per se rule in Indiana

2020Servs., Inc. v. State Lottery Comm’n, 646 N.E.2d 334, 349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).

2007Id.

2013Rather, its application should depend upon an evaluation of attendant circumstances.’ " Id. at 664-65 (quoting United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 470 (3rd Cir. 1973)).

1987However, that exception is not "a per se rule to be applied indiscriminately to ... every object that has the capacity for movement, Rather, its application should depend upon an evaluation of at *665 tendant circumstances." United States v. Valen, 479 F.2d 467, 470 (3rd Cir.1973).

2019Therefore, citing King v. United Leasing, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), 5 they contend that the inadequate service left the trial court without personal jurisdiction over them, and the default judgment was void and should be vacated. [13] However, “it is well established that non-compliance with Rule 9.2(A) is not a per se bar to the action.” Brown v. Guinn, 970 N.E.2d 192, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2017We have explained that Rule 9.2(F) “affords the trial court broad discretion in ordering compliance or permitting an action to proceed without amendment of the pleadings.” Brenneman Mech. & Elec., Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Logansport, 495 N.E.2d 233, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added), reh’g denied, trans. denied; see also Brown v. Guinn, 970 N.E.2d 192, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (“[I]t is well established that non-compliance with Rule Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1608-PL-1860 | June 2, 2017 Page 14 of 20 9.2(A) is not a per se bar to the action.”).

2015Nevertheless, evidence acquired from a show-up confrontation “is not subject to a per se rule of exclusion.” Mitchell v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), reh’g denied; trans. denied.

2013“The United States Supreme Court and the Indiana Supreme Court have both condemned the practice of conducting a one-on-one show-up because of its inherent suggestiveness,” but “identification evidence gathered via a show-up procedure is not subject to a per se rule of exclusion.” Mitchell v. State, 690 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (citations omitted), trans. denied.

2013In Little v. State, 819 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, this court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the contention “that mere deficiencies in an attorney’s bar membership give rise to a per se violation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 504 (citing U.S. v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 1991)).

2004For instance, in United States v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847 (7th Cir.1991), the Seventh Cireuit considered whether there was a per se violation when trial counsel's license was suspended for ninety days for professional misconduct pursuant to a disciplinary decision rendered during the defendant's trial.

2012Rather, as stated in Rule 9.2(F): “The court, in its sound discretion, may order compliance . . . or allow the action to continue without further pleading.” While the small claims rules do not contain a provision analogous to Trial Rule 9.2(F), “the Rules of Trial Procedure apply in small claims court unless the particular rule in question is inconsistent with something in the small claims rules.” Bowman v. Kitchel, 644 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ind. 1995).

2012Rather, as stated in Rule 9.2(F): “The court, in its sound discretion, may order compliance ... or allow the action to continue without further pleading.” While the small claims rules do not contain a provision analogous to Trial Rule 9.2(F), “the Rules of Trial Procedure apply in small claims court unless the particular rule in question is inconsistent with something in the small claims rules.” Bowman v. Kitchel, 644 N.E.2d 878, 879 (Ind.1995).

2010See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550 , 113 S.Ct. 2766 .

2010See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 550 , 113 S.Ct. 2766 .

2006The Court of Appeals explained that, "(allthough one's religious beliefs may render a prospective juror unsuitable for service in a particular case, one's religious affiliation, like one's race or gender, bears no relation to that person's ability to serve as a juror." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing (Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) ("In our heterogenous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accid

2006The Court of Appeals explained that, "(allthough one's religious beliefs may render a prospective juror unsuitable for service in a particular case, one's religious affiliation, like one's race or gender, bears no relation to that person's ability to serve as a juror." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing (Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 , 112 S.Ct. 2348 , 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992) ("In our heterogenous society policy as well as constitutional considerations militate against the divisive assumption-as a per se rule-that justice in a court of law may turn upon the pigmentation of skin, the accid

2004Hanna v. State, 714 NE2d 1162, 1166 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied.

2001Hanna v. State, 714 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482-83 , 98 S.Ct. 1173 , 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)).

1999Cf. State v. Bitz , 487 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (“irregular appointment of a grand jury foreperson and clerk does not warrant application of a per se rule of dismissal”). 2.

