor state constitution imposes "a per se requirement that a juvenile be accorded the counsel of a parent or other adult before she can knowingly and vo

1982State v. Ann Marie C., Me., 407 A.2d 715, 724-25 (1979).

1998See State v. Connors, 679 A.2d 1072, 1075 (Me.1996). [¶ 17] First, the twenty-two month delay in Hider’s case does not establish a per se violation of his right to a speedy trial, but it is enough to raise a presumption that such delay was not necessary. 11 See State v. Rippy, 626 A.2d 334, 339 (Me.1993) (nineteen-month delay was enough to raise presumption that such delay was unnecessary); State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538, 540 (Me.1991) (thirty-two month delay not per se violation). [¶ 18] Second, we have been reluctant to find violations of the right to a speedy trial unless the delay is solel

1993See State v. Michaud, 590 A.2d 538, 540 (Me.1991) (32-month delay is not a per se violation of defendant’s right to a speedy trial).

1991See State v. Beauchene, 541 A.2d 914, 918-19 (Me.1988) (in context of other factors, eight and two-thirds year delay between indictment and trial did not constitute a denial of defendant’s right to a speedy trial).

1989See State v. Beauchene, 541 A.2d 914, 918 (Me.1988).

1980State v. Gagne, Me., 362 A.2d 166, 170-71 (1976), held that although the results of lie detector tests are inadmissible, citing State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974), Maine does not have a per se rule requiring a mistrial for any reference by a witness to the fact that he or she has taken such a test.

1979State v. Gagne, Me., 362 A.2d 166, 170-71 (1976).

2024Comm’n, 382 A.2d 302, 327-28 (Me. 1978) (“We know of no persuasive authority, however, . . . establishing a per se rule that all utility rates must be based solely on cost factors . . . .

2001We addressed this issue in Central Maine Power Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 382 A.2d 302 (Me.1978) stating: We know of no persuasive authority, however, ... establishing a per se rule that all utility rates must be based solely on cost factors.

2023See Gardenhire, 722 F. App’x at 840; see also Carnicella, 2017 ME 161 , ¶ 23 & n.6, 168 A.3d 768 .

2023The reasons for the delays require further inquiry on remand. [¶45] On direct appeal, periods of delay occasioned by the accused should not be counted against the State, see State v. Spearin, 477 A.2d 1147, 1154 (Me. 1984), but other delays—both those caused by the State and those attributable to court delays and backlogs—should be counted against the State.

2023See Gardenhire, 722 F. App’x at 840; see also Carnicella, 2017 ME 161 , ¶ 23 & n.6, 168 A.3d 768 .

2023Comm’n, 383 A.2d at 375 (explaining that “decisions by federal courts interpreting the federal statutory equivalents . . . provide significant guidance in the construction of our statute”). [¶16] Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), an employer policy that requires an employee to be 100 percent fit or fully healed to return to work is a per se violation of the ADA.

2021The majority in Lyness recognized that its interpretation of the state due process clause differed from the due process requirements embodied in the federal constitution. 605 A.2d at 1210, n. 15 (referring to Withrow v. Larkin, 412 US. 35 (1971) as embracing a different view of due 1 Overruled on other grounds in In Re Kennedy, 266 Ga. 249, 251, n. 1 , 466 S.E. 2d 1 ( 1996).

2021The majority in Lyness recognized that its interpretation of the state due process clause differed from the due process requirements embodied in the federal constitution. 605 A.2d at 1210, n. 15 (referring to Withrow v. Larkin, 412 US. 35 (1971) as embracing a different view of due 1 Overruled on other grounds in In Re Kennedy, 266 Ga. 249, 251, n. 1 , 466 S.E. 2d 1 ( 1996).

2021See 5 M.R.S. § 9062 Lyness v. Commonwealth, 529 Pa. 535 , 605 A.2d 1204 (1992) was a divided decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that appears to have adopted a per se rule that a due process violation occurs under the state constitution if an administrative body is involved in the investigatory stage of a matter and later sits as an adjudicatory body on the same matter.

