86 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1969–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Beverly A. Waldripgreen2 sentences2010See United States v. Waldrip, 981 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.1993) (clarifying United States v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1978), and holding that whether a failure to instruct on the limited use of prior-conviction evidence was error was to be determined on a case-by-case basis). 2010See United States v. Waldrip, 981 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.1993) (clarifying United States v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1978), and holding that whether a failure to instruct on the limited use of prior-conviction evidence was error was to be determined on a case-by-case basis). | 6 | 6 |
United States v. Demasco Ramon Diaz, A/K/A Pipogreen2 sentences2010See United States v. Waldrip, 981 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.1993) (clarifying United States v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1978), and holding that whether a failure to instruct on the limited use of prior-conviction evidence was error was to be determined on a case-by-case basis). 2010See United States v. Waldrip, 981 F.2d 799 (5th Cir.1993) (clarifying United States v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.1978), and holding that whether a failure to instruct on the limited use of prior-conviction evidence was error was to be determined on a case-by-case basis). | 6 | 6 |
Richards v. Wisconsingreen2 sentences2015Cf. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1997) (rejecting a per se exception to the “knock and announce” rule for narcotics cases partly ■because “the reasons for creating an exception in one category [of Fourth Amendment cases] can, relatively easily, be applied to others,” thus allowing the exception to swallow the rule). “ ‘The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a showing of reliability. 2010Cf. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393-394 (1997) (rejecting a per se exception to the ‘knock and announce’ rule for narcotics cases partly because ‘the reasons for creating an exception in one category [of Fourth Amendment cases] can, relatively easily, be applied to others,’ thus allowing the exception to swallow the rule). | 4 | 7 |
Snyder v. Stategreen2 sentences2010In Snyder v. State, 893 So.2d 482, 485 (Ala.2001), the Alabama Supreme Court explained that its decision in Ex parte Minor did not create a per se rule requiring reversal when a limiting instruction was not given on the use of evidence of prior convictions. 2010Ex parte Martin, 931 So.2d 759, 768 (Ala.2004); Snyder, 893 So.2d at 485 ; see also Johnson v. State , [Ms. 1041313, Oct. 6, 2006] ___ So.3d ___, ___ (Ala.2006) ("This Court in Snyder limited the holding of Ex parte Minor by stating that although the Court in Ex parte Minor found `plain error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the purpose of the evidence of Minor's prior conviction, the Court's holding in that regard did not establish a per se rule' regarding such evidence and that `each inquiry regarding the propriety of an instruction on the use of evidence of prior convict | 2 | 4 |
United States v. Kevin R. Dockter, Also Known as Kevin R. Docktor, United States of America v. Floyd Wesley Shulzegreen2 sentences2026See also United States v. Dockter, supra; Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App. 2003) (court 23 CR-2025-0386 adopted the rationale of the Baldonado court); State v. Dubois, 75 Or. 2008See also United States v. Dockter, supra; Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298 (Tex.App.2003) (court adopted the rationale of the Baldonado court.); State v. Dubois, 75 Or.App. 394 , 706 P.2d 588, 590 (1985) ("[A]n officer's use of overhead lights alone does not necessarily cause an encounter to be a stop."). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Duboisgreen2 sentences2026See also United States v. Dockter, supra; Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App. 2003) (court 23 CR-2025-0386 adopted the rationale of the Baldonado court); State v. Dubois, 75 Or. 2008See also United States v. Dockter, supra; Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298 (Tex.App.2003) (court adopted the rationale of the Baldonado court.); State v. Dubois, 75 Or.App. 394 , 706 P.2d 588, 590 (1985) ("[A]n officer's use of overhead lights alone does not necessarily cause an encounter to be a stop."). | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Smith v. State, 639 So. 2d 543 (Ala. Crim. 2007See Smith v. State, 639 So.2d 543 (Ala. Crim.App.1993); Terry v. State, 424 So.2d 710 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Hannon v. State, 48 Ala.App. 613 , 266 So.2d 825 (Ala. Crim.App.1972). | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Martingreen2 sentences2010Ex parte Martin, 931 So.2d 759, 768 (Ala.2004); Snyder, 893 So.2d at 485 ; see also Johnson v. State , [Ms. 1041313, Oct. 6, 2006] ___ So.3d ___, ___ (Ala.2006) ("This Court in Snyder limited the holding of Ex parte Minor by stating that although the Court in Ex parte Minor found `plain error in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the purpose of the evidence of Minor's prior conviction, the Court's holding in that regard did not establish a per se rule' regarding such evidence and that `each inquiry regarding the propriety of an instruction on the use of evidence of prior convict 2010Ex parte Martin, 931 So.2d 759, 768 (Ala.2004); Snyder, 893 So.2d at 485 ; see also Johnson v. State, [Ms. 1041313, Oct. 6, 2006] — So.3d -, - (Ala.2006) (“This Court in Snyder limited the holding of Ex parte Minor by stating that although the Court in Ex parte Minor found ‘plain error in the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on the purpose of the evidence of Minor’s prior conviction, the Court’s holding in that regard did not establish a per se rule’ regarding such evidence and that ‘each inquiry regarding the propriety of an instruction on the use of evidence of prior convictions pr | 2 | 2 |