1999Cf. State v. Bitz, 487 N.W.2d 533, 535 (Minn.Ct.App.1992) (“irregular appointment of a grand jury foreperson and clerk does not warrant application of a per se rule of dismissal”). 2.

2017Stated another way, the defendant must show that, given the circumstances, the trial court erred when it did not raise the issue sua sponte because the alleged error was a blatant violation of due process and presented “an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Id. [13] Our Supreme Court has cautioned against the use of show-up identifications because of their inherent suggestiveness, see Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Ind. 1990), but identification evidence gathered via a show-up procedure is “not subject to a per se rule of exclusion[,]” Gordon, 981 N.E.2d at 1218 .

2013Wethington, 560 N.E.2d at 501 .

2013A per se rule of exclusion of pre-trial identification evidence involving suggestive or unnecessary procedures was rejected in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-14 , 97 S. Ct. 2243 , 53 L.

2013A per se rule of exclusion of pre-trial identification evidence involving suggestive or unnecessary procedures was rejected in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-14 , 97 S. Ct. 2243 , 53 L.

2025Assessor after reviewing several cases from this Court. 125 N.E.3d 7 , 11–12 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019); Grant Cnty.

2025Assessor after reviewing several cases from this Court. 125 N.E.3d 7, 11-12 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2019); Grant Cnty.

2019See, respectively, Cowell v. State, 275 Ind. 252, 254 , 416 12The Court in Strickland referred to the Cuyler standard as a “limited” presumption of prejudice—not quite a per se rule of prejudice but a lesser standard than ordinary IAC claims. 466 U.S. at 692 .

1996The defendant argues the standard of review to be utilized is the per se presumption of ineffective assistance prong discussed in Strickland , applying to instances where there is an "actual conflict of interest.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. at 2067 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 696 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)).

2013In Little v. State, 819 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, this court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the contention “that mere deficiencies in an attorney’s bar membership give rise to a per se violation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 504 (citing U.S. v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 1991)).

2013In Little v. State, 819 N.E.2d 496 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, this court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the contention “that mere deficiencies in an attorney’s bar membership give rise to a per se violation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 504 (citing U.S. v. Williams, 934 F.2d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 1991)).

2012See Moore, 498 N.E.2d at 9 (stating that where an individual has invoked his right to remain silent, it has been held that there is not a per se rule prohibiting the authorities from ever initiating a discussion or further questioning the individual on the subject).

1990Moore v. State (1986), Ind., 498 N.E.2d 1, 9 .

2001We reaffirm that analysis and again conclude that the "defendant's limited interest in putting on unreliable evidence does not outweigh the State's interest in ensuring that [only reliable evidence is introduced at trial]." Id. at 924 ; see *523 also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (holding that a per se rule exeluding all polygraph evidence did not abridge the defendant's right to present a defense under the United States Constitution).

2001We reaffirm that analysis and again conclude that the "defendant's limited interest in putting on unreliable evidence does not outweigh the State's interest in ensuring that [only reliable evidence is introduced at trial]." Id. at 924 ; see *523 also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (holding that a per se rule exeluding all polygraph evidence did not abridge the defendant's right to present a defense under the United States Constitution).

1988In Haeger v. State (1979), 181 Ind.App. 5 , 390 N.E.2d 239, 241 , this Court adopted a standard of review first set out in Springer v. United States (D.C.1978), 388 A.2d 846 , 856: “[w]here the record reflects a curtailment of a requested line of bias cross-examination in limine, so that the jury is unable properly to perform its fact-finding function in inferring bias from the testimony as a whole, we will assess cross-examination errors by a per se error standard.” Haeger at 390 N.E.2d 241 (quoting Springer).

1988In Haeger v. State (1979), 181 Ind.App. 5 , 390 N.E.2d 239, 241 , this Court adopted a standard of review first set out in Springer v. United States (D.C.1978), 388 A.2d 846 , 856: “[w]here the record reflects a curtailment of a requested line of bias cross-examination in limine, so that the jury is unable properly to perform its fact-finding function in inferring bias from the testimony as a whole, we will assess cross-examination errors by a per se error standard.” Haeger at 390 N.E.2d 241 (quoting Springer).