2021See 5 M.R.S. § 9062 Lyness v. Commonwealth, 529 Pa. 535 , 605 A.2d 1204 (1992) was a divided decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that appears to have adopted a per se rule that a due process violation occurs under the state constitution if an administrative body is involved in the investigatory stage of a matter and later sits as an adjudicatory body on the same matter.

2020See, e.g., Reznik v. McKee, 534 P.2d 243, 254-55 (Kan. 1975); Curry v. Cotton, 191 N.E. 307, 310 (Ill. 1934) (noting, however, that “where [a joint will] is one jointly executed by the husband and wife, while in 19 itself not conclusive evidence of a contract, it is a very material circumstance” to the question of whether a contract exists). [¶30] Here, the stipulated record does not establish as a matter of law that Brad’s and Belanger’s mutual promises were either a quid pro quo (and thus consideration for each other) or a matter of marital obligation or perceived social propriety (and thus

2020See, e.g., Reznik v. McKee, 534 P.2d 243, 254-55 (Kan. 1975); Curry v. Cotton, 191 N.E. 307, 310 (Ill. 1934) (noting, however, that “where [a joint will] is one jointly executed by the husband and wife, while in 19 itself not conclusive evidence of a contract, it is a very material circumstance” to the question of whether a contract exists). [¶30] Here, the stipulated record does not establish as a matter of law that Brad’s and Belanger’s mutual promises were either a quid pro quo (and thus consideration for each other) or a matter of marital obligation or perceived social propriety (and thus

2018Cox, Ltd, 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934), Congress does not have to explicitly state it is abrogating particular treaty rights; use of an explicit statement is not "a per se rule ...." US. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986).

2018Cox, Ltd, 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934), Congress does not have to explicitly state it is abrogating particular treaty rights; use of an explicit statement is not "a per se rule ...." US. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986).

2018Instead, "where the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate is sufficiently compelling, the weight of authority indicates that such an intent can also be found by a reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the legislative history of a statute." Id. at 739-40 (internal citation omitted).

2017See, e.g., State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 26 , 89 A.3d 1066 . 9 .

2017See, e.g., State v. Lovejoy, 2014 ME 48, ¶ 26 , 89 A.3d 1066 . 9 .

2012See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2399, 2408 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (noting that neither school administrators nor police officers contacted a thirteen-year-old student's legal guardian before interrogating the juvenile at school, but drawing no conclusion from this evidence alone and remanding the case to determine custody); see also State v. Ann Marie C., 407 A.2d 715, 725 (Me.1979) (concluding that neither the federal nor state constitution imposes "a per se requirement that a juvenile be accorded the counsel of a parent or other adult before she can knowingly and vo

2012See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2399, 2408 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (noting that neither school administrators nor police officers contacted a thirteen-year-old student's legal guardian before interrogating the juvenile at school, but drawing no conclusion from this evidence alone and remanding the case to determine custody); see also State v. Ann Marie C., 407 A.2d 715, 725 (Me.1979) (concluding that neither the federal nor state constitution imposes "a per se requirement that a juvenile be accorded the counsel of a parent or other adult before she can knowingly and vo

2012See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2399, 2408 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (noting that neither school administrators nor police officers contacted a thirteen-year-old student's legal guardian before interrogating the juvenile at school, but drawing no conclusion from this evidence alone and remanding the case to determine custody); see also State v. Ann Marie C., 407 A.2d 715, 725 (Me.1979) (concluding that neither the federal nor state constitution imposes "a per se requirement that a juvenile be accorded the counsel of a parent or other adult before she can knowingly and vo

2009See,~, State v. Rideout, 2000 NIE 194, 'i1 8, 761 A.2d 288, 290 .

2003United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1231 (7" Cir. 1994)(citing Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424 , 427 n.7 (9" Cir. 1978).