Fortner v. Stategreen2 sentences1995We adhere to our decision in Dilbeck , decided August 23, 1991, that, " ' "the Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial." [ Idaho v. Wright , 497] U.S. [805, 823-25,] 110 S.Ct. [3139] at 3151[, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) ]. [Provided that] incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule are not admissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the prosecution 1) produces, or demonstrates the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wis 1991The Court held that incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule are not admissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the prosecution 1) produces, or demonstrates the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use and 2) unless the statement bears an adequate 'indicia of reliability.' " Fortner , 582 So.2d at 584. | 2 | 2 |
Weatherford v. Burseygreen2 sentences1993In Weatherford v. Bursey , [ 429 U.S. 545 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) ], the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that an undercover government agent's attendance at a meeting between the defendant and defense counsel constituted a per se violation of the right to counsel. 1993In Weatherford v. Bursey , [ 429 U.S. 545 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) ], the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that an undercover government agent's attendance at a meeting between the defendant and defense counsel constituted a per se violation of the right to counsel. | 1 | 2 |
Chandler v. Stategreen2 sentences1991See also Ex parte Neelley , 494 So.2d 697 , 699 (Ala. 1986); Chandler v. State , 426 So.2d 477 , 480 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 , 107 S.Ct. 1389 , 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987) ("The fact that a defendant has legal counsel does not, as a per se rule, prohibit law enforcement officials from procuring a statement of any kind from the appellant, without first giving notice to and receiving consent from his counsel"); Eakes v. State , 387 So.2d 855 , 860 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978) (same); Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977), cert. d 1986See also, Chandler v. State , 426 So.2d 477 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Payne v. State , 424 So.2d 722 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977). | 1 | 2 |
Fulton Corp. v. Faulknergreen1 sentence2026Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Adetokunbo Fayemi v. Kess Robersongreen1 sentence2023See also Fayemi v. Ruskin, 966 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2020) ('[T]he Supreme Court has never hinted at a per se rule that defense lawyers must keep all promises made in opening statement, even if a mid-trial change in circumstances alters the defense strategy.')." State v. Lewis, [Ms. CR-20-0372, May 6. 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Alabama Power Company v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| James Willie Cochran v. Tommy Herring, Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, Cross-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| New Regency Productions, Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Jeffery Lee v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| R.C.W. v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holladay v. Haleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wittreingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cook v. County of St. Clairgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Buel Lee Shepherdgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Roadengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holmes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Guzmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanborn v. Kentuckygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lucciola v. Pennsylvaniagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sanborn v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In the Interest of J.P.B.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Robinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Montegutgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Newby v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Allen v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Curry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burnside v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Montegutgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wood v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. State
green
2 sentences1991See also Ex parte Neelley , 494 So.2d 697 , 699 (Ala. 1986); Chandler v. State , 426 So.2d 477 , 480 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 , 107 S.Ct. 1389 , 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987) ("The fact that a defendant has legal counsel does not, as a per se rule, prohibit law enforcement officials from procuring a statement of any kind from the appellant, without first giving notice to and receiving consent from his counsel"); Eakes v. State , 387 So.2d 855 , 860 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978) (same); Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977), cert. d 1988(R. 835) "The fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement of any kind from the defendant without prior notice to, if not the consent of, the attorney." * * * * * * "There being no per se or technical violation by not having the retained or appointed *Page 113 counsel of an accused present during an interrogation prior to indictment, we must resolve the question of the possibility of any constitutional violation by looking to the facts of each particular case." Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr. | 9 | 1978–1991 |
Tyus v. State
green
2 sentences1991See also Ex parte Neelley , 494 So.2d 697 , 699 (Ala. 1986); Chandler v. State , 426 So.2d 477 , 480 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 , 107 S.Ct. 1389 , 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987) ("The fact that a defendant has legal counsel does not, as a per se rule, prohibit law enforcement officials from procuring a statement of any kind from the appellant, without first giving notice to and receiving consent from his counsel"); Eakes v. State , 387 So.2d 855 , 860 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978) (same); Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977), cert. d 1979I "The fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement of any kind from the defendant without prior notice to, if not the consent of, the attorney." This rule was *Page 331 fully discussed and applied in Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977). | 6 | 1979–1991 |
Southern United Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight
green
2 sentences2002However, in Southern United Fire Insurance Co. v. Knight, 736 So.2d 582 (Ala.1999), this Court declined to adopt that proposition as a per se rule *164 for determining whether the purchase of a used motor vehicle is a transaction involving interstate commerce. 2002However, in Southern United Fire Insurance Co. v. Knight, 736 So.2d 582 (Ala.1999), this Court declined to adopt that proposition as a per se rule for determining whether the purchase of a used motor vehicle is a transaction involving interstate commerce. | 4 | 2001–2002 |
Idaho v. Wright
green
2 sentences1995We adhere to our decision in Dilbeck , decided August 23, 1991, that, " ' "the Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial." [ Idaho v. Wright , 497] U.S. [805, 823-25,] 110 S.Ct. [3139] at 3151[, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990) ]. [Provided that] incriminating statements admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule are not admissible under the Confrontation Clause unless the prosecution 1) produces, or demonstrates the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wis 1991However, the Court noted that 'we have in any event held that the Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule barring the admission *Page 174 of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial.' ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. at 3151 . | 3 | 1990–1995 |
Eakes v. State
green
2 sentences1991See also Ex parte Neelley , 494 So.2d 697 , 699 (Ala. 1986); Chandler v. State , 426 So.2d 477 , 480 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 , 107 S.Ct. 1389 , 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987) ("The fact that a defendant has legal counsel does not, as a per se rule, prohibit law enforcement officials from procuring a statement of any kind from the appellant, without first giving notice to and receiving consent from his counsel"); Eakes v. State , 387 So.2d 855 , 860 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978) (same); Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977), cert. d 1986"The fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials may not question the defendant without prior notice to or consent from the attorney." Eakes v. State , 387 So.2d 855 , 860 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978). | 3 | 1986–1991 |
Massiah v. United States
green
2 sentences1985In addition to arguing that the statement taken from the appellant without the presence of his counsel was a per se violation of his constitutional rights, appellant also argues that the State's failure to notify his counsel prior to taking his statement, while knowing that he had counsel and having been previously in contact with his counsel, constituted "indirect and surreptitious interrogation," bringing the case within the holdings of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams . 1985In addition to arguing that the statement taken from the appellant without the presence of his counsel was a per se violation of his constitutional rights, appellant also argues that the State's failure to notify his counsel prior to taking his statement, while knowing that he had counsel and having been previously in contact with his counsel, constituted "indirect and surreptitious interrogation," bringing the case within the holdings of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), and Brewer v. Williams . | 3 | 1977–1985 |
Martin v. State
green
2 sentences2026See also United States v. Dockter, supra; Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App. 2003) (court 23 CR-2025-0386 adopted the rationale of the Baldonado court); State v. Dubois, 75 Or. 2008See also United States v. Dockter, supra; Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298 (Tex.App.2003) (court adopted the rationale of the Baldonado court.); State v. Dubois, 75 Or.App. 394 , 706 P.2d 588, 590 (1985) ("[A]n officer's use of overhead lights alone does not necessarily cause an encounter to be a stop."). | 2 | 2008–2026 |
Williams v. Turpin
green
2 sentences2012Rejecting a per se rule of ineffective assistance where counsel does not consult family members, we held in Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223 , 1237 (11th Cir.1999), that counsel’s investigation was reasonable when he did not interview the defendant’s sister or father, the latter because the defendant had not lived with him for very long. ‘[Strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. 2008Rejecting a per se rule of ineffective assistance where counsel does not consult family members, we held in Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223 , 1237 (11th Cir.1999), that counsel’s investigation was reasonable when he did not interview the defendant’s sister or father, the latter because the defendant had not lived with him for very long. ‘[Strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. | 2 | 2008–2012 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2012In other words, counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 .” Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1251-52 (11th Cir.2000). 2012In other words, counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 .” Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1251-52 (11th Cir.2000). | 2 | 1990–2012 |
Sisters of Visitation v. COCHRAN PLASTERING CO. INC.
green
2 sentences2002Instead, in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So.2d 759 (Ala.2000), this Court listed factors a court should consider when determining if a transaction has had a `substantial effect' on interstate commerce. 2002Instead, in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So.2d 759 (Ala.2000), this Court listed factors a court should consider when determining if a transaction has had a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Burrell v. Aaron
green
2 sentences1991See also Ex parte Neelley , 494 So.2d 697 , 699 (Ala. 1986); Chandler v. State , 426 So.2d 477 , 480 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 , 107 S.Ct. 1389 , 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987) ("The fact that a defendant has legal counsel does not, as a per se rule, prohibit law enforcement officials from procuring a statement of any kind from the appellant, without first giving notice to and receiving consent from his counsel"); Eakes v. State , 387 So.2d 855 , 860 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978) (same); Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977), cert. d 1988(R. 835) "The fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement of any kind from the defendant without prior notice to, if not the consent of, the attorney." * * * * * * "There being no per se or technical violation by not having the retained or appointed *Page 113 counsel of an accused present during an interrogation prior to indictment, we must resolve the question of the possibility of any constitutional violation by looking to the facts of each particular case." Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr. | 2 | 1988–1991 |
Dillingham v. United States
green
2 sentences1991See also Ex parte Neelley , 494 So.2d 697 , 699 (Ala. 1986); Chandler v. State , 426 So.2d 477 , 480 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 926 , 107 S.Ct. 1389 , 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987) ("The fact that a defendant has legal counsel does not, as a per se rule, prohibit law enforcement officials from procuring a statement of any kind from the appellant, without first giving notice to and receiving consent from his counsel"); Eakes v. State , 387 So.2d 855 , 860 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978) (same); Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977), cert. d 1988(R. 835) "The fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement of any kind from the defendant without prior notice to, if not the consent of, the attorney." * * * * * * "There being no per se or technical violation by not having the retained or appointed *Page 113 counsel of an accused present during an interrogation prior to indictment, we must resolve the question of the possibility of any constitutional violation by looking to the facts of each particular case." Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 (Ala.Cr. | 2 | 1988–1991 |
Nelson v. State
green
2 sentences1986"The fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement of any kind from the defendant without prior notice to, and the consent of, his attorneys." Nelson v. State , 398 So.2d 421 , 425 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). 1982Nelson v. State , 398 So.2d 421 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981). | 2 | 1982–1986 |
Thomas v. State
green
2 sentences1980Among them are Thomas v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 373 So.2d 1149 , aff'd 373 So.2d 1167 and Thompson v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 347 So.2d 1371 , 1376 , in which it is stated: "Contrary to the argument presented by the appellant, the fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement of any kind from the defendant without prior notice to, if not the consent of, the attorney. 1979In Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1243 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the United States Supreme Court implicitly rejected any such `per se' rule." We have reached the same conclusion in another similar circumstance in Thomas v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 373 So.2d 1149 (1979). | 2 | 1979–1980 |
Alexander v. State
green
2 sentences1979Codes of professional conduct play no part in such decisions." (Bracketed material added.) On a similar question, this court in Alexander v. State , Ala.Cr.App., 370 So.2d 330 [Ms. March 6, 1979], stated: "`The fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement of any kind from the defendant without prior notice to, if not the consent of, the attorney.' This rule was fully discussed and applied in Thompson v. State , 347 So.2d 1371 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 347 So.2d 1377 (Ala. 1977). 1979Judge Bowen, speaking for this Court in Alexander v. State, 370 So.2d 330, 1979 , stated: "`The fact that a defendant has an attorney does not mean, as a per se rule, that law enforcement officials cannot procure a statement of any kind from the defendant without prior notice to, if not the consent of, the attorney'. | 2 | 1979–1979 |
Brewer v. Williams
green
2 sentences1979In Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1243 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the United States Supreme Court implicitly rejected any such "per se" rule. 1 Here there is no evidence that the law enforcement officer who questioned the appellant had any knowledge that the appellant was represented by appointed counsel. 1979In Brewer v. Williams , 430 U.S. 387 , 97 S.Ct. 1232 , 1243 , 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the United States Supreme Court implicitly rejected any such "per se" rule. 1 Here there is no evidence that the law enforcement officer who questioned the appellant had any knowledge that the appellant was represented by appointed counsel. | 2 | 1979–1979 |
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota v. Lee
green
2 sentences2025In support of his argument that merely charging a fee that is more than what was agreed upon is not a per se violation of Rule 1.5(a), Blevins relies heavily on In re Disciplinary Action Against Lee, 835 N.W.2d 836 (N.D. 2013). 2025In support of his argument that merely charging a fee that is more than what was agreed upon is not a per se violation of Rule 1.5(a), Blevins relies heavily on In re Disciplinary Action Against Lee, 835 N.W.2d 836 (N.D. 2013). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Eddings v. Oklahoma green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Ex Parte Cranman green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| SER Ford Motor Co. v. Hon. Warren R. McGraw, Judge green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Jean Schmitz Leonard Schmitz v. Carlos J. Zilveti, III Nicholas S. Meris Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., AKA Prudential Securities, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Services, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Ex Parte Southern Energy Homes, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| cluster 792413 green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Edwards v. Arizona green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Miller-El v. Dretke green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Wyrick v. Fields green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Ex Parte Minor green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Rompilla v. Beard red | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Terry v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Hannon v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Russo v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Lejeune green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| United States v. Randy L. Reis green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| California v. Carney green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| United States v. Barbara Mouzin, United States of America v. Alfonso Carvajal green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Leonard v. Terminix Intern. Co., LP green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| American General Finance, Inc. v. Branch green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Blevins v. United States green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| McKaskle v. Wiggins green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.